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attention from scholars and laypeople alike, especially in recent times. It has been explored 
from a wide range of angles and perspectives, all of which offer unique insights into what 
has often been characterised as an awkward or reluctant relĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?dŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?
contribution employs a specific focus on the attitudes of Foreign Office officials towards 
European integration in the years 1957-73, and the ways in which these attitudes shaped 
the foreign policymaking process. The role which ForeŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐƉůĂǇĞĚŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
approach to membership of the EEC was extremely significant, and their attitudes had a 
profound impact on the policymaking process. In certain cases, these attitudes conflicted 
with those of their political masters and resulted in serious struggles and confrontations in 
the corridors of power. 
dŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇǁŝůůĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĨŽƵƌĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
the years 1957- ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůũƵŶĐƚƵƌĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂƉproach 
to European integration across this period. In each case study, the attitudes and actions of 
the officials most intimately involved in European policy will form the main focus, including 
an in-depth analysis of how their attitudes had been shaped through their own formative 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?/ƚǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ
were exceptionally diverse and were not reflective of a rigid departmental orthodoxy. 
Foreign Office personnel were increasingly recruited from a wider base of social and 
educational backgrounds and this in turn created a diplomatic service containing a broad 
range of views. However, a gulf in attitudes between the elder and younger generations of 
officials became increasingly evident, with the latter being much more receptive to the 
principles of European unity after their experiences of the Second World War. The result 
was a department which increasingly viewed membership of the EEC as the future of 
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In many respects, undertaking a PhD is a solitary and isolating affair. One is largely 
ůĞĨƚƚŽŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĚĞǀŝĐĞƐƚŽƐƉĞŶĚĞŶĚůĞƐƐŚŽƵƌƐƐŝĨƚŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĂƌĐŚŝǀĞƐ
or slumped in front of a computer, typing away incessantly. However, it would be 
disingenuous and categorically untrue to say that we PhD students make it to the end 
without huge amounts of support, both personal and professional, from a wide range of 
colleagues and friends. A few lines of text in a document which very few people will ever 
read certainly does not amount to the praise and gratitude which each of these people 
deserve, but the lowly academic only has so many tools at their disposal. / ?ŵĂĨƌĂŝĚƚŚŝƐǁŝůů
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ĂŶĚƐŬĞĂƌĞĂůůŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůŐŝĂŶƚƐĂŶĚŐŽŽĚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?/ǁŽŶ ?ƚĨŽƌŐĞƚƚŚĞŐĂŵĞƐŽĨ&ƌŝĚĂǇ
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most important dynamics in post-World War II Europe and international relations: 
the transformation of the welfare state, the Cold War, and the North-South conflict 
and globalisation.1 
 
Shifts in Foreign Office attitudes take place but they do so slowly. They may result 
from changes in political leadership, from generational differences, and from 
practical experience. A study of attitudes towards the European Union would be 
highly welcome.2 
 
On 1 January 1973, the United Kingdom formally became a member of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). This event signalled a watershed moment in the history of 
both British foreign policy and domestic politics. The island nation which had built an 
empire upon which the sun never set and had emerged victorious from the two most 
destructive conflicts of the twentieth century was now an equal partner with its old 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůƌŝǀĂůƐŝŶĂƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŚĂĚ
been fraught with difficulty, doubt, and disappointment. Unlike the six founding members 
of the EEC, Britain had initially elected not to participate in the creation of a European 
common market, withdrawing from the Messina negotiations which resulted in the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957. This monumental reversal in foreign policy represented one of the most 
significant changeƐŝŶƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
The primary focus of this research is the evaluation of senior and middle-ranking Foreign 
KĨĨŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚŽǁƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƐŚĂƉĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝƌ
formative experiences, including their social background, their education, and their early 
careers, and how this affected British foreign policy towards the EEC in the years 1957-73. 
Specifically, this study aims to provide a prosopographical study of the key officials most 
intimately involved with European integration affairs in a bid to account for the 
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŽĨĐĂƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶƚŽ
                                                          
1 tŽůĨƌĂŵ<ĂŝƐĞƌĂŶĚŶƚŽŶŝŽsĂƌƐŽƌŝ ? “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶEuropean Union History: Themes and 
Debates, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2. 
2 ĂƌĂ^ƚĞŝŶĞƌ ? “dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ PZĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ
dŝŵĞƐ ?ŝŶThe Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, ed. Gaynor Johnson 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 24. 
2 
 
broad enthusiasm and support. The internal politics and divisions within the Foreign Office 
on the issue of European integration will also be explored, including how and why such 
differing attitudes were held and the effects on the policymaking process. An additional 
focus is how the Foreign Office adapted and changed its internal structure in response to 
the challenges of European integration. The thesis will explore how the leading sub-
departments on European affairs changed names, functions, and size across this period, as 
well as the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its implications for 
European integration policy. Despite the vast output of written material on the history of 
European integration, very little research has been conducted on how Foreign Office 
officials approached and considered the question of European unity. This is an absolutely 
critical omission from the scholarship. Further investigation in this area has the potential to 
revolutionise perspectives on the history of foreign policymaking and will benefit 
international historians and political scientists immensely with its examination of the actors 
ĂŶĚŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐǁŚŝĐŚƐŚĂƉĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ǉ
extension, this research may potentially pave the way for similar projects on other 
Whitehall departments and the influence key groups of officials had on policy and strategy.  
The history of Britain and its approach to European integration is consistently one of the 
most extensively covered topics in academic literature and has been labelled  ‘ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
consistent theme in British foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. ?3 Largely 
considered one of the most significant political narratives of the twentieth century, it has 
garnered the attention of politicians, journalists and laymen alike. The scholarship can be 
broadly divided into two disciplinary categories; history and political science. The literature 
from these two disciplines varies widely in both methodology and style. The historical 
ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƚĞŶĚƚŽŽĨĨĞƌĂŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
foreign policy towards Europe, whereas political scientists are chiefly concerned with 
ƚĞƐƚŝŶŐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
integration.4 The historical interpretations are characterised by certain divisions: the oldest 
literature from the 1960s and 1970s tends to frame the issue of European integration 
                                                          
3 EŝĐŚŽůĂƐƌŽǁƐŽŶĂŶĚ:ĂŵĞƐDĐ<ĂǇ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ>ĂďŽƵƌƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ ?ŝŶThe Primacy of Foreign Policy in British 
History, 1660-2000: How Strategic Concerns Shaped Modern Britain, ed. William Mulligan and 
Brendan Simms (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 305. 
4 ŽůŝŶůŵĂŶĂŶĚDŝƌŝĂŵ&ĞŶĚŝƵƐůŵĂŶ ? “ŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐdŚĞŽƌǇ P
Respecting Differences and Crossing ŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ ? ?International Security 22, no. 1 (1996), 7; Michael 
'ĞŚůĞƌ ? “ƚƚŚĞ,ĞĂƌƚŽĨ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ PhŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƵƌŽƉĞĂŶWŽůŝĐǇ ?ŝŶEuropean Union 




ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŐůŽďĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ƵƌŽƉĞŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƌĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚƚŽĂŵĞƌĞ
 ‘ƐŝĚĞƐŚŽǁ ?ŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŽƌƐŝŵƉůǇĂƐŝŶŐůĞĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ďŝŐŐĞƌƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?ŽĨ
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůů strategy. This is the argument presented by Northedge, one of the leading 
authorities on post-war British foreign policy history.5 British policymakers viewed the 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŚƵƌĐŚŝůůŝĂŶůĞŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞĐŝƌĐůĞƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĨƌĂŵĞĚ
BƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚƌĞĞŝŶƚĞƌůŽĐŬŝŶŐĂƌĞĂƐ PƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ
Empire and Commonwealth, and Europe.6 It has been argued that Europe was seen by 
successive British governments as the least important circle of interest.7 Senior politicians 
ǁĞƌĞĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƌĞĂƐƐĞƌƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂǁŽƌůĚƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝƐĞŝƚƐ
economy it needed to maintain a close relationship with the United States and bolster 
trade with the Commonwealth.8 As such, scholars of the history of post-war British foreign 
policy largely overlooked European integration in favour of Anglo-American relations, 
Commonwealth relations and the decolonisation movement.9 This orthodox school has 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŽŶůǇŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĂƉĂƌƚŝĂůǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨoreign policy strategy 
towards European integration prior to her accession to the EEC in 1973. European 
integration tended to be discussed in relation to other major challenges in post-war 
international history, particularly the Cold War and Transatlantic ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ P ‘
divided Europe became simply part of the global balance between Washington and 
DŽƐĐŽǁ ? ?10 This produces an incomplete picture which demotes European integration to a 
secondary feature of the Cold War and does not allow it to be evaluated on its own terms. 
&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?EŽƌƚŚĞĚŐĞĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƚŚĞDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƵĚĚĞŶĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞĂƐĂ ‘ŬŶĞĞ-ũĞƌŬ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁŚŽůůǇŝŶƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ
from the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, who considered European integration a 
                                                          
5 Frederick S. Northedge, British Foreign Policy: The Process of Readjustment 1945-1961 (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1962); Frederick S. Northedge, Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy 1945-
1973 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974). 
6 Ibid; Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Graeme P. Auton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, 
and Britain (New Jersey: Prentice-,Ăůů ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?^ƚĞǀĞ^ŵŝƚŚĂŶĚDŝĐŚĂĞů^ŵŝƚŚ ? “dŚĞŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů
ĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ PƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ?ŝŶBritish Foreign Policy: Tradition, 
Change and Transformation, ed. Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988), 16. 
7 Laurence Martin and John Garnett, British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the Twenty-
first Century (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 11. 
8 Ibid; Sean Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation Since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 88. 
9 William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, ed., dŚĞ ‘^ƉĞĐŝĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? PŶŐůŽ-American Relations Since 
1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from 
Empire in the Post-War World (London: Macmillan, 1988); William Roger Louis, ed., Ends of British 
Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonisation (London: IB Tauris, 2006). 
10 Hanrieder and Auton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Britain (1980), 178. 
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top priority as a counterweight to the Eastern bloc.11 ^ŵŝƚŚĂŶĚ^ŵŝƚŚĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
reluctant and begrudging move towards accession to the EEC was undertaken purely 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐůŝƚƚůĞůĞĨƚĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶďƵƚƚŽƚŚƌŽǁŝŶŝƚƐůŽƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐ ? ?12 The 
orthodox school operates on the assumption that Britain placed all of its post-war foreign 
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ‘ĞŐŐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ďĂƐŬĞƚƐ ?ŽĨŶŐůŽ-American relations and Commonwealth ties, and was 
 ‘ĨŽƌĐĞĚĚŽǁŶƚŚĞƚŽƌƚƵŽƵƐƉĂƚŚƚŽĂŶĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂŶǇƉƌŝŽƌ
serious European strategy.13 These arguments present an oversimplified narrative of post-
ǁĂƌƌŝƚŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĂŶĚĚŽǁŶƉůĂǇƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƵƌŽƉĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
endeavours. 
These earlier accounts of post-war British foreign policy have since been revised after a 
wave of scholarship from the 1990s onwards sought to redress the academic balance of 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇďǇĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇ
towards Europe, as opposed to its overarching world strategy. The revisionist literature 
ĐŽǀĞƌƐƚŚƌĞĞŵĂŝŶũƵŶĐƚƵƌĞƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐƵƉƚŽ
 ? ? ? ? PƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐĞůĨ-exclusion from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the 
 ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨĂŝůĞĚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶĂŶĚtŝůƐŽŶ ?
ĂŶĚƚŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶ
Market.14 dŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐEurope was 
in fact far more proactive than had been previously assumed, and successive British 
governments had approached the issue of European integration with careful 
consideration.15 /ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞwere 
far more complex than had been argued by the earlier scholarship. The conclusions 
reached by authors such as John W. Young, James Ellison and Wolfram Kaiser include a firm 
ƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŝnevitable, and 
ƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚůĂƌŐĞůǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ
ƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝƐŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌŽůĞĂƐĂǁŽƌůĚƉŽǁĞƌ ?16 There is little debate over the fact that in the 
                                                          
11 Northedge, Descent from Power  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?&ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬ^ ?EŽƌƚŚĞĚŐĞ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ PWĂƐƚ
ĂŶĚWƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ŝŶBritain and the EEC, ed. Roy Jenkins (London: Macmillan, 1983), 29. 
12 ^ŵŝƚŚĂŶĚ^ŵŝƚŚ ? “dŚĞŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂůĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ PƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ?
(1988), 16. 
13 Hanrieder and Auton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Britain (1980), 181. 
14 GehůĞƌ ? “ƚƚŚĞ,ĞĂƌƚŽĨ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ PhŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƵƌŽƉĞĂŶWŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? 
15 Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation Since 1945 (1992), 79; Sean Greenwood, Britain 
and European Integration Since the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1996), 4. 
16 Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-
1963 (London: Macmillan, 1996); James Ellison, Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the 
European Community, 1955-1958 (London: Macmillan, 2000); Alan S. Milward, The United Kingdom 
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period in which the British government did not actively pursue membership of the EEC, 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚ ‘ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?17 
The Attlee government pursued its security and defence objectives by strongly encouraging 
cooperation in Europe and observed the developments across the English Channel with 
great interest  W Britain lead the way with France in the creation of the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1947 and signed the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, 
a defence pact which bound together much of Western Europe.18 Beyond these gestures of 
cooperation, however, the British government did not approach the idea of closer union 
with enthusiasm. The British flatly refused to fully engage with the European economic 
integration project, observed the proceedings at Messina in 1955 with extreme scepticism, 
and thereafter approached the issue of EEC membership with caution and hesitation.19  
The issue which most scholars seem to contest is the motivation behind this stance. 
Shearman, Aspinwall and Gowland and TurŶĞƌĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĞŶƚĞƌŝŶƚŽ
a European union was largely due to historical-cultural explanations.20 Britain had a long 
and successful history as a world power, it was the only major country in Western Europe 
to have not been occupied during the Second World War, and the historical longevity of its 
political institutions entrenched a sense of superiority in her political elites.21 More 
specifically, Bulmer contests that the long-cherished principle of Parliamentary sovereignty 
was the sinŐůĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞĨƵƐĂůĂŶĚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽ
join.22 Denman, Gowland and Turner also argue that combined with these conservative, 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐǁĂƐĂƉĂƚƌŽŶŝƐŝŶŐ ‘ĂůŽŽĨŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƌŝƚŝƐŚĞůŝƚĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚ
them that any attempts made by the Western European states to forge a political or 
                                                          
and the European Community Volume I: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945-1963 (London: 
Frank Cass, 2002). 
17 Roy Denman, Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Indigo, 1996), 
185; May (1999), 25. 
18 Max Beloff, Britain and Europe: Dialogue of the Deaf (London: Macmillan, 1996), 53; Stephen 
George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 17; Alex May, Britain and Europe Since 1945 (London: Longman, 1999), 14. 
19 David Gowland and Arthur Turner, Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-
1998 (London: Pearson, 2000), 97. 
20 WĞƚĞƌ^ŚĞĂƌŵĂŶ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶĂŶĚEĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ŝŶBritain in Europe: 
Prospects for Change, ed. John Milfull (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 91; Gowland and Turner, 
Reluctant Europeans (2000), 4; Mark Aspinwall, Rethinking Britain and Europe: Plurality Elections, 
Party Management and British Policy on European Integration (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2004), 6. 
21 Ibid. 
22 ^ŝŵŽŶƵůŵĞƌ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ PKĨ^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?^ůŽǁĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ^Ğŵŝ-
ĞƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶBritain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment, ed. Stephen 
George (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 8. 
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economic union would be abject failures and a waste of British time.23 This can be seen in 
ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŶƚŚŽŶǇĚĞŶ ?ƐƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽĂƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůĨŽƌĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĞĨĞŶĐĞ
Community (EDC) by the French Prime Minister, René Pleven  W George argues that Eden 
 ‘ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŚĂǀĞĂƐƐƵŵĞĚĨƌŽŵĂŶĞĂƌůǇƐƚĂŐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĐŚĞŵĞǁŽƵůĚĨĂŝů ? ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞŶŝƚ
ĚŝĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚŝƐŽŶůǇƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŽƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƵƌŽƉĞǁĂs 
incapable of creating a meaningful power base.24 Conversely, other academics emphasise 
ŵŽƌĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƚŽƉƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-
ǁĂƌƉĞƌŝŽĚǁĂƐƚŽƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝƐĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞĂŶĚƌĞĂƐĞƌƚŚĞƌƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂ  ‘ŐƌĞĂƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ŝŶ
order to maintain national prestige and influence in international diplomacy.25 Wilkes and 
Young argue that British policymakers widely believed that this could only be achieved by 
employing a broader outlook which extended beyond Europe tŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐ
possessions and commitments, and that by restricting Britain to a narrow, Eurocentric 
project, her relations with the United States and the Commonwealth would suffer.26 
'ŽǁůĂŶĚĂŶĚdƵƌŶĞƌŚĂǀĞĂůƐŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŚŽǁƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽlicy and trade were 
ĂůƐŽŵĂũŽƌƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĨƵůůǇĞŶŐĂŐĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐ ? ? ? ?-4, 
 ? ?A?ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚƐĂŶĚ ? ?A?ŽĨŚĞƌĞǆƉŽƌƚƐǁĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐƚŚĞ
founding members of the EEC (France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries) 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĨŽƌŽŶůǇ ? ? ? ?A?ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚƐĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?A?ŽĨŚĞƌĞǆƉŽƌƚƐ ?27 Indeed, Hanrieder 
ĂŶĚƵƚŽŶŚĂǀĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƵŶƚŝů ? ? ? ? ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ‘ƐƚŝůůŚĂĚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŝŶ
Western Europe, with impressive technological capabiliƚŝĞƐ ? ?28 Therefore, there was no 
ƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝǀĞůŽŐŝĐĚŝĐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚǁŽƵůĚǇŝĞůĚ
economic success.29  
KǀĞƌĂůů ?ƚŚĞƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶ
Market presents a complex picture with a range of factors and motivations in the 
construction of British foreign policy towards Europe. Indeed, Bulmer argues that Britain ?Ɛ
 ‘ƚƵƌŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ?ŝƐ ‘ŶŽƚĞĂƐŝůǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĚŝĨĨ ƌĞŶƚƚŚĞŵĞƐĂŶĚĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ
                                                          
23 Denman, Missed Chances (1996), 182; Gowland and Turner, Reluctant Europeans (2000), 97. 
24 George, An Awkward Partner (1998), 25. 
25 Ibid; ƵůŵĞƌ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? 
26 'ĞŽƌŐĞtŝůŬĞƐ ? “dŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶWŽůŝĐǇ PWŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂŶĚ^ĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ?-  ?
in ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ PdŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ:ŽŝŶƚŚĞ
European Communities, ed. Alex May (London: Palgrave, 2001), 55; John t ?zŽƵŶŐ ? “ ?dŚĞWĂƌƚŝŶŐŽĨ
ƚŚĞtĂǇƐ ? ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĞDĞƐƐŝŶĂŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ƉĂĂŬŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?:ƵŶĞ-ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶ
British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, ed. Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (London: Macmillan, 1989), 
211. 
27 Gowland and Turner, Reluctant Europeans (2000), 94. 




involved.30 The contributions made in this area of the scholarship are fundamental to the 
analysis of the history of Britain and European integration, but there are criticisms which 
ĐĂŶďĞĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ?dŚĞƐĞ ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐƚĞŶĚƚŽĨŽĐƵƐƚŽŽŚĞĂǀŝůǇŽŶƉĂƌƚǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
agency of elected government ministers which has the potential to distort and refract the 
evaluation of British foreign policy.31 Governments and politicians are temporary and prone 
to constant shifts and changes, which strongly suggests that foreign policy was influenced 
ďǇŽƚŚĞƌŐƌŽƵƉƐĂŶĚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ
objectives in this period.32 In response ƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇŽĨ
government was forced to undergo significant changes and adaptations in order to 
facilitate the negotiations with the EEC, and yet this is rarely mentioned in this area of the 
scholarship.33 Although the Heath ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ‘ĚŽŽŵĞĚ
ƚŽƐƵĐĐĞĞĚ ? ?ƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞŵĂĚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĞĂƐŝĞƌďǇƚŚĞĨĂŝůĞĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
previous governments.34 Over the course of the decade, British officials and policymakers 
had managed to acquire ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ?ƐŝŶŶĞƌǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
overarching attitudes of its six member states.35 In doing so, the British government had far 
more manoeuvrability in terms of being aware of where compromises and deals could be 
reached with the member states, in particular the French.36 The institutional apparatus of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇŝŶtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞĂƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůǇƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƚŽŽůŝŶƚŚĞƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨ
ĞŶƚƌǇƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?ĂŶĚǇĞƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶůĂƌŐĞůǇŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ
of European integration.37 The permanence of the civil service meant that senior officials 
and diplomats maintained both a high level of input and a strong line of consistency in 
overall British foreign policy.38 Therefore, it is crucial to gain an insight into WŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?ƐƌŽůĞ
                                                          
30 ƵůŵĞƌ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? 
31 'ĂǇŶŽƌ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ? “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PdŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇŝŶƚŚĞdǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚ
ĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ŝŶThe Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, ed. Gaynor Johnson 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 5. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Simon Bulmer and Martin Burch, The Europeanisation of Whitehall: UK Central Government and 
the European Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 18. 
34 :ŽŚŶt ?zŽƵŶŐ ? “dŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ŝŶThe 
Heath Government 1970-1974: A Reappraisal, ed. Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (London: 
Longman, 1996), 267. 
35 'ĞŽƌŐĞtŝůŬĞƐ ? “dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚ&ĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽ^ƚĞĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ PŶ
/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ&ĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽŶƚĞƌƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ?-63: The Enlargement 
Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations, ed. George Wilkes 
 ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P&ƌĂŶŬĂƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?^ŝŵŽŶƵůŵĞƌĂŶĚDĂƌƚŝŶƵƌĐŚ ? “KƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞ PtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?
ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ^ƚĂƚĞĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ? ?Public Administration 76, no. 4 (1998), 609. 
36 Ibid. 






approach and negotiating stance. 
It is in the most recent developments in the scholarship on Britain and European 
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?ƐƌŽůĞŚĂƐreceived more attention. There has been an increasing 
amount of research conducted on the civil service, the diplomatic service and permanent 
officials as scholars attempt to delve deeper into the construction and implementation of 
British foreign policy.39 This has also led to a surge in the number of interdisciplinary studies 
on the subject, drawing from history, political science, economics, and other social 
sciences.40 As a result, there has been a radical change in how British foreign policy is 
evaluated and discussed. It is becoming increasingly clear how much control senior civil 
servants had over policy, and how this power was sometimes used to directly contradict, 
challenge or indeed completely bypass government ministers when disagreements arose.41 
It is often argued that the British civil service adapted remarkably well to European 
integration, and it is here that the most significant effects of the quest for membership of 
the EEC on British central government can be seen.42 One of the most significant sections of 
the literature to have emerged hails from the realm of political science and draws on 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇŝŶŝƚƐŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?43 
Kassim has offered a detailed analysis of the theoretical implicĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
for national administrative systems and how they adapt to membership of regional political 
unions.44 In doing so, two broad responses to European integration can be identified: 
 ‘ĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ǁŚĞŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůbureaucracies adapt and change in similar ways to the 
challenges posed by EEC ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŝǀĞƌŐĞŶƚ ? ?ǁŚĞŶĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝons respond by 
interpreting membership of the EEC through pre-existing structural arrangements and 
values, thereby creating a unique response through their own adaptations and 
adjustments.45 /ŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?<ĂƐƐŝŵĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĞh< ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁĂƐ
largely divergent  W the administrative machinery of government responded to the EEC on 
                                                          
39 <ĂƚũĂ^ĞŝĚĞů ? “&ƌŽŵWŝŽŶĞĞƌtŽƌŬƚŽZĞĨŝŶĞŵĞŶƚ PWƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶdƌĞŶĚƐ ?ŝŶEuropean Union History: 
Themes and Debates, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
34. 
40 >ĂƵƌĞŶƚtĂƌůŽƵǌĞƚ ? “dŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?Journal of 
Contemporary History 49, no. 4 (2014), 837. 
41 ^ƚĞŝŶĞƌ ? “dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?   ? 
42 ƵůŵĞƌĂŶĚƵƌĐŚ ? “KƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
43 Ibid. 
44 ,ƵƐƐĞŝŶ<ĂƐƐŝŵ ? “DĞĞƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŵĂŶĚƐŽĨhDĞŵbership: The Europeanisation of National 
ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ŝŶThe Politics of Europeanisation, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio 




its terms and with its own ad hoc arrangements.46 Prior to membership of the EEC, the 
British civil service implemented its own internal measures through the establishment of 
the Common Market Negotiations Committee in 1961 and a European Unit in the Cabinet 
Office under Harold Wilson, both of which involved complex and extensive cross-
departmental co-ordination in response to the challenges of European integration.47 The 
 ‘ĐŽƌĞ ?ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉďǇƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶŝŶ
1973 included the Department for Trade and Industry, the Ministry for Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, the Department of Customs and Excise, the Foreign Office, and the 
Treasury.48 Therefore, the scholarship shows that Whitehall was exceptionally effective in 
organising a broad range of government departments and collecting information from each 
administrative enclave in order to launch the most cohesive possible bid for membership of 
the EEC. This strongly suggests that the civil service had a significant amount of influence in 
British policymakinŐĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?
accounts do not investigate fully. 
The Foreign Office, more specifically, was given an increasing amount of power and 
influence as the European question became more central to the domestic political agenda. 
^ĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚĂǀĞŐŽŶĞƚŽŐƌĞĂƚůĞŶŐƚŚƐƚŽŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚ
influence over European affairs and vice versa, labelling the UK Permanent Representation 
ƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ?h<ZW )ŝƚƐ ‘ŚŝĚĚĞŶĂƌŵ ?ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞŚĂŶŶĞů ?49 
ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĞŶƚƌǇĂŶĚĂĨƚĞƌĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞďĞĐĂŵĞ ‘Ă
ƐƉĞĐƚĂĐƵůĂƌŶĞǁƉŽǁĞƌĐĞŶƚƌĞŽŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐŝƚďĞŐĂŶƚŽĐůĂŝŵũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŽǀĞƌ
a whole host of national issues which had strong implications for European issues such as 
economics, energy and agriculture.50 According to Wallace and Wallace, the Treasury had 
long been the most prestigious and powerful government department in Whitehall, but by 
 ? ? ? ?ŚĂĚůŽƐƚŝƚƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŚƵď ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
Office and the Cabinet Office.51 KŶĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝƐ'ůŝĚĚŽŶ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƌŽůĞ
                                                          
46 Ibid. 
47 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Fontana Press, 19 ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?ƵůŵĞƌĂŶĚƵƌĐŚ ? “KƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐĨŽƌ
ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?^ŝŵŽŶƵůŵĞƌĂŶĚDĂƌƚŝŶƵƌĐŚ ? “dŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨh<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ P
From Quiet Revolution to Explicit Step-ŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?Public Administration 83, no. 4 (2005), 862; Bulmer 
and Burch, The Europeanisation of Whitehall (2009), 70.  
48 ^ŝŵŽŶƵůŵĞƌĂŶĚDĂƌƚŝŶƵƌĐŚ ? “ĞŶƚƌĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶThe Europeanisation of British Politics, 
ed. Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 39. 
49 Hugo Young and Anne Sloman, No, Minister: An Inquiry into the Civil Service (London: British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 1982), 73; Hennessy, Whitehall (1990), 253. 
50 Young and Sloman, No, Minister (1982), 79. 
51 ,ĞůĞŶtĂůůĂĐĞĂŶĚtŝůůŝĂŵtĂůůĂĐĞ ? “dŚĞ/ŵƉĂĐƚŽĨŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ
MacŚŝŶĞƌǇŽĨ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?Journal of Common Market Studies 11 (1973), 251. 
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in coordinating the domestic propaganda campaign in promoting British membership of 
the EEC; a task which under normal circumstances would have fallen to a home civil service 
department.52 Across the period 1960-72, the Foreign Office assumed the duties of the 
Treasury, the Central Office of Information and the Department of Economic Affairs in the 
publicity drive for the EEC.53 A monumental programme of public information was launched 
by the Foreign Office which included the printing and distribution of hundreds of thousands 
of posters and leaflets designed to present the case for entry in the most favourable way 
possiďůĞǁŚŝůƐƚƐƚŝůůďĞŝŶŐĚĞĞŵĞĚ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?54 Ǉ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐƉƌĞŵŝĞƌƐŚŝƉƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽǀĞƌŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĨŽƌƉƵďůŝĐĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƐŽŐƌĞĂƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
European Communities Information Unit (ECIU) was created for the sole purpose of 
promoting British membership of the Common Market at home and abroad.55 Hennessy 
and Hugo Young report that a significant amount of autonomy and independence was 
handed to Foreign Office officials in negotiations and general management of UK-EEC 
relations to the point where government ministers did not feel fully in control.56 Criticisms 
from prominent politicians such as former Foreign Secretary David Owen, former Foreign 
Office minister Roy Hattersley and former Secretary of State for Energy Tony Benn include 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŚĂĚ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚŝƚƐĂůůĞŐŝĂŶĐĞƚŽƌƵƐĞůƐ ? ?ďĞĞŶŐŝǀĞŶ ‘ƚŽŽŵƵĐŚ
ůĞĞǁĂǇ ?ŝŶŝƚƐĚĞĂůŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŶĚŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŐƌĞĂƚĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐĂŶ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?h<ZW ?ƚŚĂƚŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞŵƚŚŝƐǀĞƌǇƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?57 Whilst these 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŵĂǇďĞĞǆĂŐŐĞƌĂƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƚŚƌƵƐƚŽĨzŽƵŶŐĂŶĚ,ĞŶŶĞƐƐǇ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂ
ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐĐĂƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚŝĞĨďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂƌǇŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚiations for 
entry.58 It is for these reasons that a strong rationale for studying the Foreign Office and its 
approach to European integration can be established. 
Alongside the scholarship from the field of political science, an ever-expanding body of 
historical studies on the Foreign Office and diplomatic service exists. Scholars of British 
international history are increasingly aware of the need to research the attitudes and the 
influence of officials as it becomes more apparent that the Foreign Office did not and often 
                                                          
52 Paul Gliddon ? “dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐWƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂŽŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?




56 Hennessy, Whitehall (1990), 402; Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill 
to Blair (London: Macmillan, 1998). 
57 Young and Sloman, No, Minister (1982), 79-81; Hennessy, Whitehall (1990), 402. 
58 Hennessy, Whitehall (1990), 404. 
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was not capable of exercising complete political neutrality.59 Hugo Young, Kane, Allen and 
Oliver identify a collective mentality in the Foreign Office which slowly shifted in the post-
war period. As a department, the Foreign Office is often described as being extremely 
conservative and more open to gradual adjustment as opposed to radical reform.60 In the 
1950s, the dominant view in the department was that the Common Market was a doomed 
venture and that Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŝƐŵǁĂƐ ‘ĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?61 
However, the younger generation of officials and diplomats had a completely different 
outlook on the new world; one which was shaped by first-hand experiences of the 
destruction of the Second World War and a firm conviction that such havoc should never 
again be inflicted upon the world.62 This made the new generation more receptive to the 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂƵŶŝƚĞĚƵƌŽƉĞǁŝƚŚĐŽŵŵŽŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞǁďƌĞĞĚ ?
began to replace the elder generation of officials in the 1960s, the Foreign Office became 
increasingly vocal about joining the EEC, emphasising the potential dangers Britain faced 
from exclusion.63 At certain points, this new orthodoxy put the Foreign Office at odds with 
ƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƐŚĞůĚďǇƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂdership. Helen Parr has demonstrated this in her 
ůĂŶĚŵĂƌŬƐƚƵĚǇŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ&ƌĞŶĐŚŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐũƵĚŐĞĚƚŽŽĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞďǇƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞ
Minister Harold Wilson.64 In addition, there has been increased interest in the role which 
key individuals played in the construction of British foreign policy, particularly edited 
ǀŽůƵŵĞƐĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂŵďĂƐĂĚŽƌƐĂŶĚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ
Permanent Under-Secretaries.65 The most recent attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of 
                                                          
59 :ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ? “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PdŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇŝŶƚŚĞdǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?
(2005), 6. 
60 See: Geoffrey Moorhouse, The Diplomats: The Foreign Office Today (London: Jonathan Cape: 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂǀŝĚůůĞŶĂŶĚdŝŵKůŝǀĞƌ ? “dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ŝŶThe Europeanisation 
of British Politics, ed. Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 64. 
61 Michael Blackwell, Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of 
the Second World War (LoŶĚŽŶ P'ƌĞĞŶǁŽŽĚ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?>ŝǌ<ĂŶĞ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƌƚůĂŶƚŝĐ
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ? ?- ? ? ? ? ? ?Journal of European Integration History 3, 
no. 2 (1997), 86; Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 100. 
62 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 100. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Helen Parr, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ P,ĂƌŽůĚtŝůƐŽŶĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐtŽƌůĚ
Role, 1964-1967 (London: Routledge, 2006).  
65 Keith Neilson and Thomas G. Otte, The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946 
(London: Routledge, 2009); Michael F. Hopkins, Saul Kelly and John W. Young (eds.) The Washington 
Embassy: British Ambassadors to the United States, 1939-1977 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); 
Rogelia Pastor-Castro and John W. Young (eds.), The Paris Embassy: British Ambassadors and Anglo-
French Relations 1944-79 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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the post-war diplomatic service was conducted by Hughes and Platt.66 In a ground-breaking 
ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŚŽǁŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ
significantly in the years 1945-1975, with an increased emphasis on specialisation as 
ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƐƚ ‘Ăůů-ƌŽƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŽŚĂĚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?67 It is 
hoped that this study will contribute towards this most recent development in the 
scholarship with a more specific focus on those Foreign Office officials most intimately 
involved in European integration affairs. 
Despite the major advances in academic research on the Foreign Office and its influence in 
the policymaking process, crucial areas remain unexplored. Ɛ^ƚĞŝŶĞƌ ?ƐƋƵŽƚĞĂƚƚŚĞ
beginning of this chapter indicates, a specific study of Foreign Office officials and their 
attitudes towards European integration is absent from the scholarship.68 A deeper and 
more rigorous analysis is needed in order to identify the key actors and powerbrokers in 
ƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?EĞŝůƐŽŶĂŶĚKƚƚĞ ?ƐůĂŶĚŵĂƌŬ
prosopographical study of the Permanent Under-Secretaries of the Foreign Office from 
1854- ? ? ? ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽŵĂŬĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚ QŝƚŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ
prism of individual personalities that the student of the past can best elucidate past 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? ?69 Indeed, Steiner has argued further that the very term Foreign Office 
 ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂĨŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉeople who constitute the Foreign Office are individuals with 
ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?70 This is a direct contradiction of Bulmer and 
ƵƌĐŚ ?ƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐƚŚĂƚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů
actors are defined and confined by the institutions in which they are participants.71 This line 
of argument completely denies individual actors agency and assumes that institutions such 
as the Foreign Office act in and follow a singular, linear pattern whereas the situation is far 
more complex. Individual actors constantly attempt to move in different directions and 
often conflict with other actors within the same institution, as has been proven by Hugo 
zŽƵŶŐŝŶŚŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŽůĚ ?ǀĞƌƐƵƐƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞǁ ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚe diplomatic service 
                                                          
66 DŝĐŚĂĞů: ?,ƵŐŚĞƐĂŶĚZŽŐĞƌ, ?WůĂƚƚ ? “&ĂƌƉĂƌƚƵƚůŽƐĞdŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ PYƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ
Qualitative Analysis of the Career Structure and Organisational Culture of the Post-War British 
ŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ?Diplomacy and Statecraft 26, no. 2 (2015), 266-293. For earlier studies on the 
civil service more generally, see: John S. Harris and Thomas V. GarcŝĂ ? “dŚĞWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĞƐ P
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐdŽƉĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ? ?Public Administration Review 26, no. 1 (1966), 31-44; Kevin Theakston 
ĂŶĚ'ĞŽĨĨƌĞǇ< ?&ƌǇ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞůŝƚĞ PWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?- ? ? ? ? ? ?Public 
Administration 67, no. 2 (1989), 129-147.  
67 ,ƵŐŚĞƐĂŶĚWůĂƚƚ ? “&ĂƌƉĂƌƚƵƚůŽƐĞdŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
68 ^ƚĞŝŶĞƌ ? “dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?   ? 
69 Neilson and Otte, The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (2009), xv. 
70 ^ƚĞŝŶĞƌ ? “dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?   ? 
71 Bulmer and Burch, The Europeanisation of Whitehall (2009), 31. 
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and their attitudes towards the EEC.72 However, not all actors are equal in the amount of 
power and influence they wield. It is for this reason that this study intends to conduct a 
prosopographical analysis of the most significant departmental actors in the process of 
European integration. As Young and Gliddon have suggested, there were certain individuals 
who may have had a greater impact on British foreign policy than others and certain 
personalities were fundamental in driving Britain towards the EEC.73  
WƌŽƐŽƉŽŐƌĂƉŚǇĐĂŶďĞůŽŽƐĞůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?Žƌ ‘ƚŚĞŝŶƋƵŝƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ
common characteristics of a group of historical actors by means of a collective study of 
ƚŚĞŝƌůŝǀĞƐ ? ?74 As a methodology, prosopography varies widely in its application and is not 
deployed as a rigid framework.75 This flexibility is a great asset. It has been used 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇƚŽĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨǀĞƌǇƐŵĂůůŐƌŽƵƉƐĂƐƉĞƌĂůů ?ƐThe 
Guardsmen, or exceptionally broad catalogues such as Keats-ZŽŚĂŶ ?ƐDomesday People.76 
Prosopography can also take the form of a collection of biographies of people who have 
held a specific position in government or the civil service over a period of time. Examples 
include The Washington Embassy by Hopkins et al and The Paris Embassy by Pastor-Castro 
and Young.77 As a methodology, it has proven to be increasingly popular across all sub-
disciplines of history, and its malleability makes it an ideal framework for this thesis.78 
Stone has argued that it is particulaƌůǇǀĂůƵĂďůĞĂƐĂƚŽŽůĨŽƌ ‘ƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚ
economic affiliations of political groupings; the exposure of the workings of a political 
ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƉƵůůƚŚĞůĞǀĞƌƐ ? ?79 This is the precise aim of 
this study. It is hoped that by examining certain groups of officials in each chapter, trends 
will be established in their socio-educational and professional backgrounds, the major 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůďĞ 
                                                          
72 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 100. 
73 Ibid ?<ĂŶĞ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƌƚůĂŶƚŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?'ůŝĚĚŽŶ  “dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚ
Domestic Propaganda on ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
74 >ĂǁƌĞŶĐĞ^ƚŽŶĞ ? “WƌŽƐŽƉŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ?Daedalus 100, no.1 (1971), 46. 
75 K.S.B. Keats-ZŽŚĂŶ ? “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PŚĂŵĞůĞŽŶŽƌŚŝŵĞƌĂ ?hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐWƌŽƐŽƉŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ŝŶ
Prosopography Approaches and Applications: A Handbook, ed, K.B. Keats-Rohan (Oxford: 
Prosopographica et Genealogica, 2007), 1-32. 
76 K.S.B. Keats-Rohan, Domesday People: A Prosopography of Persons Occurring in English 
Documents 1066-1166. 1: Domesday Book (London: Boydell, 1999); Simon J. Ball, The Guardsmen: 
Harold Macmillan, Three Friends, and the World they Made (London: Harper Collins, 2004). 
77 Michael F. Hopkins, Saul Kelly and John W. Young (eds.) The Washington Embassy: British 
Ambassadors to the United States, 1939-1977 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Rogelia Pastor-
Castro and John W. Young (eds.), The Paris Embassy: British Ambassadors and Anglo-French 
Relations 1944-79 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
78 Keats-Rohan has noted that it has become increasingly popular with historians of all periods, 
particularly since the turn of the 21st century: Keats-ZŽŚĂŶ ? “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? 
79 ^ƚŽŶĞ ? “WƌŽƐŽƉŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? 
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identified and explained, and the most influential officials working on European integration 
will be identified and the impact of their actions examined. Unlike some of the vast 
quantitative studies which have been undertaken by scholars of ancient and medieval 
history, this thesis will focus on small groups of officials in each chapter and examine their 
backgrounds, formative experiences and attitudes towards European integration 
thoroughly. The rationale for this is that the Foreign Office was a relatively small, close-knit 
institution in which a select number of key personnel dealt with specific areas of policy. In 
addition, only a small number of officials in the middle or upper echelons could have hoped 
to wield significant influence over major policy questions such as European integration. 
This is confirmed by the archival evidence, which will be explored in greater detail below. 
The study of individual or group attitudes is often fraught with conceptual and theoretical 
complications which can erect intellectual barriers for researchers. On the most basic level, 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ‘ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ƌĞƐŝůŝ ŶĐĞŽƌĂĚĂƉƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŝƐĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ
which has vexed social theorists for generations. This study will employ the works of 
Gordon Allport and Karl Mannheim, which provide excellent frameworks for any historian 
or social scientist who seeks to unravel psychological factors when investigating an 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚŝƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?80 Allport has loosely 
defined aƚƚŝƚƵĚĞĂƐ ‘ĂŵĞŶƚĂůĂŶĚŶĞƵƌĂůƐƚĂƚĞŽĨƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?
ĞǆĞƌƚŝŶŐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽƌĚǇŶĂŵŝĐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƵƉŽŶƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽĂůůŽďũĞĐƚƐĂŶĚ
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŝƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ? ?81 Therefore, attitudes are learned and entrenched by an 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƵƉďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ
their relationships with other people. An individual can hold multiple attitudes, or a 
 ‘ĐŽŶƐƚĞůůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǀĂƌǇŝŶƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĂŶĚƌĂŶŐĞĨƌŽŵŚŝŐŚůǇƉŽƐŝƚive dispositions to 
extremely negative ones.82 /ŶƚƵƌŶ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĐĂŶĂůƚĞƌŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞĂƐĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
experiences causes them to reassess their views. Examples of potential causes of 
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚŝŶĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚƌĂƵŵĂŽƌ ‘ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĚŝƐƐŽŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?ƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶtegration in the 
workplace, and religious conversion.83 /ŶƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ
into the Foreign Office and diplomatic service represented a highly significant turning point 
in their personal and professional lives. The social psychologist Halloran has argued: 
                                                          
80 'ŽƌĚŽŶůůƉŽƌƚ ? “ƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?ŝŶ A Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Carl M. Murchison (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1967), 798-84 ? ?<ĂƌůDĂŶŶŚĞŝŵ ? “dŚĞWƌŽďůĞŵŽĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶKarl 
Mannheim: Essays, ed. Paul Kecskemeti (London: Routledge, 1972), 276-322. 
81 ůůƉŽƌƚ ? “ƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
82 Blackwell, Clinging to Grandeur (1993), 10. 




change. If a person values his membership in a group he will tend to cling to the attitudes 
endorsed by that group in order to maiŶƚĂŝŶƐƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?84 Membership of the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ‘ŐƌŽƵƉ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚŝŶĞǀĞƌǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?Ɛ
personal views and attitudes, but there were still very clear differences in opinion, 
particularly between age groups. The current Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, Sir Simon McDonald, has himself asserted that in the Foreign 
KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĞǆŝƐƚƐ ‘ĂǀĞƌǇƐƚƌŽŶŐŐƌŽƵƉŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĨŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁŚŽũŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
same year.85 Furthermore, he also argued that this spoke to a wider generational mentality: 
 ‘dŚĞǁŽƌůĚŽĨǇŽƵƌƚĞĞŶǇĞĂƌƐŝƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞǀĞƌǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƐǇŽƵ ?ƌĞƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐǇŽƵƌĐĂƌĞĞƌŝŶ
your twenties. And the generation ahead of me were definitely more viscerally pro-
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ? ?86 Indeed, Napoleon Bonaparte is often recorded ĂƐƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞŵĂŶ ?ǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚǁŚĞŶŚĞǁĂƐƚǁĞŶƚǇ ? ?87  
The common formative experiences of the generations of officials involved in British 
foreign policymaking towards European integration in the years 1957-73 are therefore the 
crux of this study. Mannheim has argued P ‘ŽƵƌĐƵůƚƵƌĞŝƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚďǇŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐǁŚŽ
ĐŽŵĞŝŶƚŽĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĂŶĞǁǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚĞĚŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞ QĂĨƌĞƐŚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĂůǁĂǇƐŵĞĂŶƐ a 
changed relationship of distance from the object and a novel approach to assimilating, 
ƵƐŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĨĞƌĞĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ? ?88 In other words, a new generational 
attitude exists when a group of new participants interacts with and re-evaluates the culture 
ĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŚĂƐŝŶŚĞƌŝƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚ
role, and by extension, its approach to European integration, is a classic example of such a 
re-evaluation. The impact of the Second World War was the single greatest formative 
experience for those who joined the Foreign Office in the post-war period, particularly 
those who had served in the armed forces during the War and witnessed its devastation 
first-hand: 
 
These new men knew well enough that Atlanticism, the American relationship, the 
god before which [Roger] Makins and his generation worshipped, was at the heart 
of British national interest. The war and the victory had proved it. But theirs was a 
                                                          
84 J. D. Halloran, Attitude Formation and Change (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1967), 60. 
85 Simon McDonald, interviewed by author, John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson, 2 August 2016. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Leonardo E. Stanley, Emerging Market Economies and Financial Globalisation: Argentina, Brazil, 
China, India and South Korea (London: Anthem Press, 2018), i. 
88 DĂŶŶŚĞŝŵ ? “dŚĞWƌŽďůĞŵŽĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
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different kind of war, far from the armchair generalship that had imparted to older 
men a single-minded obsession with the Pax Americana. For them, the shot and 
shell of the front line were what they could never forget. Their war gave them a 
different perspective. And since they were the men of the future, many of whom 
rose high in the Foreign Office by the time the prejudices of their elders proved to 
have been misdirected, they are a cadre of some interest.89 
 
zŽƵŶŐ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐŽŶĞƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĞŶĚŽƌƐĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŶĚƐƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ?KĨ
course, this line of debate does not suggest that the elder generations of Foreign Office 
officials were not affected by the Second World War, merely that their experiences of it 
differed markedly from their younger colleagues. Paul Gore-Booth, the Permanent Under-
Secretary 1965-9, wrote in his memoirs that during his time in the Washington embassy 
 ‘hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ-hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂǇĞĂƌ ?ƐĨƵůůĂůůŝĂŶĐĞŚĂĚďƌŽƵŐŚƚĂďŽƵƚďǇ
1943 an integration of effort of truly astonishing proportions between two completely 
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?90 Denis Greenhill, who succeeded Gore-Booth, also commented 
upon the closeness of British and American foreign policy objectives in the immediate post-
war period, and how it framed much of his early experiences as a junior diplomat.91 The 
ŐůŽƌǇĚĂǇƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ǁĂƐǁŚĂƚĐŽůŽƵƌĞĚƚŚĞĞůĚĞƌŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐ
of the War. Other major events in British international relations in this period which were 
potential causes of attitudinal change include the Suez Crisis, ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚǀĞƚŽŽŶ
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ?ĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐǁŝůůĂůƐŽ
explore how these subsequent experiences challenged departmental orthodoxies and 
individual attitudes, and how these affected conceptions of ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞĂŶĚŚĞƌ
approach to European integration. 
Identifying and evaluating attitudes in the source material presents a number of challenges 
ĨŽƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ?/ƚĐĂŶďĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĞǆƚƌĂƉŽůĂƚĞĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůǀŝĞǁƐĨƌŽŵĂĨĞǁ
pages of correspondence, and ascertaining whether these thoughts and beliefs translated 
into action is particularly ambitious. However, the modern or contemporary historian is 
dealt a significant advantage in this regard, as there is no shortage of sources for such an 
investigation. The Foreign Office documents deposited in the National Archives are this 
ƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞĨŝůĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Foreign Office personnel lists. The personnel lists were fundamental in understanding the 
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞƐĂŶĚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐĞŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶ
                                                          
89 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 100. 
90 Paul Gore-Booth, With Great Truth and Respect (London: Constable, 1974), 121. 
91 Denis Greenhill, More By Accident (York: Wilton, 1992), 67. 
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European integration affairs. This, combined with a detailed evaluation of which officials 
contributed the most towards European policy in the Foreign Office correspondence files, 
and the extent to which these contributions impacted upon decision-making at higher 
levels, provided the rationale for selecting the officials under discussion in each chapter. 
The archival sources have been supplemented by private papers, particularly those of Paul 
Gore-ŽŽƚŚĂŶĚWĂƚƌŝĐŬZĞŝůůǇŝŶƚŚĞŽĚůĞŝĂŶ>ŝďƌĂƌǇ ?ĂŶĚĂůĂƌŐĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?
memoirs, including those of Gladwyn Jebb, Christopher Audland, Denis Greenhill, Roderick 
Barclay, Paul Gore-Booth, David Hannay, Alan Campbell, Henry Brind, Wynn Hugh-Jones, 
ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ?dŚĞƐĞƉĂƉĞƌƐĂŶĚŵĞŵŽŝƌƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů
ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?ďƵƚŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇƚŚĞŝƌ
own thoughts and views on British international relations and European integration. 
ŚƵƌĐŚŝůůŽůůĞŐĞ ?ƐƌŝƚŝƐŚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐKƌĂů,ŝƐƚŽƌǇWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞĞŶĂǀĂůƵĂďůĞ
resource, as have interviews conducted by the author with Neil Smith, Sir Simon McDonald, 
and Sir Jon Cunliffe.92 Finally, the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography and obituaries in 
newspapers such as The Times, The Guardian, The Independent and The Telegraph have 
ďĞĞŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽƵƌĐĞƐƵƐĞĚƚŽƚƌĂĐŬŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĐĂƌĞĞƌƐĂŶĚŐĂŝŶĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŝŶƐŝŐŚƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƌ
professional achievements. This wide range of source material ensures that such a study of 
Foreign Office attitudes is highly plausible and attainable. In many instances, the officials 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ‘ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŝƐƐƵĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞgration, 
^ƵĞǌ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞ ?ĂŶĚŶŐůŽ-American relations in the source material. There is 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂǁĞĂůƚŚŽĨƚĂŶŐŝďůĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚƐƉĞĂŬƐƚŽ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?
and this will be demonstrated throughout the thesis.  
The thesis will examine four major case studies in British foreign policy towards European 
integration in the years 1957-73. These case studies cover the most critical junctures in the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ǁill focus 
on the Western Organisations Department (WOD) in the Foreign Office and its attempts to 
create an alternative framework to the EEC for European political cooperation in what 
ďĞĐĂŵĞƚĞƌŵĞĚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ŝƚǁŝůůŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƚŚĞŬĞǇĂĐƚŽrs involved in the 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚĞǆƉůŽƌĞƚŚĞŝƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
their socio-educational backgrounds and early careers. The chapter will then explore the 
wider historical context of British foreign policy and the Foreign Office after the Suez Crisis, 
and how this shaped the departmental orthodoxy in response to the creation of the EEC. 
                                                          
92 Neil Smith is a former British ambassador to Finland. Sir Jon Cunliffe is currently Deputy Governor 
of the Bank of England but was previously British Permanent Representative to the EU. 
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There will then be a detailed examination of the evidence and a narrative account of how 
ƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
ƉůĂĐĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌǁŽƌůĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ
and the Six. In the years 1957-9, the Foreign Office remained largely ambivalent towards 
the EEC but attempted to pursue a proactive approach towards European cooperation 
through institutions such as NATO, the Council of Europe and the OEEC. However, there 
were elements of the department who fundamentally disagreed with this policy and 
argued in favour of closer association with the EEC.  
Chapter 2 will examine the rise of the European Economic Organisations Department 
(EEOD) as the principal department concerned with European integration affairs and the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐĂŶĚƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶƚƚƵƌŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐůĂƵŶĐŚŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ first application to 
ũŽŝŶƚŚĞ ?dŚŝƐǁŝůůĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƐĞŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁĞƌĞƐƚŝůůůĂƌŐĞůǇ
unconvinced about the case for British entry but were compelled by an anxiety that the 
United States would begin to increasingly view the EEC as its main Cold War partner in 
Europe. The younger, middle-ranking officials tried to press a more enthusiastic approach 
towards EEC membership, but there remained a gulf in generational attitudes. The chapter 
will begin by briefly contextualising BƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐůŽǁƚƵƌŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚĞK
ǁĂƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂŶĚĂďƐŽƌďĞĚŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞtK ?ƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƐƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚďĞŐĂŶƚŽǀŝĞǁ
the EEC more seriously. The key officials involved in European integration policy will be 
discussed, with an overview of their formative experiences and attitudes. An account of the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐůĂƵŶĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůƚŚĞŶďĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ?
identifying the key areas of debate and disagreement within the department, including the 
role of EFTA and potential overtures to Euratom and the ECSC. The chapter will not give a 
ůĞŶŐƚŚǇĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĞŶƚƌǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŝǆĂŶĚǁŝůůŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ
official attitudes towards the negotiations themselves and their ultimate failure. It will be 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƌƵƐƐĞůƐďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶ ?ŽĨ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƚƵƌŶŝŶŐ
point for Foreign Office attitudes towards European integration, and the department 
pursued EEC membership much more vigorously thereafter. 
Chapter 3 will study the ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚǀĞƚŽŽŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂƚƚŝ ƵĚĞƐĂŶĚŚŽǁ
ƚŚŝƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ
second application under Harold Wilson. The British Delegation to the EEC (UKDEL) in 
Brussels was strengthened significantly after the veto and signalled a more serious 
approach towards British membership and European integration more generally. After a 




European policymaking and the influence of their formative experiences. The chapter will 
ƚŚĞŶŐŝǀĞĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛrevaluation of British foreign policy 
towards European integration and its attempts to push Downing Street towards a renewed 
application. A significant feature of this chapter will be the tensions between No. 10 and 
the Foreign Office in how to approach EEC membership, with the former opting for an 
Anglo-French partnership whereas the latter insisted on pursuing an alliance with the 
 ‘&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇ&ŝǀĞ ?ƚŽŝƐŽůĂƚĞ&ƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƌĞ-ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ ?
Ğ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĨƵůůǇĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚǁŝůůbe argued that the second 
application was largely a triumph for the Foreign Office tactic of demonstrating continued 
commitment towards EEC membership. The result was that British membership became 
ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ key foreign policy priority, with the French becoming further ostracised 
by their EEC partners due to their obstructive behaviour. 
Finally, chapter 4 will focus on the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
Anglo-&ƌĞŶĐŚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůďŝĚĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞEC. As the 
political and economic importance of the Commonwealth waned with the Anglo-American 
 ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇŽǀĞƌŚĂƵůƚŚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚ
shape of the department and diplomatic service. Officials orientated the Foreign Office 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
foreign policy strategy. After the amalgamation, the Foreign Office pursued a 
reconstruction of Anglo-French relations in a bid to launch a third application for 
membership, a policy which had been prioritised by the government. The chapter will 
contextualise the state of British international relations in the late 1960s and examine the 
ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞŽŶƚŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?dŚĞĂŵĂůŐĂŵĂtion of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office will then be evaluated, particularly the internal politics of the 
merger and how certain officials saw it as a golden opportunity to divert greater resources 
towards European integration and economic diplomacy. It will be argued that the 
amalgamation was not driven by a desire to make financial savings, but to prepare the 
department for British accession to the EEC. The chapter will then look at the development 
of European integration policy after the amalgamation and the fallout of the Soames Affair, 
ǁŚŝĐŚƉĂǀĞĚƚŚĞǁĂǇĨŽƌĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĂƌĞŶĞǁĞĚďŝĚĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ǇƚŚŝƐ
point, Foreign Office support for EEC membership was practically unanimous, and the 
'ĞŶĞƌĂůƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚŽďƐƚĂĐle. In lieu of a narrative account of the 




ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƉĂrt in the reconstruction of Anglo-French relations 





























1. dŚĞ ?'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?dhe Foreign Office Western Organisations 
Department and the Search for ĂŶ ?ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƵƌŽƉĞ ?  1957. 
 
In June 1955, the six founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
 W France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg  W met at a 
conference in Messina, Sicily. At this conference, they decided to embark on a more 
ambitious programme of European integration through the creation of a common market, 
strengthened political unity, and an atomic energy community.93 The eventual outcome 
was the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome in March 1957. The creation of the EEC represented one of the most 
significant mŽŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŚŽƌƌŽƌƐŽĨƚǁŽǁŽƌůĚǁĂƌƐ ?ƚŚĞ
nations of Western Europe agreed to bind themselves together under a supranational 
authority and become completely interdependent.94 The one notable exception in this act 
of solidarity was Britain. 
The nature of the British response to the Messina Conference and Treaty of Rome has been 
hotly contested by historians. The orthodox school, led by scholars such as Northedge, has 
argued that Britain was largely indifferent to the European integration project, citing her 
ties to the United States and the Commonwealth as more valuable areas of foreign policy.95 
Post-ǁĂƌƌŝƚŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐďƌŽĂĚůǇŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞŚƵƌĐŚŝůůŝĂŶ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞĐŝƌĐůĞƐ ?
doctrine, which marked the United States, thĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞĂƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
principal areas of interest.96 However, Europe was often designated a distant third by 
politicians and officials, with the Anglo-American partnership seen as the epicentre of 
international power and influence.97 European integration was therefore initially perceived 
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as a sideshow in the corridors of British power. In a more accusatory vein, revisionist 
scholars such as Kaiser, Young and Ellison have advanced the view that the British 
government actively sought to sabotage the creation and development of the EEC following 
its lukewarm reception to the European Defence Community (EDC).98 This line of argument 
follows that British ministers and officials were in agreement ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ
ǁĂƐĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞďĞŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ? ?99 Overall, the scholarship 
paints a picture of Britain being at best ambivalent and at worst completely hostile. This 
chapter will demonstrate that these conclusions are not entirely accurate and that the 
Foreign Office took a proactive approach towards European integration, considering the 
issue carefully and formulating their own policies on the matter. Some of the most senior 
officials in the Foreign Office and the diplomatic service considered Europe to be a higher 
priority than the Middle East, and the evidence shows that they began to construct an 
alternative vision for a united Europe  W ǁŚĂƚďĞĐĂŵĞƚĞƌŵĞĚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?100 The 
 ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚ ?ƚŚĞritish response to the Common Market. The plan 
advocated the creation of a wider Atlantic Community which would encompass a European 
Community in order to promote security and stability in the West and reorganise the 
various European assemblies into a single parliamentary body, which included the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly of the Western European 
Union (WEU) and the Common Assembly of the ECSC.101  
This venture was, of course, a failure. It is not the purpose of this chapter to dispute this. 
Rather, this chapter seeks to establish how Foreign Office officials devised British European 
integration policy in the early years of the EEC and why they pursued particular objectives 
ǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŝĚĞr world. Within the Foreign Office and 
diplomatic service, there was often disagreement and even conflict over Europe which had 
the potential to divide the department into factions. These disputes made the formulation 
of foreign policy a complicated process which included constant consultation and 
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reassessment. The Western Organisations Department (WOD), which had the most 
influence over European and Atlantic cooperation in this period, will form the main focus of 
this chapter. In 1957 British European integration policy was still in its infancy, and this was 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?dŚĞŵĂŝŶĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚ
the multilateral institutions of Europe was the WOD. The WOD had responsibility for NATO, 
the Council of Europe, the WEU, and certain aspects of the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC).102 Another smaller department, the Mutual Aid Department 
(MAD), controlled United States aid, NATO economic affairs, OEEC economic affairs, and 
later the planning and coordination of the failed Free Trade Area (FTA) and European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA).103 Neither department held a great deal of clout within the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞtK ?ƐĚĞĂůŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚEdK ?ĂŶĚďǇĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
States, gave it more prestige than the MAD.104  
ƐĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝ ŶĐĞƐĂŶĚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐ
had a significant influence on their attitudes towards major issues in British foreign policy 
such as European integration, and their professional lives were often informed by their 
ŽǁŶďĞůŝĞĨƐĂŶĚƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƐ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐǁŝůůďĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ
thoroughly and analysed alongside the views and attitudes they expressed in their 
capacities as Foreign Office employees. In order to construct a cohesive and logical 
narrative of the policymaking process and the major strategic decisions taken, the primary 
actors involved will first have to be identified. The degree of influence an individual official 
held over a certain area of policy can generally be ascertained by tracking how much input 
they had in the Foreign Office general correspondence. Through a rigorous examination of 
ƚŚĞĨŝůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĐŚŝǀĞƐ ?ŝƚďĞĐŽŵĞƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ‘ĐŽƌĞ ?ŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂŶĚ
diplomats wĞƌĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞ ?ŵŽƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?dŚŝƐŐƌŽƵƉŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĞ
highest rankings members of the WOD, Lord Samuel Hood (Assistant Under-Secretary) and 
Patrick Hancock (Head of Department) as well as Sir Christopher Steel, the ambassador to 
West Germany, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the ambassador to France, and Wynn Hugh-Jones, a 
middle-ranking official and First Secretary in the WOD. Of these five officials, the first three 
held very similar views and attitudes towards Europe and foreign policy in general, whereas 
the latter two developed a reputation for proposing more radical measures and challenging 
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the status quo. This group will constitute the main focus of this chapter, but there were 
indeed other officials who occasionally voiced their opinions. These perspectives will also 
be incorporated into the discussion where relevant in order to brŽĂĚĞŶƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐƌĂŶŐĞ
by drawing on the views of as many officials as possible. 
The most striking fact one notices about the aforementioned group of officials is the 
similarity  W uniformity even  W in their social and educational backgrounds, with the 
exception of Hugh-Jones. Jebb and Steel were born in the first decade of the 20th century, 
with Hood and Hancock being born in the first half of following decade. Jebb and Hood 
both attended Eton College, Hancock attended Winchester College, and Steel was educated 
at Wellington College.105 All of them had studied at either Oxford or Cambridge. Thus, the 
ĞůĚĞƌĨŽƵƌǁĞƌĞŵŽƵůĚĞĚĂƐŐĞŶƚůĞŵĞŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƉƌĞƐƚŝŐŝŽƵƐĂŶĚĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ
schools, in keeping with their aristocratic lineages, and would have been educated and 
conditioned in very similar environments. Indeed, Hancock and Hood, who were a mere 
four years apart in age and worked together extremely closely in the WOD, had both 
attended Trinity College, Cambridge and joined the diplomatic service within two years of 
each other. With the exception of Hugh-Jones, all of them entered the service in the 1920s 
ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚďĞĐĂŵĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂůƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁĂƌƚŝŵĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?&ŽƌƚŚĞĞůĚĞƌĨŽƵƌ ?ƚŚĞŝƌ
experiences as officials during the conflict would have been fundamental to both their 
careers and their views on international and domestic politics and society.106 Hugo Young 
ŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞtĂƌŚĂĚ ‘ƉƌŽǀĞŶ ?ƚŽĂŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂŶĚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
 ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁĂƐĨirmly at the heart of British national 
interest, and that it would continue to be the most important component of British foreign 
policy in the post-war world.107 In his memoirs, future Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Paul 
Gore-Booth recalled that during his tŝŵĞŝŶƚŚĞtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶĞŵďĂƐƐǇ ‘hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ-United 
<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂǇĞĂƌ ?ƐĨƵůůĂůůŝĂŶĐĞŚĂĚďƌŽƵŐŚƚĂďŽƵƚďǇ ? ? ? ?ĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ĞĨĨŽƌƚŽĨƚƌƵůǇĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚŝŶŐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚǁŽĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?108 
Denis Greenhill, who was to succeed Gore-Booth as Permanent Under-Secretary in 1969, 
also commented upon the closeness of British and American foreign policy objectives in the 
immediate post-war period, and how it framed much of his early experiences as a junior 
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diplomat in Washington.109 These sentiments also appear to have been shared by the group 
being studied in this chapter. During the War, for example, Hancock worked in the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare, which saw a high degree of collaboration with the United States 
government.110 In addition, Steel was Head of the Political Division of the Allied Control 
Commission from 1945-47, Political Advisor to the British Commander-in-Chief until 1949, 
Minister at the Washington embassy 1950- ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞh< ?ƐWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƚŽ
NATO 1953-7.111 These strong groundings in Allied military cooperation and diplomatic 
relations with the United States made Steel an ardent Atlanticist. Roy Denman, who served 
under Steel at the embassy in Bonn, described him in an interview as an ambassador of the 
ŽůĚƐĐŚŽŽůǁŚŽǁĂƐĨŝƌŵůǇĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? and a hardened sceptic of 
the Common Market.112 /ŶĂƌŽǁǁŝƚŚĞŶŵĂŶŽǀĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ ?^ƚĞĞů
ŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƐŶĂƉƉĞĚ P ‘Her Majesty's Government could not possibly associate itself with 
this continental cockalorum, but it was damned impertinent of them to think of going it on 
their own ? ?113  
Conversely, Gladwyn Jebb is a much more complex case. As the elder of the group and a 
blue-blooded Etonian, Jebb was quite committed to Britain maintaining her Empire and 
Commonwealth as a means of preserving her great power status, and recognised the 
primacy of the Atlantic Alliance for much of his career, particularly during his time at the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare and then in New York as Acting Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.114 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ ‘dŝƚĂŶĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ?ĂƐŚĞŝƐůĂďĞů ĞĚďǇ^ĞĂŶ
Greenwood, became ŵŽƌĞƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐŐŽĂůƐĂƐŚĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞ
developments at Messina from his position as ambassador to France.115 The foundation of 
the EEC, coupled with the Suez Crisis, convinced Jebb of the need for British involvement in 
Europe.116 /ŶŚŝƐŵĞŵŽŝƌƐ ?:ĞďďĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ^ƵĞǌĂƐƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƌĞďƵŝůĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǁƌĞĐŬĂŐĞ
of the Crisis.117 In this regard, Jebb was an exception  W the Anglo-American alliance and the 
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ŚƵƌĐŚŝůůŝĂŶƚŚĞƐŝƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞĐŝƌĐůĞƐ ?ŽĨĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŚĞ
mindset of the majority of the senior officials and diplomats in the 1950s.118 His views were 
more in keeping with the younger generation of post-war recruits such as Wynn Hugh-
Jones, whose formative experiences differed significantly from the elder four. Hugh-Jones, 
in stark contrast to the upper and upper-middle class backgrounds of the other members of 
the group, was a Welsh grammar schoolboy from a lower-middle class family.119 During the 
War he had served in the Royal Air Force (RAF) and was posted to France and Italy, where 
he witnessed first-hand the devastation and suffering inflicted upon Europe.120 Hugh-Jones 
stated that these experiences in his early adult life convinced him of the need for European 
solidarity and made him a lifelong supporter of European unity.121 This seems to have been 
further reinforced by his diplomatic career. Following his discharge from the RAF, Hugh-
Jones joined the diplomatic service in 1947 and after working at the Foreign Office in 
London and at the British embassy to Saudi Arabia in Jeddah, he was transferred to Paris 
where he claims that he and Jebb engaged in an intense discussion on the political merits 
of British membership of the Common Market.122 Hugh-Jones also remarked that the two 
men became lifelong friends, and the archival evidence suggests that Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐ ?ƚŝŵĞŝŶ
the WOD was characterised by his strong support for the suggestions which Jebb sent to 
London from across the English Channel.123 Indeed, the pro-European perspectives of Jebb 
and Hugh-Jones acted as a counterweight to the cautious scepticism of Hood, Hancock and 
^ƚĞĞůŝŶƚŚĞtKĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŝƚĐĂŶďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ
Jebb and Hugh-Jones provide crucial insights into the disputes which the WOD encountered 
as it formulated its foreign policy strategy towards Europe. 
ƐŝƚǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞĐůĞĂƌŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽ ‘ĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƉĂƌƚŽĨĂǁŝĚĞƌĚŝƐĐŽƌĚŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽǀĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
world, and the best strategy for maintaining her prestige. In order to fully comprehend the 
mindset of the Foreign Office official in 1957, it is essential to contextualise the overall 
state of British foreign affairs, and how this fed into their personal outlook. The following 
section will attempt to place the attitudes and mindset of this group in a broader context 
by examining the state of British foreign policy after the Suez Crisis, and whether or not the 
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Crisis constituted a major shift in British foreign policy strategy, as well as in the psychology 

























British Foreign Policy and the Foreign Office After Suez 
 
At the end of 1956 and the beginning of 1957, the most dominant feature of British foreign 
ƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐŽůŽŶĞůEĂƐƐĞƌ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ƵĞǌCanal and the events surrounding it. 
The Suez Crisis had far-reaching consequences for British foreign policy in the Middle East, 
her overall grand strategy, her relationship with the United States, and the psychology and 
attitudes of the top politicians aŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?/ƚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶŚĂŝůĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ǁĂƚĞƌƐŚĞĚ ?
in the history of the British Empire, and in British foreign policy. The true extent to which 
Suez altered the course of British political and diplomatic history is difficult to determine, 
but it was certainly a significant event in its own right. The Crisis permanently weakened 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞDŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚďǇĚŝƐŝůůƵƐŝŽŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĂďƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞ
of the Baghdad Pact in 1958, which had bound Britain, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey 
together economically and politically.124 The damage to British prestige was so great that 
Arab nationalist movements began to directly challenge British authority in the region and 
anti-British sentiment became rife. In 1958, Iraqi revolutionaries toppled the pro-British 
King Faisal II and purposefully assassinated high profile members of the Iraqi government 
who were sympathetic to Britain.125 In the longer term, Suez set in motion an exodus and 
eventual disappearance of British power in the region, with the final knell ringing in 1968 
ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞtŝůƐŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĂƐƚŽĨ^ƵĞǌ ?ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ?ŵƵĐŚƚŽƚŚĞ
chagrin of the Americans who had relied on British support against communism in the 
Middle and Far East and still held out hope for some level of involvement in Vietnam from 
their old allies.126 In short, Suez can be considered a turning point for British foreign policy 
ŝŶƚŚĞDŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚ ?ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĂďůǇŶƵĚŐĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Common Market.127 The rapid reduction in British influence in the region contrasts greatly 
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with the political landscape a mere few decades earlier, when the Suez Canal was seen as 
ƚŚĞ ‘ǀŝƚĂůŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŚŝŐŚǁĂǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŵƉŝƌĞ ?128 
In addition, Suez is held as one of the most potentially damaging events in the Anglo-
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇĂůƚĞƌĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůů
foreign policy strategy. Scholars such as White and Butler argue that the crisis forced the 
hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĂŐĞŽĨĐŽůŽnial empires was drawing to a 
ĐůŽƐĞ ? ?129 However, whilst it was indeed a disaster for British prestige, as argued above, the 
evidence suggests that it was not necessarily reflective of a rift in Anglo-American relations. 
Louis has argued that American disdaiŶĨŽƌƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵǁĂƐ ‘ĂůǁĂǇƐƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƚŽ
the more urgent problem of anti-ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƐŵ ? ?130 The Eisenhower administration was more 
ĨĞĂƌĨƵůŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĚĞŶ ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶDŝĚĚůĞ
Eastern nations being driven towards communism and the Soviet Union out of 
disillusionment with the West.131 Eisenhower continued to see the British Empire as an 
 ‘ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ?ĂůůǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽďĞ ‘ƌĞďƵŝůƚĂƐƐŽŽŶĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ?132 This 
sentiment was, of course, shared by the Macmillan government, which went to great 
lengths to repair the damage done by Suez. 133 The Prime Minister immediately dispatched 
the future Permanent Under-Secretary Harold Caccia, a well-respected Foreign Office 
official with strong American connections through his wife, to heal the diplomatic wounds 
ĂŶĚƌĞƐƵƌƌĞĐƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵŽƐƚǀĂůƵĂďůĞĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ?134 dŚƵƐ ?ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ
Suez with regards to the United States did not signal a departure from the prioritisation of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?dŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůƌĞŶĞǁĂůŽĨƚŚŝƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĐĂŶďĞƐƚďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞ
Anglo-American response to the Lebanese insurrection and the Iraqi revolution of 1958. 
Eisenhower had drawn the conclusion that the Iraqi revolution was a component of a 
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Soviet-NassĞƌŝƚĞƉůŽƚĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĚĂŵĂŐĞƚŚĞtĞƐƚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?135 United 
States marines were deployed in Beirut and British paratroopers were dropped into 
Amman to stabilise Jordan and Lebanon, which had also been stirred into unrest.136 Louis 
has described ƚŚĞũŽŝŶƚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂƐ ‘ĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶƌĞƐƚŽƌŝŶŐŐŽŽĚ
ǁŝůůĂŶĚƚƌƵƐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ QĂŶĚĂŶĞƋƵĂůŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨ
ŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƐŶĞĞĚĨŽƌƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?137 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƚĐĂŶďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
actions had deeper implications. It was a clear statement from the British government that 
it still considered the Anglo-American alliance ƚŽďĞŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŬĞǇĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
global foreign policy strategy, despite the damage and embarrassment caused by the Crisis. 
Whilst Suez contrastingly marked a momentous shift in British foreign policy and prestige 
and a minor blip in Anglo-American relations, it can be argued that it represented a 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĞůŝƚĞƐ ?>ǇŽŶ ?s assertion that 
^ƵĞǌǁĂƐĂ ‘ŵĂũŽƌƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůǁĂƚĞƌƐŚĞĚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚĐĂŶďĞƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚ
ďǇƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƐĞŶŝŽƌĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ?138 The 
ŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ƵĞǌƌŝƐŝƐ ?ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽŶƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŝƐĚƵĞŝŶpart to the Eden 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?tŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĨĞǁƚŽƉŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂŶĚ
confidants, the Foreign Office was barely consulted on the decision to attack Nasser in 
coalition with France and Israel.139 This resulted in a level of malcontent in the ranks, with 
several officials threatening resignation and condemning the actions privately, notably Paul 
Gore-Booth, who at the time was Deputy Under-Secretary.140 The strong opposition to the 
scheme from the Foreign Office and the devastating political consequences it yielded 
ƌŽĐŬĞĚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚůǇĂůƚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞ
in the world. Indeed, Hugo Young has argued that the coincidence of the Suez Crisis and the 
dƌĞĂƚǇŽĨZŽŵĞ ‘ƌĂŝƐĞĚƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶof national identity as a predicament that has perhaps 
ďĞĞŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚŵŽƌĞĂĐƵƚĞůǇŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶƚŚĂŶŝŶĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?141 The 
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majority of senior Foreign Office officials and diplomats in 1956 belonged to a generation 
ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶďƌŽƵŐŚƚƵƉ ‘ǁith a world view that presented the British Empire as a 
ŶĂƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚƵŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůĞĨĂĐƚ ? ?142 Suez challenged and to a certain extent demolished this 
paradigm, showing that Britain was incapable of military intervention without severe 
political repercussions. TŚŝƐůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚĂĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌĂ ‘ƐƵƌƌŽŐĂƚĞĨŽƌĞŵƉŝƌĞ ?
and a new means of maintaining British power.143 In a minute drafted by Samuel Hood, it 
ĨŝƌŵůǇƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ P ‘/ĨǁĞĂƌĞƚŽďĞĂĨŝƌƐƚĐůĂƐƐƉŽǁĞƌ QŝƚĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞĚŽŶĞŝŶĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ
with other cŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?144 This was a momentous departure from the pre-Suez orthodoxy in 
the post-ǁĂƌƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŐĞĂƌĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂŶ
independent great power in the same tier as the United States and the Soviet Union.145 The 
full acceptaŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶǁĂƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŝŐdŚƌĞĞ ?ŚĂĚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů
repercussions for Foreign Office attitudes and British foreign policy. 
&ƌŽŵĂƐŽĐŝĂůƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?^ƵĞǌƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂŶ ‘ŝƌƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĂďůĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?for 
some officials in theiƌƉƐǇĐŚĞƐŽƌĂ ‘ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĚŝƐƐŽŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?146 This is what Allport defines as 
the primary cause of attitudinal change, which can be either immediate or gradual.147 A 
ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƌƵƉƚƵƌĞ ?ĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚƵŵŝůŝĂƚ ŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂĨƚĞƌŵĂƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ
ƌŝƐŝƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂƚƚŝƚƵĚŝŶĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
socio-political elites regarding her position in the world.148 With specific reference to post-
ǁĂƌ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂŶĚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ůĂĐŬǁĞůůĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ
ĚŝƐƐŽŶĂŶĐĞ ?ǁŝůůŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĂůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽƌǀŝĞǁƐ ?
particularly when they are conditioned by institutions and networks.149 As mentioned in the 
introduction, Halloran has argued that attitudes which ĂƌĞƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚďǇ ‘ŐƌŽƵƉĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
are exceptionally difficult to alter. Indeed, an individual may maintain a particular attitude 
which has been endorsed by the status quo to preserve their own position within a group 
or institution.150 It is therefore crucial to acknowledge that attitudinal change is not a 
ƐŝŵƉůĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂŶĚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĨƌĂŵĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ‘ĐĂƵƐĞĂŶĚĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚƌƵĞ
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of Foreign Office officials, who were not only involved in complex foreign policymaking 
decisions where neutrality and objectivity were supposedly championed, but were for the 
most part also strongly attached to the collective identity reinforced by the department 
and the group attitudes this perpetuated.151 In addition, it must be noted that despite the 
ŚŝŐŚĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůŚŽŵŽŐĞŶĞŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƌĂƌĞůǇĂ ‘ƵŶŝƚĞĚ ?ƐĞůĨ-
conscious and self-ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚƐŽĐŝĂůŐƌŽƵƉ ? ?152 Steiner has also argued this point, stating 
that the Foreign Office is dominated by separate personalities, ideas and interests which do 
not necessarily act in unison.153 This would have directly fed into British foreign 
policymaking, and the evidence paints a picture of disagreement as much as it does 
ĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞ
continued prioritisation of the Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞ
ŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐ ‘ŐƌŽƵƉĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ? ?ƚŚĞ^ƵĞǌƌŝƐŝƐĚŝĚĨŽƌĐe the Foreign Office 
to think more seriously about committing to the changing political landscape in Europe, 
which was a relatively significant policy shift in itself ?ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ
strategy was constantly discussed and reassessed, ǁŝƚŚƚǁŽĐůĞĂƌ ‘ĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ; those 
ŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽ
advocated a more cautious and conservative approach based on cooperation and 
ŝŶƚĞƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐŵ ?dŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐŝŶŬĞĞƉŝng with this cautious and 
conservative approach; representing ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇŽĨ
ZŽŵĞĂŶĚĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƵƌŽƉĞ ?ǀŝĂŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞ
 ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽǁƌĞƐƚĐontrol of the movement for 
European unity and cooperation from the Six, but it was certainly marketed as a 
complementary scheme. 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĂůƐŽǁŽƌƚŚďƌŝĞĨůǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂscertain the 
reasons behind the Foreign OfĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŶŽƚƚŽƐĞĞŬĨƵůůŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞĂŶĚ
ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĂŶ ‘ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ
standard of living still far outweighed that of the Six, and the overwhelming majority of her 
trade was still reliant on the Commonwealth: in the years 1952-4, it accounted for 47% of 
British imports and 48% of British exports.154 ǇĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ?ŽŶůǇ ? ? ? ?A?ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚƐ
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and 19.6% of her exports came from and went to the Six respectively.155 Therefore, at this 
point in time there was little to suggest that the EEC would become the great success that 
ŝƚĚŝĚĂŵĞƌĞƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌ ?ƉƌŽŵƉƚŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?Ɛ
such, there was little incentive for the British government or the Foreign Office to pursue 
membership of the Common Market, and this belief was reinforced by the firm conviction 
amongst the top officials that the EEC was primarily an economic venture, not a political 
one.156 dŚŝƐǁĂƐŝŶĚĞĞĚŽŶĞŽĨ^ŝƌ'ůĂĚǁǇŶ:Ğďď ?ƐŵĂŝŶŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ ƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƌƚǇůŝŶĞ ? ?ĂƐŚĞ
recognised that the Six were seeking to establish a Community with strong political 
functions, and tried in vain to convince his colleagues that the question of European 
integration was loaded with political considerations.157 However, the orthodoxy of the 
upper echelons of Whitehall stood fast and remained opposed to supranationalism.158 In 
his correspondence with Jebb, for example, Hancock is insistent on a European Community 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ǇĞƚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞtime urges British leadership of 
the proposed European Community, which strongly implies that he was in favour of Britain 
making a genuine political commitment to Europe, but believed that it was both in Britain 
ĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĨŽƌŝƚƚŽďĞĂƐubcomponent of the Atlantic Alliance.159 In short, 
the Foreign Office and, more specifically, Hood, Hancock and Steel, sought a British 
association with Europe which would be detached from the supranationalism of the EEC 
and supported by American and Canadian participation. Despite this, it can be contended 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚĂƉŽŽƌůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚĂŶĚŚĂůĨ-ŚĞĂƌƚĞĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽ ‘ŐĞƚ
ĐůŽƐĞƌ ?ƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƐĐŚĞŵĞĐĂŶďĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂƌĐŚŝǀĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?
but it was hampered by some ŽĨƚŚĞƚŽƉŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƵŶǇŝĞůĚŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐ
Alliance and the Commonwealth.  
In conclusion, the Suez Crisis had varying degrees of impact on British foreign policy, 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?dŚĞŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞ
ŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƐŝƐĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƚŽƌĞƚŚŝŶŬƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůůĨŽƌĞŝgn policy strategy and 
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paved the way for what was perceived by senior officials to be a more committed approach 
ƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐůůŝƐŽŶŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? ‘^ƵĞǌŵĂǇŶŽƚŚĂǀĞůĞĚƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
destiny for Britain, as it did in France, but the establishment of new Anglo-European links 
ǁĂƐĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂůƉĂƌƚŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?160 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐůŝŶĞǁĂƐƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽ
prioritise the Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ĂƚĂůůĐŽƐƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
 ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƵƌopean unity, despite the dissenting voices of 
officials such as Jebb and Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĂƌůǇǇĞĂƌƐ
outside the Common Market, with the objectives of the British government diverging 
significantly from those of the Six. The profound differences in opinion for a united Europe 
ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇĐĂƵƐĞĚĨƌŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ďĞŝŶŐƐƚƌƵĐŬĚŽǁŶďǇƚŚĞ^ŝǆ
and other European states from outside the EEC.161 With this context in mind, the main 
focus of the remainder of this chapter will consist of how the aforementioned group of 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚĂŶĚƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚĞŝƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚ
experiences fed into the policymaking process, particularly in light of the overall picture of 
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 ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? 
 
On 5 January 1957, the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd submitted a memorandum to the 
British Cabinet.162 /ƚǁĂƐĂĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘dŚĞ'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ PŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
EurŽƉĞ ? ?163 dŚĞŵĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌĂ ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐĂŶĚ
the creation of a new Atlantic assembly, which would encompass all aspects of Western 
cooperation.164 The new assembly would replace the Consultative Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, the Common Assembly of the ECSC, the WEU Assembly and the Conference of 
NATO Parliamentarians, with a special provision for the proposed EEC assembly should the 
Six choose to join, which suggested that the two bodies share the same location and 
secretariat.165 The assembly would be an intergovernmental, consultative body, 
ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇĂŶ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĞĞƌŝŶŐŐƌŽƵƉ ?ǁŝƚŚĨŝǀĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ PĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?
economic, social and cultural, and legal and administrative.166 Wolfram Kaiser has 
suggested that the  ‘Grand Design ? was an attempt to sabotage the Six ?s European 
integration efforts, whereas Young and Camps have argued that it was a genuine and 
sincere political initiative which aimed to bring Britain closer to Europe.167 This study 
strongly endorses the latter view. Even Gladwyn Jebb, who later came out in opposition to 
ƚŚĞƉůĂŶ ?ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ĂŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚĂŶĚŝŶĚĞĞĚƵƐĞĨƵůƐĐŚĞŵĞ ? ?ĂůďĞŝƚ
hampered by poor timing.168 The origins of the proposals are more difficult to ascertain; 
Ellison has argued that there is too much ambiguity to pinpoint them definitively, but 
zŽƵŶŐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂŶ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĚĞŶWůĂŶ ? ?169 Regardless, it 
can be argued wiƚŚĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚŶŽƚďǇƚŚĞ
elected politicians in Cabinet, but by the Foreign Office, and more specifically, by the WOD. 
dŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŝƐƐŚĂƌĞĚďǇůůŝƐŽŶ ?ǁŚŽƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ‘ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚƚŚĞďƌŝĞĨ
dĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?170 This claim can be 
ĐŽƌƌŽďŽƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?dŚĞĨŝůĞƐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ƐŚŽǁĂŶĞǆƚƌĂŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
amount of revision and reassessment by officials before the plan ever reached the 
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Cabinet.171 dŚĞtK ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŐŝŶŐŽĨƚŚŝƐƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐƚŽ ‘ŝƌŽŶŽƵƚ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƐ
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚƚĂŝůŽƌƚŚĞŵŝŶƚŽƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚďĞďŽƚŚ
ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚǁŽŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
most prominent ambassadors, Sir Christopher Steel and Sir Gladwyn Jebb, were also key 
ƉůĂǇĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ďĞŶĞĨŝƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
insight of the British ambassadors to France and West Germany, whose expertise should 
have made the proposals more attractive to the two most important members of the Six. 
As shall be argued below, however, this was not necessarily the case as the personal views 
and convictions of the officials directly affected the policymaking process. 
FiƌƐƚůǇ ?ŝƚŝƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐǁĞƌĞǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽ
European policy. Kane and Greenwood have argued that the Foreign Office ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůů
attitude towards European integration was framed by the Cold War and defensive 
considerations.172 This certainly appears to have at least been the case for the senior 
officials in the WOD, including Hood and Hancock, who were adamant that Western Europe 
be united against the Soviet Union and the international threat of communism.173 This can 
ďĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
Eastern European states in the proposed assembly as a means of détente.174 Secondly, the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛ ‘ƚǁŽ-ƉƌŽŶŐĞĚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĞ economic 
from the political, with the MAD becoming closely involved with the FTA negotiations and 
the WOD being saddled with the overarching political questions, which included devising a 
plan for an association between the UK and the Six via the rationalisation of the European 
intergovernmental institutions.175 This division of political and economic functions between 
the two departments, dictated by the belief that Britain could exempt itself from any loss 
of national sovereignty and involvement in supranational institutions whilst reaping the 
economic benefits of the Common Market proved to be a grave error. For the Europeanists 
in the ranks of the Foreign Office such as Jebb and Hugh-Jones, the most frustrating 
exercise was trying to convince the sceptics that the EEC was intended to be a powerful 
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political bloc and not simply a customs union.176 /ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞtK ?ƐƚŽƉďƌĂƐƐ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŽďĞ
the absolute priority, and refused to consider anything which could potentially jeopardise 
it, particularly after the devastation of the Suez Crisis.177 The effect of Suez on British 
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐŽĨƐƵĐŚŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞƚŚĂƚĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ƉĂƌĂŶŽŝĂ ?ĞŶƚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞ
ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?^ƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛpolitical association with Europe could be 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽƐƵƉĞƌƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ‘ĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ
ƌŝǀĂůƌǇ ?ƚŽƚŚĞhnited States ǁĞƌĞƐǁŝĨƚůǇƐƚƌƵĐŬĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐǁĂƐ
instead placed on the wider framework of the Atlantic Alliance in order to quash 
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƐŵŽƌƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐŵŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?178 
The Cabinet also vehemently rejected any reference to cooperation with Europe on 
thermonuclear weapons and research from the first edition of the document on similar 
grounds: there were fears that such a radical proposal could antagonise the Americans, 
ǁŚŽǁĞƌĞƐƚŝůůƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵĂŝŶƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŝŶŶƵĐůĞĂƌĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
uranium needed for her civil atomic programme.179 /ŶƐƵŵŵĂƌǇ ?ƚŚĞtK ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ
with regards to European integration were containment of the Eastern bloc, preservation 
of the Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?ĂŶĚĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŝŶƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ
for European unity without submitting to supranationalism. These objectives would frame 
the intradepartmental debates on Europe and became the source of conflict and friction 
within the group of actors identified for this study.  
After much reassessment and editing, the second ediƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŵĞƚǁŝƚŚ
Cabinet approval  W the proposals for nuclear collaboration and implications of an 
independent Western European bloc had been axed and the Foreign Office were ready to 
put the plans to the Europeans.180 However, this did not halt the advance of the diplomatic 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƐĚŝƐƐĞŶƚŝŶŐǀŽŝĐĞƐ ?ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁĞĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?:ĞďďǁƌŽƚĞƚŽ,ŽŽĚĂŶĚ
ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĂĚĂŵŶŝŶŐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞtK ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?:ĞďďĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚǁŚĂƚŚĞ
perceived as the single-mindedness of tŚŽƐĞǁŚŽǁĞƌĞŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽŝĚĞĂƐŽĨĂ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ?
on the grounds that it would damage links with the United States and Commonwealth, 
arguing that this view was borne from outdated delusions of imperial grandeur, and a 
                                                          
176 Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (1972), 288; Hugh-Jones, Diplomacy to Politics (2002), 261. 
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ďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ QƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ the United Kingdom with her Commonwealth and 
ŵƉŝƌĞ ? ?181 Jebb also drew on the dominance of Anglo-American relations in British foreign 
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐŝƚƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞďƵƚƐƚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂůůŝĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŝƐŽŶĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?
complete dependence is surelǇĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?182 This was quite a departure from the Atlanticist 
ŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?:Ğďď ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞǁĂƐŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞůĞŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ƵĞǌ
Crisis, and he indeed makes reference to the merits of a foreign policy strategy 
independent of the United States; something which he believed could be achieved through 
European unity. Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, Jebb warned Hood that the 
 ‘ƚǁŽ-ƉƌŽŶŐĞĚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&dĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚƌƵĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
unity through the O ?ĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚ ?ŝŶ:Ğďď ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ ?ŵŽǀĞĚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ƐůŽǁĞƐƚŵĞŵďĞƌ ? ?183 The ambassador hinted that the separation of political and economic 
ŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂ ‘ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŶŽ
agreement would be reached on rationalisation of the institutions before the EEC and the 
FTA had been fully established.184 This point is of particular interest for this study. One of 
ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉŝƐŝƚƐƉŽŽƌƚŝŵŝŶŐ ?
given the imminent completion of the EEC negotiations and the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome, which aroused the suspicions of the Six.185  
The rationale behind the timing of the announcement of the plan must be carefully 
considered. It is highly unlikely that the British government intended to deliberately irritate 
and alienate the Six, and equally unlikely that they were blissfully unaware that such an act 
would antagonise the European states  W this possibility had been mentioned in a minute 
drafted by Hugh-Jones.186 ůůŝƐŽŶŚĂƐĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐŝŶ
large part a knee-jerk response to Suez, and a means of currying favour with the United 
States, who strongly endorsed European integration.187 This study does not contest this 
argument, and the evidence certainly suggests that the spectre of the Crisis loomed in the 
ĨŽƌĞĨƌŽŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ŵŝŶĚƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂ
genuine desire on the part of the Foreign Office and the government to either directly 
participate in the movement for European unity, which they had hitherto done so with 
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reluctance and scepticism, or gain the political leadership of Europe. In both cases, a 
willingness to engage in European integration is betrayed, and this can be observed in the 
 ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ǁŝƚŚ,ŽŽĚƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ P ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŐƌĞĂƚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞh<ƚŽŐŝǀĞĂ
ůĞĂĚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?188 There is a strong possibility that this could have been the motive for 
ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?ĂŶĚĨĞĂƌƐŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƚŚĂƚ Britain was potentially 
ďĞŝŶŐ ‘ůĞĨƚďĞŚŝŶĚ ?ďǇƚŚĞŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĚŝĚĞǆŝƐƚ ?ĂůďĞŝƚto a small extent.189 Moreover, the 
timing of the announcement reveals a great deal about the mindset of the senior officials 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞ:Ğďď ?Ɛǁarnings that the EEC was very much a 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ŽŽĚĂŶĚ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬǁĞƌĞĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞ
achieved in isolation from what they perceived to be largely economic developments in 
Europe.190 dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞseparation of political and economic 
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŝĐŬŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚƐ ?ŝŶ
the department. Jebb and Hugh-Jones were diametrically opposed to the strategy, but they 
were in a minority. Hood and HancocŬ ?ƐĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚďǇƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĨƌŽŵ
Steel in Bonn and Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees, the British representative to the OEEC in Paris, the 
ůĂƚƚĞƌĂƐƐƵƌŝŶŐŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶŝƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇŚŽƉĞĨŽƌƚŚĞǁĞůů-ordered 
development of the ƵŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?191 Indeed, at this stage much of the Foreign 
KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƵƉƉĞƌƌĂŶŬƐǁĞƌĞĚƵďŝŽƵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞǁŽƵůĚĞǀĞƌĐŽŵĞƚŽĨƌƵŝƚŝŽŶ ?
Gowland and Turner report that the new Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Frederick Hoyer-
Millar, remainĞĚ ‘ƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂů ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƚǇŽĨŚŝƐĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŚŝƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌ^ŝƌ/ǀŽŶĞ
<ŝƌŬƉĂƚƌŝĐŬǁĂƐĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞƐĐĂƚŚŝŶŐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚƐ P ‘ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚǁŝůů
never allow a common market. Fancy the French wine-growers allowing any French 
goverŶŵĞŶƚƚŽĂŐƌĞĞ ? ?192 ŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐĂƐŽƵŶĚĂŶĚĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ
plan, the WOD put the proposals to the Council of the WEU on 26 February.193 
The decision to choose the WEU Council as the first institution to test the proposals was a 
calculated ŽŶĞ ?dŚĞtKƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŐĂŝŶƚŚĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?
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European nations, they would have to win over the Six, who were still regarded as the 
 ‘ŶƵĐůĞƵƐ ?ŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƵŶŝƚǇ ?194 The WEU Council was well-ƐƵŝƚĞĚƚŽƚŚŝƐ ‘ƚĞƐƚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ
waters ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞh<ĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?195 In a bid to increase the appeal of 
ƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?,ŽŽĚ ?ǁŚŽǁĂƐĂůƐŽWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞthŽƵŶĐŝů ?
ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇĚŽǁŶƉůĂǇĞĚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐůůŝĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƉůĂĐĞĚ ‘ŵŽƌĞ
emphaƐŝƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?ďĞŝŶŐĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞĂƌŐƵŝŶŐŝŶƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ
American and Canadian participation was fundamental to the plans.196 In the drafting of the 
proposals, Hood convinced the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, David 
Orsmby-'ŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŶŽƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞ
ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ? ?197 This reveals that Hood was fully aware of 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ŐůŽƐƐŽǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ
AtlaŶƚŝĐŝƐƚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŐĂŝŶƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?
Robertson has argued that many European states, particularly the Six, believed European 
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞ ‘ĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ? ?ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌƚůĂŶƚŝĐůůŝĂŶce.198 
dŚŝƐŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂŶĚĂŶĂĚŝĂŶŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ,ŽŽĚ ?Ɛ
ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞthŽƵŶĐŝů ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚŝƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ
ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞǁĂƐŽƌĚĞƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ŬĞĞƉƚŚĞǁŽůǀĞƐĂƚďĂǇ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĚĂŵƉ QĚŽǁŶ ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
countries from potentially scrutinising and criticising the proposals too heavily.199 The 
paper which Hood presented to the WEU Council contained strong condemnation of the 
currĞŶƚƐƚĂƚĞŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŚĂĚďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ‘ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽĚŝƐƌĞƉƵƚĞ ? ?200 Ellison has argued that in this 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐ ‘ĂƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚůǇƵŶĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĂƚ ĞŵƉƚ ?ďǇƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ
to contribute to the European integration movement by undermining the current system 
through disparaging statements.201 This is an argument which this study strongly endorses. 
Nevertheless, the proposals were successfully tabled for discussion, and the WEU Council 
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ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐ ? ?202 
In the meantime, the WOD sought to court American and Canadian support and 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?,ŽŽĚĂŶĚ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬ ?ƐƉƌŽ-American and pro-
Commonwealth sympathies ran deep, and their correspondence with Washington reveals a 
great deal about their psychological outlook on European integration. Hood met with 
representatives from the American embassy in London, where he went to great lengths to 
reassure the State Department that the British government had no intention of 
ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐŽƌĚƵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐEdK ?ƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚEdKǁŽƵůĚƌĞƚĂŝŶ ‘ƉƌŝŵĂĐǇ QŝŶƚŚĞ
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨŝĞůĚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ?203 
,ŽŽĚĂůƐŽĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞǁĂƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ
the British government were nŽƚŚŽƐƚŝůĞƚŽƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐŐŽĂůƐ ‘ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ? ?204 These promises were 
likely ŵĂĚĞĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽƐŵŽŽƚŚŽǀĞƌƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚŶŐůŽ-American relations 
after the Suez Crisis, but also to demonstrate British sincerity and commitment to the 
European integration effort, something which the United States government strongly 
supported.205 In conjunction with his talks with American officials, Hood discussed the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĞŵďĂƐƐǇŝŶtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽĨĨĞƌƐĞǀĞŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ
insight into thĞtK ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŶĂƚĞůĞŐƌĂŵƚŽ:ŽŚŶŽƵůƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ
embassy, Hood mentioned that it was the aim of the Foreign Office to have the United 
States ĂŶĚĂŶĂĚĂ ‘ŝŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚ ? ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĂƐƐĞŵďůǇ
was marketeĚĂƐďĞŝŶŐ ‘ĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?206 Moreover, Hood directed Coulson to allay American 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽǀĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚ
development with the Six in the WEU Council, arguing that such cooperation would be 
ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇ ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨŽƵƌƐƉĞĐŝĂůŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞh^ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚĂŵŽǀĞǁĂƐ
merely a diplomatic gesture of goodwill rather than anything concrete.207 dŚĞtK ?Ɛ
communications with Canada reinforce the view that British foreign policy towards Europe 
was framed by Atlanticist and Commonwealth sympathies. In meetings with the Canadian 
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High Commissioner, Hugh-Jones reported that the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) 
ŝŶǀŝƚĞĚƚŚĞĂŶĂĚŝĂŶƐƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƐĐŚĞŵĞ ‘ĂƐĨƵůůǇĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚ ? ?
dĞƐƉŝƚĞĂŶĂĚŝĂŶƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŚĂĚƉůĂĐĞĚƚŽŽŵƵĐŚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ
ƚŚĞƉůĂŶƐďĞŝŶŐĨŽƌ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?208 Hugh-Jones was 
instructed to curb these concerns by assuring the High Commissioner that the Canadian 
government would have the opportunity to evaluate the plans and offer their own 
suggestions.209 This is of particular interest due to the fact that Canada and the United 
States were the only countries outside of the WEU Council who had been extended the 
courteƐǇŽĨĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞŝƚƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?
and were both granted a further opportunity to review the plans at the Bermuda 
Conference on 21-23 March 1957.210 As such, the British government were effectively 
lavishing  ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŶŐůŽƉŚŽŶĞĂůůŝĞƐǁŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
states were forced to wait.  
The above evidence suggests, as argued previously, that Hood and the WOD deliberately 
ĚŽǁŶƉůĂǇĞĚƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐŝƐƚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? to the Six whilst simultaneously 
trying to foster American and Canadian support for the plans. This strategy of acting as a 
 ‘ŵŝĚĚůĞŵĂŶ ?Žƌ ‘ďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶEŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂĂŶĚtĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞǁĂƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚŝŶ
ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŚƵƌĐŚŝůůŝĂŶ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞĐŝƌĐůĞƐ ?Žƌthodoxy of the late 1950s and early 1960s 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ,ŽŽĚ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁǁĂƐƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇƐŚĂƉĞĚďǇƚŚŝƐ
doctrine.211 As such, Hood was utterly convinced that any European community had to be 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?ĂƉŽŝŶƚargued by his colleague Hancock.212 
ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶƚ
to accept North American involvement, which can be observed in some of Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐ ?
correspondence. In Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐ ?ĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĐƌƵƚŝŶy of the evidence must be especially 
rigorous  W as a middle-ranking official, Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐǁĂƐƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůůǇŽďůŝŐĞĚƚŽ ‘ƚŽǁƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌƚǇůŝŶĞ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚĐĂƵƐĞƚŽŽŵƵĐŚĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽƌĚŝƐƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŚĞŚŝŵƐĞůĨ
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acknowledged in an interview.213 Therefore, the content of much of his correspondence 
does not necessarily contain explicit statements of dissent, but the tone and language used 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞtK ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚŚĂŶ
his superiors. For example, when writing to the UK Permanent Representative to the 
Council of Europe, Gerald Meade, about the developments in the WEU Council with 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?,ƵŐŚ-Jones is noticeably pessimistic in tone. He argued that 
despite the Council agreeing to study the closer association and rationalisation of the 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĂŶĂĚĂǁĂƐ ‘ŶŽƚƐƚƌŽŶŐ ? ?214 Hugh-Jones instead placed 
greater emphasis on the necessity ŽĨ ‘ĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƵƐƚŽŵƐ
hŶŝŽŶ QƌĞƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŝƚƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĞǀĞŶĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐƉƵƚŝŶƚŽ
practice.215 Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐĂůƐŽǀŝŐŽƌŽƵƐůǇĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ǁŚĞŶƐĐĞƉƚŝĐƐĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?ůĞƐƐ ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ?ǁŽƌĚŝŶŐǁŚĞŶ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆǁĂƐƚŚĞ
single most important factor in the potential success of the British plans.216 This view 
contrasted markedly with ,ŽŽĚĂŶĚ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬ ?ƐĨŝƌŵĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂŶĚĂŶĂĚŝĂŶ
participation was the vital component. In light of Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐ ?ƉƌŽ-Common Market views, 
it is clear that he was advocating a closer association between Britain and the EEC, instead 
of what he pĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐĂŶŽǀĞƌƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚĂƐ ‘ƉŝĞ-in-the-ƐŬǇ ?ĂŶĚŽƵƚĚĂƚĞĚ ?217  
Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚďǇ:Ğďď ?ǁŚŽƐĞŶƚĂƚĞůĞŐƌĂŵƚŽ,ŽŽĚĂƐƐŽŽŶĂƐ
he received a copy of the paper submitted to the WEU Council. However, as a senior 
diplomat who carried some weight in the Foreign Office, Jebb made his criticisms of the 
scheme more overt and vocal than Hugh-Jones. Firstly, Jebb stated that the proposed 
assembly was inadequate given its purely consultative functions, and that it would not 
stimulate much interest from the Six.218  Secondly, the ambassador painted a bleak picture 
ĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇƐŚŽƵůĚƐŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶ
opposed to the priŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ P ‘ƚŚĞh<ǁŝůůďĞŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇĨŽƌĐĞĚŽƵƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚ
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pushed towards the United States, in whose eyes she will, I fear, come increasingly to 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƐŵĂůůĐůŝĞŶƚĂŶĚƉŽŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?219 Jebb also expressed his scepticism over 
American entŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
primary objectives were the preservation of NATO as the heart of Atlantic cooperation, and 
ƚŚĞ ‘ĨĂƌƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞDĞƐƐŝŶĂ^ŝǆ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ?220 By 
highlighting these points, not only did Jebb provide a damning critique of British foreign 
ƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶŐůŽ-American relations, he also suggested 
ƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇǁŽƵůĚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶĂŶĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐůŽƐƐŽĨƉƌĞƐtige and global 
standing; something which the most senior officials such as Hood and Hancock were 
specifically trying to prevent. Thirdly, and perhaps more radically, Jebb called for a change 
ŝŶƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚĐŽƵůĚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶ ƚŚĞƌŝƚish government taking the 
ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨĞĚĞƌĂůŝƐƚƐ ? ?221 
:ĞďďĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽĨDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ‘'ĞŶĞƌĂůƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů functions and a system of 
weighted voting.222 dŚŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚǁŽƚŚŝŶŐƐĂďŽƵƚ:Ğďď ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐ PŚĞǁĂƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ
ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ďƵƚďĞůŝĞǀĞĚŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĨĂƌ-reaching enough, and that British 
participation in a supranational union was an inevitability which the Foreign Office needed 
to adjust to ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?:Ğďď ?ƐĨŽƵƌƚŚƉŽŝŶƚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƐŝŐŚƚĨƵů ?dŚĞĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚ
ƚŽŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐǇĞƚĂŐĂŝŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ^ŝǆĂƌĞ QŽŶƚŚĞŝƌǁĂǇƚŽĨŽƌŵŝŶŐĂ “ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƵŶŝŽŶ ? ?
which Britain had to associate ǁŝƚŚŽŶƐŽŵĞůĞǀĞů ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ
of political and economic issues in its approach to Europe was an inadequate foreign policy 
strategy.223 Therefore, this group of actors represented a wider conflict in the Foreign 
Office over BriƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?:ĞďďĂŶĚ,ƵŐŚ-Jones were more 
ƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐĨŽƌĂƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƵŶŝŽŶĂŶĚďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ƚŝŵĞǁĂƐƌŝƉĞĨŽƌĂƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
relationsŚŝƉ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ,ŽŽĚ ?,ĂŶĐŽĐŬĂŶĚ^ƚĞĞůǁĞƌĞŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨ
ĂŶ ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĨŝƌŵůǇƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌ ‘ƚůĂŶƚŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ
intergovernmental cooperation. Above all, however, there was a fundamental 
disagreement between the two factions on whether or not the Foreign Office should 









economic association efforts into two different schemes and departments. 
The initial reaction of the Six and other EuƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ
at best by uncertainty and ambivalence and at worst by hostility and criticism. The Italian 
government were the first to express their opposition to the plans after a meeting with the 
British ambassador, Sir ƐŚůĞǇůĂƌŬĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂŶĚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚ
ĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŚĂĚ ‘ƚŽŽƚůĂŶƚŝĐĂĨůĂǀŽƵƌ ? ?224 Italian opposition would prove to be detrimental to 
ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ĂƐǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĞƚĂŝů
below. A couple of days later, Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of West Germany, 
expressed his uneasiness towards the British proposals, stating: 
 
 QƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĂĐĐĞƉƚĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞ
those countries not concerned with the Common Market, or who had no direct 
interest in it, or who were perhaps even unfriendly towards it, might be able to 
overrule them in parliamentary institutions.225 
 
^ŝƌŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ^ƚĞĞů ?ƐĚŝƐƉĂƚĐŚƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽŶĚĞŶĂƵĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĚŝĚ
not declare any opinions on the attitude of the West German government as it was merely 
ĂďƌŝĞĨ ?ĨĂĐƚƵĂůƌĞƉŽƌƚŽŶƚŚĞŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƚĞůĞŐƌĂŵŝƐĐĞƌƚainly 
ƉĞƐƐŝŵŝƐƚŝĐŝŶƚŽŶĞ ?ĚĞŶĂƵĞƌ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƐƚĂƚĞƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞ ‘ƵŶĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ?ƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶ
Market is rather vague, but it can be argued with a degree of certainty that this was a 
subtle ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŽƐĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚ ĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐ
antagonistic at a time when the EEC negotiations were nearing completion.226 In addition to 
his telegram to the Foreign Office, Steel wrote to Hood personally, urging him to persuade 
Selwyn Lloyd to write to the West German Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, in a bid 
ƚŽĐůĞĂƌƵƉĂŶǇŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŽŐŝǀĞ^ƚĞĞůĂtour 
Ě ?ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶ with von Brentano which the ambassador could use in order to create an 
ĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨŐŽŽĚǁŝůůĂŶĚĂŵŝĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĚĞŶĂƵĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?227 ^ƚĞĞů ?Ɛ
attitude towards European integration and the West German government is quite apparent 
in his correspondeŶĐĞ ?ĂƐŚĞǁĂƌŶƐ,ŽŽĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚŽůĞĨƵƐƐ QĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶŝƐ
                                                          
224 ƐŚůĞǇůĂƌŬĞ ? “dŚĞ'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?th ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
225 ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ^ƚĞĞů ? “ƌ ? ĚĞŶĂƵĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/130969/WU1072/105. 
226 See: Camps, Britain and the European Community (1964), 121; Ellison, Threatening Europe (2000), 
103; Young, Britain and European Unity (2000), 55. 




ŝŶƚŚĞƌĂƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZŽŵĞdƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ ? ?228 Steel also reported that sections of the 
Bundestag ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚĂ ‘ƉĞĐƵůŝĂƌĚĞǀŽƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽǀĞ
problematic for the British proposals if they put pressure on the government to reject the 
 ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?229 ^ƚĞĞů ?ƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĚŝŶŚŝƐĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂůŽĨ 
what he perceived to be the pro-ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨĚĞŶĂƵĞƌ ?ƐƌĞƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŝƌƌŝŶŐĂŶ
ƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ‘ĨƵƐƐ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌ ?ƐǁŚŽůĞŚĞĂƌƚĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚ
ĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞŝƐĂůƐŽƐŚŽǁŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ
that Steel was sceptical of attempts to forge European unity through institutions which 
were not firmly rooted in the wider Atlantic Community.  
This attitude of the West German government did not bode well for the discussion of the 
proposals at the next meeting of the WEU Council, which was scheduled for 10 April. 
Indeed, reports from the Foreign Office on the proceedings painted an uncertain picture. In 
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?ƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůǁĂƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ĚǁŝƚŚĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů
from the Italian deleŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĂƵƚĐŚ ‘ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŶĂŝƌĞ ?ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŚĞ
attitudes of the WEU member states towards rationalisation.230 The French and the 
Belgians opposed any further alteration of the European assemblies, whereas the Germans 
pledged to seriously consider the plans on the condition that the Six-Power Assembly be 
excluded, which dented British hopes that the EEC would eventually associate with the 
proposed Atlantic assembly.231 During the discussions in the WEU Council, Frederick Hoyer-
Millar received reports of stirrings of French suspicion regarding the British embassy in 
WĂƌŝƐ ?ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?,ŽǇĞƌ-DŝůůĂƌǁĂƐĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽǁƌŝƚĞƚŽ:ĞďďŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵŚŝŵƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵŽƌĞ
ƚŚĂŶŽŶĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?ŚĂĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌǁĂƐĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƐĂďŽƚĂŐĞƚŚe 
Common Market by attempting to prevent its ratification in the French Parliament through 
his connections with French politicians.232 To make matters worse, the foreign diplomats 
ĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐǁŚŽŚĂĚƌĂŝƐĞĚƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽǀĞƌ:Ğďď ?ƐĂůůĞŐĞĚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŚĂĚassumed that 
he was acting on instructions from London.233 From a diplomatic perspective, this was a 
disastrous development for the British government. The accuracy of the rumours was of 
little relevance; the fact remained that suspicions had been aroused and as a result the 
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 ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?Ɛ ?ĂƉƉĞĂůŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚĂŝŶƚĞĚ ?:ĞďďĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚĂŶĚĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĞĚƚŚĞƌƵŵŽƵƌƐŝŶ
a reply to Hoyer-Millar, who had also expressed severe doubts over the validity of the 
ĂĐĐƵƐĂƚŝŽŶƐŐŝǀĞŶ:Ğďď ?ƐǁĞůů-known pro-European sympathies.234 However, the damage to 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŚĂĚďĞĞŶĚŽŶĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂůůŽƵƚƐŽŽŶďĞĐĂŵĞĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?&ŽƵƌĚĂǇƐĂĨƚĞƌ
the discussions had opened, the British plans were dealt a blow when France and the 
Benelux countries declared their support for the Italian proposals, albeit with minor 
reservations.235 The Italians successfully argued in the WEU Council that the British 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞǁĂƐƵŶĂĐŚŝĞǀĂďůĞĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚďĞ
ƵŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌŝĂŶƐŝŶƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ůĞŐŝƐlatures, and that North 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚĂůŝĞŶĂƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?236  
Following the setbacks suffered in the WEU Council, a brief was sent to the UK Permanent 
Representative to the Council of Europe to offer direction on the line to take at the next 
meeting of the Committee of Ministers.237 As argued previously, the Foreign Office appear 
to have been adamant that plans for the rationalisation of the European assemblies be 
deliberated and decided upon in the WEU Council before any consultation with the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe:  
 
 QǁĞǁŽƵůĚƉƌĞĨĞƌƚŚĞƌĞƚŽďĞŶŽĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĞŝƚŚĞƌŽĨƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞŽƌƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?tĞ
should particularly wish to avoid the Committee of Ministers embarking on its own 
study of the rationalisation of European assemblies. We want if possible to keep 
ƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇŝŶƚŚĞŚĂŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞth Q/ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĨĂƚĂůƚŽŽƵƌƐĐŚĞŵĞŝĨƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇ
were transferred to Strasbourg.238 
 
dŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ƐƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ in the 
Council of Europe, as argued above, stemmed from their very real concern that the 
 ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐǁŽƵůĚďĞƋƵŝĐŬƚŽƌĞũĞĐƚĂŶǇƉůĂŶƐǁŚŝĐŚĚŝĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůŽĨ
the Six or were perceived to be sodden with Atlanticism. Another principal concern was the 
ŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐĐƚŝŶŐ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ-General, Dunstan Curtis, and his pro-European 
convictions. Curtis was a British ex-lawyer and one of the main architects of the Council of 
                                                          
234 Ibid.; Gladwyn Jebb to Frederick Hoyer-Millar, 23 April 1957, TNA/FO371/130971/WU1072/161. 
235  “'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ PKŶĞƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?th ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ZŽďĞƌƚƐŽŶ ?The 
Council of Europe (1961), 103. 
236  “'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ PKŶĞƐƐĞŵďůǇ ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?th ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?





Europe.239 As an outspoken proponent of European integration, he was a source of much 
irritation to the Foreign Office, particularly because of his previous employment in the 
diplomatic service at the British embassy in Paris.240 In the previous meeting of the 
Committee of Ministers, Curtis submitted a document advocating an exchange of views 
between the Committee, the WEU Council and the Brussels intergovernmental conference, 
with a view to the Secretariats of all three issuing a joint paper on the rationalisation of 
European institutions. In addition, he drew up plans for an amalgamation of the OEEC and 
the Council of Europe, or the closest possible association, taking into account the different 
memberships of the two bodies.241 ƵƌƚŝƐ ?ƉůĂŶƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝǀĞ
Assembly of the Council of Europe to Paris and the provision of international parliamentary 
ƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞK ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ&dŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?242 This move sent 
alarm bells ringing in Whitehall, who considered it a matter for national governments, and 
ƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƵƌƚŝƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽǁƌest the leadership of the rationalisation movement from the 
British government.243 One particular point of contention was that the proposed OEEC-
Council of Europe merger was too narrow as it did not address the need for rationalisation 
across all of the European institutions.244 Even more unsettling, however, was the 
possibility of the Secretariat of the Council of Europe having control over the FTA 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞK ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚũĞŽƉĂƌĚŝƐĞďŽƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ‘ƉƌŽŶŐƐ ?
in their approach to European cooperation.245  
As a means of stalling Curtis and his plans, the brief expressed the hope that the meeting of 
the Committee of Ministers would be dominated by the WEU member states, who would 
argue that negotiations in the WEU Council on proposals for rationalisation were ongoing, 
and that the Council of Europe should therefore wait until a report was produced by the 
former.246 dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨƚĂĐƚŝĐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ǁĂƐƚŽƉůĂǇĨŽƌƚŝŵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞth
ŽƵŶĐŝůǁŚŝůƐƚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?dŚŝƐ
tactic did not prove effective. In a report from the meeting of the Committee of Ministers, 
it was revealed that the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
                                                          
239 ŽƐŵŽZƵƐƐĞůů ? “ƵƌƚŝƐ ?ƵŶƐƚĂŶDŝĐŚĂĞůĂƌƌ ? ? ? ? ?-  ? ) ? ?Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, 2004, accessed 9 December 2015, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30992  
240 Ibid. 









Fernand Dehousse, argued that it was unreasonable and inadequate that the British and 
Italian plans for rationalisation were only being reviewed in the WEU Council, given that 
ƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ‘ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ? ?247 The 
exclusivity of the WEU Counciů ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇĂůƐŽĚƌĞǁĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
statesmen, including Paul-Henri Spaak, who stated that the procedures in the WEU Council 
ǁĞƌĞ ?ƵŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ ?ƚŽŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞŶŽŶ-WEU states such as Sweden, Turkey and Greece.248 
This view was shared by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, who warned the 
ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽĨĂ ‘ĐƌǇƐƚĂůůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐŝŶƚŚĞthŽƵŶĐŝůďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞKŽƌƚŚĞ
Council of Europe had been consulted.249 dŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĐŽŶĨŝŶĞĚƚŽ
the discussiŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉůĂŶƐ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐĂůƐŽƐƵďũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽ
scrutiny. The Italian delegation highlighted the fundamental differences between the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚĂŶĚ/ƚĂůŝĂŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ?ƌĞŵŝŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
include the Six-WŽǁĞƌƐƐĞŵďůǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶƚŚĞĞǇĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂůƐ ? ?ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇůĞƐƐĞŶĞĚ
the appeal of the British plans.250  
The Foreign Office officials began to respond to these changing circumstances as the plans 
were discussed in the WEU and Council of Europe, revealing a high degree of attitudinal 
resilience. Sir Gladwyn Jebb took a particularly firm line in a letter to the Foreign Secretary, 
ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚĞĚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚŚĂĚ ‘ĨĂƌŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƚŚĂŶ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ? ?251 This was ĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ:Ğďď ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛ
 ‘ƚǁŽ-ƉƌŽŶŐĞĚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐĂŶ
ŽǀĞƌĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƚůĂŶƚŝĐŝƐŵĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?ĂƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵŚĞĂƌŐƵĞĚǁĂƐ ‘ƵŶĚƵůǇ
ƚŚǁĂƌƚŝŶŐ QƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?252 Jebb also denounced what he perceived to be the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƵŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂŶĚƌŽŵĂŶƚŝĐŝƐĞĚǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚƚŽ
ďĞƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ?ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĂƵŶŝƚĞĚ
Europe, a strategy which the Foreign Office had been relentlessly pursuing since 1945.253 
The ambassador questioned the feasibility of such a strategy, arguing to Selwyn Lloyd that 
a close association of Britain and its Commonwealth and a maintenance of an Anglo-
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ
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ƉŽǁĞƌ ?ďƵƚǁŽƵůĚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŚĞƌďĞŝŶŐƌĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚƚŽĂŵĞƌĞ ‘ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ W
a sort of glorified 49th ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?254 KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨ:Ğďď ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞŝŶ
earlier correspondence, and in many ways, this letter to the Foreign Secretary can be 
ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚĂƐĂŶĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝŶƌĞĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ:Ğďď ?ƐƉƌŽ-European 
sympathies were deeply held, in that the constant reiteration of his convictions in the face 
of departmental adversity was unlikely to precipitate any major paradigmatic shifts in 
policymaking, and yet he continuously attempted to win over hearts and minds despite 
ďĞŝŶŐĂǁĂƌĞŽĨtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?ƐƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŚŝƐquestion préalable that the British 
government would either have to enter Europe or withdraw completely.255 He warned 
Lloyd and the Foreign Office that any collapse or failure of the EEC would have grave 
consequences not just for Western Europe but also for British strategic interests, in that 
ƚŚĞ ‘ďƵůǁĂƌŬ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶďůŽĐǁŽƵůĚďĞƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚůǇǁĞĂŬĞŶĞĚ ?256  
It was in his concluding remarks, however, that Jebb advanced his most radical proposal to 
ĚĂƚĞ P ‘ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞŽŶŚŽǁďĞƐƚǁĞĐĂŶ QůĞĂĚ “ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĨƌŽŵǁŝƚŚŝŶ ? ?257 This was 
ĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵ:Ğďď ?ƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂďŽůĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽ
advocate a policy against the status quo; one which would certainly provoke highly 
ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞďĂƚĞ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?:ĞďďŚĞĂǀŝůǇŝŵƉůŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐ
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ?ĂƐŝƚǁĂƐƐƚŝůůĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůƵƌŽƉĞǁŝƚŚ ‘ŽŶĞĨŽŽƚŝŶƚŚĞ
ĚŽŽƌ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŶůǇǀŝĂďůĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞǁĂƐƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞĂŶĚƵƐĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ
and prestige to direct the Common Market and make it more compatible with British 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?:Ğďď ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƚŽ>ůŽǇĚĐĂƵƐĞĚĂƐƚŝƌŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚĂƚƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ
from a number of officials, including Wynn Hugh-Jones, who was quick to voice his cautious 
support on a couple of issues. Hugh-Jones strove to maintain an objective tone and did 
ŝŶĚĞĞĚĚŝƐƉƵƚĞ:Ğďď ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh<ǁŽƵůĚĂƚƐŽŵĞƉŽŝŶƚďĞĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽũŽŝŶƵƌĂƚŽŵ ?
but his pro-European sympathies can be detected elsewhere.258 He stated that the British 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚĨŝŶĚŝƚ ‘ǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ to resist being drawn into a European Council of 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?259 By arguing this point, Hugh-Jones had 
effectively conceded that British membership of a supranational European institution was 
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an inevitability, which suggestĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ&dǁĞƌĞĨƵƚŝůĞ
exercises, as both were specifically designed to curb the rise of supranationalism by 
allowing Britain to associate with European states on an intergovernmental basis. Jebb and 
Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐ ?ŵŽƌĞŽǀert support for British participation in European integration and 
ƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŚĂǀĞƐƚĞŵŵĞĚŝŶůĂƌŐĞƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?Ɛ ?ůĂĐŬŽĨ
ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞthĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?dŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐĨŝƌŵƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚ
ĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŶŽƚinclude the EEC Assembly would have dented British hopes of closely binding 
the European Community to the Atlantic Community, which in turn may have encouraged 
Europeanists such as Jebb and Hugh-Jones to urge the Foreign Office to pursue an 
alternative course of action. 
In addition to Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?:Ğďď ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚĂĐŽŽůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞD ?
which was handling the FTA negotiations. Alan Edden, the Head of the department, was 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐĐĂƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ:Ğďď ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞr joining the Common 
DĂƌŬĞƚ P ‘tĞĚŽŶŽƚůŝŬĞĂůůĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƵƐƚŽŵƐhŶŝŽŶ ?^ƚŝůůůĞƐƐĚŽǁĞůŝŬĞŝƚ
ŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌǁĞĐĂŶŐĞƚĂ&ƌĞĞdƌĂĚĞƌĞĂ ? ?260 dŚĞŵĂŝŶƚŚƌƵƐƚŽĨĚĚĞŶ ?Ɛ
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ:Ğďď ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐǁĞƌĞŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐ ‘ƉƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƚĞĚ ? ?261 Edden did not recognise the 
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇĂŶĚ:Ğďď ?Ɛ
attitudes towards Europe, and seemingly argued that the British government was just as 
committed to the European integration effort as the governments of the Six. As well as 
ĚĚĞŶ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ŚŝƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ
agriculture and tariffs on foodstuffs are particularly revealing about the attitudes of many 
ŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƐĞŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĚĚĞŶĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĐŽƵůĚ
not entertain the possibility of conceding the Commonwealth preference system as a result 
ŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĐŝƚŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚƚƌĂĚĞ ?262 As 
such, Edden argued that any tariff reductions made as a result of the creation of the FTA or 
association with the Common Market would have to have safeguards in place to protect 
British trade interests. Not only does this reinforce the argument that the majority of the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƚŽƉƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐǁĞƌĞŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĂŶ ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƵƌŽƉĞǁŚĞƌĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ
would reap the economic benefits whilst exempting itself from any commitment to 
supranationalism, bƵƚĚĚĞŶ ?ƐĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞĂůƐŽĂƌŐƵĂďůǇĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐĂŶĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů
                                                          





ĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐůŝŶŬƐǁŝƚŚŚĞƌĨŽƌŵĞƌŵƉŝƌĞ ?dŚĞ
preservation of Commonwealth ties was very much in line with the most senior 
ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ ?ǀŝĞǁƐ Wthe Permanent Under-Secretary expressed his explicit 
ĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĂƌŝĨĨƐĐŚĞŵĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞ
overseas territories.263  
This conservative outlook on British foreign policy can also be found in comments made by 
Hood on a forthcoming meeting between Harold Macmillan and Konrad Adenauer. 
&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?Ɛ ?ůƵŬĞǁĂƌŵƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞthĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ
ĂŵŝĚƐƚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĂůůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽŽƌƐĂďŽƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐƉůĂŶƐ ?ƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞ
Minister insisted on a meeting with the Chancellor in order to resolve any 
ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽǀĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?264 In a preliminary 
meeting with German embassy officials in London, John Bushell, the Assistant Head of the 
WOD, was warned that the West German government were not in favour of the British 
plans for developing European integration as a subcomponent of Atlantic integration.265 
dŚŝƐůĞĚƵƐŚĞůůƚŽĂĚǀŝƐĞŚŝƐƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌƐƚŽ ‘ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƚŚĞƐƚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŵƵƐƚůĂy 
ŽŶŽƵƌǀĞƌǇƌĞĂůĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĂƐƐŝƐƚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?266 Hood commented at the bottom of the 
ŵŝŶƵƚĞ P ‘zĞƐ ?ďƵƚEKdĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨŽƵƌEŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĂƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚ
which Hoyer-DŝůůĂƌƐŚĂƌĞĚ ?ĂĚĚŝŶŐ ‘ǆĂĐƚůǇ ? ?267 This evidence provides conclusive proof that 
the upper echelons of the Foreign Office continued to regard the Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ĂƐĂŶŝŵŵƵƚĂďůĞĂŶĚĂďƐŽůƵƚĞƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
changing political landscape in Europe. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that this is a 
clear indication of both the strong influence officials had on broader issues of British 
foreign policy and the fundamentality of their personal convictions in the policymaking 
process. Here it can be observed that Hood and Hoyer-Millar were not merely dealing with 
day-to-ĚĂǇƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƐ ?ďƵƚǁŝƚŚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů ?ŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞĐŝƌĐůĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƐƵĐŚ
questions on highly personal terms, reflecting their own deeply-held views and beliefs. 
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dŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŝŶ ƚŚĞthĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨ
Europe was a severe setback for the WOD, and as events unfolded the leadership for 
institutional rationalisation gradually slid away from the British government. In early May 
1957, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted their own resolution on 
the rationalisation of European institutions, something the Foreign Office had specifically 
tried to prevent.268 The resolution stated: 
 
 QƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂƚůĞĂƐƚƉĂƌƚŝĂůůǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĐĂůĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽďŽƚŚƚŚĞƐƐĞŵďůǇŽĨ
the Six and the Assembly of the Council of Europe is the most important step that 
can be taken to ensure a close relationship between the Six and the Fifteen at 
ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇůĞǀĞů Q269 
 
This development was a disaster for the British government. Not only had the Consultative 
Assembly wrested the initiative for institutional rationalisation from Britain, but they had 
also created the conditions for ties between the proposed Six-Power Assembly and the 
Council of Europe, something the WOD had hoped to achieve with the proposed Atlantic 
Assembly. British plans to include Canada and the United States with the Western 
European states in a wider Atlantic Community had been rendered all but obsolete. The 
resolution also advocated the appointment of a delegation from the Consultative Assembly 
under the leadership of Fernand Dehousse to meet with the Interim Committee of the 
Common Market and Euratom and the WEU Council in order to present the Council of 
ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐƉůĂŶƐĨŽƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?270 This particular point put the Foreign Office in a difficult 
position. As Hugh-Jones argued in a report for a meeting of the WEU Council, the worst 
possible outcome would be foƌƚŚĞĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĂ ‘ŐŽŽĚŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ^ŝǆďƵƚĂ
poor one from the WEU, as the blame would fall on the British government if a joint 
resolution was rejected by the one institution in which Britain carried substantial political 
weight, particularly in light of the recent allegations of sabotage.271 Once again, however, 
Hugh-Jones conditioned his response in a way which presented the European case in a 
ĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞůŝŐŚƚĂŶĚƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌĞ ?,ƵŐŚ-
Jones expressed apprehension at the prospect of allowing a delegation from the Council of 
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Europe when the WEU Council had already rejected one from the WEU Assembly on the 
grounds that it would undermine the role of national governments, arguing that the 
Assembly would feel irritated and alienated.272 He also stated that there was little the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĐŽƵůĚĚŽďƵƚŚŽƉĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆǁŽƵůĚ ‘ƚĂŬĞƚŚĞůĞĂĚŝŶƚƵƌŶŝŶŐĚŽǁŶƚŚŝƐ
ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚĂďƌŽŐĂƚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĐƵůƉĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽƌĞĂĐŚĂŶ
agreement.273 This gave the Foreign Office little choice but to wait for news from Brussels. 
^ŚŽƌƚůǇĂĨƚĞƌƚŚŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞtK ?ƚŚĞ^ŝǆĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?Ɛ
ĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐĂƐĂŶ ‘ĂƵĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŶŽƚĂĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?274 As a result, the WEU Council 
ĂůƐŽĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŽĂŶ ‘ĂƵĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂĨƚĞƌ ‘ƚŚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ-General pressed the Council hard to agree 
ƚŽƌĞƚƵƌŶĂĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞƌĞƉůǇŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ? ?275 dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƉůĂŶƚŽŬĞĞƉƚŚĞ
discussion of institutional rationalisation in the WEU Council, where it was believed that 
ƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁŽƵůĚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĂŵŽƌĞĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ?ŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂŶĂďũĞĐƚĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? 
As argued above, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Dunstan Curtis, had 
drawn up separate plans for the amalgamation of the OEEC and Council of Europe. This was 
much to the chagrin of the Foreign Office, who considered it to be too narrow a venture 
and potentially problematic for the FTA negotiations which were taking place in the 
OEEC.276 The discussions in the OEEC for this potential merger ran concurrently with the 
more general debates over rationalisation in the WEU and Council of Europe.277 Therefore, 
the Foreign Office were forced to conduct two sets of negotiations on matters which were 
ǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚs of interest.278 In addition, the counter-
proposals submitted by other national governments such as France and Italy had seriously 
ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂůŽĨƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚƐůŽǁĞĚŝƚƐŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵŝŶƚŚĞth
considerably. By the end of May 1957, the BritiƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉůĂŶƐĨŽƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶůĂƌŐĞůǇ ‘ĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶ ? ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĂŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŝŶƚŚĞĞůŐŝĂŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
ministry during a meeting with British diplomats in Brussels.279 The Belgian official 
attributed this in large part to two specific reasons: European suspicions over the British 
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were strongly opposed to any radical changes to the existing institutions, including the 
grouping of the secretariats in one location.280 These reports stirred a level of apprehension 
in the WOD, and Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐǁĂƐƋƵŝĐŬƚŽƉŽŝŶƚŽƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽŶŽ
ůŽŶŐĞƌďĞĂŶĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞŽƉƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ^ŝǆ
ĂƌĞ QďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŽǁĞĂŬĞŶŽn the idea of bringing the existing assemblies together under 
ŽŶĞƌŽŽĨ ? ?281 Hugh-Jones qualified this statement by suggesting that the Six had granted 
ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂŶ ‘ĂƵĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĂĨŽƌĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
Council of Europe and had instead allowed a consultation with the delegation.282 In doing 
so, Hugh-Jones indicated that even if there was a strong desire for the amalgamation of the 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞ^ŝǆǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉůĂŶƐĂŶĚ
instead favoured something centred around the Council of Europe.283 Hood took Hugh-
:ŽŶĞƐ ?ǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƐŽŶďŽĂƌĚĂŶĚĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚĞĂƉĂƉĞƌŽŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨƚŚĞ
 ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?/ŶŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?,ŽŽĚĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƉůĂŶƐŚĂĚ ‘ĨŽƵŶĚůŝƚƚůĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?
and that the majority of European states had alternative visions for institutional 
rationalisation.284 ,ŽŽĚĂůƐŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĨŽƌĂŶ ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ŚĂĚďĞĞŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚĨŽƌďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƚŽŽƚůĂŶƚŝĐŝŶĨůĂǀŽƵƌ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽƉŽƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
subordination of the Six-Power Assembly to the Atlantic Assembly, suggesting that 
supranationalism had been firmly established and could not be undermined so easily.285 As 
ĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ?,ŽŽĚŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĂƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
 ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ǁĂƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĂĐŚŝĞǀĂďůĞĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƐŚŽƵůĚ
instead try and encourage the closest institutional association possible.286 Suggestions from 
,ŽŽĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŵĞƌŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽĨDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ OEEC 
Council, increasing membership of the WEU, and creating either a General Assembly for all 
three of the institutions, or a common secretariat and meeting place.287  
dŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞǀĂƌŝĞĚ ?,ŽŽĚ ?ƐĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ
thaƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŚĂĚĂůůďƵƚĨĂŝůĞĚƉƌŽǀŽŬĞĚƐƚƌŽŶŐƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞ
spectrum. Edden from the MAD took a much harder line than Hood and argued that the 
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thǁĂƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐůĂƐƚŚŽƉĞĨŽƌĂ ‘ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁĞŝŐŚƚƚŽƚŚĞƐƐĞŵďůǇŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ĂŶĚĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĚ
an increase in its political functions to stem the tide of supranationalism.288 As head of the 
department in charge of the FTA negotiations, Edden also argued that: 
 
 QĂ^ƚƌĂƐďŽƵƌŐƐƐĞŵďůǇǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ empowered to look after the Free Trade Area 
would secure thereby a permanent lease of life without, however, necessarily 
acquiring any greater authority by comparison with the Assembly of Six than it has 
at present.289 
 
This statement reveals that the MAD were fearful that both the economic as well as the 
political  ‘ƉƌŽŶŐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚ
potentially be submerged by the EEC. Instead, Edden hoped that a strengthened WEU 
would be able to act as an effective parliamentary body for the FTA and allow it to flourish 
as an alternative scheme to the Common Market.290 ĚĚĞŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐƐůŝŐŚƚůǇ
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŽ,ŽŽĚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ?ďƵƚůĂƌŐĞůǇŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚ Ğ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆǇŽĨ
opposing supranationalism and providing an alternative to European cooperation. 
Conversely, the Europeanist dissenters seized upon ƚŚĞĨĂůƚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂƐĂŶ
opportunity to be bolder and advance the view that the British government needed to 
overhaul its foreign policy strategy towards Europe. Hugh-Jones responded to Edden and 
,ŽŽĚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ?
countries was too great for the British government to convince them that the WEU was a 
ƐƵŝƚĂďůĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ&d ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ Consultative 
ƐƐĞŵďůǇŽĨƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ
choice.291 ŵŽƌĞĚĂŵŶŝŶŐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ
from a highly influential individual in the diplomatic service. A powerfully emotive and 
persuasive document emerged from the Rome embassy at the same time as the circulation 
ŽĨ,ŽŽĚ ?ƐƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƚŽ/ƚĂůǇ^ŝƌƐŚůĞǇůĂƌŬĞ ?
former Deputy Under-Secretary.292 Clarke was a popular and well-respected figure in the 
Foreign Office and reportedly had the full confidence of the Italian government, serving a 
total of nine years as ambassador in Rome  W  ‘ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚǁŝĐĞĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐĂŶǇƌŝƚŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
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service officer in an important embassy had the rŝŐŚƚƚŽĞǆƉĞĐƚ ? ?293 ůĂƌŬĞ ?ƐŽƉĞŶůĞƚƚĞƌƚŽ
the Foreign Secretary was, in large part, a statement of support for Jebb, with whom he 
agreed strongly.294 ůĂƌŬĞƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ/ƚĂůŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞ
ŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚǁĂƐ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨŝƌƐƚĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐĞĐŽŶĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝĚĞĂ ?
ŚĂƐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂƉƉĞĂůĨŽƌƚŚĞ/ƚĂůŝĂŶƐ ? ?295 In conclusion, the ambassador argued that 
British membership of the EEC was an inevitability which the Foreign Office and 
government needed to face up to, and the sooner Britain joined the more she would be 
able to exert her influence over the European integration effort, particularly with her clout 
in thermonuclear research.296  
dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŽůĂƌŬĞ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌŝŶĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌŵĂŶŶĞƌƚŽ:Ğďď ?ƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌ
correspondence, by widely circulating it and the attached comments around Whitehall as a 
ŵĞĂŶƐŽĨŝƐŽůĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂů ‘ƌĞŶĞŐĂĚĞƐ ? ?297 Sydney Cambridge 
ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚůĂƌŬĞ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚƌǇĂŶĚƐĞĞŬĂŶĂǀĞŶƵĞŝnto the 
ďǇĨůĂƵŶƚŝŶŐŝƚƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ P ‘ƚŚĞh<ĐĂŶŶŽƚũŽŝŶƵƌĂƚŽŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵĞƌĞ
ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐŶŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŵƉĂĐƚ ? ?298 ,ŽŽĚĂŶĚƵƐŚĞůůƐĞŝǌĞĚůĂƌŬĞ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌĂƐ
an opportunity to reinforce the departmental line in light of the recent diplomatic setbacks 
ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂĨƵůůĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ:Ğďď ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ƵƐŚĞůů
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞƐǇŵƉĂƚŚŝƐĞĚǁŝƚŚ:Ğďď ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
things the British government could not accept, such as supranationalism.299 He also 




way i.e. to take every possible step to safeguard our trade with Europe while 
surrendering as little of our sovereignty as we have to.300 
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This provides an excellent summary of the departmental orthodoxy of the day. Bushell 
made it plain that it was the job of officials to steer policymaking away from radical 
solutions and instead encourage gradual, evolutionary change which would do little to 
upset the status quo. This institutional conservatism was a fundamental part of the Foreign 
KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŝƚƐŐƌŽƵƉŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?dŚŝƐ ĂůƐŽƉĂƌƚůǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛ
aversion to supranationalism, which Bushell vehemently denounced as incompatible with 
British interests.301 ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ƵƐŚĞůůĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶĞĚƚŚĞ&dĂƐƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
most promising policy with regards to European integration, acknowledging that it was 
ŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐĂŶ ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞ
ŵŽƐƚůŽŐŝĐĂůĂŶĚƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ‘ŵŝĚĚůĞĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽƵůĚ
ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?302 BƵƐŚĞůů ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ&dĂƐďŽƚŚĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ
complementary scheme seemingly stemmed from his emotional attachment to the 
Commonwealth.303 In his minute, Bushell argued strongly against British membership of the 
ŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ?
ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ:Ğďď ?ƐƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůďůŽĐǁĂƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ
an absolute certainty.304  
,ŽŽĚďŽůƐƚĞƌĞĚƵƐŚĞůů ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐďǇĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐŚŝƐŽǁŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ:ĞďďĂŶĚůĂƌŬĞ, 




ŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?,ŽŽĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞůǇŚĂǀĞƚŽ ‘ƐƚĞƉ
ŝŶĂŶĚƐĂǀĞƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ QŵƵĐŚĂƐŝƚĚŝĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶƉƌŽƉŽƐals after 
ƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ? ?305 This dismissal of the EEC was combined with a strong conviction 
that the Six could not expect Britain to commit to the Common Market without offering her 
special terms and safeguards.306 ,ŽŽĚ ?ƐŵŽƐƚĚĂŵŶŝŶŐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ŚŽǁever, was reserved for 
ŚŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ P
 










Power communities whilst the Six maintain their somewhat arrogant belief that 
Europe begins, if not ends, with their communities and that all they need to do 




European integration and could be construed as open hostility.308 ,ŽŽĚĂůƐŽĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚ
is in this attitude of the Six that is to be found the seeds of the division of Europe into 
ďůŽĐƐ ? ?309 This suggests that not only did Hood have a personal aversion to the EEC, but he 
believed that it was detrimental to wider European solidarity and unity, which is of 
particular interest as Hood is the most senior London-based official under study, and was 
ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ƐĂsupervising Under-
Secretary, his opposition to European supranationalism would have carried a lot of weight 
in Whitehall and his attitude would probably have been shared by a number of other top 
officials. This would explain why the departmental orthodoxy was rooted in a vision for an 
 ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƵƌŽƉĞ ?ǁŝƚŚďƌŽĂĚĞƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚŵŽƌĞĨůĞǆŝďůĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? 
dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶŐůŽ-American relations and the 
ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶ,ŽŽĚ ?ƐĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ:Ğďď ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞĚ that a 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚůůŝĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŶŽƚďĞĐŽŵĞĂ ‘ŐƌŽƵƉŽĨƚƌƵĐƵůĞŶƚĂůůŝĞƐ ?ƐƚŝůůůĞƐƐĂƌŝǀĂůƚŽƚŚĞ
hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?310 ,ŽŽĚƉůĂĐĞĚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚhe Atlantic 
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƌŵŽŶƵĐůĞĂƌĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƐŚŽƵůĚƉůĂĐĞŚĞƌĂƚƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐŚĞĂĚ ?
ďƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁŽƵůĚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƌŝƚĂŝŶƚŽŚĂǀĞ
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ‘ƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƵƉƉŽƐedly preferring to 
 ‘ĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh<ĂƉĂƌƚ ? ?311 ,ŽŽĚ ?ƐƚůĂŶƚŝĐŝƐƚĂŶĚŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌůŝŶĞĚŚŝƐ
resolve that Britain would be able to successfully associate with the EEC without submitting 
to all the conditions of membership, thus maintaining hĞƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŚĞǀŝƚĂů ‘ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?ŽĨ
ƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĐŝƌĐůĞƐ ?/ŶĐŽŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
ŐůŽďĂůƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?,ŽŽĚ ?ƐŵŽƐƚŝŶƚƌŝŐƵŝŶŐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ƚŝŵĞůŝŶĞ ?ŽĨ
European integration and the amount of time the British government had to reach a 








suitable arrangement with the Six. Hood argued to Jebb and Clarke that their insistence on 
an immediate commitment to European unity was ill-founded given that it would be 
 ‘ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇ ?ŽĨZŽŵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽƌŵŽƌĞƉƌŽďĂďůǇ ? ? ? ?ďĞĨŽƌĞ QƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶ
DĂƌŬĞƚŝƐŝŶďĞŝŶŐ ? ?312 This belief that the Common Market would very gradually and slowly 
come into being is vital in dissecting the mindset of the senior policymaker in the 1950s. At 
this early stage in the European integration effort, there was little to suggest to the Foreign 
Office that the EEC would become an economic powerhouse with supranational oversight 
in a relatively short space of time. The high level of economic performance and political 
integration the Six had experienced a mere three years after the signing of the Treaty of 
ZŽŵĞ ?ƉƌŽŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŚĞDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
have been easily predicted.313 The majority of the Whitehall elite were confident that they 
had time tŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŝǆĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐůŽƵƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
be threatened so quickly and so seriously by the EEC. This deeply entrenched attitude 
towards European integration reinforced the departmental orthodoxy of association and 
intergovernmentalism.  
Even at this late stage, when the WOD had failed to capture the imagination of the Six and 
ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌtĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƐĞŶŝŽƌƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůƌĞĨƵƐĞĚƚŽ
deviate from the official line of cooperation, association and intergovernmentalism in an 
 ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?dŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŚĂĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇďĞ ŶĐŽŶĨŝŶĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ
gutter and yet major figures such as Hood and Hancock decided not to consider a major 
redrawing of British foreign policy towards EƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĚŝŶ,ŽŽĚ ?Ɛ ‘ƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ?
ŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?314 tŚĂƚĨŽůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞǁŝƚŚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛ
plans for institutional rationalisation can best be described as departmental conservatism, 
rigidly reinforced by a group of senior officials who did not see any merit in pushing against 
the status quo due to their personal convictions and formative experiences. These officials 
could not contemplate allowing Britain to weaken her ties with the Commonwealth, which 
for most eƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚĨŝŐƵƌĞƐǁĂƐĂŚŝŐŚůǇ ‘ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ĐĂƵƐĞ ?ŽƌŝŶĚĞĞĚƌŝƐŬĚĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ĂŶǇĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂŶĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ
priority after the devastation of the Suez Crisis.315 The calls for Britain to join the Common 
                                                          
312 Ibid. 
313 ƵůŵĞƌ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ?'ƌĞĞŶǁŽŽĚ ?Britain and European 
Integration (1992), 82. 
314 ^ĂŵƵĞů,ŽŽĚ ? “'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?     ?th ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
315 ƐŚůĞǇůĂƌŬĞƚŽ^ĞůǁǇŶ>ůŽǇĚ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĂŶĚƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶtŽƌůĚ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/198; Gowland and Turner, Reluctant Europeans (2000), 109. 
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Market or try and reach a deal with the Six on associative membership of the EEC were still 
coming from a minority of vocal visionaries, namely Jebb and Clarke, with middle-ranking 
officials such as Hugh-Jones still not overtly advocating their personal support for the 
European idea. In the words of Hugo Young:  ‘In London there were the beginnings of 
ĚŝƐƐĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇƚŚĂƚŐƌŝƉƉĞĚƵƉƉĞƌtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů Q/ŶƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůŽĨƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞ
1950s, they did not get a hearing, but they did exist. ?316 As will be argued below, the 
Foreign Office continued to try and pressure and influence plans for rationalisation of the 
European institutions despite having lost the initiative, and would later support other 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂů
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƚǁŽ-ƉƌŽŶŐĞĚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ
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Old Tricks: Foreign Office Conservatism and the Rationalisation Agenda 
 
In the latter half of June 1957, Hugh-Jones was charged with drafting a paper on the future 
ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ,ŽŽĚ ?ƐĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŚĂĚ ‘ĨŽƵŶĚůŝƚƚůĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ?ŽŶĞǁŽƵůĚ
expect the WOD to have altered their policy towards European integration, but instead the 
department favoured a conservative approach which was consistent with previous ideas.317 
The paper hinted that if the British government was unable to forge an Atlantic Assembly 
with North American participation, then it would at least try and bring about the closest 
possible association of the European assemblies for more effective intergovernmental 
cooperation.318 The tK ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĂƐƚŽƐŚŝĞůĚƚŚĞƉƌŽ ŽƐĞĚ&d
from any undesirable political interference from the Six and other non-FTA member states 
in the Council of Europe.319 Therefore, relations between the OEEC, where the FTA was to 
be launched, anĚƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?ǁĞƌĞƚŽƉŽĨƚŚĞtK ?ƐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?320  
Hugh-:ŽŶĞƐ ?ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚǁĂƐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ?/ƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉĞĂƐŝƚƚŚĞŶƐƚŽŽĚ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ‘ŚĂǀĞƐŚŽǁŶƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇ
interested ŝŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĂƐƚŚĞŶƵĐůĞƵƐŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇŽƉƉŽƐĞĂŶǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽ ‘ƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞ ?321 However, he acknowledged that the 
 ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝĚĞĂŽĨƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĨĂŝƌůǇ
welĐŽŵĞĚ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞďĞƐƚĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?322 In light of the fact 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶƚůĂŶƚŝĐƐƐĞŵďůǇŚĂĚďĞĞŶƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚďǇŵŽƐƚ
European states, the paper proposed a closer association of the OEEC and the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in order to stop the FTA from coming under the political 
influence of the EEC or other non-FTA national governments.323 In addition, it advocated a 
gradual transition period for the amalgamation to prevent any disruption to the FTA 
negotiations in the OEEC.324 The plans also expressed the hope that the Six would agree to 
send reports from the EEC and Euratom to the Consultative Assembly, which would 
                                                          
317 ^ĂŵƵĞů,ŽŽĚ ? “'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ? ? June 1957, TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/207. 










ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞŶŝŽƌƐƐĞŵďůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ďƌŽĂĚĞƐƚƐĐŽƉĞ ? ?325 To the 
British government this was much more preferable, as it would neutralise the growing 
power of the Common Market and stem the tide of supranationalism in Europe. 326  
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞtK ?ƐŶĞǁƉůĂŶƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?.
Given United States and Canadian membership of the OEEC, the British government hoped 
that a merger of the Consultative Assembly and the OEEC would allow for North American 
participation in parliamentary procedures.327 dŚĞtK ?ƐŵŽƐƚĐontroversial proposal, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐƚĞŵŵĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĂůůƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
institutions in a single city as a means of streamlining cooperation and preventing 
functional overlaps in the assemblies.328 The ultimate objective was to bind the FTA to the 
Common Market and further strengthen the intergovernmental bodies as counterweights 
to the EEC Assembly. This proved to be a contentious issue for certain European states, 
particularly members of the Six who did not want the FTA to be on a level pegging with the 
Common Market or an extension of it. In particular, German suspicion of British intentions 
ŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶďĞŐĂŶƚŽƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚďĞĐĂŵĞĚĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůƚŽƚŚĞtK ?ƐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
agenda. 
In a letter circulated by the MAD, the Deputy Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs, Paul 
Gore-Booth, stated that the ideal scenario would be for the European institutions to 
 ‘ŐƌĂǀŝƚĂƚĞ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐWĂƌŝƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞKĂŶĚEdKǁĞƌĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĂƐĞĚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ďƵƚǁĂƌŶĞĚŚŝƐ
colleagues that the national governments of the Six were reluctant to establish the EEC in 
WĂƌŝƐŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞǁŚŝĐŚ&ƌĞŶĐŚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĐĞŶƚ
discussion with the Dutch ambassador had confirmed this hesitancy.329 The gravity of this 
issue is made abundantly clear by Gore-Booth characterising the complete exclusion of the 
&dĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚĂƐďĞŝŶŐ ‘ůĞĨƚŽƵƚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽůĚ ? ?ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶďĞŝŶŐ
diplomatically isolated in Europe.330 In order to inform the WOD of the attitude of the West 
German government towards Britain and institutional rationalisation, the British embassy 
in Bonn sent a report detailing their most recent exchanges.331 The report stated that the 
'ĞƌŵĂŶƐǁĞƌĞŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ
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with Europe, but were deeply suspicious of British plans to concentrate the European 
institutions in Paris.332 Certain elements in the German Chancellery were convinced that 
the French and British governments had conspired to bolster their national influence at the 
expense of the EEC.333 As such, the West German government were opposed to Paris 
becoming the centre of European cooperation, and remained sceptical of any radical 
proposals for the amalgamation of the European institutions.334  
The Foreign Office continued to face internal problems as well as external ones. Following 
,ŽŽĚ ?ƐƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐƋƵŝĞƚƐƚŝƌƌĞĚďǇ:ĞďďĂŶĚůĂƌŬĞ ?ƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞ
surfaced once again from another distinguished ambassador in Europe. The British 
ambassador to Spain, Sir William  ‘/ǀŽ ?DĂůůĞƚ ?ĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂůĞƚƚĞƌŚĞŚĂĚǁƌŝƚƚĞŶƚŽůĂƌŬĞŝŶ
ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐĐĂůůĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶƚŽĨƵůůǇũŽŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
integration movement.335 DĂůůĞƚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŽǀĞƌĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶŽƵƌƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
with the United StaƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƌŶĞĚŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐĂƌĞĨĂƌŵŽƌĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƵƌŽƉĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŝŶƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇ
concept of an Atlantic community was regarded with deep suspicion.336 DĂůůĞƚ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐĚŝĚ
not fall on deaf ears. The ambassador wielded a considerable amount of influence and was 
well-respected in the department having served as Assistant Under-Secretary 1949-51 and 
then as ambassador to Yugoslavia 1951-4.337 Officials from the WOD, the MAD and the 
Southern DepartŵĞŶƚĂůůĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƚŽDĂůůĞƚ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƚƌǇ
and counter the dissenters. Kenneth Pridham of the Southern Department dismissed the 
ĞŶƚŝƌĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞŽĨ:Ğďď ?ůĂƌŬĞĂŶĚDĂůůĞƚ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ^ŝƌZŽŐĞƌDĂŬŝŶƐ ?ŚĞĂǀŝůǇ
AtlantiĐŝƐƚ ‘EŽƚĞƐŽŶƌŝƚŝƐŚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ?ĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƵƉĚĂƚĞĚĂŶĚƵƐĞĚƚŽ
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁ ?338 Alan ĚĚĞŶŽĨƚŚĞD ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚDĂůůĞƚ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĂĐƚĂƐĂglobal 
player, she needed to maintain her links with the United States and the Commonwealth as 
well as with Europe.339 ĚĚĞŶĨŝƌŵůǇĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽ ‘ŬĞĞƉŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚĂůůƚŚƌĞĞ




335 Ivo Mallet to Ashley Clarke, 5 July 1957, TNA/FO371/130973/WU1072/226. 
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338 DĂŬŝŶƐ ?ŶŽƚĞƐĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĂŶĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĐůŽƐĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
States, and that Britain would become increasingly dependent on American support for national 
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂƐƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌƵŶĨŽůĚĞĚ PZŽŐĞƌDĂŬŝŶƐ ? “^ŽŵĞEŽƚĞƐŽŶƌŝƚŝƐŚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ
1951, TNA/FO371/124968/ZP24/2; Kenneth Pridham, 17 July 1957, 
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ŝŶďĂůĂŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝĨĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůďůŽĐǁĂƐŝŶĚĞĞĚĨŽƌŵĞĚ ? ‘ƚŚĞŶǁĞŚĂǀĞƚŽĨŝŶĚ
ǁĂǇƐŽĨůŝǀŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐ ? ?340 John Bushell, the Assistant Head of the WOD, also announced 
ŚŝƐƐƚƌŽŶŐĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚDĂůůĞƚ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ P ‘ŝĨǁĞŚĂĚƚŽŵĂŬĞĂĐŚŽŝĐĞ Q/ďĞůŝĞǀĞǁĞ
would always choose the United States before continĞŶƚĂůƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?341  
dŚĞŵŽƐƚŵŽŵĞŶƚŽƵƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐDĂůůĞƚ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌ ?
however, came from Christopher Steel in Bonn. Hitherto, Steel had not fully expressed his 
ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚƌĂƚegy but had decided to 
take the recent debate as an opportunity to voice his opinions on the matter. Steel mainly 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚŚŝƐĚŝƐƉĂƚĐŚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ:Ğďď ?ƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƉƌŝů ?ŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐĂƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ
from West Germany, which along with France was one of the two most influential 
members of the Six.342 ^ƚĞĞů ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƉŽŝŶƚŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞǁŝƚŚƚĞ
Commonwealth. The ambassador argued that an abandonment of the sterling area would 
be economically unsound, but there are hints of an ideological and emotional attachment 
elsewhere.343 /ŶĂĚŝƌĞĐƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽ:Ğďď ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů
ǁĞƌĞƵŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĐŚĂŝŶĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ QƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ
ǁŝƚŚŚĞƌŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚŵƉŝƌĞ ?344  and could not possibly fall to the Six, Steel argued 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐŚĂĚ ‘ŶŽŚŝŶƚĞƌůĂŶĚůŝŬĞƚŚĞƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇĐŽůŽƐƐŝ QŶŽƚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞǀĞƌǇ
real hinterland represented for the United Kingdom by the Commonwealth connection 
ĂŶĚ QƐƚĞƌůŝŶŐĂƌĞĂ ? ?345 Steel dismissed what ŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞ
ĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚǁŽƵůĚŽŶĞĚĂǇƌŝǀĂů
ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ ?ůĂďĞůůŝŶŐŝƚ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨ ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶĞƐƚĨĂůůĂĐŝĞƐƉƵƚ
ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ? ?346 ^ƚĞĞů ?ƐŵŽƐƚĚĂŵŶŝŶŐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞof the EEC, however, was reserved for the 
attitudes of the French and the Germans: 
 
 QŝƚŝƐŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞƚŚĂƚ ?ŝĨƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĨŝŶĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐũŽŝŶĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ
inside a ring fence of the Six, their basic differences of approach will lead first to 
economic argument and before long to serious political collision. Unless the circle 
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of the free trade partners can be widened so as to spread the shock of these 
contradictions, the fate of the whole enterprise will be inevitable collapse.347 
 
As argued above, this belief that the Common Market was destined for failure was not 
uncommon amongst the senior generation of Whitehall officials, and Hood had made a 
similar point in an earlier correspondence with Jebb.348 ^ƚĞĞů ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞ
institutional conservatism of the Foreign Office and bolstered the departmental line of 
opposition to full membership of the EEC. His correspondence, as well as the comments 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ĂůƐŽŚĞĂǀŝůǇŝŵƉůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŚƵƌĐŚŝůůŝĂŶ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞ
ĐŝƌĐůĞƐ ?Ěoctrine still carried significant weight in the corridors of power, despite the 





arrival, there had not been an interdepartmental response to silence the whisperings of 
dissent. Hancock wrote to Gore-Booth, calling for a reply to Jebb and the other 
ĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĂŝŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƚŽĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚĞŝƚĨĂŝƌůǇǁŝĚĞůǇŝŶƉƌŝŶƚ ? ?349 The draft 
would incorporate comments from the WOD, the MAD, the Permanent Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?Ɛ
department and the Treasury, and would include consultations from the Board of Trade 
and the Ministry of Power.350 The purpose of widely circulating a document countering the 
issues raised the by the Europeanists and including the opinions of a broad cross-section of 
Whitehall is not made clear in the evidence, but it can be argued with a high degree of 
certainty that the primary aim was to marginalise and isolate the dissenters and strengthen 
the status quo of the Whitehall establishment. The context is also essential in order to fully 
grasp the implications of this evidence. AƚƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŚĂĚĂůůďƵƚ
ĨĂŝůĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƵƌŽƉĞǁĂƐƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐ ?dŚŝƐŚĂĚĚĂŵĂŐĞĚ
the strength and appeal of the departmental orthodoxy that association and 
intergovernmental cooperation was the best approach to European integration. The upper 
echelons of Whitehall were eager to maintain and protect the vitality of this entrenched 
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group attitude towards European integration, which would have been another powerful 
ŵŽƚŝǀĞŝŶƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƐůŽǁƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚƐ ?ŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵ ?
The final draft of the letter to Jebb was completed in October and copied to all the major 
embassies and representations in Europe. In order to add further weight and legitimacy to 
the document, the officials had it signed by the Foreign Secretary.351 This also created the 
impression that the entire department and government were united in opposition to the 
Europeanists, and at several points the letƚĞƌƉƵƌƉŽƌƚƐƚŽƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŽĨ ‘,Ğƌ
DĂũĞƐƚǇ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?352 This is of particular interest due to the fact that according to the 
evidence, government ministers had absolutely no input in the drafting of the letter 
whatsoever  W all of the minutes and comments consist of opinions from Whitehall officials. 
The drafting of the letter cannot be dismissed as too low a priority for the Foreign Secretary 
ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ?dŚĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƐĞŶŝŽƌĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƐǁĞƌĞŽĨŐƌĞĂƚ
importance in the policymaking process, and if there was significant disagreement at the 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůĞǀĞů ?ŝƚǁĂƐŝŶƚŚĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐƚŽƚƌǇĂŶĚƌĞƐŽůǀĞƚŚŝƐƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂƵŶŝƚĞĚ
front in foreign affairs.353 This response to Jebb is evidence of senior officials bypassing 
ministerial input, but also of the resilience of overriding group attitudes which were 
prevalent in Whitehall. The senior officials in the Foreign Office made it abundantly clear in 
the dispatch that they had no intention of contemplating full or associative membership of 
ƚŚĞƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂĚ ‘ĂƉůĞƚŚŽƌĂ ?ŽĨŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞĨƌŽŵŝŶ
ŝƚƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞ ‘ƚŽŽŵĂŶǇƵŶŬŶŽǁŶƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞ
government to make a definitive step towards closer relations with the Common Market.354 
dŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂůƐŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂĚĞĞƉƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐƉůĂŶƐ ?ĐŽŶũƵƌŝŶŐƵƉƚŚĞ
ŵĞŵŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝĂƐĐŽ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ŵĂĚĞĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞƐŽƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚĞDĞƐƐŝŶĂŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƐ
ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞůƵĐƚĂnce and hesitation.355 This was coupled 
ǁŝƚŚĂĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƵƌŽƉĞŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ^ŝǆ-Power 
ŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŶŽďůĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐŽĨŽƌŐĞůŝŶŬƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
wider European community via the FTA initiative, including the Scandinavian states, 
Portugal, Ireland, Austria and Switzerland.356 Not only does this suggest that the senior 
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officials in the Foreign Office were still confident that the Common Market might fail, but it 
also argued that the Six were responsible for the political fragmentation of Europe. This line 
allowed the Foreign Office to defend its decision to not commit to the EEC and instead 
ƉůĂĐĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶĂƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌĂďĞƚƚĞƌ ? ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƵƌŽƉĞǁŚŝĐŚƌŝƚĂŝŶǁŽƵůĚůĞĂĚ ? 
The rhetoric employed in the letter also had highly ideological connotations. There was a 
firm conviction that British relations with the United States and the Commonwealth should 
continue to be prioritised, and that closer association with Europe could jeopardise these 
ties.357 In addŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞ
ƐŝŶŬŝŶŐŝƚƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚďĞƚƌĂǇƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚĨĞĂƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ
senior administrative elite.358 Officials such as Hancock and Hood fervently believed that 
BritŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚǁŽƵůĚƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ
and prestige, relegating her to a component of a federal Europe, something which Wallace 
ŚĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŶŐůŽ-Saxon and European 
coŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?359 This ideological attachment to national prestige in foreign policy 
was not a new one; it had dominated the mindset of Foreign Office officials since the 
ĚǁĂƌĚŝĂŶƉĞƌŝŽĚĂŶĚǁĂƐƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚďǇƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌŝous powers 
in 1945.360 dŚŝƐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐĐĂŶďĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶĚĞĨĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ
towards European integration was framed in large part by the Cold War and defensive 
considerations.361 /ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǀŝĞǁĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶEdKĂŶĚ
ŚĞƌĂůůŝĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŽďĞŽĨ ‘ŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ
would not be able to establish an effective framework for cooperation in armaments and 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞthŽƌEdK P ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ^ŝǆ-Power military grouping seems 
ƌĞŵŽƚĞƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĚĞŵŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ? ?362 There was also a heavy implication that only Anglo-
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚĐŽƵůĚŐƵŝĚĞƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƵŶŝƚǇŝŶtĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂŶĚŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƚŚĂƚ
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ŝƚ ‘ĂĚŚĞƌĞĚĨŝƌŵůǇƚŽƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐůůŝĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĚŝĚŶŽƚďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƐƚƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?363 
dŚŝƐŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇŝŶƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?ďƵƚŝŶƚŚŝƐ
particular document a sense of apprehension and anxiety can also be detected. The 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐŚŝŶƚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞŝ^ǆĂŶĚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝĚĞĂ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ
ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĚŝĚŶŽƚƉĂƐƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ? ?364 The 
most significant statement in this paper, however, referred to the possibility of 
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ&d P ‘tĞŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞƚŽĂŝŵĂƚŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ
of the Free Trade Area with as much dignity and authority as those of the European 
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?365 It is not entirely clear what was meant by this, but it suggests 
that the Whitehall establishment was more concerned with curbing the influence of the Six 
in Europe than providing an alternative to European cooperation, and would go to great 
lengths to achieve this end. In short, the top officials in the Foreign Office were more anti-
EEC than pro-Europe. 
The letter to Jebb greatly strengthened the Foreign Office orthodoxy and the senior 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?dŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶ W at least 
temporarily  W quelled and the WOD moved back towards advocating the rationalisation 
agenda. Their efforts were met with little success as European affairs increasingly 
gravitated towards the EEC and the Six, which benefited from the support of the United 
States.366 British attempts to provide an alternative framework for European political 
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚŚǁĂƌƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞďĞŐĂŶƚŽďĞ
challenged by some of the very nations which she had helped liberate or defeat little more 
than a decade ago. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Foreign Office attitudes largely held 
fast. dŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƐƐƚŝůůĨƌĞƐŚŝŶƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ ?ŵŝŶĚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-Suez Foreign 
Office still saw the Anglo-American partnership as the most viable foundation for British 
foreign policy. European integration may have beeŶƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
ministries, but the concept had yet to win over the hearts and minds of senior Foreign 
Office officials such as Hancock, Hood and Steel. The younger generation of officials, 
represented here by Hugh-Jones, were motivated by a desire to see Britain participate fully 
in the process of European unity and solidarity after their experiences of the Second World 
War. They were supported in this endeavour by some of their more radical older colleagues 




366 Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe  ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ P^ƚ ?DĂƌƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
Press, 1993), 109. 
70 
 
such as Jebb, Clarke and Mallet. However, the arguments of the pro-Europeans failed to 
galvanise broad departmental or ministerial approval. Within the Foreign Office itself, the 
WOD saw its status dwindle aƐƚŚĞ ?ƐĐůŽƵƚĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞth ?ƚŚĞ
Council of Europe and the OEEC. This decline became even more apparent after the 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůĂƵŶĐŚŽĨ&dŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚŚĞD ?ƐďƌĂŝŶĐŚŝůĚ ?367 The latter 
department became increasingly important, and as shall be demonstrated over the course 
of this study, ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŝƚƐĞůĨĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŵŽƐƚŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůĂŶĚ
prestigious units. However, this only took place ĂĨƚĞƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
integration changed dramatically. ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ƚƵƌŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ?would be fraught with division, 
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2. Better In Than Out: The European Economic Organisations 
ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ&ŝƌƐƚƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨ
the EEC, 1960-  
 
 QƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŐƌŽǁŝŶŐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?-1, among civil servants, ministers, 
journalists, industrialists and other elite groups, that EEC membership was the only 
way forward if Britain was to remain a leading influence in world affairs.368 
 
 QŝƚŝƐŶŽǁĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐƚƌŽŶŐƌĞĂƐŽŶƐŽĨĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĨŽƌŽƵƌũŽŝŶŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?/ĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ “ƐƵĐĐĞĞĚ ? ?ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŐƌĞĂƚůǇĚĂŵĂŐĞĚƉŽůŝtically if we were 
outside, and our influence in world affairs would be bound to wane; if we were 
ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁĞǁŽƵůĚǁŝĞůĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚǁŽƵůĚďĞĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ Q369 
 
The above quote from a Cabinet Office paper presented to ministers in July 1960 perfectly 
summarises the reluctant reversal of British foreign policy towards European integration. 
dŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĂƚĨƵůůŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ
should be seriously considered lest Britain see its international standing shrink  W better in 
than out.370 ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĂƉƉůǇĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ
was driven less by an ideological conversion than by the practical foreign policy realities of 
ƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞƐŽĨƚŚŝƐ ‘ƚƵƌŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂƌĞůĞss simplistic. The discussions in 
Whitehall and more specifically, the Foreign Office, were laced with debate, disagreement, 
and uncertainty. The degree of caution and scepticism which had characterised British 
official attitudes towards Messina and the Treaty of Rome had certainly not evaporated 
entirely. Indeed, many of the reservations harboured by senior officials in the 1950s 
remained and marked the stance taken by the government during the negotiations. The 
application for membership was part of a sloǁĞƌĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŐƌĂĚƵĂů ‘ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚ
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚŝŶĂů ‘ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ƚǁŝůůďĞƚŚĞĂŝŵŽĨƚŚŝƐ
chapter to examine this adjustment in British foreign policy from the perspective of the 
officials in the European Economic Organisations Department (EEOD) and how their 
attitudes shaped the decision to apply for membership of the EEC. 
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for the shift in British foreign policy towards European integration. Bulmer argues that the 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŝƐ ‘ŶŽƚĞĂƐŝůǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ? ?ĐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ƵĞǌƌŝƐŝƐ ?ƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐƐƚƌŽŶŐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?ĨĞĂƌŽĨƚŚĞ ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
States as potential reasons.371 Despite the enduring arguments of scholars such as Lamb, 
ƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
called into question by much of the literature.372 ĂŵƉƐŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
relationship with the Six had now become a key foreign policy question and was no longer 
ůŽŽŬĞĚĂƚƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĂƐĂĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?373 This argument has been reaffirmed by 
other historians such as Greenwood, Tratt, May and John W. Young.374 Therefore, the 
strategic and diplomatic connotations surrounding the decision to join the Common Market 
were of great consequence, and this was certainly true of the Foreign Office; perhaps more 
ƐŽƚŚĂŶĂŶǇǁŚĞƌĞĞůƐĞ ?,ƵŐŽzŽƵŶŐŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
issue [in EƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽďĞƐǁĞƉƚĂƐŝĚĞĂƐŝĨŝƚďĂƌĞůǇŶĞĞĚĞĚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ? ?375 
dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐůĞƐƐĞƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐĐĂŶďĞĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽĨ
the senior officials which reinforced the institutional orthodoxy. Economics and public 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐ ‘ǀƵůŐĂƌŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐŵƐ ?ďǇŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞŽůĚĞƌŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŽ
preferred to focus on fundamental questions of international diplomacy and security.376  
This is directly reflected in the archival evidence, where officials in the EEOD acknowledged 
that the fundamental questions of European integration were of a political nature, despite 
ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŶĂŵĞŝŵƉůŝĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚƐƌĞŵŝƚǁĂƐƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚƚŽ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐǁŝůůďĞĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚƵƉŽŶďĞůŽǁ ?377  
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separation of political and economic policy towards European integration into two 
departments, the WOD and the MAD, had been a failure. It was becoming clearer to senior 
officials that in order to construct a more comprehensive foreign policy strategy, a more 
cohesive approach was needed which incorporated both political and economic 
considerations. The earlier warnings from figures such as Sir Gladwyn Jebb that the 
 ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝĚĞĂ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚ QĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝƐƐƵĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇǁĞƌĞƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƚŽďĞ
taken much more seriously.378 This is partly how the EEOD was created and designated 
more control over political issues. At the beginning of 1960, the MAD was renamed the 
EEOD and was made responsible for relations with the ECSC, the EEC, the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA), the OEEC, and the Council of Europe.379 Prior to these changes, 
the MAD had been chiefly concerned with United States aid, the financial and economic 
implications of NATO and more recently, the EFTA negotiations.380 This was largely because 
the MAD was the successor of the European Recovery Department, which was renamed 
and restructured in 1950 in response to the inception of NATO and the OEEC.381 However, 
as the significance and influence of the various institutions in Europe grew across the 
1950s, so too did the importance of the MAD. By 1960, its control over British foreign 
policy towards European integration had become more established, and it overtook the 
WOD as the principal department concerned with multilateral European institutions, with 
the WOD only retaining control over NATO and WEU affairs.382 This could possibly be 
ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨ&dĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ŝŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƵƐĞ&d
ĂƐĂ ‘ďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ƚŽĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?383 The MAD therefore benefited from 
ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƵƐĞŽĨ&dĂƐƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ‘ďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽŽů ?ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
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ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ƐƚŚĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐůŽƵƚƐǁĞůůĞĚ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚŝƚƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ
attempts to create an alternative framework for European political cooperation and 
instead tried to adapt itself institutionally to the Common Market, accepting its central role 
in the European integration movement. The EEOD and its activities were direct results of 
this institutional adaptation and provide a critical insight into the transition of British 
foreign policy towards application for membership of the EEC. 
DƵĐŚůŝŬĞƚŚĞtK ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?ƚŚĞKŚĂĚĂƐĞůĞĐƚŐƌŽƵƉŽĨ
officials and associated diplomats who were in constant consultation over the application 
for membership of the Common Market and the wider political issues. Despite the fact that 
ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐǁĂƐŵĂĚĞƵƉŽĨ
personnel from a range of Whitehall departments, including the Treasury, the Foreign 
Office, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Commonwealth Relations Office 
and the Colonial Office, the EEOD retained some influence over the direction of the 
negotiations. All reports on the proceedings of the formal negotiations and on informal 
discussions between the delegates and other foreign officials were fed back to the EEOD. It 
ŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĂĐƚŽƌƐĐĂŶďĞ
identified. The same names contributed continuously across this period towards the debate 
ŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĂƉƉůǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞƐĞ
ǁĞƌĞ^ŝƌZŽĚĞƌŝĐŬĂƌĐůĂǇ ?^ŝƌWĂƚƌŝĐŬZĞŝůůǇ ?ZŽŐĞƌ:ĂĐŬůŝŶŐ ?&ƌĂŶĐŝƐ'ĞŽƌŐĞ ‘<ĞŶ ?'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?
Christopher Audland, and John Robinson. This group of gentlemen represented an eclectic 
mix of individuals, varying in age and social and educational background. Barclay and Reilly 
were both born in 1909, Jackling was born in 1913, Gallagher was born in 1917, Robinson 
was born in 1925 and Audland was born one year later, though was in the same school year 
as Robinson.384 Barclay was educated at Harrow, Jackling was educated at Felsted School, 
an independent boarding school in Essex, Reilly and Audland both attended Winchester 
CŽůůĞŐĞ ?'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌǁĂƐĞĚƵĐĂƚĞĚĂƚ^ƚ ?:ŽƐĞƉŚ ?ƐŽůůĞŐĞ ?ĂZŽŵĂŶĂƚŚŽůŝĐƐĐŚŽŽůŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚ
London, and Robinson was educated at Westminster School.385 Therefore, whilst these 
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officials were still from relatively privileged families, at least two of the officiaůƐ ?
backgrounds were not as exclusive as some of their predecessors.386 In addition, their 
university educations reveal even greater diversity in the ranks of the Foreign Office. Whilst 
Reilly and Robinson elected to study Greats  W ƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĂƌŝŶ ?ƐĨĂǀŽƵƌŝƚĞ Wat New College 
and Christ Church, Oxford respectively, Barclay studied languages at Trinity College, 
Cambridge.387 Even more unusually, Jackling and Gallagher did not attend Oxbridge at all, 
studying Public Administration and Law respectively at the University of London.388 As such, 
ƚŚĞǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĞǆĐĞůůĞŶƚĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŚŽǁƚŚĞ ‘KǆďƌŝĚŐĞďĂƌ ?ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽ
weaken ever so slightly as the Foreign Office moved into the 1960s. Audland is the one 
exception when it comes to higher education. Having initially secured a place to study 
languages at Caius College, Cambridge, he elected to try and enter the diplomatic service 
ǀŝĂƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŵĞƚŚŽĚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĨŽƌ ‘ǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽŚĂĚƐƉĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĂƌŵĞĚ
forces the years when they might normally have gŽŶĞƚŽƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ? ?389  
The broadening range iŶƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƐŽĐŝŽ-educational backgrounds would suggest that 
this had little impact on their attitudes towards European integration. However, their birth 
dates span three decades and represent an interesting generational shift in attitudes. Much 
like Hugh-Jones, who was discussed in the previous chapter, Audland and Robinson were 
ardent Europeanists, driven passionately by an emotional and ideological attachment to 
the idea of European unity. This is demonstrated in the literature and in interviews, as well 
as the archival evidence.390 The two men came from privileged backgrounds; both attended 
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public school and both their families had long traditions of military and public service.391 
Both men had also served as NCOs in the Second World War where they encountered first-
hand the sufferings inflicted upon the Continent  W Robinson, for example, worked with and 
befriended Italian prisoners of war and Audland had close connections to French families 
who had lost several relatives in the War.392 Their wartime experiences certainly 
contributed towards their wholehearted support for European integration, and Audland 
specifically admits as much in his memoirs.393 Audland has also stated that the two men 
ǁĞƌĞůŝĨĞůŽŶŐĨƌŝĞŶĚƐĂŶĚǁŽƌŬĞĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĐůŽƐĞůǇŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
join the EEC, which is of particular interest to this study.394 /ŶƵĚůĂŶĚ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƚŚĞŝƌ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ‘ǁĂƐƐǇŵďŝŽƚŝĐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĐůŽƐĞŶĞƐƐƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚhat the two men were 
part of a younger generation of like-ŵŝŶĚĞĚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǀĂŶŐƵĂƌĚ ?ŽĨƉƌŽ-
Europeanism.395 Robinson was reportedly quite a unique personality in the Foreign Office. 
He worked uninterrupted on European integration issues for sixteen years in Paris, Brussels 
and London in the years 1956- ? ? ? ? ?ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐŚŝŵ ‘ƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂƌĞĂůƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĞǆƉĞƌƚ ? ?396 
However, tŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶǁĂƐĂƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚ ?ŝƐ
contentious. The amount of energy and effort he poured into his work, as well as his 
confrontational style which made him notorious for berating colleagues with alternative 
points of view, would certainly suggest so. His obituary in The Times ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽƵŶĚŝƚ
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞŽƚŚĞƌŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐ ?ĂŶĚŚĂĚĂŶ ‘ŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚŝƐƐĞŵďůĞŚŝƐŽǁŶ
ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ? ?397 ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?,ƵŐŽzŽƵŶŐĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĂŶ ‘ĚĞƐƉŝƐĞĚ “ďĞůŝĞĨ ? ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ
ŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?ŽĨŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ ?398 
The eůĚĞƌĨŽƵƌ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂƌĞŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆ. Their enthusiasm for the European 
project was heavily guarded and qualified, which was typical of the upper echelons in 
Whitehall at the time. As the elders of the group, Barclay and Reilly embarked on their 
careers in the early 1930s. Barclay entered the service in 1932 and served in Brussels and 
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Paris, giving him a strong grounding in European affairs.399 However, most of his time 
during the War was spent at the Washington embassy where he witnessed the full force of 
the Anglo-American alliance and the attitudes this fostered in the British diplomatic 
service.400 Following a term as ambassador to Denmark 1956-60, he returned to the 
Foreign Office as Deputy Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇǁŝƚŚĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞŵŝƚĂƐ ‘ĂĚǀŝƐĞƌŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ 
ƚƌĂĚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?401 According to his obituary in The Times ?ĂƌĐůĂǇ ‘ŚĞůƉĞĚƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞƚŚĞ
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĂůůŝĂŶĐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚƐƚŝůůƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
and even named his dog Efta after the European Free Trade Association!402 ĂƌĐůĂǇ ?Ɛ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨůǇŝŶŐŬŶŝŐŚƚƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ
of the Common Market and his special status within the Foreign Office make him a 
significant figure in understanding the attitudes of Foreign Office officials towards 
European integration, and why the senior generation began to drift towards the EEC when 
previously they had shunned it. 403 ZĞŝůůǇ ?ƐĐĂƌĞĞƌǁĂƐĞƋƵĂůůǇŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?,ĂǀŝŶŐďĞĞŶ
ĞůĞĐƚĞĚĂƐĂĨĞůůŽǁŽĨůů^ŽƵů ?Ɛ ?KǆĨŽƌĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ŚĞĞŶƚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞĚŝplomatic service in 1933, 
topping the Foreign Office entrance examinations.404 From 1953-6, he returned to Paris as 
minister of the embassy where he worked closely with the ambassador, Gladwyn Jebb.405 In 
late 1956 Reilly was promoted to Deputy Under-Secretary but was very soon after moved 
to Moscow and made British ambassador to the Soviet Union.406 This proved to be one of 
ZĞŝůůǇ ?ƐŵŽƐƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŚĞǁĂƐĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽĞŶĚƵƌĞŚŝŐŚůǇƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞƉŽŝŶƚƐŝŶ
the Cold War, including the U2 spy plane incident of 1960.407 Following his tenure as 
ambassador to the Soviet Union, Reilly was recalled to London and reappointed Deputy 
Under-Secretary, in charge of European economic affairs.408 It can be argued with a degree 
ŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇƚŚĂƚZĞŝůůǇ ?ƐĞĂƌůǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁĂƌƚŝŵĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŚŝƐ
training in the Imperial Defence College and his various postings relating to defence and 
anti-communist operations, had a powerful effect on his attitude towards foreign policy in 
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Biography, 2004, accessed 18 May 2016 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/73087  







his professional life. Like many of his colleagues, he was prone to viewing European 
integration through the lens of the Cold War, which often resulted in Atlanticist sympathies 
ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶďůŽĐ ? 
Jackling and Gallagher ŚĂĚůĞƐƐ ‘ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ?ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƚŚĂŶŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ
and had entered the diplomatic service via unusual career paths. Jackling was slightly older 
than Gallagher and had practiced as a solicitor before he entered the service in 1939 as 
Acting Vice-Consul at the British Consulate-General in New York.409 Following this he was 
appointed Second Secretary at the Washington embassy, and remained here until late 
1947.410 Therefore, Jackling also developed his early career as a diplomat immersed in the 
high watermark of Anglo-American cooperation. The fact that he also married a Canadian 
and later retired to Florida where he died also suggest strong Atlanticist sympathies and 
influences in his private life.411 In 1959, Jackling was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary 
and supervisor of the EEOD alongside Deputy Under-Secretary Patrick Reilly.412 :ĂĐŬůŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
earlier professional experiences were equally dominated by Atlanticist influences, 
particularly his frequent encounters with United States government personnel in the age of 
the Marshall Aid plan and the American initiatives behind European reconstruction.413 
Gallagher had also come to his career in the Foreign Office later than many of his 
colleagues; entering the service in November 1945 at the age of 28.414  By 1960, he was 43 
and already Head of a Foreign Office department, but had also been young enough to serve 
in the War alongside his younger colleagues Robinson and Audland. After his time in the 
EEOD, Gallagher continued to serve in a variety of posts relating to European affairs, 
including Head of the Western Economic Department in the Commonwealth Office, Head 
of the Common Market Department, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office in charge of European economic affairs, and UK Permanent 
Representative to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).415 
This suggests that he was considered an authority on European economic issues and clearly 
ŚĂĚĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞ ? 
                                                          
409 Foreign Office, Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book 1960 (London: Harrison 




413 Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 
1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 3. 
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The group of officials under study for this chapter represent a complex mixture of 
personalities and show how Foreign Office personnel had begun to slowly diversify as it 
entered the 1960s. This complexity, in turn, directly impacted the policymaking process as 
ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐůŽǁůǇƚƵƌŶĞĚĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĚĞǀŝƐŝŶŐƐĐŚĞŵĞƐĨŽƌĂŶ ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?
Europe and instead moved towards association with the EEC. The origins of the Foreign 
KĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?ƐŐƌĂĚƵĂůĂŶĚŐƵĂƌĚĞĚĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶǁŝůůďĞĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚďĞůŽǁ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ
how and why the government eventually decided that full membership of the Common 
Market was the best course of action. It will become clear that this foreign policy strategy 
ǁĂƐŶŽƚĂŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂůŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?ďƵƚĂŶ ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĚƌŝǀĞŶĂƚƚŚĞďŽƚƚŽŵ
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One Foot in the Door: Turning towards Europe 
 
The landmarks in the shift in the British position towards entry into the EEC during 
1960 are familiar. The cancellation of the British Blue Streak weapons system, 
American refusal to back EFTA as against the EEC, the failure of the Paris Summit 




As argued by GrĞĞŶǁŽŽĚ ?ƚŚĞǇĞĂƌ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐ ‘ƉŝǀŽƚĂů ?ŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĂƉƉůǇĨŽƌ
membership of the Common Market.418 Before the Macmillan government decided to 
apply, there were various initiatives emerging from Whitehall which advocated partial 
association with the EEC or membership of the ECSC or Euratom, but not full membership 
of the EEC. This is heavily indicative of a very reluctant and guarded change in British 
foreign policy. Indeed, many of the concerns voiced by officials during Messina and earlier 
continued to frame the debate in 1960. Domestic agriculture, Commonwealth ties and 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶ&dĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽďĞŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐŝƐƐƵĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂŵƉĞƌĞĚ
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĞĂƌŶĞƐƚŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?/ŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨ'ŽǁůĂŶĚĂŶĚdƵƌŶĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ
to applǇǁĂƐ ‘ƚĂŬĞŶŶŽƚŝŶĂĨŝƚŽĨƵƌŽ-enthusiasm, but out of a reluctant recognition that it 
represented the lesser ŽĨƚǁŽĞǀŝůƐ ? ?419  
dŚĞƐůŽǁƌĞǀĞƌƐĂůŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ ‘ƉƌŽ-ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ?ůŝŶĞďĞŝŶŐƚĂŬĞŶĐĂŶƉŽƐƐŝďůǇďĞ
attributed to the change in personnel at the top of certain departments at the beginning of 
1960, particularly the Treasury.420 For example, the ardently Atlanticist Roger Makins had 
been replaced as Joint Permanent Secretary by the vehemently pro-European Sir Frank 
Lee.421 In addition, Eric Roll, who was an Austrian-born economist with strong pro-
European convictions, took over from R.E. Stedman at the Ministry of Agriculture.422 The 
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upper echelons of the civil service were slowly becoming more open to the idea of 
associating with the Common Market on some level. 1960 also saw the launch of EFTA, the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽƌĞŐĂŝŶĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?
tŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂƐƐĞŵďůŝĞƐŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨ
ŵŽƌĞ ‘ƐƚƌĞĂŵůŝŶĞĚ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů coordination had failed, Britain had succeeded in the creation 
of an alternative trade bloc which did not rely on supranational oversight. However, the 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨ&dĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞŽŶŝƚ
proved to be a damaging foreign policy gamble.  
Before Britain had even considered devising alternative forms of European cooperation, 
ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŚĂĚŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚƚŚĂƚŝƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐ
and would not look kindly upon any British attempts to frustrate or undermine them.423 
The opinions of the Eisenhower and later the newly-elected Kennedy administrations on 
EFTA, however, had not been fully ascertained. The Deputy Under-Secretary for European 
economic affairs, Paul Gore-Booth, who was soon to be transferred to India and appointed 
British High Commissioner, wrote a letter to Harold Caccia, the British ambassador to the 
hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂƐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌŚŝŵƚŽ ‘ŬĞĞƉƵƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐůǇŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ
ideas of the Americans in WashingtŽŶ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŶĚ&d ?424 The Foreign Office 
ŬŶĞǁƚŚĂƚ&d ?Ɛviability as a competitor of the EEC would be largely dependent on the 
attitude of the United States and therefore needed as much information as possible. The 
very future of British foreign policy towards Europe hinged on this factor. Certain officials 
were particularly apprehensive given the apparently unenthusiastic response to EFTA in the 
ǁŽƌůĚƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ?ƐŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐůǇƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?425 Discussions in 
the OEEC and elsewhere about the EEC and &d ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĂůƐŽĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇ
proved frustrating for the British government. For example, the United States government 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽůŽǁĞƌƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶƚĂƌŝĨĨ ?ƚŚĞƌĞďǇŐƌĞĂƚůǇĂĐĐĞůĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
process of economic integration, ĂŶĚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞŝƌƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐƌĞĨƵƐĂůƚŽ
strike a deal on tariffs with the EFTA member states.426 The United States attempted to 
ƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĞ&dďǇĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚ ‘ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ
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423 Camps, Britain and the European Community (1964), 53; N. Piers Ludlow, Dealing with Britain: 
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424 Paul Gore-Booth to Harold Caccia, 21 January 1960, TNA/FO371/150152/M611/87. 
425  “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statement does not reflĞĐƚĂŶŝŵŽƐŝƚǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ&d ? ?427 This did little to quell the Foreign 
KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝŽŶ P 
 
 QƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŚĂĚĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƚŚĞŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ
that the Americans are supporting the Six against the Seven. We therefore fear that 
it may seriously prejudice discussions in the Trade Committee and cut across our 
efforts to find acceptable means of dealing with the European trade problem.428  
 
/ŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨǁŚĂƚǁĂƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ůƵŬĞǁĂƌŵĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
participation in the European integration process, the Prime Minister began consulting the 
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ^ƚĞĞƌŝŶŐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞĂŶĚtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůŝŶDĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ?ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
potential options.429 After some suggestions from Conservative MP Peter Kirk and others, 
the Foreign Office were asked to provide thoughts on the possibility of Britain joining the 
ECSC and Euratom, but not the EEC. Gilbert Holliday, the soon to be replaced Head of the 
K ?ĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂŵŝŶƵƚĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
ƐƚĂǇŝŶŐŽƵƚĂŶĚĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶŚĂƐĐŚĂŶŐĞĚƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐŚĂƚ ƌŝƚĂŝŶĐŽƵůĚƐƚĂŶĚƚŽŐĂŝŶ
significantly from membership of the ECSC and Euratom, but that this would be in direct 
conflict with EFTA and would probably result in eventual accession to the Common Market 
anyway.430 The initial thoughts of other officials varied. John Coulson argued that the 
 ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŬƵĚŽƐ ?ŽĨũŽŝŶŝŶŐĞŝƚŚĞƌŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞƋƵŝƚĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚ
do little to convince the Six that the British government were more committed to the ideal 
of European unity.431 The Permanent Under-Secretary, Frederick Hoyer-Millar, also waded 
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞĂŶĚĂĚĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞĨŽƌũŽŝŶŝŶŐďŽƚŚƵƌĂƚŽŵĂŶĚ^ŝƐƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶďĞĨŽƌĞ ? ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂƵŶĐŚŽĨ&dǁĂƐĂ ‘ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐĨĂĐƚŽƌ ?
and that the government would struggle to justify their move towards the Six without 
offending the Seven on some level.432 dŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ^ƚĞĞƌŝŶŐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĂůƐŽ
favoured a greater commitment to European integration. Frank Lee forcefully argued that 
EFTA was no longer a practical solution and that Britain could no longer rely on the 
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428 Ibid. 
429 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain (1997), 31. 
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Commonwealth.433 In addition, Lee discarded the notion of an Atlantic Free Trade Area as 
 ‘ŶŽƚĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂďůĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?434 According to Hugo Young, Lee was aware at this stage that 
he could not bluntly recommend membership of the EEC given the division of opinion in 
tŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?ďƵƚŚĞĚŝĚŵĂŬĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞĨŽƌ ‘ŶĞĂƌ-ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?435 
This stance tallied with the cautious calls for membership of one or more of the European 
Communities and opened the door to more support for initiatives concerned with 
associating with the EEC. On the whole, most Whitehall officials were in agreement that a 
re-examination of Britain joining the ECSC and Euratom was warranted, with Macmillan 
ĂĚĚŝŶŐ P ‘/ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇĂŐƌĞĞƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĂĨŝŶĞƚŚŝŶŐŝĨǁĞƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞĐĂƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ
hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵũŽŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽĂůĂŶĚ^ƚĞĞůŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚƵƌĂƚŽŵ ? ?436 
However, it is crucial to delve into the deeper implications of this decision. The motivation 
behind re-examining the case for British membership of the ECSC and Euratom was, in large 
part, concern over American attitudes towards British European policy. TŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
approach towards European integration was still heavily influenced by Atlanticist 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůƌĞĨƵƐĂůƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĨƵůůŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨ
the Common Market was in keeping with the cautious and guarded approach towards 
European integration which had characterised post-war British foreign policy. The push for 
British participation in Euratom and the ECSC was not a dramatic reversal of foreign policy; 
it was merely an alternative means of achieving long-held objectives, principally the 
ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŐůŽďĂůŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? 
Upon agreeing that the case for membership of the ECSC and Euratom was worth pursuing, 
the Foreign Office decided to ascertain the opinions of the Six and the United States. Sir 
HĂƌŽůĚĂĐĐŝĂ ?ƐƌĞƉůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶĞŵďĂƐƐǇǁĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞ
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƉůĂĐĂƚĞƚŚĞŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ĂŶĚůĂƚĞƌƚŚĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ )
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂĐĐŝĂ ?ƐƚĞůĞŐƌĂŵĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚǁŚĂƚ>ŽŶĚŽŶŚĂĚĨĞĂƌĞĚ P 
 
dŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚ QƚĞŶĚƚŽǁĞůĐŽŵĞan offer by us to join Euratom and/or the ECSC and 
regard it as a sign of grace on our part that we at last showed signs of moving in the 
direction in which they had always hoped we would move. But I think they would 
inevitably conclude that this was merely the first step and that with one more 
heave they would be able to get us into the European Economic Community (sic). 
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Otherwise they would not see much point in our taking this step and the 
favourable reaction would soon wear off.437 
 
The reaction from Bonn was slightly more optimistic. Sir Christopher Steel argued that large 
ŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐŚĂĚĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ƐŽŵĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽƌŐĞƐƚƵƌĞ ?ĨƌŽŵƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶ
order to counter the view that the EEC and EFTA were causing divisions, and that 
membership of Euratom and the ECSC would go some way to allay these fears.438 Gladwyn 
:Ğďď ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵWĂƌŝƐƉĂŝŶƚĞĚĂŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆƉŝĐƚƵƌĞǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽ&ƌĞŶĐŚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?
:ĞďďƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶĐŽƵůĚĞǆƉĞĐƚ ‘ĂŐƵĂƌĚĞĚǁĞůĐŽŵĞĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞĚďǇsome smug 
ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂĚĂƚůĂƐƚƐĞĞŶƚŚĞĞƌƌŽƌŽĨŽƵƌǁĂǇƐ ? ?439 In a similar vein to the 
Americans, Jebb also reported that the French would interpret British membership of 
Euratom and ECSC as the first step towards eventual accession to the Common Market.440 
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?:ĞďďǁĂƌŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ&ƌĞŶĐŚƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ŽƵƌŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽ
organisations was a deep-seated ploy by Perfidious Albion somehow to weaken the Six and 
ƚŽƉůĂǇƚŚĞŵŽĨĨĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞŚĂƌďŽƵƌĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ
would ultimately prove decisive.441 Despite some of the variations in the responses from 
the overseas embassies, several conclusions appeared to have been reached: the obstacles 
which had previously prevented Britain from joining the Communities were now less 
problematic; membership of the ECSC and Euratom would broadly be seen as a positive 
step towards European integration but would also conjure up suspicions over why Britain 
continued to refuse to enter the EEC; and British relations with EFTA and the Seven would 
likely suffer in the event that she enter the ECSC and Euratom. Compounding the warnings 
of the diplomatic service, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Derick Heathcoat-Amory 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ somewhat contradicted 
ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŵŽƌĞŽƉƚŝŵŝƐƚŝĐĐĂƐĞ ?,ĞĂƚŚĐŽĂƚ-ŵŽƌǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞ
little political advantage to be gained from our taking an initiative now to join either or 
ďŽƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŽĨŝtself bring about any significant 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƐ ? ?442 This argument summarised the 
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departmental scepticism of the Treasury towards the very idea of European integration, as 
argued by scholars such as Hugo Young, Ludlow, and Bulmer and Burch.443 The case for 
membership of the ECSC and Euratom, was, therefore, plagued with uncertainty and 
conflicting points of view. 
dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŚŽƉĞƐĨŽƌĂŐƵĂƌĚĞĚĂŶĚƋƵĂůŝĨĞĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŝǆǀŝĂƚŚĞ
ECSC and Euratom were soon dealt a blow when Arthur Tandy, the ambassador to the EEC, 
sent a report to the Foreign Office from Brussels detailing a conversation he had had with 
William Walton Butterworth of the United States mission to the EEC: 
 
He said that it had been decided that, if the United Kingdom were to propose 
joining Euratom and/or the ECSC but not the European Economic Community, the 
United States government would oppose acceptance of this by every means within 
their power no matter how much embarrassment was caused. The United States 
government believed that such action would be disruptive of the unity of the Six to 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚƐŽŵƵĐŚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ Q444 
 
The Eisenhower administration had previously expressed their support for the Common 
Market and refused to act as mediators between the two economic groupings in the OEEC, 
ďƵƚƚŚŝƐŚĂĚŐŽŶĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶŝƚƐĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŚĂůĨ-heartedness.445 The 
ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ƐĨĞĂƌƐĂŶĚƐƉƵƌƌĞĚDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶŝŶƚŽĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?
who was extremely concerned by the tidings which had reached him from Washington. The 
Prime Minister telegrammed Selwyn Lloyd, who at the time happened to be in the 
American capital, ordering him to discuss the attitude of the Eisenhower administration 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ with Europe with the Secretary of State, Christian Herter.446 
DĂĐŵŝůůĂŶƵƌŐĞĚ>ůŽǇĚƚŽƚƌǇĂŶĚĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞ,ĞƌƚĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ
ƚŽŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƵƌŽƉĞǁĞƌĞĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇƐŝŶĐĞƌĞĂŶĚƌĂŝƐĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽŽĚŵĂŶǇ
indications that tŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŝƚƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂƌĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?447 >ůŽǇĚ ?Ɛ
report back to London was short but stated that Herter had denied that the Americans 
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were consciously working against the British government on European integration.448 
dĂŶĚǇ ?Ɛƚelegram also provoked a response from John Robinson, a First Secretary in the 
EEOD. Robinson recognised that Britain needed to pursue its own independent policy 
towards Europe without constantly trying to justify their reluctance to the Americans. His 
minutes on the telegram betrayed a passionately pro-European stance, where he argued 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĂƚǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚƚĂŬĞĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŽŶ^ĂŶĚƵƌĂƚŽŵŝŶ
ŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚŝƐŚĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŶĞǆƚůŽŐŝĐĂůƐƚĞƉ ?449 In 
actual fact, this directly contradicted the attitudes of more senior officials such as Steel and 
Hoyer-Millar, who were hopeful that membership of the two Communities would allow 
Britain to continue her policy of prioritising the Anglo-American partnership and acting as 
ƚŚĞ ‘ďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶEŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƐƵďŵŝƚƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ ?ƐƐƚƌŝŶŐĞŶƚ
ƚƌĂĚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚŝƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞǁĂƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶZŽŐĞƌ:ĂĐŬůŝŶŐ ?Ɛmore Atlanticist 
comments:  
 
It is nevertheless for consideration whether we ought not to make yet another 
attempt to persuade the US to be of help to us, be that following a course of 
sympathetic passivity in our attempts to get our relationship with Europe right.450 
 
These comments from Robinson and Jackling are strong evidence of the gulf in attitudes 
between the elder and the younger generation in the Foreign Office. Both groups, of 
course, held the same objectives  W to preserve and promote British power and prestige in 
global politics. However, there was a profound disconnect in the genĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǀŝĞǁƐŽŶŚŽǁ
this could best be achieved. 
The mixed signals from Washington did not prevent the government and the Foreign Office 
from pursuing communications and meetings with officials and politicians from the Six. 
Roderick Barclay, the Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs, summoned 
the ambassadors of the Six to his office in London  W what became known as the ad hoc 
committee  W ĂŶĚŽƉĞŶĞĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƵƌĂƚŽŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ECSC.451 The WEU Council had tabled a recommendation on the subject a week earlier, and 
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the delegates agreed that informal discussions between representatives of Britain and the 
Six was the best way to proceed for the time being.452 ĂƌĐůĂǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ
provide a critical insiŐŚƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ŵŝŶĚƐĞƚĂƐƌŝƚĂŝŶĚƌŝĨƚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?,ĞĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƵƌĂƚŽŵĂŶĚ^ ‘ĚŝĚŶŽƚ
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶĞǁƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŽƌĂ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚ
the governmĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨ ‘ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐǁĂǇƐĂŶĚŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?453 It could be argued that Barclay had taken this line in an attempt to project the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĂŶĚƌĞƐŽůǀĞ ?ďƵƚĞǀĞŶŝĨƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ?ŝƚ
betrays the fact that senior officials and ministers were concerned with how British foreign 
policy towards Europe was perceived by the Six, and how this could potentially affect 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ŝĨĂƌĐůĂǇ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĞƚing were 
indeed sincere, then this is direct evidence of the Foreign Office pursuing what they 
considered to be a conservative and moderate strategy which did little to revolutionise the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚǁĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇŝŶŬĞĞƉŝŶg with the cautious 
and guarded approach which had been employed previously. As well as reaffirming the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůŝŶĞŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐĞƌǀĞĚĂĚƵĂůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?
Barclay went to great lengths to seek assurances that Britain would be granted the 
opportunity to apply to the ECSC and Euratom without applying to the EEC.454 The 
ambassadors of the Six offered no such guarantees, with the Dutch ambassador arguing 
ƚŚĂƚĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚŽŶůǇďĞƌĞĂĐŚĞĚǁŚĞŶ ‘ĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞŚad been 
ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ? ?455 This did little to comfort Barclay, who responded negatively when the 
ambassador from Luxembourg stated that the meeting itself showed that the Six accepted 
ƚŚĞh< ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?456  
The ad hoc committee met again at the end of July 1960, where Barclay once again took a 
firm line on Euratom and the ECSC, stating that the British government needed some 
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƐƵĐŚĂǀĞŶƚƵƌĞ ?457 However, Barclay also referred 
to a speech made by the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, where the latter made clear that 
the government understood that British membership of the two Communities could not be 
 ‘ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚŝŶŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁŝĚĞƌƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ŽĨŚĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚ
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the Common Market.458  ƐǁŝůůďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚďĞůŽǁ ?>ůŽǇĚ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨŽŵŵŽŶƐ
ŚĂĚĂƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
integration, and gave them a fund of goodwill with the Germans and Italians in 
particular.459 ĂƌĐůĂǇ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞǁĂƐƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ
tried to explain to Barclay that given the uncertain future of the Communities, as well as 
their possible amalgamation, a definitive position on Britain joining the ECSC and Euratom 
was not possible.460 The Dutch ambassador pressed Barclay further and asked if the British 
government were completely unable to accept accession to the EEC; Barclay replied rather 
ǀĂŐƵĞůǇƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƐƚŝůůŶŽƚŬŶŽǁŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƵƌĂƚŽŵ ‘ĐŽƵůĚ
ŶŽƚďĞĚŝǀŽƌĐĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ?461 It was agreed that the questions raised by 
ĂƌĐůĂǇŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ
European Communities in Brussels, where they would be subjected to a lengthy process of 
consultation and assessment.462 The bid for membership of Euratom and the ECSC would 
have to wait.  
Whilst the EEOD continued to examine the case for British membership of the ECSC and 
Euratom, things were moving quickly in the Cabinet and the Economic Steering Committee. 
&ƌĂŶŬ>ĞĞ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐŝŶƉƌŝůĂŶĚDĂǇŚĂĚƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞ
Minister, and on 13 July 1960 a Cabinet meeting was called.463 Ministers were presented 
with a report from Cabinet Office offŝĐŝĂůƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶ>ĞĞ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĂ
momentous debate ensued on the possibility of Britain joining or associating with the 
Common Market.464 ĞƐƉŝƚĞ>ĞĞ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐ:ŽŝŶƚWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?
foreign policy questions formed an integral part of the discussion. The document plainly 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁĂƐĨĂƐƚďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĨŽƌĐĞ ?
ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚƐŽŽŶďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŶůǇtĞƐƚĞƌŶďůŽĐ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶŐŝŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ QƚŚĞh^^ZĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?465 Interestingly, the document 
also went to some length to dispel any beliefs that the Six would form a controversial, non-
ĂůŝŐŶĞĚ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ?ŝŶŐůŽďĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂƐƚŝĐŬŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚĨŽƌŵĂŶǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŝŶ
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the previous chapter.466 It was argued that the Six would only deviate from the United 
States and the Atlantic Alliance to a very limited extent, which quelled fears that some of 
the Western European states, particularly France and West Germany, might seek some 
form of rapprochement with the Soviet Union.467 The issue which probably had the greatest 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶĂďŝŶĞƚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĂƐƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐǁŝƚŚ
ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?/ƚǁĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂ ‘ŐƌŽǁƚŚŽĨĚŝƌĞĐƚ
conƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ^ŝǆĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĂŶĚ
ǁŽƵůĚĂůŵŽƐƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇũĞŽƉĂƌĚŝƐĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƌŽůĞĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽƌ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶEŽƌƚŚ
America and Western Europe.468 dŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶ QŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐe  W 
especially in Europe  W would inevitably encourage the United States to pay increasing 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƐŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ǁĂƐĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌĂŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁŚŽŚĂĚƉƵƚĂůŽƚŽĨƐƚŽĐŬŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?.469 There were 
ƐƚŝůůǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚũŽŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƵůĚĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
States on atomic energy and potentially antagonise trade relations with American goods 
facing strong discrimination from the common external tariff, but the argument that Anglo-
American relations would suffer inside the EEC had been turned on its head.  
This, for many of the senior policymakers in Whitehall and in government, eventually 
ďĞĐĂŵĞƚŚĞ ‘ĐůŝŶĐŚĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĂƉƉůǇĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝp of the 
Common Market. The Cabinet did not agree to apply on 13 July 1960; several ministers still 
ŚĂĚƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚ&d ?ďƵƚĂƐ>ĂŵďŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? ‘DĂĐŵŝůůĂŶ
ŚĂĚďƌŽŬĞŶƚŚĞŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŝƐŶŽǁƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚďǇƐŽŵĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐĂs the decisive 
moment when the first application became a reality.470 &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?DĂĐŵŝůůĂŶ ?Ɛ
subsequent Cabinet reshuffle two weeks later saw a number of pro-European ministers 
promoted, including Edward Heath as Lord Privy Seal, Christopher Soames as Minister for 
Agriculture and Duncan Sandys as Minister for Commonwealth Relations.471 Selwyn Lloyd 
was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer and was replaced as Foreign Secretary by Alec 
Douglas-,ŽŵĞ ?ǁŚŽ ‘by temperament and background Qwas some distance removed from 
Heath's passionate commitment to a united Europe ?and was more than content for Heath 




469 Ibid.; Alan S. Milward, The United Kingdom and the European Community Volume I: The Rise and 
Fall of a National Strategy 1945-1963 (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 311. 
470 See: Lamb, The Macmillan Years (1995), 139; Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 123. 
471 Young, This Blessed Plot  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?'ƌĞĞŶǁŽŽĚ ? “ ?EŽƚƚŚĞ “'ĞŶĞƌĂůtŝůů ? ďƵƚƚŚĞ “tŝůůŽĨƚŚĞ
'ĞŶĞƌĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
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to take the lead on the negotiations.472 The board was set, and Macmillan had invested in 
ƚŚĞƉŝĞĐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚǁŽƵůĚĚĞůŝǀĞƌŚŝŵĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ‘ĐŚĞĐŬŵĂƚĞ ?ŝŶƵƌope. The 





















                                                          
472 Lamb, The Macmillan Years (1995), 139; Audland, Right Place  W Right Time (2004), 123; Douglas 
,ƵƌĚ ? “,ŽŵĞ ?ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌ&ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬŽƵŐůĂƐ-, Fourteenth Earl of Home and Baron Home of the Hirsel 




 ?dŚĞEĞĞĚĨŽƌWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐhŶŝƚǇŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? 
 
The first matter mentioned in the Motion is that of European unity, the need for 
political and economic unity in Europe. I want to make certain points absolutely 
clear. We in Britain regard ourselves as part of Europe. By history, by tradition, by 
civilisation, by sentiment, by geŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ǁĞĂƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ Qthe fact that the 
English Channel had not been crossed successfully in war as often as had some 
other physical barriers in Europe did not disqualify us from European status. The 
fact that our Queen is Head of the Commonwealth and that we are a member of 
that association does not disqualify us from European status.473 
 
^ĞůǁǇŶ>ůŽǇĚ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƚƌĂĚĞĚĞďĂƚĞŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨŽŵŵŽŶƐŝŶŚŝƐ
new position as Chancellor of the Exchequer represented a significant moment for the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚion, and was an exceptionally well-timed 
political gambit. Just as the Foreign Office had opened up discussions with representatives 
from the Six on membership of the ECSC and Euratom, the Chancellor had confirmed 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚƌŽŶŐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂůŽf European unity. The move yielded results 
almost instantaneously. Macmillan met with Adenauer a couple of weeks after the debate 
in the Commons, where the two men had highly productive talks on British association with 
the EEC, with the Chancellor announcing that he strongly believed Commonwealth free 
entry could and should be preserved.474 This was a remarkably radical statement, with an 
article in The Times ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ P ‘ŝƚĐĂŶďĞƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐǇĞƐƚĞƌĚĂǇ ŶĚƚŽĚĂǇ
have made it possible for Britain to contemplate association with the Six that seemed 
ĂůŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŽŶůǇĂĨĞǁǁĞĞŬƐĂŐŽ ? ?475 Adenauer also suggested further bilateral talks 
ǁŝƚŚDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶŽŶƚŚĞ ‘^ŝǆ ?^ĞǀĞŶ ?ŝƐƐƵĞƐƉůĂŐƵŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ&dĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŶ
the autumn of the same year, which eventually took place in November.476 So far, the 
WƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌŝŶŐǁĂƐƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ? 
The EEOD continued to play a crucial role as the government pushed for association with 
the Common Market at the high political level. In light of the progress made by the Prime 
Minister, the department changed its rhetoric on British involvement in Europe and 
became much less guarded, at least in internal correspondence. In preparation for the Lord 
WƌŝǀǇ^ĞĂů ?ĚǁĂƌĚ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐǀŝƐŝƚ to the WEU Assembly, a brief was drafted which updated 
                                                          
473  “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶdƌĂĚĞ ?,Deb 25 July 1960 vol. 627 c. 1099. 
474  “ƌŝƚŝƐŚ>ŝŶŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŝǆEĞĂƌĞƌ ? ?The Times 12 August 1960, 10. 
475 Ibid. 




the one which had been followed previously, stating: 
 
We have now come round to the view not only that membership of Euratom and 
ECSC alone would bring no direct gain for us (indeed membership of Euratom and 
ECSC alone would bring serious disadvantages unless we could negotiate special 
treatment), but that it would not materially assist us to achieve our political 
objectives. These can only be achieved by membership, or something very similar 
to membership, of all three Six-power Communities. Moreover, it is most 
improbable that the Six would grant us membership of only two of the three 
communities.477 
 
This was a significant departure from the orthodoxy which had prevailed a couple of 
months earlier, where membership of two of the European Communities was seen as a 
viable option worthy of serious exploration. The reasons behind this change are not 
entirely clear. ThĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŚŝƐ
ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚ ‘ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚŝŶƚŚĞ
summer of 1960 certainly appear to have played a role.478 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?'ƌĞĞŶǁŽŽĚ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ
that the Foreign KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŚĂĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚĨƌŽŵ ‘^ŝǆ ?^ĞǀĞŶďƌŝĚŐĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ?ƚŽ ‘ĂŵŽƌĞ
ƌĂĚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ QďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶŽĨ
ĚŝƐƐĞŶƐŝŽŶĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞtĞƐƚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐ ?ŝƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂƌĐŚŝǀĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?
particularly departmental concerns over United States attitudes towards British 
detachment from the Six.479  
dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŶĞǁůŝŶĞŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚďǇĂƚĞůĞŐƌĂŵĨƌŽŵ
Arthur Tandy, the UK Representative to the European Communities. Tandy argued that 
 ‘ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƐŚŽƌƚŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŽƵůĚĚĞƉƌŝǀĞƚŚĞh<ŽĨƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŝŶ ?ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵŽŶĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ ?Ɛ ?ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ?ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ
ŵŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚe entering into any 
relationship with the EEC other than one which would be accepted as membership 
                                                          
477  “tĞƐƚĞƌŶ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478 See: Lamb, The Macmillan Years (1995), 138; Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the 
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ĐŽŶĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂůůŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?480 dĂŶĚǇ ?ƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů
argument was that Britain stood to lose more from exclusion than it did from inclusion  W 
better in than out. The comments on his telegram appear to have been broadly in 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂŐĂŝŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞKǁĞƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŵŽƌĞ ‘ƌĂĚŝĐĂů
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ?dŚĞƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞůǇƉƌŽ-European John Robinson stated that there was 
ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŝŶdĂŶĚǇ ?ƐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚǁĞŶĞĞĚĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ? ?481 This was high praise 
ŝŶĚĞĞĚĨƌŽŵĂŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůǁŚŽŚĂĚĂƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌďĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŵĂŶǇŽĨŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ
and suggestions.482 Ken Gallagher, the Head of the EEOD, was equally in accordance with 
ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ P ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐŝŶDƌ ?dĂŶĚǇ ?ƐŶŽƚĞĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƌŽǁŶ
ǀŝĞǁƐ ? ?483 'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĞŶƚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨdĂŶĚǇ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚƐ ?dĂŶĚǇŚĂĚ
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨĂŶĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝon with the ECSC High Authority was 
ŵŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐĚǁŝŶĚůŝŶŐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Communities.484 Gallagher concurred and also stated his belief that following the Treaty of 
Rome, the Council of Ministers was fast ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ‘ŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐďŽĚǇ ? ?ĚƵĞ
ƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶƚŚĞĨĞĚĞƌĂůŝƐƚŝĚĞĂ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĞƌĞ
largely hostile towards.485 'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌĂĚĚĞĚƚŚĂƚŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐƚŚĞ
principal decision-making body in the EEC, national governments were at less risk of being 
overruled or having their authority challenged by the Commission.486 In short, the 
supranational barrier was seemingly a much lesser problem than it had been previously. 
This could lend further justification for a British bid for membership of the Common 
DĂƌŬĞƚ ?'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐǁĂƐŝŶŬĞĞƉŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐůŝŵĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇ PĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ
anti-federalist sentiment was no secret and the French President had been pressing for 
regulĂƌŝŶƚĞƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐŚĞĂĚƐŽĨƐƚĂƚĞƚŽƐƚĞŵƚŚĞƚŝĚĞŽĨ
supranationalism.487 &ŽƌĂƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚ ‘ƉĂŝŶĨƵůůǇůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ŵŝŶĚƐƵĐŚĂƐ'ĂůůŐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ?ƚŚŝƐ
threat to British sovereignty had been minimised.488 As such, it could be argued that 
'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĂƌŝƚŝƐŚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇĚƵĞ
                                                          
480 ƌƚŚƵƌdĂŶĚǇ ? “h<ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ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TNA/FO371/150165/M611/287. 
481 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? December 1960, TNA/FO371/150165/M611/287. 
482 See: Christopher Audland, interviewed by Thomas Raineau, 20 June 2012, CCC/BDOHP/138/23. 
483 <ĞŶ'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? December 1960, TNA/FO371/150165/M611/287. 
484 ƌƚŚƵƌdĂŶĚǇ ? “h<ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ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TNA/FO371/150165/M611/287. 
485 <ĞŶ'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
486 Ibid. 
487 Northedge, British Foreign Policy (1962), 324; Bulmer ? “ritain anĚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
8; Young Britain and European Unity (2000), 65. 




ƚŽƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛpersonal attachment to the principle 
of European unity. These attitudes defined the differences between the elder and younger 
generations of officials under study in this chapter. 
The new departmental line continued to bear fruit. In December 1960, the WEU Assembly 
ƉĂƐƐĞĚĂƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŽƉĞŶĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌ
governments of WEU ǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇĂƐĂĨƵůůŵĞŵďĞƌŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?489 dŚĞƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĚĞĞŵĞĚ ‘ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌǇ ?ďǇ
ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƚĞǀĞŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ‘ƚŚĞĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞh<ƚŽƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇŽĨZŽŵĞŽŶ
terms accepƚĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞh< ? ?490 Whilst this may seem like a diplomatic victory, it is worth 
acknowledging that this resolution meant very little in the grand scheme of things. The 
WEU Council was completely separate from the institutions of the European Communities 
and in fact had no say in the membership process. The Foreign Office were aware of this 
ĂŶĚĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŝŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐƚŽ ‘ŶŽƚƚĂŬĞĂŶǇĐŽŐŶŝƐĂŶĐĞŽĨŝƚ
ĂƐǇĞƚ ? ?491 However, the WEU Council was made up of delegates from the six member 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŐĂǀĞƚŚĞƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƉĞĐŝĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂ ‘ƉƌĞĐƵƌƐŽƌ ?ŽĨ
acceptance for Britain. In this sense, one could argue that it provided the British 
government with a valuable propaganda coup which could be referred to as the 
negotiations unfolded. The near-unanimous support for a British bid for membership of the 
European Communities was a strong endorsement and a gesture of goodwill on the part of 
the Six. The substance of the resolution is, however, of less importance than the wider 
impact it had on attitudes in the Foreign Office. Having received word of the resolution 
from Brussels, the Foreign Office circulated a telegram to all British High Commissioners in 
Commonwealth countries with a view to giving assurances on the future of Commonwealth 
trade. The telegram instructed the High Commissioners to inform the Commonwealth 
governments that the member states of the EEC were beginning to appreciate the 
importance and the complexity of Commonwealth trade as a potential bar to British entry 
of the Common Market.492 In addition, the telegram mentioned the fact that there was a 
 ‘ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂƌĞŝŶƐĞƉĂƌĂďůĞ ?ǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
links with the Commonwealth.493  
                                                          
489  “t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This statement is crucial in compreŚĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
integration policy. For years, the department had pursued a strategy of separating 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Free Trade Area were two schemes created by separate Foreign Office departments in 
order to boost British cooperation with Europe, and whilst the two complemented one 
another, there was a clear separation of political and economic considerations between the 
WOD and the MAD. Indeed, the Macmillan government had continued to attempt to forge 
economic links with Europe without paying the political price of loss of sovereignty via 
EFTA. It was an argument which Sir Gladwyn Jebb had consistently tried to make to his 
colleagues, that the EEC waƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĂ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚ
economic questions needed to be considered jointly.494 This new attitude towards 
European integration, albeit still very guarded and cautious, was a more radical one than 
that which had preceded it. Indeed, in his memoirs, Christopher Audland suggests that the 
ŶĂŵŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞKǁĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƉůĂǇĚŽǁŶ QƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?495  
ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ƚŚĞK ?ƐƚůĂŶƚŝĐŝƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ
towards EFTA and a possible Six/Seven solution endured. These concerns were exacerbated 
by the uncertainties surrounding the creation of a new administration under the newly-
elected President John F. Kennedy. Although the Foreign Office had moved towards a more 
favourable position on the EEC, there were still very serious questions surrounding issues 
such as EFTA, agriculture, and the Commonwealth. Barclay launched enquiries with the 
tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶĞŵďĂƐƐǇ ‘ƚŽƐĞĞǁŚĂƚƉŽůicy the new administration will follow on the 
^ŝǆ ?^ĞǀĞŶŝƐƐƵĞ ? ?496 Barclay was confident that the new personnel in the State Department 
would be less hostile to EFTA and that progress could be made on an association with the 
Common Market.497 As argued above, Barclay had a highly personal stake in the success of 
the EFTA. His position as Deputy Under-Secretary and special adviser on European trade 
questions had seen him play an integral part in the launching of EFTA, which he also named 
his dog after, highlighting his strong emotional attachment to his work.498 Barclay stressed 
ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ƚŚĞďĞŶĞǀŽůĞŶƚŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞh^ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŝĨƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝǀĞ
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ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƐŽůǀĞƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŝŶtĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?499 Barclay was very clear 
in his discussion of the Six/Seven problem that it was a matter of great political magnitude, 
and acknowledged that it could not simply be relegated to a debate on tariffs and 
economic interests.500 In addition, Barclay made reference to the fact that a Six/Seven 
association would open the door to more favourable arrangements on agriculture and the 
Commonwealth for Britain in the event that she acceded to the EEC.501 In this sense, 
Barclay represented the cautious and conservative wing of the Foreign Office, who were in 
principle unopposed to membership of the Common Market but demanded a heavily 
qualified relationship with safeguards in place. As such, the line being taken by the more 
senior figures in the EEOD was not radically different to the institutional orthodoxy a few 
years earlier, when membership of the EEC was ruled out completely. 
The ambassador to the United States, Harold Caccia, replied to Barclay and seems to have 
harboured very similar views. Caccia argued that the best course of action would be to try 
ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŝŶŽǀĞƌ ?ƐĞǀĞƌĂůŬĞǇŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞǁ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ
Dean Rusk and the chiefs of the Economic Affairs department.502 The ambassador 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐďĞĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚďǇĂƉƉĞĂůŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽůĚtĂƌ
objectives by making the argument that a Six/Seven solution would substantially bolster 
the strength of the Western bloc.503 ĂĐĐŝĂ ?ƐƉƌĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ
strategies and overarching global security matters was typical of the senior generation, 
ǁŚŽƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽǀŝĞǁŵŽƐƚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂƚƚĞƌƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ?ůĞŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ŽůĚtĂƌ ?ĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŵĂĚĞĂďƵŶĚĂŶƚůǇĐůĞĂƌŝŶĂĐĐŝĂ ?Ɛ
ƚĞůĞŐƌĂŵ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞǁĂƐƚŽĨŽƌŐĞ ‘ĂŶ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐǇƐƚĞŵĞŵďƌĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?504 
dŚŝƐĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƚŽĂŶ ‘ƚůĂŶƚŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?ƐƉĞĂƌŚĞĂĚĞĚďǇŶŐůŽ-American leadership, 
was an idea which never lost traction with those who had witnessed the administrative 
ƉĞĂŬŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞtĂƌ ?ĂĐĐŝƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂŶĞǁ
memorandum be drafted for the Washington embassy to use and refer to during 
discussions with members of the Kennedy administration.505 This would give the embassy a 
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line to follow which would hopefully prove agreeable to members of the State Department. 
Barclay agreed and the EEOD began drafting immediately.506 
The memorandum for the Washington embassy is extremely important to this study for 
two reasons. Firstly, the four senior officials under study in this chapter  W Roderick Barclay, 
Patrick Reilly, Ken Gallagher and Roger Jackling  W were all consulted on the draft. Secondly, 
it highlights the weight which concerns over United States attitudes carried in the Foreign 
Office, and more specifically, the EEOD, which was supposedly occupied with European 
economic issues, not Anglo-American relations. The first draft of the memorandum 
acknowledged that hitherto, two different methods of European cooperation had 
manifested themselves: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.507 These differing 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐǁĞƌĞůĂďĞůůĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƉůŝƚŝŶtĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?508 This 
admission is of particular interest to this study, as it affirms the findings of the previous 
ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝƚŝƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĂŶ ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?
framework for European cooperation. Whilst the draft recognised that these competing 
visions of European unity had contributed towards the formation of a rift in Western 
Europe, the rhetoric employed hinted that the blame lay with the Six and their refusal to 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚ ‘ǁŝĚĞƌĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƵŶity of Western Europe as 
ĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ?509 dŚŝƐŝƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇ ?dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů
line on EEC had indeed changed, as outlined above, but the acceptance that an application 
for membership was imminent did not remove all traces of reluctance and reservation. 
Officials such as Barclay, Reilly, Jackling and Gallagher were still adamant that safeguards 
for British interests such as EFTA were essential preconditions for accession. This is the 
overriding attitude which coloured the memorandum for convincing the new United States 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?dŚĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚ
ǁĞƌĞĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚǁĂƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂůƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĂŶĚ
stability of the free worlĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƐŵ ?
and that damaging the economic interests of the Commonwealth by forcing Britain to yield 
its policy of free entry would be a blow to the Western bloc.510 In addition, the draft made 
reference ƚŽƚŚĞŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƉŽůŝĐǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ?Ɛ ?
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citing a potentially sharp rise in food prices.511 The possibility of an EEC-EFTA association 
was presented as the main solution to these problems, and the recent WEU resolution and 
bilateral talks between Macmillan and Adenauer were used as evidence of a more 
sympathetic view emerging from the Six.512  
The first draft of the memorandum came under some criticism from the strongly pro-
European Edward Tomkins, the Head of the Western Department and a future ambassador 
to France.513 The official had a number of concerns which he echoed to his colleagues. 
Firstly, Tomkins argued that the memorandum in its current form would do little to win 
over more sceptical members of the State Department such as Douglas Dillon.514 His main 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚƵŶĚƵůǇŝŵƉůŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĨŽƌ
European unity were the same as those of the Six, which he believed to be fundamentally 
untrue.515 Secondly, he said that such a statement would provoke a strong rebuttal from 
ƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƐŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŝƌǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂŶĚ&d ?ƐĂŝŵƐǁĞƌĞĚŝǀĞƌŐĞŶƚ ?
 ‘ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ^ŝǆĂŶĚŶŽƚƚŚĞ^ĞǀĞŶ ? ?516 Thirdly, Tomkins 
also urged caution with regards to the criticisms levelled at the Six in the draft, suggesting 
ƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚĚŽůŝƚƚůĞƚŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĐĂƵƐĞ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŐŝǀĞŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ^ƚĂƚĞ
Department sympathies.517 dŚĞƚŽƉŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŝŶƚŚĞKƚŽŽŬĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŽdŽŵŬŝŶƐ ?
criticisms. PatrŝĐŬZĞŝůůǇĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚdŽŵŬŝŶƐ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆǁĂƐƵŶǁŝƐĞ ?
ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƌĞĂůĚĂŶŐĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝƚŝƐǀĞƌǇŚĂƌĚƚŽƐĂǇƚŚŝƐ
ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐůǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ QŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐƐŽŵĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆĂƌĞĚŽŝŶŐ ? ?518 Barclay largely 
ĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞĚǁŝƚŚZĞŝůůǇ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂĚĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞŝŶ ĨĂĐƚƐŽŵĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚĂŶĚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƌĞƐŝƐƚĞĚ
this.519 :ĂĐŬůŝŶŐǁĂƐŵŽƌĞƐĐĂƚŚŝŶŐŽĨdŽŵŬŝŶƐ ?ƌĞŵĂƌŬƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞ had read his 
ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ‘ǁŝƚŚƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŵŽƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƚŚĂŶŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? ‘ƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĂůǁĂǇƐĨŽƌƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƐƚŽĨ
ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ? ?520 Gallagher added that Tomkins had misunderstood the aim of the 
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518 WĂƚƌŝĐŬZĞŝůůǇ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ?  ? ? ? ? 
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ůŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚŚĂĚŶŽƚĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂ ‘ŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐŽƌŝŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐ
cause.521 ,ĂǀŝŶŐďĞĞŶĨŝƌŵůǇŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞK ?ƐƐĞŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?dŽŵŬŝŶƐǁĂs overruled 
and the memorandum was sent to the Cabinet for approval. The ministers reviewed the 
memorandum and after adding a couple of suggestions from the Prime Minister, 
authorised it to be sent to Harold Caccia.522 The overtures to the Kennedy administration 
were given the green light. 
Meanwhile, the Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, decided to write to Macmillan in order to 
update him on the progress of the Six/Seven issue in light of the bilateral talks which had 
been conducted with the Germans and Italians, as mentioned above. Heath informed the 
Prime Minister that so far the talks had been quite productive, but that the French still 
remained the greatest barrier to further progress.523 ,ĞĂƚŚĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŚŝƐƚŽƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ?Ɛ
lack of understanding of the British position and concerns.524 He suggested bilateral talks 
with them as soon as possible in order to establish a mutual understanding of the two 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?525 The government had tried to hold tripartite talks with both the 
French and the Germans, but the former had refused on the grounds that they would be 
ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ‘ĐŽƌŶĞƌĞĚ ?ďǇƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƚǁŽ ?526 ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŽŶĐŽŶƐƵůƚŝŶŐŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ
over these new developments were pragmatic and calculating. The Lord Privy Seal knew 
ƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞto raise before the Anglo-French talks the fundamental 
questions of foreign policy, national sovereignty and the problem of association with or 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚ ?ĂƐŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ
which had appeared at the momentous Cabinet meeting of July 1960 would resurface.527 
/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?,ĞĂƚŚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚƚƌǇƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŽƵƌĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐǁŝƚŚƵƐ ?ďǇĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐ
the positives of the Anglo-German talks.528 Heath knew that there would be fierce 
opposition from certain members of the Cabinet such as the Home Secretary Rab Butler, 
but elected to keep his colleagues in the dark for the time being.529 
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Simultaneously, Macmillan had ordered the Foreign Office to draft a Cabinet paper on 
British policy towards the Six and the Seven, which the EEOD took the lead on. The paper, 
ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĞĚŝƚĞĚŚĞĂǀŝůǇďǇĂƌĐůĂǇ ?ƌĞĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ
membership of the EEC on political grounds. The main motivation for membership, as it 
had been since the reassessment in July 1960, was the possibility of British power fading 
next to the increased significance of the Six; the mentality that Britain was better off in 
than out.530 The document also made much of the overarching security issues which would 
unfold if the Six were to fail and the Western bloc was to be weakened.531 These points had 
essentially been transplanted from the previous Cabinet paper and made no new 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƉĂ Ğƌ ?ƐĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
reduction in natioŶĂůƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇǁĂƐŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞĐĂŶĚŝĚ ?/ƚƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞ^ŝǆ
would involve a greater surrender of our national sovereignty, e.g. in the powers of 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĂŶǁĞŚĂǀĞŚŝƚŚĞƌƚŽĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞĚ ? ?532 Despite this frank assessment of 
national sovereignty, the paper went to great lengths to emphasise the advantages of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƐĂǇŝŶƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞŽĨŚĞƌŐůŽďĂů
ƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƋƵĞůůĨĞĂƌƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐĂĐƌŽƐĂŶĐƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐďĞŝŶŐƐŽůĚĚŽǁŶ
the river.533 The most significant statement, however, referred to the choice between 
membership and association: 
 
Joining rather than associating would be the best way to achieve our foreign policy 
objectives. Moreover, an offer to join would be more likely to appeal to General de 
Gaulle than an offer to associate, which he would suspect as designed to secure the 
benefits without paying the price.534 
 
The open acknowledgement that an application for full membership would convince the 
&ƌĞŶĐŚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇand would, on balance, be more positive in the fulfilment of 
British foreign policy objectives was a slightly bolder line than that which had been 
espoused earlier. The possibility of an associative relationship had dominated policymaking 
throughout much of 1960. The attraction of full membership, albeit with safeguards in 
place, was becoming stronger in the Foreign Office, and further consultations on the 
                                                          









joining the ComŵƵŶŝƚǇĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ “ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?535 
Bilateral talks with the French were arranged and took place on the 27 and 28 February in 
the Foreign Office. The British delegation was led by Sir Roderick Barclay and the French 
delegation was led by Olivier Wormser, ŚĞĂĚŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐĂƚƚŚĞYƵĂŝĚ ?KƌƐĂǇ ?536 
>ƵĚůŽǁŚĂƐƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ‘ŚĂĚĐŽŵĞƚŽĨĞĂƌĂŶĚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ?tŽƌŵƐĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
ĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨƌĞĞƚƌĂĚĞĂƌĞĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĨŽƌŚŝƐĨŝƌŵĂŶĚƵŶĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐŝŶŐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ
style.537 Therefore, the talks were regarded as highly important and extremely sensitive. 
Barclay knew that Wormser would not be persuaded easily. The discussions began on EFTA 
and the need for safeguards for the Seven.538 As Heath had predicted, the French 
responded by urging the British to accede to the Treaty of Rome and that their attitude 
towards individual issues such as EFTA would depend heavily on whether the UK was 
seeking full membership or a loose association.539 The French delegation also argued that 
ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĂĚŝŶĞss to accept the common external tariff was a welcome 
step forward, but that it was loaded with caveats on Commonwealth free entry which 
ůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?540 When Barclay pressed the French on how their 
attitudes would differ if Britain chose a loose association over membership, the French 
avoided giving a definitive answer.541 This would have been particularly frustrating for the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ǁŚŽƵŶĚĞƌ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŐƌĞĂƚůĞŶŐƚŚƐƚŽĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŚĞ
French position ŽŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ ‘ƐƚŝĐŬŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƐ ? ?KŶĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĨŝƌŵůǇƌƵůĞĚŽƵƚ
any special provisions for British farming and argued that any demands on this front would 
ŵĂŬĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚ ‘ƌĂŝƐĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ?542 This statement 
effectively slammed the door shut on the possibility of an extended transitional period for 
British agriculture; something which, according to Christopher Audland, the Ministry of 
Agriculture would later take great exception to and cause great difficulties over.543 Overall, 
the meeting had proven largely unsatisfactory to the Foreign Office. Barclay wrote that 
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 ‘ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚthere was an exchange of views which both sides agreed had been useful, not 
ŵƵĐŚĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚǁĂƐĨŽƵŶĚ ? ?544 The dismissal of the possibility of an associative 
relationship with the Common Market by Wormser was a bitter pill to swallow, particularly 
for Barclay who favoured a looser arrangement in order to protect EFTA and the 
Commonwealth.545 
The lukewarm hearing from the French was compounded by the response from the United 
States. In late March, the American Under-Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural 
Affairs, who was also responsible for European affairs, George Ball, visited London.546 Ball is 
most famous for his opposition to the Vietnam War, but he was also passionately attached 
ƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘ĂƐƚƌŽŶŐ ?ƵŶŝĨŝĞĚtĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?547 Ball believed that Europe was the 
ƉŝǀŽƚĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƌĞŶĂŽĨƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŬĞǇƚŽĂƐƚ-tĞƐƚƌĂƉƉƌŽĐŚĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁĂƐ
through European integration.548 In his memoirs, Ball stated that after Kennedy took office 
ŚĞƐĂǁŚŝƐĚƵƚŝĞƐ ‘ĂƐƚǁŽĨŽůĚ ? P 
 
I would encourage the British to take the plunge, but, at the same time I must not 
let insular British elements destroy the institutional potential of the Rome Treaty 
and turn the European Community into a mere trading bloc.549 
 
Ăůů ?ƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚƵƌŶĞĚŽƵƚƚŽďĞĂŚĞĂĚĂĐŚĞĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ĂƌĐůĂǇ
and the other top officials in the EEOD had hoped that the new State Department 
personnel would be much more ƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ?ďƵƚĂůů
harboured no such sympathy. He was particularly critical of what he perceived to be British 
 ‘ĂůŽŽĨŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ‘ŚĂĚŶŽƚǇĞƚĂĚũƵƐƚĞĚƚŽƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?
with the loss of ŚĞƌĞŵƉŝƌĞ ?ƌĞŵŝŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇĂŶŝƐůĂŶĚŶĂƚŝŽŶŽŶ
which the sun not only set, but set every evening  W provided one could see it for the 
ƌĂŝŶ ? ?550 At the meeting in London, which was attended by Heath and Sir Frank Lee, Ball 
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remarked that ŚĞǁĞůĐŽŵĞĚ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐŵŽƌĞŽƉƚŝŵŝƐƚŝĐŽƵƚůŽŽŬŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚ
urged the British government to go further.551 When pressed on the Six/Seven issue by Lee, 
who argued that the United States would surely prefer a less stringent arrangement in 
order to stem the tide of EEC protectionism, particularly with regards to agriculture, Ball 
ĨůĂƚůǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ‘ǁĂƐƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚĨŽƌƐŽŵĞƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞƐŽĨ
ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ? ?552 This is not what the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽŚĞĂƌ ?dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌƚƌĂĚĞ
discrimination and their balance of payments had been one of the few points which the 
Foreign Office had been able to use as an argument in favour of a looser Six/Seven 
association. Furthermore, Ball emphatically stated that the new administration would 
directly oppose any attempts by the British government to reap the economic benefits of 
membership of the Common Market without paying the political price of 
supranationalism.553 This was a fatal blow for the senior officials under study in this chapter 
who fervently believed in a qualified relationship with the Six. By contrast, however, 
Ludlow has argued that the talks with the French and the Americans provided Macmillan, 
,ĞĂƚŚĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ
Cabinet and the Conservative party that full membership was the only available path, citing 
ƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐŝŵƉĂƚŝĞŶĐĞ ‘ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐůŽǁĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽĨďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?554 Ludlow 
ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚƌĂƚĂŐĞŵŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƚŽDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶŝŶ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ?
where he urged the Prime Minister to not call for a major policy review until they could 
 ‘ƐŚŽǁ ?ƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞ QĚŽŶĞĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐƉŽƐƐible to achieve our object along the 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚůŝŶĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂůůŽƚŚĞƌŽƉƚŝŽŶƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶĞǆŚĂƵƐƚĞĚ ?555 Regardless of whether or 
not the Prime Minister and the Lord Privy Seal had hoped that French and American 
stubbornness would provide them with the opportunity to launch the application for 
membership formally, one thing is certain: association was no longer seen as a viable 
strategy.  
In response to the talks with France and the United States, Macmillan and Heath ordered 
Whitehall to begin seriously considering the potential results of a successful British 
accession to the European Communities. John Robinson and Christopher Audland were 
designated the task of re-ĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚ&dŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
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552 Ibid.; Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (1982), 212. 
553 Ibid. 
554 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain (1997), 37. 
555 Ibid.; Edward Heath to Harold Macmillan, 7 February 1961, TNA/FO371/158264/M634/12. 
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UK joined the Common Market. As mentioned earlier, Audland has described in his 
ŵĞŵŽŝƌƐŚŽǁŚĞĂŶĚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ‘ǁĞƌĞĚĞƐƚŝŶĞĚƚŽďĞũŽŝŶƚůŝŶĐŚƉŝŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚ
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĨƌŽŵƐƚĂƌƚƚŽĨŝŶŝƐŚ ?ǁĞƐĂǁĞǀĞƌǇŝƐƐƵĞŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇ ? ?556 The 
relationship of the two most junior officials under study in this chapter is key in 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞK ?ƐĚƌŝǀĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?&ŽƌƚǁŽ&ŝƌƐƚ
Secretaries, the two men commanded an extraordinary amount of influence on the 
everyday details of British foreign policy towards Europe and were given an incredible 
amount of freedom by their superiors. Robinson in particular was highly effective in 
projecting his views across Whitehall and Audland pays tribute to his tenacity, arguing that 
Hugo Young was right to devote a whole chapter to him in his book This Blessed Plot.557 
With regards to the document on future EFTA relations, it is interesting to note that the 
EEOD took a clear lead and that the other European departments involved, namely the 
Northern and Central Departments, were merely consulted on a handful of minor issues.558 
This reflected the shifting influence of the departments within the Foreign Office as the 
KƚŽŽŬŽŶĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƌŽůĞ ?ƵĚůĂŶĚĂŶĚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨ&dŝŶ
the event of UK membership was frank and blunt: 
 
 Q&dǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚƐƵƌǀŝǀĞŝŶŝƚƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĨŽƌŵŝĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵǁĞƌĞƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞ
a full member of the EEC. Membership of the EEC would not be consistent with the 
obligations of continued membership of the EFTA.559  
 
The candidness of the ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƚŽŶĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚĂĐŽůĚ ?ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ
from the younger officials, who appear to have been fully prepared to abandon EFTA if it 
proved necessary. Furthermore, the report argued that EFTA was unlikely to continue in 
some modified ĨŽƌŵ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚƚŽĂŶ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝǀĞ
ŐƌŽƵƉ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚďĞůĂƌŐĞůǇŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚŽƉĞƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂŶǇĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
economic harmonisation.560 /ƚǁĂƐĨƵůůǇĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂďĂŶĚŽŶŵĞŶƚŽĨ&d
would breed a great deal of resentment from the Seven, particularly the Swedes and the 
^ǁŝƐƐ ?ďƵƚŝƚǁĂƐĂůƐŽŚŽƉĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĐŽƵůĚďĞĂůůĂǇĞĚďǇƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐ ‘ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌǇ
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ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞ&dŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?561 This, however, presented a number of difficulties 
given the brŽĂĚƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞǀĞŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?^ŽŵĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ
Switzerland and Sweden, wished to jealously guard their neutrality, others such as 
Denmark and Norway would consider joining the Common Market alongside the UK, 
whereas Portugal was fiercely opposed to supranationalism, but attracted by the economic 
benefits.562 In short, Audland and Robinson seemed to suggest that potential resentment 
from the Seven and the probable collapse of EFTA were prices worth paying in pursuit of 
membership of the EEC. This view would have directly conflicted with those of their senior 
colleagues, particularly the EFTA architect Roderick Barclay, but as the likelihood of an 
application grew, so too did the confidence of the Europeanists. 
Another area of reassessment the Foreign Office received was the constitutional 
implications of accession to the Treaty of Rome. This was an extremely unusual task for the 
Foreign Office to receive. Questions over Parliamentary sovereignty and the compatibility 
of supranational institutions with the British constitution went far beyond the 
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞŵŝƚ ?ZĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƌĞůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƐƵĐŚ
fundamental issues, and once again the EEOD were gifted a great deal of input on the 
matter, notably from Barclay and Robinson. The document which eventually reached the 
Cabinet in April 1961 was extremely comprehensive and employed a tone which minimised 
the negative consequences of joining the EEC.563 The opening paragraph detailed how the 
potential loss of national sovereignty had been seen as one of the greatest barriers to 
joining both the ECSC and the EEC, but that these fears were now less relevant: 
 
As things now stand, it seems probable that a solution of our relations with Europe 
cannot be achieved without some political act which continental opinion can take 
as an earnest sign of our determination to play a full part in and with Europe. Some 
surrender of sovereignty would be involved and, although this might conceivably 
be less than was required of the present members of the EEC when they signed the 
Treaty of Rome, it certainly could not be more.564 
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This statement presented any loss of sovereignty as something of little consequence, and 
that since the drafting of the Treaty of Rome, the practical realities of policymaking in the 
European Communities had meant that member governments still retained a high degree 
of control over Community affairs.565 This was something which Cabinet ministers would 
have found extremely satisfactory. Concerns over the sanctity of Parliamentary sovereignty 
being violated was something which alarmed the political elite, and these concerns indeed 
remain to this very day.566 The report stated that previous treaties had already imposed 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?Ɖarticularly membership of the WEU and 
GATT, but that these restrictions were over specific and defined areas, whereas the Treaty 
ŽĨZŽŵĞǁŽƵůĚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ ‘ĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨŝŶĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌĂǁŝĚĞĨŝĞůĚŽĨ
action which could subsequently be translated into specific obligations within the same 
ĨŝĞůĚ ? ?567 This was much more far-reaching than anything which Britain had opted into in the 
past. The document acknowledged that this was the case but went to great lengths to 
downplay the cons by highlighting the advantages of membership and the amount of 
influence the British government would exercise within the organs of the Community given 
ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƐŝǌĞĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐůŽƵƚ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞŚŽƐƚŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇĂƌĞĂƐƚŚĞ
would not be able to legislate on.568  
However, the constitutional gravity of accession was made quite plain. The report argued 
that whilst the British government and Parliament would de jure reserve the right to 
ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ŝĨĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉďĞĐĂŵĞŝŶƚŽůĞƌĂďůĞ ? ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂĚ
ƚŽďĞĂǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƌĞŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇŝŶŝƚƐƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇǁŽƵůĚďĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇĚŝƐĂƐƚƌŽƵƐ
ĂŶĚ QĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŶŝƌƌĞǀŽĐĂďůĞƐƚĞƉƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĐůŽƐĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?569 This effectively indicated that membership would be, in practice, an irreversible 
foreign policy decision which could attract significant criticism both within and without 
Parliament.570 The officials did not simply inform the Cabinet of the potential criticisms, 
however. Detailed advice on how to best make the case for membership to both 
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(2005), 177. 







Parliament and the public was attached. The document strongly advised ministers to be up-
front about the constitutional difficulties and tackle them pre-emptively by bringing them 
 ‘ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽƉĞŶĂƚĂƐƵŝƚĂďůĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇŝn the context of the wider issues in order to 
ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŝƌďĞŝŶŐƵƐĞĚǁŝƚŚĚĂŵĂŐŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚůĂƚĞƌŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶŐĂǀĞƚŚĞŵĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůŝŶĞƐƚŽ
follow in the event that they were questioned on it by the press.571 The officials knew that 
if the government did not take the initiative and address the sovereignty issue early on, it 
would plague the negotiations and stir up animosity from an uninformed and unfamiliar 
public. The role of the Foreign Office in domestic propaganda on the EEC has been explored 
in great detail by Paul Gliddon, who argues that the department became key in promoting 
membership of the Common Market at home, despite the fact it should have fallen to a 
department concerned with public information campaigns such as the Central Office of 
Information.572 dŚŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ'ůŝĚĚŽŶ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĞŐƌŽǁƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?
The officials framed the sovereignty question as a secondary consideration and largely 
assumed that ministers would accept the imminence of an application to join the European 
Communities. With the Prime Minister now firmly in favour of membership, this document 
would have provided even further justification to the Cabinet for his bid for membership. 
The most controversial area of reassessment prior to the application was, by far, the future 
ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?dŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶŐůŽ-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ĚŝĚŝŶĚĞĞĚůŽŽŵůĂƌŐĞďƵƚďǇŶŽǁƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ was that 
membership of the EEC would enhance relations with the United States, as evidenced in 
ƚŚĞK ?ƐĚƌĂĨƚƐŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?573 There was no such certainty surrounding the 
Commonwealth issue. Whilst the bulk of the communications and meetings with 
Commonwealth governments were carried out by Duncan Sandys and the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, this did not prevent members of the EEOD from voicing their own 
concerns. The ambassador to France and future head of the negotiations delegation in 
Brussels, Pierson Dixon, wrote to Patrick Reilly from Paris, informing him that there was a 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽĨŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŽŶŚŽǁƚŽŚĂŶĚůĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚƚŝĞƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
the French and the Germans.574 The Germans were reportedly more inclined to offer 
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^ ?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April 1961, TNA/FO371/158267/M634/71. 
574 Pierson Dixon to Patrick Reilly, 24 May 1961, TNA/FO371/158270/M634/140. 
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concessionƐƚŽƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŵĞĂƐŶŽƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ ?ďƵƚďǇŝǆŽŶ ?Ɛ
ĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞƐŝǆƚǇ-four dollar question is surely whether we could ever be completely 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŽĨŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚǁĞǁĂŶƚ QĨŽƌƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶ
advance of nĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŵ ? ?575 As Dixon argued, the manner in which the question 
of Commonwealth trade should be broached before the negotiations was a serious 
concern. Officials were unsure whether it would be preferable to firmly demand certain 
concessions as preconditions to the negotiations or whether the negotiations themselves 
ƐŚŽƵůĚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇ ?ŝǆŽŶŽƉƚĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŽƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ
that the endless consultations were largely unhelpful and did little to assure the Six that 
Britain was embracing the opportunity to apply enthusiastically.576 Reilly replied to Dixon 
ĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŚĂŶĚƐǁĞƌĞƚŝĞĚĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂďŝŶĞƚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐĂŶĚ
powerful lobbǇŐƌŽƵƉƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů&ĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?hŶŝŽŶƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚƚŽďĞĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚ ?
meaning that precious time had to be spent listening to and allaying concerns.577 The EEOD 
were therefore sensitive to the domestic barriers to membership of the EEC, and were 
aware that an application could potentially conjure up strong opposition. Barclay concurred 
with Reilly, reminding Dixon that the consultations with the Commonwealth governments 
were still underway and until they had been fully examined the government could not yet 
announce their intention to apply.578 Roger Jackling also reinforced these points, citing the 
ŶĞĞĚƚŽƐĂƚŝƐĨǇƚŚĞ ‘ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚďĞĨŽƌĞĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ?579 By 





As the member governments of the Community are aware, the United Kingdom 
government would need, in the course of the negotiations, to ensure that special 
arrangements were made to take account of United Kingdom obligations to the 
Commonwealth and of differences between the United Kingdom agricultural 
system and the systems prevailing amongst the present member states.580 
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help preserve this crucial union.581 However, emotional attachments to the Commonwealth 
ran deep. The Deputy Under-Secretary of the Commonwealth Relations Office, Henry 
>ŝŶƚŽƚƚ ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚŝƐƐƵĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞ ‘ůƵŵƉĞĚŝŶ ?ǁŝƚŚĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĞ
and should have much more text emphasising its contributions as a strong political force 
towards international security in the statement.582 This may have been mere departmental 
ũŽƐƚůŝŶŐŽŶ>ŝŶƚŽƚƚ ?ƐƉĂƌƚ ?ďƵƚŚŝƐƌĞŵĂƌŬƐĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘/ŶŶĞƌ'ƌŽƵƉ ?ŝŶĐŚĂƌŐĞŽĨthe 
draft and were incorporated accordingly.  
As the consultations with the Commonwealth dragged on and the EEOD grew more 
ŝŵƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨĚŝƐƐĞŶƚďĞŐĂŶƚŽĞŶƚĞƌƚŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ
ties. Foreign Office officials espoused the view that the Commonwealth was an economic 
cul-de-sac which provided no alternative to the framework of the Common Market.583 Only 
significant investment in the Commonwealth would produce a trade bloc remotely 
ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐ ‘ďĞǇŽŶĚ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ?ƌĞƐŽƵ ĐĞƐ ? ?584 The department also 
ĨƵůůǇĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚ ‘ŐŽŽŶƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐƵŶůŝŵŝƚĞĚŽƉĞŶŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ĨŽƌ
Commonwealth countries after accession, and seemed confident that the EEC would 
provide greater opportunities for trade and investment.585 This brutally calculating 
perspective from the EEOD was game-changing. Senior figures such as Barclay and Reilly, 
who had been born into an age of imperial grandeur and Britannic heroism must have 
found it personally difficult to recommend moving away from the Commonwealth, but did 
ƐŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŬŶĞǁƚŚĂƚŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůƚĞƌŵƐ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŵǇĂŶĚďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐ
were underperforming when compared to the Six.586 It has been argued by the likes of 
,ƵŐŽzŽƵŶŐĂŶĚWĂƵů'ůŝĚĚŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐƐĞĞŶĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ‘Ɖƌo-ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐ ?ŽĨĂůůƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐďǇƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ
                                                          
581 Ibid. 
582 Henry Lintott to Arnold France, 26 June 1961, TNA/FO371/158274/M634/183. 







ƚŚĞK ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ ?587 Membership of the Common Market 
was the only way to progress. 
It was at this point, after the lengthy consultations within Whitehall and with the 
Commonwealth governments, that Macmillan decided that the application needed to be 
launched. As will be explored in the following section, the departmental officials were 
eager to apply as soon as possible ĂƐŝƚǁĂƐĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽŽĚǁŝůů ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
had hitherto harvested was slipping away in the wake of the extensive consultations with 
the Commonwealth and the Seven. With the members of the EEOD now completely 
committed to membership of the Common Market, all that was left was for Macmillan to 
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dŚĞ ?&ůǇŝŶŐ<ŶŝŐŚƚƐ ?dĂŬĞ Off: Application and Negotiation 
 
 ‘/ƚŝƐƚƌƵĞ ?ZŽŐĞƌ:ĂĐŬůŝŶŐǁƌŽƚĞ ? ‘ƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǁĞĞŬƐŐŽďy, the Commonwealth and our EFTA 
partners are likely to become increasingly resigned to the prospect of our applying to 
ĂĐĐĞĚĞƚŽƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇŽĨZŽŵĞ ? ?588 However, Jackling simultaneously warned that if the 
government did not announce its intention to apply bĞĨŽƌĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƵŵŵĞƌƌĞĐĞƐƐ ?
 ‘ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞƚŝĚĞŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŵĂǇǁĞůůƌĞĐĞĚĞ ? ?589 This sense of 
apprehension at the time being taken to announce the application was present throughout 
the EEOD. The officials were becoming increasingly impatient and wanted negotiations to 
ďĞŐŝŶĂƐƐŽŽŶĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?&ĞĂƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆǁŽƵůĚƐƚĂƌƚĚŽƵďƚŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇŝŶůŝŐŚƚ
of the lengthy consultations with EFTA and the Commonwealth were a real concern, and 
Jackling communicated this to his colleagues.590 Barclay argued that the Commonwealth 
issues could not be rushed but agreed that the government should at the very least release 
a statement on its position.591 The political climate in Europe was also pressuring the British 
government. Evelyn Shuckburgh, the Deputy Under-Secretary in charge of NATO and 
Western European affairs reminded his colleagues that the escalating tensions in Berlin 
which would eventually culminate in the construction of the Wall were at a critical 
juncture, and the imminent withdrawal of British armed forces from West Germany would 
result in the government being subjected to sharp criticism from its allies.592 Shuckburgh 
was extremely pessimistic about the future and the implications it would have on an 
application for membership ŽĨƚŚĞ P ‘ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂƐƚƚŚƌĞĞŵŽŶƚŚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐǇĞĂƌ ?ŝĨǁĞ
have not got a war on our hands, I believe that our stock in European minds may be 
ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůůǇůŽǁ ? ?593 ,ĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚ:ĂĐŬůŝŶŐ ?ƐĐĂůůƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞ
ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚĂƐƐŽŽŶĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞĚ ‘ĨƌŽŵĂ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĂƚĂŶǇ
further delays would be diplomatically dangerous.594 John Robinson concurred with his 
superiors, and added that domestic opinion was another factor which called for a sense of 
urgency.595 Robinson argued that no announcement before the summer recess would be 
treated with extreme suspicion, as certain sceptical groups would accuse the government 
                                                          
588 ZŽŐĞƌ:ĂĐŬůŝŶŐ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
589 Ibid. 
590 Ibid. 
591 ZŽĚĞƌŝĐŬĂƌĐůĂǇ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D     ? ? ? ? 
592 ǀĞůǇŶ^ŚƵĐŬďƵƌŐŚ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?     ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
593 Ibid. 
594 Ibid. 
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ŽĨƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ƐŚŽĞŚŽƌŶ ?ƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĚĞďĂƚĞ ?596 Ted Heath was 
sensitive to these concerns from his subordinates, and ordered Ken Gallagher to draft a 
paper for the Cabinet outlining the arguments in favour of applying before Parliament 
adjourned aƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨ:ƵůǇ ?'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞ
advantages of an early announcement including the fact that the British government were 
currently benefiting from political momentum and favourable press coverage, the relatively 
positive attitudes of the Six, and the political developments in Germany.597 A few weeks 
later, as a House of Commons statement on the application was being drafted for the 
Prime Minister, Christopher Audland went further than other members of the EEOD by 
effectively suggesting that the department needed to pressure ministers into complying 
with the announcement:  
 
 QŝƚŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽƐĞĞǁŚĂƚĞůƐĞĐŽƵůĚďĞƐĂŝĚŝĨŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐĚŽŶŽƚŝŶĨĂĐƚĚĞĐŝĚĞƚŽ
seek to enter into negotiations before Parliament rises. At the same time it is surely 
the duty of officials, in submitting these texts, to make very clear to ministers the 
effects, which would certainly be unfortunate, of putting off a decision until the 
end of October.598 
 
ƵĚůĂŶĚ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞĚƵƚǇŽĨthe officials to advise ministers frankly on the 
potential consequences of a delay was almost certainly entirely sincere, but this reveals 
how desperate the EEOD were to launch the application. At this point, the entire 
department appears to have been fully committed to British membership of the European 
Communities and wanted to press ahead as quickly as possible. The fact that the 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚŵĞƌĞůǇĂĐŽƵƉůĞŽĨǁĞĞŬƐĂĨƚĞƌƵĚůĂŶĚ ?ƐŵŝŶƵƚĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞK ?ƐĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƉĂŝĚoff. The actors were now unanimously convinced 
that Britain was better off in than out, albeit due to a variety of factors. 
dŚƵƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞ ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ
membership of the European Communities, with the Prime Minister announcing it to the 
House of Commons on the 31 July.599 One of the most striking entries in the minutes from 
the meeting is the attitude of the Cabinet ministers towards the Commonwealth. As argued 
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above, the EEOD had started to become much more exasperated with the Commonwealth 
as the consultations were painstakingly prolonged, seeing them as a hindrance to progress 
with the Six, and this opinion appears to have been shared by much of the Cabinet. It was 
concluded that: 
 
If [Community and Commonwealth interests] could not be reconciled, the 
government would be in a stronger position, both generally and in relation to the 
Commonwealth, if this were clearly demonstrated as a result of genuine 
negotiations which they were obliged to break off than if they were to announce 
that informal soundings had led them to the conclusion that negotiations could not 
succeed.600 
 
The British government, therefore, wished to be seen by the Commonwealth governments 
as fighting vigorously for safeguards, but realised that certain issues were irreconcilable 
which would give them much more manoeuvrability in the negotiations. As such, whilst 
>ƵĚůŽǁ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŝƐĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐ
not account for the motivations behind this position.601 The government were purposefully 
trying to project a robust stance in order to appease sceptical third parties, particularly 
ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů&ĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?hŶŝŽŶ ?dŽďĞƐƵƌĞ ?ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŚŝŐŚ
profile ministers such as Reginald Maudling and Rab Butler were still quietly opposed to 
membership of the Common Market, but Macmillan had persuaded the majority of the 
Cabinet and managed to carry the dissenters with him, largely by treading carefully and 
consulting them on every single detail.602 For example, the Cabinet met once again four 
ĚĂǇƐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŐŽƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ
proposed statement with a fine toothcomb.603 Seemingly minor alterations to the phrasing 
which made the British government sound more resolute on safeguards and concessions, 
ƐƵĐŚĂƐĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ‘ǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌǇĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŽ ‘if satisfactory 
arrangements can bĞŵĂĚĞ ?ǁĞƌĞŝŵƉŽƐĞĚ ?604 Indeed, Tratt has gone so far as to say that 
 ‘ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ the French and the opinion of the US President were secondary, in the 
WD ?ƐŵŝŶĚ ?ƚŽƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐĂďŝŶĞƚĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?605 Regardless of whether or not this argument 
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603 EŽƌŵĂŶƌŽŽŬ ? “ŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ P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is entirely accurate, one cannot dismiss the importance Macmillan placed on Cabinet 
approval. The WƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞǁĂƐŵĞƚǁŝƚŚĂŶŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐůǇ
positive reception in the press and from the Six, with the exception of France.606 It was a 
promising start for the government. However, the EEOD were still apprehensive about the 
amount of lip-service constantly being paid to the Commonwealth and EFTA, with Sir 
WĂƚƌŝĐŬZĞŝůůǇĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚǁŝůůŚĂǀĞĂĚĂŵƉŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚĂďƌŽĂĚ ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶ
France.607 The British government were simultaneously attempting to please the 
Commonwealth governments, the Six, the Seven, domestic pressure groups and members 
of their own political party. It could be argued that the attempts to appease all these 
different groups at the same time was one of the most significant reasons for the failure of 
the applŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?'ŽǁůĂŶĚĂŶĚdƵƌŶĞƌŚĂǀĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌ
an incredible amount of scrutiny from a number of interest groups, whereas the Six had 
benefited from slightly less attention during the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome.608 
Such publicity would ultimatĞůǇƉƌŽǀĞƚŽďĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŽǁŶĨĂůů ? 
The EEOD made no delay in following the procedures for the submission of a formal 
application. Ken Gallagher wrote to Arthur Tandy, the ambassador to the EEC, with a copy 
ŽĨƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĨŽƌŵĂůůĞƚter of application to the Secretary-General of the Council 
of Ministers and specific instructions on its execution.609 As argued by Ludlow, the 
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌŽĨĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽŶĚŝƚ ŽŶĂů ? ?610 Immediately after 
declaring the formal application in the first paragraph, the second launched into a defence 
ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŶĞĞĚƚŽƚĂŬĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ&d ? ?611 The 
letter reflecƚĞĚƚŚĞƚŽŶĞŽĨDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚŝŶƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶƐ Wcouched in cautious 
terms, emphasising the negatives of exclusion, and laced with ambiguity. As Hugo Young 
ŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨŽƌŵƵůĂǁĂƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐůĂŝĚŝƚƐŚĂŶĚŽŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ
approacŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĞǀĞƌƐŝŶĐĞƚŚŝƐĨŝƌƐƚĞĨĨŽƌƚǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ ? ?612 Consequently, the 
officials in the EEOD were eager to launch the negotiations as soon as possible in order to 
capitalise on the current climate of goodwill and enthusiasm amongst the Six. As 
                                                          
606  “ƌŝƚŝƐŚDŽǀĞtĞůĐŽŵĞĚďǇŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?The Guardian  ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐŽĨ
ŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐtĞůĐŽŵĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? ?The Times 2 August 1961, 9; Ludlow, Dealing with Britain 
(1997), 43. 
607 Patrick Reilly to Ken Gallagher, 27 July 1961, TNA/FO371/158279/M634/248. 
608 Gowland and Turner, Reluctant Europeans (2000), 126. 
609 Ken Gallagher to Arthur Tandy, 9 August 1961, TNA/FO371/158282/M634/306. 
610 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain (1997), 41. 
611 Harold Macmillan to Christian Calmes, 9 August 1961, TNA/FO371/158282/M634/306. 
612 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 129. 
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mentioned above, there was an awareness that the constant focus on the need for 
safeguards and conditions was a source of irritation and suspicion in Europe.613 Roger 
:ĂĐŬůŝŶŐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶĂŵŝŶƵƚĞ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƐĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽ
be difĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŵĂǇǁĞůůďĞůŽŶŐĚƌĂǁŶŽƵƚ ? ?614 Sir Patrick Reilly supported 
:ĂĐŬůŝŶŐ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŐƌĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂŶĞĂƌůǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ
would best suit ministers and officials.615 Such was the level of urgency in the Foreign Office 
that the Permanent Under-Secretary circulated a minute discussing the composition of the 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ĞƚƚĞƌŽĨĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚĞǀĞŶ
been sent.616 Hoyer-Millar was adamant that the Foreign Office seize the initiative and 
begin the process of assigning members of the department to the delegation.617 He argued 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĐĂƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŽŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƐŝĚĞďĞŝŶŐĨŽƵŶĚďǇƚŚĞ
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝůůloom very large and many of the 
ŵĂũŽƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐǁŝůůďĞƚĂŬĞŶƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐƌŽƵŶĚƐ ? ?618  
The acknowledgement that the negotiations would primarily be of a political nature by the 
most senior official in the Foreign Office is crucial in understanding the new attitudes being 
fostered by the elder generation. Dealing with the European Communities was no longer 
seen as an economic venture. The foreign policy implications of membership were now 
regarded as extremely significant, and as such, the Foreign Office expected to be given a 
leading role in the negotiations. More specifically, this attitude would directly benefit the 
EEOD, as it was the principal Foreign Office department concerned with European 
Community affairs. For example, Hoyer-Millar immediately demanded that Sir Roderick 
ĂƌĐůĂǇďĞĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨ ‘ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚĂ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů
ŝƐĐŚŽƐĞŶƚŽůĞĂĚƚŚĞĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?619 Unsurprisingly, Barclay and Reilly echoed the 
Permanent Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?s sentiments. Reilly wrote that in the event that the minister in 
ĐŚĂƌŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĂƐŶŽƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ‘ŽƵŐŚƚƚŽ
insist that the official leader of the delegation should be a member of the Foreign 
^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ?620 BarclĂǇǁĂƐĚĞĐŝĚĞĚůǇůĞƐƐĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐŝŶŐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
minister in charge come from the Foreign Office.621 ĞƐƉŝƚĞEŽƌŵĂŶƌŽŽŬ ?ƐƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ
                                                          
613 Patrick Reilly to Ken Gallagher, 27 July 1961, TNA/FO371/158279/M634/248. 
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ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝůů ?ƐƵƌĞůǇ ?ďĞŵĂŝŶůǇĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
Treasury, the senior figures in the EEOD and Permanent Under-Secretary stood fast.622 
Across this period, as the government pressed for membership of the EEC, the Foreign 
KĨĨŝĐĞŐĂŝŶĞĚĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůĂŶĚǁĂƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚŝĞĨ
ďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂƌǇ ? ?ĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚďǇ,ĞŶŶĞƐƐǇ ?623 Therefore, when departmental jostling came to a 
head, the Foreign Office were increasingly confident that they would be able to get their 
ŽǁŶǁĂǇĂƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐĂƉƉĂƌĂƚƵƐĂĚĂƉƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚby 
European integration.624 Ultimately, the Foreign Office managed to assert itself and the 
ĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐĨŝŐƵƌĞƐǁĞƌĞĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?WŝĞƌƐŽŶŝǆŽŶǁĂƐ
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚ^ŝƌZŽĚĞƌŝĐŬĂƌĐůĂǇĂƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ 
ŵĞŵďĞƌ ? ?625 Eric Roll of the Ministry for Agriculture was appointed deputy head of the 
delegation, but the Foreign Office had succeeded in relegating the role which the Treasury, 
its main rival in Whitehall, would play in the negotiations. The Treasury would have three 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŽŶƚŚĞĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƐŝǆƚĞĞŶ ?626 The EEOD were ready for the 
negotiations and had manoeuvred themselves into a key role. 
It was at this high watermark of Foreign Office optimism and confidence that the 
negotiations began in November 1961.627 It is not the intention of this chapter to produce a 
lengthy narrative account of the negotiations themselves as this has already been achieved 
by a number of scholars.628 However, it is instructive for this study to examine the attitudes 
of the officials under study in this chapter towards the negotiations, and, more importantly, 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞŝƌĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?ƵĚůĂŶĚ ?ƐŵĞŵŽŝƌƐĂƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǀĂůƵĂďůĞĨŽƌƚŚŝƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ?ƵĚůĂŶĚ
ŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĨŝƌƐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚ ?ƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ĂĐůĞĂŶƐůĂƚĞ ? ?629 From his 
perspective, there was initially very little to suggest that the negotiations for entry would 
ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇĨĂŝů ?ďƵƚŚĞĚŝĚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŚŝƐĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐĨƵůůǇĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚŝŶtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
initiative in breaking log-jams in the negotiations caŶŽŶůǇĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ? ?
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and not from the forced hand of the EEC.630 Audland advocated a much more flexible 
approach to the negotiations than the rigid line which had been followed so far, but was 
nonetheless quietly confident that the talks would unfold successfully.631 His optimism was 
shared by much of Whitehall. In a letter from a Treasury official to Ken Gallagher, a hope 
was expressed that the delegation would be able to break the back of the negotiations by 
August 1962.632 This was a hope that Gallagher shared in his reply, and many of his 
thoughts on the timetabling of the negotiations operated upon this assumption.633 
'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞůǇƉŝŶƉŽŝŶƚ W according to a former 
ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞ ?ŚĞŚĂĚĂ ‘ƉĂŝŶĨƵůůǇůŽŐŝĐĂůŵŝŶĚ ?ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨŚŝƐůĞŐĂůƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂƚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?634 In 
this sense, Gallagher may not have had too much of a personal attachment to the ideals of 
European solidarity but viewed himself as an extremely hard-working and dutiful public 
servant, which ŵĞĂŶƚĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ>ŽƌĚWƌŝǀǇ^ĞĂů ?ƐŽƌĚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?635  
ƵĚůĂŶĚŝƐŵŽƌĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨ'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞƐƚĂƚĞĚŝŶĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
 ‘ƉĞĚĞƐƚƌŝĂŶ,ĞĂĚŽĨĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚĨŝƌŵůǇĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨ
ƚŚĞĂŶĚ ‘ǁĂƐĂǀŝƌƚƵĂůŶŽŶĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ?636 This is a particularly scathing picture of Gallagher, 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂďŽƵƚŚŝŵďĞŝŶŐĂ ‘ŶŽŶĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƚĂůůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨŝŶƉƵƚŚĞ
has in the Foreign Office correspondence files or indeed his reputation as an exceptionally 
hard worker who rarely dictated anything and took the burden of writing minutes and 
dispatches largely upon himself.637 However, his pragmatic and logical approach to the 
question of European integration may have caused friction with the deeply personal and 
ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞŚŝŶĚƵĚůĂŶĚĂŶĚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?/ŶĂŶǇĐĂƐĞ ?
ŝƚŝƐƋƵŝƚĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƵĚůĂŶĚĚŝĚŶŽƚŚŽůĚ'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌŝŶŚŝŐŚƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ
ƚŽƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?Ɛ ?ĂƌĐůĂǇǁĂƐĂůƐŽďƌŽĂĚůǇ positive about the 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĚĞƐƉŝƚĞŚĂƌďŽƵƌŝŶŐƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ministerial meeting in Brussels on 8- ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ĂƐŐŽŽĚĂƐǁĞĐĂŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ
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TNA/FO371/158304/M634/714. 
631 Audland, Right Place  W Right Time (2004), 130. 
632 C. C. Lucas to Ken Gallagher, 8 November 1961, TNA/FO371/158302/M634/675. 
633 Ken Gallagher to C. C. Lucas, 23 November 1961, TNA/FO371/158302/M634/675. 
634 Neil Smith (former British ambassador to Finland), interview with the author, 16 June 2016, 
Canterbury. 
635 Ibid. 
636 Christopher Audland, interviewed by Thomas Raineau, 20 June 2012, CCC/BDOHP/138/19. 




ĞǆƉĞĐƚ ? ?638 /ŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƚĂĐƚŝĐƐǁŝƚŚ the negotiations, Barclay added 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽŐŝǀĞƚŚĞŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĞŐŽŽĚǁŝůůŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆĂŶĚ ?ŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ ?ƚŽĂƉƉĞĂƐĞ
the sceptical Commonwealth governments.639 Barclay later conceded that he had always 
favoured a wider association based round EFTA, which accounts for his ambivalence 
towards the European integration project.640 ƵĚůĂŶĚƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƌĐůĂǇ ‘ƐĂŝůĞĚǁŝƚŚ
the wind a bit. He was not opposed, but was not treŵĞŶĚŽƵƐůǇŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌ ? ?641  
/ŶĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌǀĞŝŶ ?WĂƌƌŚĂƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶƚŚĂƚZĞŝůůǇǁĂƐĂ ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌ ?ŽĨ&ƌĂŶŬ>ĞĞ ?Ɛ
conclusions on seeking membership of the Common Market, but it is highly likely that his 
decision was reached only after it became clear that the risks of exclusion far outweighed 
those of inclusion.642 As argued previously, Reilly had cut his diplomatic teeth in the high 
politics of the Cold War and anti-communist operations.643 It would not be unreasonable or 
illogical to assume that his approval of the application was qualified by concerns over the 
cohesion of the Western bloc, and this is highlighted in his memoirs which focus primarily 
ŽŶĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƵŶŝƚĞĚĨƌŽŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ
struggle against communism.644 Indeed, in a meeting on future European policy with Heath 
and other high-ƌĂŶŬŝŶŐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂĨƚĞƌĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐǀĞƚŽ ?ZĞŝůůǇĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ>ŽƌĚWƌŝǀǇ
^ĞĂů ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŽŽŵĂŶǇ
difficulties, and that other opportunities would arise, such as an Atlantic free trade area 
with Canada.645 This pessimism and dismissal of future attempts to join the Common 
DĂƌŬĞƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚĞĚƚŚĞŶĞǁŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆǇǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚƐ ?
championed after ƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚďĞƚƌĂǇĞĚZĞŝůůǇ ?ƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƐŚĂůůŽǁ
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640 ZŽĚĞƌŝĐŬĂƌĐůĂǇ ? “ŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐEĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?  &ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/171423/M1091/223; Roderick Barclay, Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office 1932-69 
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641 Christopher Audland, interviewed by Thomas Raineau, 20 June 2012, CCC/BDOHP/138/19. 
642 ,ĞůĞŶWĂƌƌ ? “WĂƚƌŝĐŬZĞŝůůǇ ? ? ? ? ?- ? ? ?ŝŶThe Paris Embassy: British Ambassadors and Anglo-French 
Relations 1944-79, ed. Rogelia Pastor-Castro and John W. Young (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 116.  
643  “^ŝƌWĂƚƌŝĐŬZĞŝůůǇ ? ?The Times  ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?<ĞŶŶĞƚŚ:ĂŵĞƐ ? “^ŝƌWĂƚƌŝĐŬZĞŝůůǇ ? ?The 
Guardian  ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?:ŽŚŶhƌĞ ? “ZĞŝůůǇ ?^ŝƌ ? ?ƌĐǇ )WĂƚƌŝĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? ?-  ? ? ) ?ŝŶOxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, 2004, accessed 18 May 2016 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/73087 
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commitment to European integration. In an assessment of the failures of the first 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ZĞŝůůǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞƐƵďũĞĐƚǁĂƐŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
difficulty politŝĐĂůůǇĂƚŚŽŵĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚĞĂƐǇĨŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐƚŽĨŽƌŵĂŶƵŶďŝĂƐĞĚũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?
suggesting that he appreciated that the personal convictions of those involved contributed 
towards the Brussels breakdown.646 ZĞŝůůǇĂůƐŽƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇůĂĐŬĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŚĂƌĚ-edge of 
decisiveness and self-ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵĂŶǇŽĨŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŶŽĚŽƵďƚ
made his commitment towards the application at best reserved and at worst undecided.647   
This is where the generational differences in attitude became more apparent. Barclay, 
:ĂĐŬůŝŶŐ ?ZĞŝůůǇ ?ĂŶĚ'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁŚŝĐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
ministers were much more comfortable with, as it projected a tough and resolute stance 
designed to bolster their negotiating credentials, but Audland and Robinson believed this 
ǁĂƐĂŶŝŵƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁŚŝĐŚĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞ
principles laid down in the Treaty of Rome.648 Hugo Young and George Wilkes have both 
crafted particularly apt summaries which are worthy of repetition: 
 
 Q ?ŝƚǁĂƐ ?Ă conditional and tentative venture, creeping in a state of high suspicion 
towards this moment of historic destiny, declining to make a commitment until the 
Europeans had shown what ground they were prepared to surrender, and 
reserving even then the option ŽĨĂƌŝƚŝƐŚǀĞƚŽ QƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚǁĞƌĞŶŽƚƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽ
do more than negotiate and hesitate. They were not, actually, applying. They made 
it clear that they wanted the Treaty of Rome, which they had declined to 
participate in drafting, unpicked in certain parts ?ĂŶĚǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽ
accept the acquis communautaire  W the patrimony of principles, politics and laws 
already agreed by the Community  W that were the basis of the great project.649 
 
The views of eyewitnesses of how large the contribution of the UK to its own 
setbacks was diverged widely according to their perspective on how the 
government policymaking machine worked. Officials in Brussels were more likely to 
perceive a split between senior and junior policymakers over the necessity of 
greater flexibility vis-à-vis ƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ũƵŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐďĞŝŶŐŵŽƌĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ
diplomatic failings during the negotiations.650 
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The cautiousness of both the application and the negotiations was a direct result of the 
attitudes of the senior policymakers in the government and the Foreign Office. Their 
commitment to the cause was firm, but it was not born from an enthusiastic and 
ideological attachment to the concept of European integration. In the words of Wilkes, 
ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŐƵůĨďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ ‘ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ‘ƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Communities; something which became apparent to the Six as the negotiations 
progressed.651  
The negotiations have been roughly divided by some commentators and historians into a 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ‘ƐƚĂŐĞƐ ? ?ƵĚůĂŶĚĂŶĚĂŵƉƐŚĂǀĞĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚĂ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞƐƚĂŐĞ ?ŵŽĚĞů PƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ
phase from November 1961 until Easter 1962, the second phase from Easter 1962 until 
August 1962, and the third from September 1962 until January 1963.652 Ludlow has 
employed a more nuanced timetable, underlining the complex nature of the negotiations, 
arguing that the first stage was from October 1961 until March 1962, with an overlapping 
stage from January 1962 until July 1962, then the events surrounding the momentous 
tenth ministerial meeting in July-AugƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĨŝŶĂůůǇƚŚĞ ‘ĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŝŵƉĂƐƐĞ ?ŝŶ
September-December 1962.653 Regardless of the differing divisions of the timeline, Wilkes 
has argued that there was a broad consensus amongst eyewitnesses from the Six that the 
negotiations were far from complete when de Gaulle exercised his veto in January 1963.654 
This would suggest that many of the difficulties which the British delegation had hoped it 
would overcome were still significant barriers by the time the negotiations were aborted. 
The officials under study in this chapter do not share this view. British ministers and 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽůĞĂŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚĂĚĞĂůǁĂƐ ‘ĐůŽƐĞƚŽďĞŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĐĂƌĚƐ ? W
,ĞĂƚŚǁĂƐĂĚĂŵĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĂůŬƐ ‘ǁĞƌĞĚŽŽŵĞĚƚŽ
ďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶ ?  W and that the fault mainly lay with the French.655 Audland is highly critical of 
ƚŚĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ůĂďĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ ‘ĂďůŽŽĚǇ
ŶƵŝƐĂŶĐĞ ? ?656 ,ĞĂĚĚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĂůƐŽ:ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚǁŽĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ
were ŝŶĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚǁĞƌĞďĞŝŶŐĂďŝƚŽĨĂƉĞƐƚ ? ?657 This certainly tallies with 
^ĂŵƉƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĂůŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶ ?ǁŚŽĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽƵƐŽĨ'ĂƵůůŝƐƚ
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653 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain (1997). 
654 Wilkes,  “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ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚ ?ƌĞůŝƐŚĞĚ ?ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞYƵĂŝĚ ?KƌƐĂǇ ? ?658 There was, of course, 
ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚŽƵƚƌĂŐĞĂƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĚƵƉůŝĐŝƚǇĂŶĚŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ZĞŝůůǇƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůǇ
ĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĞĚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶ ?ďĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐŝƚƚŽďĞĂďĞƚƌĂǇĂůŽĨ
the loyalty and goodwill the latter had shown the former during the War.659 Barclay, 
ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂůŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?ǁĂƐĂůƐŽĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇďŝƚƚĞƌĂďŽƵƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ
treatment of Britain and the outcome of the negotiations, and as ambassador to Belgium 
would later remind the Belgian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Hendrik Fayat that it 




There is no doubt that we were right to set out our main requirements pretty fully 
on all our three principal problems, the Commonwealth, agriculture and EFTA. The 
statement was accepted as a basis for opening negotiations by the Six and the 




of the EEC will probably never be known, but the EEOD were certain that several factors 
contributed towards his decision. Audland is convinced that the Polaris deal with the 
United States was pivotal in providing the General with a way of justifying his opposition to 
British entry on the grounds that Britain was too reliant on her relationship with the United 
States and that British accessiŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞĂ ‘dƌŽũĂŶŚŽƌƐĞ ?ĨŽƌŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?662 This 
view is shared by a number of authors, including Hugo Young, John Young, and May.663 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?>ƵĚůŽǁ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞǁĂƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
French national grandeur and the fear that British membership would threaten this is also 
extremely compelling.664 In his memoirs, de Gaulle certainly spent much ink detailing how a 
ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƵƌŽƉĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŝŶŚĂƌŵŽŶǇǁĂƐŬĞǇƚŽƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝƐŝŶŐ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞ
                                                          
658 Anthony ^ĂŵƉƐŽŶ ? “KďŝƚƵĂƌǇ P:ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?The Independent 5th February 1998. 
659 BODL, Private Papers of Sir Patrick Reilly, MS.Eng.c.6924, 236. 
660 Roderick Barclay to Charles Johnston, 17 September 1964, TNA/FO371/177368/M1091/34. 
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ŐŝǀĞŶŚĞƌƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůƌŽůĞ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽŚŝŵ ?&ƌĂŶĐĞ ‘ŚĂĚŶŽƌĞĂůŶĞĞĚŽĨĂŶ
organisation of Western Europe, since the war had damaged neither her reputation nor her 
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ? ?665 tŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽďůŽĐŬƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐďŝĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
very beginning is unclear, and it is tempting to speculate on whether the negotiations could 
have succeeded had he not used his veto. Roy Denman, a vehemently pro-European official 
ůĂƚĞƌǁƌŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁŚĞŶDĂĐŵŝůůĂŶŚĂĚǀŝƐŝƚĞĚWĂƌŝƐŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂůŚĂĚƐĞĞŵĞĚ
ƌĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚĞŶƚƌǇ ? ?666 The guarded, conditional approach employed by the senior 
officials in the EEOD and Whitehall certainly did little to instil confidence in the Six. Audland 
and Denman argue that the weight given to Commonwealth and agricultural considerations 
slowed the negotiations down considerably, when what was needed was a speedy 
approach which could have created the basis for a deal earlier on and prevented the 
General from wrecking the application.667 De Gaulle reportedly only felt secure enough to 
block Britain ?s bid after his referendum and election victories in October and November 
1962.668 Audland also argues that ministers and senior officials were overconfident on the 
concessions they could secure for transitional arrangements on the Common Agricultural 
Policy and the common external tariff.669 Even Barclay, who was largely sympathetic of the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚ ‘ ?ŽƉĞŶĞĚ ?ŽƵƌŵŽƵƚŚƐĨĂŝƌůǇ
ǁŝĚĞŽŶƐŽŵĞŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĐĂƌƌǇƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚ ?ƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƚŚĞ
Commonwealth, the Seven and the public had been a complicating factor.670  
The fallout from the veto was monumental. As will become clear in the following chapter, 
de Gaulle may have succeeded in preventing Britain from joining the EEC, but he also 
created an atmosphere of hostility and resentment amongst the Six  W Paul Henri Spaak 
ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ĚĞĞƉůǇŽĨĨĞŶĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌŝĂůŵĂŶŶĞƌŽĨĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?671 dŚĞ^ŝǆǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽďĞƉůĂŐƵĞĚďǇĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĂƵƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂŶĚ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ‘ŵƉƚǇŚĂŝƌ ?ƌŝƐŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐ
Compromise.672 The effect which the veto had on Foreign Office attitudes was even 
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greater. The institutional orthodoxy completely transformed from one of cautious, 
ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŐƵĂƌĚĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉƚŽĂĨŝƌŵĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞ
lay with the European Communities. De Gaulle had humiliated Britain and the Foreign 
Office sought revenge and vindication.673 Audland specifically admits that many officials felt 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƉƌŝĚĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶǁŽƵŶĚĞĚďǇĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ ‘ĚŝƌƚǇƚƌŝĐŬ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐĂŵĞ
convinced that accession to the Common Market was an essential objective.674 There can 
be little doubt that the Brussels breakdown was, for the attitudes of the Foreign Office 
officials under study in this chapter and beyond, a watershed moment. The language in 
reports and dispatches changed completely. The Six were rarely referred to as a collective  W 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǇďĞĐĂŵĞƚŚĞ ‘&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇ&ŝǀĞ ?ƉůƵƐ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŽŚĂĚďĞĞŶĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĚ
as the enemy and the barrier to British entry. This coincided with the decreasing economic 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
,ĂƌŽůĚtŝůƐŽŶĂŶĚ>ǇŶĚŽŶ ?:ŽŚŶƐŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĂŐĞŽĨsŝĞƚŶĂŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĂƐƚŽĨ^ƵĞǌ ?
withdrawal.675 The Atlanticist concerns which, for senior policymakers, had been the 
decisive factor in the launch of the first application were of far lesser importance by the 
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Application to Join the EEC, 1964- ? ? ?ŝŶBritain, the Commonwealth and Europe: The Commonwealth 
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3. Unfinished Business: The Foreign Office, the United Kingdom 
ĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ^ĞĐŽŶĚ
Application, 1964-  
 
dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ QďƵƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ?ĂĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ
accepted throughout the Foreign OffiĐĞĂŶĚŝŶtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ/ ?Ɛ
more radical conclusion was that European membership could be a vehicle to 
ĚŝƐĞŶŐĂŐĞĨƌŽŵƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨďŽŽƐƚŝŶŐ
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ?676 
 
ŵĞƌŐŝŶŐŚĞƌĞ QǁĂƐĂŶĞǁ ?ǇŽƵŶŐĞƌďƌĞĞĚof Foreign Office orthodoxy to replace 
ƚŚĞŽůĚƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵ QƵƌŽƉĞǁĂƐŶ ?ƚǇĞƚƚŚĞƉĂƚŚŽĨĐŚŽŝĐĞĨŽƌĞǀĞƌǇĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐ
diplomat, but it promised to be much more interesting than the 
ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ QǇ ? ? ? ? ?ĂĐŽƌƉƐŽĨĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚƐǁĂƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶĂŶĚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞ
Foreign Office who saw the future for both themselves and their country inside 
Europe. The interest of their country and their careers coincided. It was an 
appealing symbiosis. The fact that France had, for the moment, obstructed it was 
less a deterrent than a challenge to their ambition.677 
 
The Brussels breakdown in January 1963 was a severe blow to the British government and 
the Foreign Office. The collapse of the negotiations led to an extensive period of review 
and reflection in order to ascertain why the application had failed and what future British 
European policy should entail. The Foreign Office produced an extremely detailed account 
which painstakingly dissected the sequence of events prior to the application and the 
course of the negotiations themselves.678 In addition, the European Economic 
Organisations Department (EEOD) began establishing its new strategy for European 
cooperation. The conclusions which were ultimately drawn were that the long term 
objectives of British foreign policy should be the pursuit of full membership of the 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƐŽƚŚĂƚŝƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐŝŶǁĂǇƐǁŚŝĐŚ
will best facilitate our eventual accession; and to seek to cooperate with the Community in 
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ĂƐŵĂŶǇĨŝĞůĚƐĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ?679 However, there waƐĂŶĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĨƵůů
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŝƐĂƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚďĂƌƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚďĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŽƌĞƐĞĞĂďůĞĨƵƚƵƌĞƵŶůĞƐƐĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ
and the French government changed its attitude towards British accession.680 Despite this 
understanding that membership would be unachievable for quite some time, there can be 
little doubt that this was a seismic shift in British foreign policy. The first application to join 
ƚŚĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐĂŶĚĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐǀĞŶƚƵƌĞǁŝƚŚĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇ ‘ƵŶ-ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ?
objectives.681 dŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨĂilure, however, had hardened Foreign Office attitudes and 
completely transformed the institutional orthodoxy of the day to being overwhelmingly in 
favour of joining the European Communities. There were, of course, a broad number of 
reasons why many in the Foreign Office now fully endorsed membership: some were 
passionate believers in the cause of European solidarity; some saw it principally as a way of 
revitalising British power and prestige; some believed there were great economic benefits 
to be had; some simply wished to counterbalance French power on the Continent, 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂĨƚĞƌĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐŚƵŵŝůŝĂƚŝŶŐǀĞƚŽ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐŶĞǁŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆǇŐƌŝƉƉŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞĂƌĚĞŶƚ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚƐ ?ǁŚŽŚĂĚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚŵŝĚĚůĞ-
ranking and junior roles in the service found themselves being moved to key positions in 
London and Brussels in the years between the failure of the first application and the 
launching of the second. The government also responded to the breakdown by 
strengthening the UnitĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ƐĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐ
(UKDEL) and the increased use of bilateral economic committees with the Six.682 The line 
pursued for the remainder of 1963 was, in large part, a gesture of defiance against the 
French. The British government and the Foreign Office wished to create the perception that 
Britain would not simply give up and saunter off with her tail between her legs.683 She had 
unfinished business.  
It will be the aim of this chapter to examine the effect which the 1963 Brussels breakdown 
had on Foreign Office attitudes and how this shaped British foreign policy towards the 
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ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?dŚĞtŝůƐŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĞxtremely short-
lived. Having been announced in May 1967, de Gaulle quashed the initiative in November 
of the same year.684 However, the Foreign Office had worked tirelessly to steer the 
government towards a more positive and enthusiastic approach towards European 
integration before the decision to apply was actually taken.685 'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
extremely short lifespan, historians have granted it less attention than the first application 
under Macmillan. Furthermore, the bulk of the literature on the second application tends 
ƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌƉĂƌƚǇ ?>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŚŽƌƚƚĞƌŵŝƐŵŽĨ,ĂƌŽůĚtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
policy tactics.686 There is an overarching assumption that the second application was a 
 ‘ƐŝĚĞƐŚŽǁ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ
concerned with running down international military commitments and upholding the 
Commonwealth as a global interracial community for international cooperation.687 Indeed, 
^ƚĞŝŶŶĞƐĂŶĚƌŽĂĚŚĂǀĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĂĨƚĞƌĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐǀĞƚŽ ?‘ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĞŶƚƌǇ
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞǁĂƐĚĞĂĚĨŽƌƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞ ? ?ĐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŝƚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?
general election campaign.688 As will become clear over the course of this chapter, this 
paradigm is rather narrow and simplistic. These studies fail to account for the reasons 
ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ>ĂďŽƵƌƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ůĂĐŬŽĨĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǀĞƚŽ ?/ƚǁĂƐ
purely a temporary, pragmatic calculation.689 Ğ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐǀĞƚŽǁĂƐ ?ƋƵŝƚĞŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?Ɛƚŝůů
firmly entrenched in the memories of British politicians and the public, and his position 
showed no sign of immediate change.690 Avoiding the issue of EEC membership in public 
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685 WĂƌƌ ? “'ŽŶĞEĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? 
686 Lynton J. Robins, The Reluctant Party: Labour and the EEC, 1961-1975 (Ormskirk: G.W. & A. 
,ĞƐŬĞƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?ŚƌŝƐtƌŝŐůĞǇ ? “EŽǁzŽƵ^ĞĞŝƚ ?EŽǁzŽƵŽŶ ?ƚ P,ĂƌŽůĚtŝůƐŽŶĂŶĚ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ
Foreign Policy, 1964- ? ? ?ŝŶThe Wilson Governments 1964-1970, ed. Richard Coopey, Steven Fielding 
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Bevin to Blair (London: Palgrave, 2001), 55; Kristian Steinnes, The British Labour Party, Transnational 
Influences and European Community Membership, 1960-1973 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014), 
81. 
687 Robins, The Reluctant Party (1979), 45; Alex May, Britain and Europe Since 1945 (London: 
Longman, 1999), 40; AlexĂŶĚĞƌ ? “>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚWŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
 ? ? ? ?,ĞůĞŶWĂƌƌ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?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1964- ? ? ?ŝŶThe Wilson Governments 1964-1970 Reconsidered ?ĞĚ ?'ůĞŶK ?,ĂƌĂĂŶĚ,elen Parr 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 103; Gowland et al, Britain and European Integration Since 1945 (2010), 
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688 Broad, >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ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was simply a way of allowing BritaiŶ ?ƐĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐǁŽƵŶĚƐƚŽŚĞĂůĂŶĚĚŝĚŶŽƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞ
attitudes and ideas which were being formed or continued to be held behind closed doors. 
tŝůƐŽŶ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĂƚŚĞĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚƌŝƚŝƐŚĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌ ‘ƚŚĞ
ƌŝŐŚƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?691 The Foreign Office in particular continued to be exceptionally proactive 
ǁŚĞŶŝƚĐĂŵĞƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?dŚŝƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶ,ĞůĞŶWĂƌƌ ?ƐůĂŶĚŵĂƌŬ
studies.692 WĂƌƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŚĂƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚƚŚĞ
pivotal role whŝĐŚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƉůĂǇĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƵŶĚĞƌtŝůƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
ƉƌĞŵŝĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƚ ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŝŶ
ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ?h<> )ďĞĐĂŵĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂĨƚĞƌĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐǀĞƚŽ ?ǁŝƚŚŝƚƐƐƚĂĨĨ
sending valuable information on the Six and the progress of the EEC back to London, 
allowing the Foreign Office to develop the appropriate diplomatic responses as events 
unfolded.693 Over this period, the Mission was also staffed by some exceptionally influential 
officials who would later become fundamental to the successful negotiations under Prime 
Minister Ted Heath.  
ĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƌĞĂƐŽŶƐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽ
apply a second time is also a source of fierce contention in the scholarship. Lieber has 
ĨĂŵŽƵƐůǇĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ ?ŝŶůĂƌŐĞƉĂƌƚ ?ĂĐĂƐĞŽĨ ‘ĐŽůůĂƉƐŝŶŐ
ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?694 That is, the British government had no option but to stake the future of its 
power and prestige on membership of the EEC. Lieber attributes this specifically to the 
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĐƌŝƐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞtŝůƐŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĞŶĚƵƌĞĚ PZŚŽĚĞƐŝĂ ?ƐhŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDĂůĂǇĂĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶĚŽ-
Pakistani War of 1965 all indicated that the Commonwealth was no longer a community of 
nations united under a common cause.695 British relations with EFTA also suffered after the 
government decided to levy a 15% surcharge on all imports without any consultation, 
which infuriated the other member states.696 dŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚƌĂŝŶ
                                                          
691 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London: Michael Joseph, 
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692 ^ĞĞ PWĂƌƌ ? “'ŽŶĞEĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?,ĞůĞŶWĂƌƌ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ P
,ĂƌŽůĚtŝůƐŽŶĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛtorld Role  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ PZŽƵƚůĞĚŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?,ĞůĞŶWĂƌƌ ? “ŶŐůŽ-French 
ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĠƚĞŶƚĞĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ^ĞĐŽŶĚƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶ
European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, ed. N. Piers Ludlow 
(London: Routledge, 2007). 
693  “hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ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694 Robert J. Lieber, British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites, and Pressure Groups (London: 





with the ascension of Lyndon B. Johnson, who made no effort to disguise his view that 
Britain was an unequal, subordinate partner  W something Wilson wrestled with as he firmly 
opposed extending military support to the United States in Vietnam.697 Therefore, In 
>ŝĞďĞƌ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ƌŝƚŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐƉĂŝŶƚĞĚŝŶƚŽĂĐŽƌŶĞƌĂŶĚŽŶůǇƚŚĞ
seemed to provide an opportunity to re-ĞŶĞƌŐŝƐĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƐƵffering 
from a weak currency and a burgeoning balance of payments deficit.698 This argument has 
ďĞĞŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚďǇtƌŝŐůĞǇ ?ǁŚŽĂĚĚƐƚŚĂƚtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĂƉƉůǇǁĂƐĂ ‘ĚĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ?
ƚĂĐƚŝĐ ?ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĚŝǀĞƌƚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ďŽƚŚ international 
ĂŶĚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ? ?699 Roy Denman, an ardently pro-Common Market official who was Deputy 
Under-Secretary of the Board of Trade during the second application also subscribes to this 
ǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚtŝůƐŽŶǁĂƐĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŚĞwas above all a 
ƚĂĐƚŝĐŝĂŶ ?ŚŝƐƐƵƉƌĞŵĞĂŝŵǁĂƐƚŽŬĞĞƉƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌƉĂƌƚǇƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ
had Wilson won the 1970 general election, the renewed membership bid would have failed 
again.700 May has also intimated that Wilson was motivated by electioneering opportunism; 
accession to the EEC under Labour would steal a march on the Conservatives, who under 
Heath made membership their foreign policy priority.701  
Ellison, Parr and John Young have led the charge of reappraisal on these points, 
emphasising the strategic concerns which Wilson harboured and the role which more pro-
European members of his Cabinet such as George Brown played in steering towards the 
application.702 In addition, they have contextualised the practical realities and difficulties 
which Wilson faced during his premiership, and how these severely limited his 
ŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĂŶƚĂŐŽŶŝƐŵŽǀĞƌEdKĂŶĚŚŝƐ
continued opposition to British entry were obstacles which the Prime Minister could not 
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1964- ? ? ?ŝŶThe Wilson Governments 1964-1970 Reconsidered ?ĞĚ ?'ůĞŶK ?,ĂƌĂĂŶĚ,ĞůĞŶWĂƌƌ
(London: Routledge, 2006), 83. 
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have surmounted.703 dŚĞƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨŵĂŶǇŽĨtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐďĂĐŬďĞŶĐŚĞƌƐĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽŶŽƚďĞ
ignored, particularly when Labour were initially governing with a majority of four; soon 
reduced to three after a by-election defeat.704 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?WĂƌƌ ?Ɛ
emphasis on the role of the Foreign Office and Whitehall in the formulation of European 
policy and the constellation of attitudes and motivations which drove this radical 
reorientation towards full acceptance of the Treaty of Rome and membership of the EEC 
has ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚƚŚĞŶĞǁ ‘ĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌ ?ŽĨƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉŽŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?Ă
ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂŝŵŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůďĞƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚWĂƌƌ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐďǇ
shedding more light on the personalities in the Foreign Office and their input in the 
policymaking process.  
As in the previous chapter, the role of the top officials in the EEOD, which remained the 
principal Foreign Office department concerned with European integration affairs, will form 
ƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇĂůƐo intends to incorporate the role of the British 
Delegation to the European Communities in Brussels more centrally. The rationale for this 
is twofold. Firstly, as argued above, the Permanent Mission was greatly strengthened after 
the failure of the first application in a bid to maintain strong Community relations and 
monitor its progress.705 Secondly, many of the most influential officials in the formulation 
of British foreign policy towards Europe and the launching of the second application were, 
at some poiŶƚŝŶƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ?ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ?ǁŚŽďĞĐĂŵĞŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ
most ardent advocates of British entry to the Common Market, was Head of the Mission 
until 1965, when he was replaced by James Marjoribanks, who had been Assistant Under-
Secretary in charge of European economic affairs and supervisor of the EEOD.706 K ?EĞŝůů
subsequently became Deputy Under-Secretary in charge of European economic affairs, 
thereby replacing Marjoribanks in a slightly more senior capacity.707 In addition, John 
Robinson was stationed as First Secretary of the Delegation throughout this period, 
continuing the work he started with the first application.708 Therefore, there was a 
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708 ZŽǇĞŶŵĂŶ ? “ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?:ŽŚŶƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐ ? ? ? ? ?-  ? ) ?ŝŶOxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, 2004, accessed 18 May 2016 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/69317. 
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significant amount of interaction between the EEOD and the UKDEL, both in terms of 
personnel and policymaking. Other key figures in this period include Paul Gore-Booth, who 
was recalled to London from India in 1965 and appointed Permanent Under-Secretary, 
Curtis Keeble, Head of the EEOD 1963-5, and Norman Statham, Assistant Head of the EEOD 
1961-5 and then Head of the department thereafter. This is not to say that other 
individuals did not make significant contributions towards British European policy in this 
period  W for example, Michael Palliser was incredibly influential as Private Secretary for 
foreign affairs to the Prime Minister from 1966 until 1969.709 Sir Patrick Reilly continued to 
play an important role as ambassador to France and Sir Frank Roberts served a five-year 
term as ambassador to West Germany where his views on the developments within the 
EEC were highly respected.710 Therefore, the perspectives of other officials will also be 
incorporated at certain points in an attempt to broaden the scope of this study.  
In a similar vein to the previous chapter, these officials hailed from a wide range of socio-
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƚĂƚƵƐĞƐĂŶĚĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚ'ŽƌĞ-Booth had 
remarkably similar backgrounds. They were only three years apart in age; Gore-Booth was 
ďŽƌŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚK ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐďŽƌŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?711 Both men were descendants of the Anglo-
Irish gentry, they both attended Eton, and they both went on to study at Balliol College, 
Oxford.712 K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐƚŚĞƐŽŶŽĨĂŶhůƐƚĞƌhŶŝŽŶŝƐƚDW ?^ŝƌ,ƵŐŚK ?EĞŝůů ?ĂŶĚ'ŽƌĞ-Booth 
was the nephew of Constance Markievicz, the prominent Sinn Féin politician and the first 
woman elected to the House of Commons.713 Therefore, both men were born into a world 
where national duty and public service were the orders of the day. At Oxford, Gore-Booth 
elected to study Greats but stayed on for a fourth year and completed a degree in Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics, gaining a second in both.714 K ?EĞŝůůŵĂŶĂŐĞĚƚŽĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚ
himself slightly more than Gore-Booth: he took a first in English and was granted a law 
                                                          
709 Michael Palliser, interviewed by John Hutson, 28 April 1999, CCC/BDOHP/37/15; David Hannay, 
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711 Paul Gore-Booth, With Great Truth and Respect  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ PŽŶƐƚĂďůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?ĞŶŵĂŶ ? “K ?EĞŝůů ?
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712 Ibid. 
713 Ibid. Though, of course, she did not take her seat. 
714 Gore-Booth, With Great Truth and Respect  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?ĞŶŝƐ'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůů “ŽŽƚŚ ?WĂƵů,ĞŶƌǇ'ŽƌĞ-, 
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fellowship at All Souls College the year after graduating.715 After completing his studies, 
Gore-Booth travelled around Germany and Poland for a year from the summer of 1932.716 
In his memoirs, he vividly describes how the Great Depression had seriously damaged 
social morale in Germany, and that many cities were transfŽƌŵĞĚŝŶƚŽ ‘ŐŚŽƐƚƚŽǁŶƐ ? ?717 He 
went on to describe how the Nazi parades were incredibly impressive affairs, and that it 
was easy to see why the party had attracted so much support.718 In Poland, he had the 
opportunity to speak to several officials in Warsaw about the Prussia/Pomerania 
controversy and German antagonism on the border.719 There can be little doubt that these 
experiences as a young man had a profound effect on Gore-Booth, who took the Foreign 
Office entrance exam immediately after his return and joined the diplomatic service in 
1933.720 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐĞĂƌůǇĐĂƌĞĞƌĂůŵŽƐƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇŵŝƌƌŽƌĞĚ'ŽƌĞ-ŽŽƚŚ ?Ɛ ?K ?EĞŝůůƚŽŽŚĂĚĂŶ
interest in Germany and the German language, and when he was appointed Third Secretary 
at the Berlin embassy in 1938, just two years after joining the service, he was thrilled.721 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐĨĂŵŽƵƐůǇĂŵĂŶŽĨ ‘ƵŶďĞŶĚŝŶŐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚŚĞƌĞƐŝŐŶĞĚŝŶĚŝƐŐƵƐƚ
over the policy of appeasement which the Chamberlain government opted for.722 This was 
to be his first of two resignations from the diplomatic service, and, as has been pointed out 
by Roy Denman, was truly remarkable given how high he managed to climb up the 
diplomatic career ladder.723 Gore-Booth was also a highly principled member of the service. 
During his time as Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs, he wrote to the 
then Permanent Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ/ǀŽŶĞ<ŝƌŬƉĂƚƌŝĐŬĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ
ŽǀĞƌŽůŽŶĞůEĂƐƐĞƌ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ƵĞǌĂŶĂů ?724 Gore-Booth was probably the 
most senior and prominent member of the Foreign Office to voice such open dissent, and 
later admitted that he had seriously considered resigning over the fiasco.725 He had 
criticised government policy in the full knowledge that the potential consequences for his 
career would be severe. 
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UpŽŶƚŚĞŽƵƚďƌĞĂŬŽĨtĂƌ ?ƚŚĞƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĐĂƌĞĞƌƐďĞŐĂŶƚŽĚŝǀĞƌŐĞ ?'ŽƌĞ-Booth was 
ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞdŽŬǇŽĞŵďĂƐƐǇĂŶĚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁĂƌŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ
in his internment for nine months before being allowed to leave in 1942 when he was 
appointed First Secretary in Washington.726 He remained in the United States until the end 
of the War, witnessing the full force of the Anglo-American partnership at the official level, 
ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞĨĨŽƌƚŽĨƚƌƵůǇĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚŝŶŐƉƌŽƉŽƌtions between 
ƚǁŽĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?727 After leaving the Washington embassy, Gore-
Booth immersed himself in post-war European reconstruction and internationalism, 
heading the economic and social divisions of the United Nations department and later the 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶZĞĐŽǀĞƌǇĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƚŚĞDƵƚƵĂůŝĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŶĚ ?
ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞK ?ƐƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌ ?728 In 1949 he was appointed director of the British 
Information Services in the United States which was largely a public relations role, an 
appointment which was met with some criticism from the British press due to Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?Ɛ
lack of experience in such a field.729 Gore-Booth served as ambassador to Burma in 1953-6, 
after which he returned to London as Deputy Under-Secretary.730 His vocal opposition to 
the Suez operation has already been noted, but Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŝŶƚŚŝƐƌŽůĞŝƐŽĨ
greater importance to this study. Gore-Booth managed to establish himself as an incredibly 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐĂŶĚ ‘ǁon the respect of the 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐŝŶtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ? ?731 Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
integration at this juncture appear to have been largely in keeping with most of the senior 
generation at the time  W the EEC was seen primarily as an economic venture within the 
ǁŝĚĞƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨEdK ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨ
the Communities would not come, in his view, until a later date: 
 
The question remains, could we have done better over Europe? With hindsight, of 
course we could. We could have understood quicker and reacted earlier. In that 
event the tone of relations with the European Community by 1960 might have 
been more cordial but I doubt whether events themselves would have been greatly 
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different. The inertias in the early and mid-fifties were to my mind too great for us 
to have got in on the European ground floor.732 
 
Gore-Booth left this post in 1960 in order to become British High Commissioner in India, 
but it is interesting to speculate on his career trajectory had he stayed in London.733 When 
the Foreign Office were deciding which officials to attach to the delegation for the first 
application for membership of the EEC, Gore-Booth was considered by most, including the 
Permanent Under-Secretary Frederick Hoyer-Millar, to be the best and most experienced 
candidate to lead the negotiations.734 However, it was also acknowledged that he could not 
simply be recalled from India in the middle of a major appointment.735 In any case, had 
Gore-Booth indeed headed the delegation, the outcome would almost certainly have been 
the same. Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƐĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐĂŶĚ
guarded like many of his senior colleagues, and his approach would have been largely in 
keeping with the orthodoxy of the day. In 1965, he was recalled to London and appointed 
Permanent Under-Secretary.736 Unlike his predecessors, Hoyer-Millar and Harold Caccia, 
Gore-Booth took an active interest in British European policy and contributed significantly 
towards minutes on the issue. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. Gore-Booth had 
certainly had a much stronger grounding in European affairs earlier on in his career than 
Hoyer-Millar and Caccia, which would have made him more interested in European 
integration on a personal level, but his involvement may represent something more 
significant. After de 'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐǀĞƚŽŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƚŽƉ
priority by the Foreign Office.737 The Permanent Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ
in policymaking may have reflected the new orthodoxy gripping the Foreign Office, which 
no longer relegated European integration to a secondary consideration. 
ĨƚĞƌŚŝƐƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞǁĂŬĞŽĨƚŚĞDƵŶŝĐŚŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?K ?EĞŝůůũŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞĂƌŵǇ
intelligence corps in 1940.738 He returned briefly to the Foreign Office in the latter part of 
the War, and despite ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĂƐƵŶĂďůĞƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞĂƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?^ŝƌ,ŽƌĂĐĞtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ‘ŚĂĚŶŽƚĨŽƌŐŝǀĞŶŚŝƐƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?
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and blocked the appointment.739 /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?K ?EĞŝůůũŽŝŶĞĚThe Times as a lead writer, fulfilling 
one of his teenage ambitions to become a journalist.740 He rejoined the Foreign Office a 
year later and in 1948 was transferred to the Political Division of the Allied Control 
Commission in Germany.741 Here he witnessed the early efforts to reconstruct post-war 
ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚŚŝƐ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚ ?ǀŝĞǁƐ ?742 He gained the rank of Counsellor in 
1951 and in 1953 spent a year at the Imperial Defence College as Foreign Office 
representative.743 /Ŷ ? ? ? ?K ?EĞŝůůďĞĐĂŵĞ,ĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐEĞǁƐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?
where he proved to be an effective public relations manager.744 He was transferred to 
Beijing in 1955 and appointed ĐŚĂƌŐĠĚ ?ĂĨĨĂŝƌĞƐ, where he remained for two years before 
returning to London as Assistant Under-Secretary for Eastern European affairs and UN 
organisation and disarmament.745 /ŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ?K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƚŽ&ŝŶůĂŶĚĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚ
remain there throughout the negotiations.746 As such, he was largely removed from one of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŬĞǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƵƌŽƉĞ ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŚŝƐ
appointment as ambassador to the European Communities in Brussels was a career 
turning-ƉŽŝŶƚ ?K ?EĞŝůůƉƌŽǀĞĚŚŝŵƐĞůĨƚŽďĞĂŚŝŐŚůǇƐŬŝůůĞĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐĚĞƐƉite 
ďĞŝŶŐŝŶĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĂƚŚĞƌĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƐƚŚĞ
ĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂĨĨĂŝƌƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐůĂƚĞƌƚŽƉƌŽǀĞƐŽǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ? ?747 He 
returned to London as Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs in 1965 and 
ǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽďĞŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂƵŶĐŚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
second application.748 K ?EĞŝůůƌĞƐŝŐŶĞĚĂƐĞĐŽŶĚƚŝŵĞŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂĨƚĞƌďĞŝŶŐƐŶƵďďĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
Foreign Secretary George Brown for the ambassadorship in Bonn, a job he had long 
coveted.749 He returned once again in 1969 as Deputy Under-Secretary for European 
integration affairs, and was later appointed head of the delegation for the successful 
negotiations for EEC membership under the Heath government.750 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
successful accession to the EEC has been highlighted by a number of people, and his 
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significance cannot be underestimated. Hugo Young has argued that alongside John 
ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ŚĞǁĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?but also 
ĂĚĚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘K ?EĞŝůů QǁĂƐƚŚĞƐĞŶŝŽƌŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌƉŽƐƐŝďůǇƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? ?751 ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶtĂůů ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĐƌĞĚŝƚƐ
K ?EĞŝůůǁŝƚŚŝŶũĞĐƚŝŶŐ ‘ƐŽŵĞŚĂƌĚ-headed rigour into British European policymaŬŝŶŐ ?ĂĨƚĞƌ
the humiliation of the Brussels breakdown.752 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?-2 negotiations 
ŝƐƐƚŝůůƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂŶĚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
accession to the EEC.753 His commitment to British membership was unquestionable, but he 
ǁĂƐŶŽƚĂŶŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇĚƌŝǀĞŶ ‘ƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ? ?K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐĨŝƌƐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ
ǁŝƚŚƌŝƚŝƐŚƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞĂŶĚŝƚƐƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ P ‘tŚĂƚŵĂƚƚĞƌĞĚǁĂƐƚŽŐĞƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ
Community, and thereby restore our position at the centre of European affairs which, since 
 ? ? ? ? ?ǁĞŚĂĚůŽƐƚ ? ?754 ZĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨŚŝƐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚǀĂŶŐƵĂƌĚĂŶĚǁŽƌŬĞĚƚŝƌĞůĞƐƐůǇĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶƚŽĞŶƚĞƌƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶ
Market. His attitudes and input are absolutely crucial to this study. 
In contrast to Gore-ŽŽƚŚĂŶĚK ?EĞŝůů ?DĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ?^ƚĂƚŚĂŵĂŶĚ<ĞĞďůĞĐĂŵĞĨƌŽŵƌĂƚŚĞƌ
humble backgrounds; particularly the latter two. Marjoribanks was born in 1911, the son of 
a Church of Scotland minister in Edinburgh.755 He was educated at Merchiston Castle 
School and Edinburgh Academy, two prestigious independent schools in Edinburgh, and 
went on to read modern languages at the University of Edinburgh.756 Keeble was born into 
a working class family in Essex in 1922: his ancestors had worked for generations on 
Thames barges and tea clippers, though his father was a clerk at Bethnal Green Council.757 
He attended Clacton County High School, the local grammar school, and then Queen Mary 
College at the University of London, where he elected to study modern languages but his 
studies were interrupted with the outbreak of the Second World War.758 Keeble enlisted in 
1941 and served in the army for the remainder of the War.759 Towards the end of the War, 
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his knowledge of Russian was put to use as an interpreter for the two thousand Russians in 
Liverpool who were being repatriated back to the Soviet Union.760 Statham was also born in 
1922 in what is now Greater Manchester and attended Manchester Grammar School.761 He 
gained a place to study modern languages at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge and 
upon graduation in 1943 worked for the Intelligence Corps in Italy and Austria until 1947.762 
^ƚĂƚŚĂŵǁĂƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇ ‘ŶŽƚĂƚǇƉŝĐĂůĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚ ? ?763 ,ĞŚĂĚĂ ‘ďůƵĨĨ ?ŶŽƌƚŚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?
and had also lost a leg in a motorcycle accident in his twenties.764 This atypical style also 
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽ<ĞĞďůĞĂŶĚDĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ?<ĞĞďůĞ ‘ĚŝĚŶŽƚůŽŽŬŽƌƐŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŚĞƉůĂǇĞĚƐŽ
ǁĞůů QŚĞƚŽŽŬƉƌŝĚĞŝŶŚŝƐƐŝŵƉůĞŽƌŝŐŝŶƐ QŚĞǁĂƐĂŶŽĚĚĨŝŐƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐĂůŝĂŽĨƚŚĞ'D'
with whiĐŚŚŝƐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐǁĞƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚǁŚĞŶŚĞƌĞƚŝƌĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?765 Marjoribanks was a 
 ‘ƐŚƌĞǁĚ QĂŶĚŵĂŐŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů ?^ĐŽƚ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůůǇĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůůǇƋƵŝƚĞĨĂƌƌĞŵŽǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ
ƐĐŚŽŽůďŽǇƐĂŶĚKǆďƌŝĚŐĞŐƌĂĚƵĂƚĞƐǁŚŽƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞƚǇƉŝĐĂů ‘ƉƌŽĨŝůĞ ?ŽĨĂĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚ ?766 
All three men were reportedly strongly in favour of British membership of the EEC.767 
DĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ‘ƐĂǁŵŽƌĞƐŚƌĞǁĚůǇƚŚĂŶŵŽƐƚŽĨŚŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶŝŶ
ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚƚŽƌĞƚŝƌĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĂǇĞĂƌĂŶĚĂŚĂůĨďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ
successful conclusion of the negotiations for membership.768 After his retirement, he was 
ĐŚĂŝƌŵĂŶŽĨƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉ ‘^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂŶĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĞĚƚŽŬĞĞƉƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞ
during the 1975 referendum.769 /ŶŚŝƐŵĞŵŽŝƌƐ ?<ĞĞďůĞƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
aloofness towards the Messina Conference ĂŶĚƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇŽĨZŽŵĞǁĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚ
mistake in British post-ǁĂƌĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?770 Keeble goes further and argues that whilst it 
ǁĂƐĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŵĂĚĞďǇŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐ ‘ƐƚŝůůŽďƐĞƐƐĞĚǁŝƚŚ 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌŽůĞĂƐĂŵĂũŽƌǁŽƌůĚƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ?ĚŝĚŶŽƚƐĞĞŬƚŽƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞƚŚĞŵŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ? ?771 Therefore, Keeble directly 
acknowledged that the attitudes of senior officials in the Foreign Office contributed 
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ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐĞůĨ-imposed exile from the early years of the European Communities. 
Statham had a more personal attachment to Europe. His time in the Intelligence Corps 
during the War and the early Occupation period had a profound impact on him, and he 
later married an Austrian, which gave him a love of the German language.772 Before 
entering the diplomatic service in 1951, he worked for a Manchester oil company which 
gave him a strong grounding in economic and trade issues; this would influence his career 
at the Foreign Office.773 Statham cut his teeth in economic positions in Bonn and New York 
before joining the EEOD, where he spent an enormous chunk of his career: with the 
exception of a two year posting as Consul-General in Sao Paulo in 1968-70, he worked as 
Assistant Head and then Head of the department 1963-71.774 Statham established himself 
as an authoritative European trade expert, later spending five years as Economic Minister 
at the Bonn embassy and then Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs at 
the Foreign Office.775  
In a similar vein to the previous chapter, this group of officials are evidence of an 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇƐŽĐŝĂůůǇĂŶĚĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĚŝǀĞƌƐĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?K ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚ'ŽƌĞ-Booth 
certainly represented the  ‘ĂƌĐŚĞƚǇƉĂů ?ĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚ PƉƵďůŝĐƐĐŚŽŽůďŽǇƐĨƌŽŵĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ
families who had both attended Balliol College, an institution, which, according to Herbert 
ƐƋƵŝƚŚ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŵĞŶƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƋƵŝůĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŽĨĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚůĞƐƐ
ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?776 However, Marjoribanks, Keeble and Statham could not have been more 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ŵŽƵůĚ ? ?dŚŝƐĞĐůĞĐƚŝĐĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐ
contributed significantly towards the policymaking process and these officials, amongst 
others, attempted to steer the government towards closer relations with the EEC and, 
eventually, a second application for membership.  dŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐĂŶĚ
educations seemingly had little influence on their attitudes towards European integration, 
and they were motivated by a range of factors. Gore-ŽŽƚŚĂŶĚK ?EĞŝůůǁĞƌĞĚƵƚŝĨƵů
ƉĂƚƌŝŽƚƐǁŚŽǁŝƐŚĞĚƚŽƐĞĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŐůŽďĂůŐƌĂŶĚĞƵƌƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?^ƚĂƚŚĂŵǁĂƐĂŚĂƌĚ-nosed 
economic expert who believed that British trade and economic power would be 
strengthened within the Common Market; Marjoribanks and Keeble were much more 
ideologically attached to the principles of European unity and solidarity. It was these 
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attitudes which coloured the background of the Foreign Office and the Wilson 

























The Wilderness Years: Reconstructing European Policy from Wreckage 
 
/ŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?tŚŝƚĞŚĂůůĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽůĂƵŶĐŚĂŶ
inter-departmental study of British membership of the EEC. It was headed by David 
Pitblado, Third Secretary at the Treasury.777 Parr has argued that the Pitblado report 
 ‘ƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŝŶĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?778 This is an argument which this study strongly endorses. More specifically, 
the EEOD were given a high degree of input in the Pitblado report, and the political and 
strategic arguments in favour of continuing to pursue membership were given considerable 
weight. As supervising Under-Secretary and Head of the department, Marjoribanks and 
Keeble had a great deal of influence over the initial drafts. Their thoughts and comments 
during the discussions for the Pitblado report are essential in dissecting their attitudes 
towards European integration. Marjoribanks argued that the Foreign Office should 
 ‘ƚƵƌŶ QƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?779 He suggested that EFTA be built up in a bid to 
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ‘ďĞĂƐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂƐ
ǁĞĐĂŶŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƵŶŝŽŶ ? ?780 The former was merely a continuation of British 
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĨƌŽŵ&d ?ƐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌǁĂƐĂŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞƌĂĚŝĐĂů
proposal. European political union was something which ministers and officials had been 
wary of, particularly the implication of supranational oversight. However, the political 
developments in the European Communities required a more enthusiastic approach from 
ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚƐŚŽƌĞƵƉƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇ&ŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?<ĞĞďůe concurred with this 
ůŝŶĞŝŶŚŝƐĚƌĂĨƚƉĂƉĞƌ ?ĂĚĚŝŶŐ P ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞ^ŝǆĂƌĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƵƉŽŶĂŶ
economic base we cannot achieve our full political and economic objectives without 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?781 Keeble also argued that de Gaulle was, realistically, an 
ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞďĂƌƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŶŽƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽƐƚŽƉĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
interest in joining the Common Market.782 This negativity would play into the hands of the 
French, who would use it as evidence of British half-heartedness towards European 
unity.783 dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞĂŵŽŶŐƐƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ
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ƉƌŝĐĞĨŽƌŽƵƌĞŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇǁŝůůďĞĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇŽĨZŽŵĞ ? ?784 As Parr 
has noted, instead of demanding safeguards before accession, which had been the strategy 
ŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞŬƚŽĂŐƌĞĞƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞŶǁŽƌŬƚŽƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶƐŝĚĞ ? ?785 Marjoribanks, 
<ĞĞďůĞĂŶĚK ?EĞŝůůǁĞƌĞĂŵŽng the first officials to fully accept this and argue it forcefully 
ƚŽƚŚĞŝƌtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? 
In addition to preparing papers for the Pitblado report, the Foreign Office decided to 
embark upon their own reassessment, free from the constraints of other Whitehall 
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵĂŶĚũŽƐƚůŝŶŐ ?dŚĞƐĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŽĨĞǀĞŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌǀĂůƵĞŝŶ
ĚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?<ĞĞďůĞƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚĂƉĂƉĞƌƚŽƚŚĞĐŚŝĞĨƐŽĨƚŚĞK ?ƚŚĞ
Western Organisations and Coordination Department (WOCD) and the Western 
ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ŽƵƚůŝŶŝŶŐ ‘ƉƵƌĞůǇĂƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůǀŝĞǁ ? ?786 Keeble highlighted the need for the 
incoming government to define its immediate short-term policy towards European 
integration not too long after the election, as there would be pressure from the Six for 
reassurance and reaffirmation.787 Furthermore, Keeble gave a frank and stark picture of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚƐŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?/ƚŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶ
accepted that British exclusion from the EEC would harm Anglo-American relations, and 
that the United States would continue to look towards the Six as their principal European 
partners in international defence, but Keeble went further and argued the benefits which 
membershiƉǁŽƵůĚďƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ
ǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞƌŝƚĂŝŶĂƐĂ ‘ǀĂůƵĂďůĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐŝŶŐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚǁŝůůƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
ƉĂǇƵƐ QŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?788 The new departmental attitudes towards the 
Commonwealth were also quite different from those which governed the first application. 
<ĞĞďůĞĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽůĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ŵĂǇ ?ĨŽƌĂƚŝŵĞƐƵĨĨĞƌ ?
but in the long run we may expect to enjoy the positive advantages flowing from a 
dominant posiƚŝŽŶŝŶĂƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůŐƌŽƵƉŝŶŐ ? ?789 The casual dismissal of the potential 
weakening of Commonwealth ties as a temporary setback and price worth paying differed 
markedly from the stance taken before the Brussels breakdown. Certain members of the 
EEOD had expressed in private the view that the Commonwealth was an economic cul-de-
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sac compared to the opportunities which the Common Market presented, but there was 
still an understanding that political consultations with Commonwealth governments would 
continue to be of value.790 This was no longer the case as far as the Foreign Office was 
concerned. Only a political relationship with the EEC would allow Britain to continue to 
project influence across the globe. With regards to EFTA, Keeble seemingly echoed 
DĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ?Ɛentiments in January. He argued that it should be built up with the possible 
ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂǁŝĚĞƌĐƵƐƚŽŵƐƵŶŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂƐĂŶ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŝŵƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ
economic divisions in Europe.791 However, Keeble acknowledged that this would not be a 
long-ƚĞƌŵƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌũŽŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĨůŽǁƐĨƌŽŵ
an assessment of its long term political importance rather than from the possibility of 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ? ?792 In contrast to the notion that Britain was, on balance, 
marginally better off inside the European Communities than outside, which was the 
ultimate motivation behind the first application, the new orthodoxy argued that 
membership, for all its drawbacks, was the only way to preserve British power and that 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨĂƚĞǁĂƐƚŝĞĚƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚƐŚĞĐŽƵůĚũŽŝŶƚŚĞ ?793 In the words of 
DĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ?ŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ŽŶůǇĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶǁĞƐŚĂůůĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇũŽŝŶƵƉǁŝƚŚƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?
indicating the amount of stock which the Foreign Office was placing in British 
membership.794  
<ĞĞďůĞ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌǁĂƐĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚĞĚƚŽh<>ŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ?ǁŚĞƌ ŝƚĐĂŵĞƵŶĚĞƌK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ?
The attitudes which these two men harboured towards European integration were broadly 
similar, but there were still divergences of opinion on certain iƐƐƵĞƐ ?K ?EĞŝůůŚĂĚƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚ
ŽĨĚŝƌĞĐƚĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĂŶĚǁĂƐƉƌŽďĂďůǇƚŚĞŵŽƐƚǁĞůů-
informed member of the diplomatic service with regards to the politics of European 
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ possible exception of John 
Robinson. As such, he went to some lengths to dispel some of the ideas which Keeble had 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ?hŶůŝŬĞDĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐĂŶĚ<ĞĞďůĞ ?K ?EĞŝůů
was completely opposed to using EFTA as a bargaining tool.795 ,ĞĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚ<ĞĞďůĞ ?ƐƉůĂŶƐ
ĨŽƌĂŶ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŝŵ ?ĨƌĞĞƚƌĂĚĞĂƌĞĂ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞƵƐĞĚĂƐĂƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂŐĞĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚ
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TNA/FO371/158277/M634/225. 
791 ƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ? May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43. 
792 Ibid. 
793 Curtis KĞĞďůĞ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE &K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
:ĂŵĞƐDĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   D  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
794 :ĂŵĞƐDĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   D  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
795 ^ŝƌŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ, 28 May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43B. 
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ŽƚŚĞƌ&dŵĞŵďĞƌƐƉƌŝŽƌƚŽĨƵůůĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ P ‘/ǁŽŶĚĞƌŝĨŝƚŚĂƐ
ĞǀĞŶ QůŝŵŝƚĞĚĂƉƉĞĂů ?ƋƵŝƚĞĂƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵŝƚƐĂƚƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?796 K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
&dǁĂƐĂŶŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƚŽƚŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŝŐŚƚǁĞůůŚĂǀĞŬĞƉƚƵƐ
ŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĞǀĞŶŝĨĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞŚĂĚŶŽƚƵƚƚĞƌĞĚŚŝƐǀĞƚŽ ? ?797 It is not entirely clear 
whether Marjoribanks and Keeble also shared this view or if they had advocated closer 
cooperation with EFTA in order to promote a generally more proactive approach towards 
Europe. The latter is probably more likely. The majority of the Foreign Office had, by this 
point, come to the realisation that EFTA did not provide a long-term solution and could 
only be used as a temporary answer to the divisions in Europe.798 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐŵŽƐƚŝŶƐŝŐŚƚĨƵů
remarks, however, come from his attitude towards membership as a whole. He stated that 
 ‘ƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŽĨ QƐƚĂǇŝŶŐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ǁĞƌĞ ?ŝŶŚŝƐǀŝĞǁ ?
 ‘ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ QĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶ ? ?799 This attitude seems to have been 
harboured by much of the senior generation of officials after the Brussels breakdown. As 
argued above, the consequences of exclusion were now seen as far too great and 
constituted the main motivation for joining the Common Market as opposed to some of 
the potential advantages which Keeble had tried to emphasise. For the more conservative 
officials, accession was more a means to an end and did not necessarily represent a 
 ‘ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇĂŶĚƵŶŝƚǇ ? 
ĨƚĞƌƚŚŝƐĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞǁŝƚŚ<ĞĞďůĞ ?K ?EĞŝůůďĞŐĂŶǁŽƌŬŽŶĂƉĂƉĞƌǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞ
new frontier in British European policy. It was addressed to the Foreign Secretary and 
circulated widely around Whitehall. It was comprehensive and mercilessly analytical. In the 
ƉĂƉĞƌ ?K ?EĞŝůůĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝŶŚŝƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ
post.800 This is a cruĐŝĂůƉŽŝŶƚ ?K ?EĞŝůůŚĂĚŶŽƚďĞĞŶĂĨŝĞƌĐĞĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ
in a European union for much of his career. During his time as a correspondent for The 
Times ?ŚĞŚĂĚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƵŶŝƚǇĂƐ ‘ƉůĂƚŝƚƵĚŝŶŽƵƐŽƌĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ?ŝŶ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽtŝŶƐƚŽŶŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĂƐŚĂŝƌŵĂŶŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚƵƌŽƉĞDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂƚ
the Albert Hall in May 1947.801 However, his position as ambassador to the EEC had given 
ŚŝŵĂƵŶŝƋƵĞŝŶƐŝŐŚƚŝŶƚŽ ‘ŝƚƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?ŝƚƐŝŶŶĞƌĐŽŵƉulsions, its methods, its 
                                                          
796 Ibid. 
797 Ibid. 
798 WĂƌƌ ? “'ŽŶĞEĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?tĂůů ?The Official History of Britain and the European Community 
Volume II (2013), 93. 
799 ^ŝƌŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
800 ^ŝƌŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽZ ? ?ƵƚůĞƌ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ&ƵƚƵƌĞZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/70. 
801 ^ŝƌŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “hŶŝƚĞĚƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?The Times 15 May 1947, 5. 
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ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨŝƚƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝƚƐƉƌŽďĂďůĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
convinced him that European political and economic cooperation was the future of 
international security.802 He outlined his new views to his colleagues:  
  
 Q/ĨĞĞůƚŚĂƚǁĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶƐƚŝůů ?ŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƵŶĚĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ
European Communities are and always have been concerned with politics and 
power. Their economic titles and functions still blind us to a fact the  “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐ ?
themselves have never sought to conceal: that they aim, through union, to revive 
their influence and power, not merely the prosperity, of their countries and 
peoples.803 
 
K ?EĞŝůůŵĂŶĂŐĞĚƚŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞǁŚĂƚƚŚĞŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ officials had 
failed to realise since the founding of the Communities. The Common Market was intended 
as both a political and economic venture, and British attempts to artificially separate the 
two in policymaking and their diplomatic responses were severĞůǇŚĂŵƉĞƌŝŶŐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?
ĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂŶĚƉƌĞĚŝĐƚƚŚĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆĂŶĚƚŚĞ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇ ?
As a result, Britain had been temporarily locked out of participating in European 
Community affairs and diplomatically ostracised by France, which was proving to be 
extremely damaging to British interests.804 K ?EĞŝůůĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽƚƌǇ
and mitigate this damage. Once again, he advocated a positive approach towards the EEC, 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚ ‘ǁŽƵůĚďƌŝŶŐŶŽĞĂƌůǇƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚĂŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ‘ǁŽƵůĚďĞ
ƚŚĞƐŝŐŶĂůĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚŽƵƌĞŶĞŵŝĞƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ QĂƌĞǁĂŝƚŝŶŐ ? ?805 ,ŝƐƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
relationship with Europe should the government decide to withdraw its desire to seek 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁĂƐƐƚĂƌŬ ?K ?EĞŝůůƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚ ‘ǁŽƵůĚĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽƚĂŬŝŶŐŽĨĨƚŚĞďƌĂŬĞ QŽŶƚŚĞ
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƵƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŶ ‘ŝƌƌĞǀĞƌƐŝďůĞ ?ƐƚĞƉǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚ
ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚůǇƐĞǀĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?806 ƌŝƚĂŝŶǁĂƐŶŽƚũƵƐƚ ?ŝŶK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?
infinitely better off in than out, but would also have to proclaim her intentions long and 
ůŽƵĚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŚĞƌĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?/ŶWĂƌƌ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ ? ‘ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞ
to join the European Community would act as a corrective to French influence in Europe, 
reminding the Five that there were alternatives to a political settlement on French 
                                                          








ƚĞƌŵƐ ? ?807 dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƚĂĐƚŝĐŽĨƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇ&ŝǀĞ ?ƚŽďƌŝŶŐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶƚŚĞ
&ƌĞŶĐŚĂŶĚĐŚĞĐŬƚŚĞŝƌŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂŶĞǁ ?ƌĂĚŝĐĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?K ?EĞŝůů
identified that the Six could no longer be treated as a collective and that the divergence of 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŚĂĚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ
government could potentially play this to their advantage by presenting Britain as a 
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁĞŝŐŚƚƚŽ&ƌĞŶĐŚĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ?dŚĞƐĞŝĚĞĂƐǁŽƵůĚĐŽůŽƵƌŵĂŶǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŝŶ
the run-up to the second application. 
K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌƉƌŽǀŽŬĞĚĂǁŝĚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞĨƌŽŵǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚ
embassies of Europe. The Head of the WOCD ?:ŽŚŶĂƌŶĞƐ ?ůĂďĞůůĞĚŝƚĂ ‘ǀĂůƵĂďůĞĚĞƐƉĂƚĐŚ ?
and that he was in ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ ‘ĂůŵŽƐƚĂůůŽĨŝƚ ? ?808 tŚĞƌĞƚŚĞh<> ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞĚ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚŽƐĞŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĂƐŽǀĞƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?K ?EĞŝůůŚĂĚ
argued that it was not in ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŽƚƌǇĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŝŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƵŶŝŽŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞƌŝƚĂŝŶǁŽƵůĚƐƚŝůůďĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞ ?ƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
removed from policymaking  W a political community of the Seven could not coexist with an 
economic community of the Six.809 In addition, he was adamant that such political 
discussions would not amount to anything and would be a diplomatic wild goose chase for 
the British government.810 ĂƌŶĞƐĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĚǁŝƚŚK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐĚŝĂŐŶŽƐŝƐĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚ
would be ƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƚŽƚƌǇĂŶĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ǁŝĚĞŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ ?Ɛ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŽŽĨ ?ƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞŽƚŚĞƌƵ ŽƉĞĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ‘ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ QůĞƚƚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞ^ŝǆŐŽĂŚĞĂĚƚŽďƵŝůĚĂ>ŝƚƚůĞƵƌŽƉĞŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ? ?811 These ideas stemmed from a 
long-held orthodoxy in the WOCD that Britain could participate in political developments 
with the Six without necessarily going all the way into the Common Market. Parr has also 
argued that Barnes was first and foremost an Atlanticist and subscribed to the idea of an 
 ‘ƚůĂŶƚŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉŽƉƵůĂƌĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂůǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞtKƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŵŝĚ-
1950s.812 ĂƌŶĞƐ ?ƵŶůŝŬĞK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌĨŝŐƵƌĞƐŝŶƚŚĞK ?ŚĂĚƐƚŝůůĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽ
appreciate that only full membership of the EEC would grant Britain the political influence 
ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŽƵŐŚƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŝŶĂďŝĚƚŽĐƵƌďƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ
                                                          
807 Parr, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2006), 19. 
808 :ŽŚŶĂƌŶĞƐ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ1964, TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/70. 
809 ^ŝƌŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽZ ? ?ƵƚůĞƌ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ&ƵƚƵƌĞZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ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TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/70. 
810 Ibid. 
811 :ŽŚŶĂƌŶĞƐ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?




supranational Commission had reinvigorated interest in such arrangements.813 Indeed, 
Harold tŝůƐŽŶǁŽƵůĚůĂƚĞƌǀŽŝĐĞŚŝƐĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨEurope de 
patries ǀĞƌƐƵƐƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ?ƐŵŽƌĞĨĞĚĞƌĂůŝƐƚvision to the Foreign Office.814  
Frank Roberts, the British ambassador in Bonn, sent his own major paper to the Foreign 
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĂƐĂƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚƐ ?ZŽďĞƌƚƐǁĂƐů ƌŐĞůǇŝŶĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚK ?EĞŝůů
on German attitudes towards British membership of the EEC and how the West German 
government believed that Britain could not participate in any meaningful political 
integration without first joining the Communities.815 He also agreed that the British 
government would have to publicly maintain a highly positive approach to Europe in order 
to demonstrate their continued commitment.816 ZŽďĞƌƚƐ ?ĨƵůůĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚat there 
ǁĂƐ ‘ŶŽŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůǁĂǇƚŽďƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŶĚ&dƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ǁĂƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞƌĂĚŝĐĂů
ƐƚĂŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚĐŚŝŵĞĚǁŝƚŚK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?817 However, like Barnes, Roberts was 
adamant that British participation in a European political union was essential, and likened 
K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĂƚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ‘ ?ƐƚĂǇŝŶŐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞƐŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐĂŶĚ ?ůĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞ^ŝǆĨŝŐŚƚŝƚ
ŽƵƚĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?818 ZŽďĞƌƚƐĐŝƚĞĚƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ?ƐŝŵƉĂƚŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůǁŝůů
ƚŽƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ǁĂŝƚĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐŽŵĞƐĂǁĂƐĞǀidence of British half-heartedness.819 At 
the opposite end of the spectrum were the more conservative members of the diplomatic 
service who still held out hope for an association with the EEC. Roderick Barclay, one of the 
officials under study in the previous chapter and now ambassador to Belgium was one such 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ĂƐǁĂƐĚŐĂƌŽŚĞŶ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƚŽ&d ?ĂƌĐůĂǇ
ĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞďŝƚƚĞƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ ? ?ŵŽŶƚŚƐĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŽĨŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
Community have left me with a subjeĐƚŝǀĞĚŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨŝƚ ?ĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽ
believe that the application would have been successful had it been for an associative 
relationship rather than full membership.820 ŽŚĞŶĞĐŚŽĞĚĂƌĐůĂǇ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŽŶ
association with the EEC and the possible construction of a free trade area, but his 
                                                          
813 WŝĞƌƌĞ'ĞƌďĞƚ ? “/Ŷ^ĞĂƌĐŚŽĨWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůhŶŝŽŶ PdŚĞ&ŽƵĐŚĞƚWůĂŶEĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?- ? ? ) ?ŝŶThe 
Dynamics of European Union, ed. Roy Pryce (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 114; Jean-Marie Palayret, 
 “Ğ'ĂƵůůĞŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ P&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŵƉƚǇŚĂŝƌƌŝƐŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐ
ŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ?ŝŶVisions, Votes and Vetoes: The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise 
Forty Years On, ed. Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace and Pascaline Winand (Oxford: Peter Lang, 
2006), 47. 
814 WĂƌƌ ? “'ŽŶĞEĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? 






820 Roderick Barclay to Charles Johnston, 11 August 1964, TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/81. 
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ĚĞƐƉĂƚĐŚǁĂƐĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚĂƐ ‘ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ?ďǇƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ?821 These responses to 
K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚƚŚĞĚŝƐƵŶŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?/Ŷ
particular, calls for an association between Britain and the Six had not yet disappeared 
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ ?ƵŶĚĞƌůŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĚƵƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
integration. However, the majority of officials at this point were convinced that nothing 
short of membershŝƉǁŽƵůĚƐĂƚŝƐĨǇƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐ
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞǁŚŝĐŚĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞWŝƚďůĂĚŽƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?ĂŶĚ
K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽďĞƋƵŽƚĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ďůƵĞƉƌŝŶƚ ?ŽŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
Europe.822 
The final version of the Pitblado report was submitted in October 1964, in time for the 
incoming Labour government following their election victory.823 It was an exceptionally 
comprehensive document which took into account Anglo-American relations, the 
Commonwealth, the likely economic consequences of accession, and the state of British 
foreign policy in general.824 The Foreign Office had it circulated to the Western European 
and American embassies and the permanent missions to NATO, EFTA, the OECD and the 
EEC.825 In his letter to Charles Johnston, the Deputy Under-Secretary for European 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ĂǀŝĚWŝƚďůĂĚŽƚŚĂŶŬĞĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?
ƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƉƵƚ ?ďƵƚƐŝŶŐůĞĚŽƵƚŽŶK ?EĞŝůůĨŽƌ his 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞĂůŽŶĞŚĂĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌŽƵƌƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? ?826 
There can be little doubt that the sections of the report which dealt with foreign policy 
ǁĞƌĞŚĞĂǀŝůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌƐĨƌŽŵh<> ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚe language 
employed is near-identical, particularly the new Whitehall perspectives on the political 
ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ƚůĂŶƚŝĐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ǁĂƐĂůƐŽŐŝǀĞŶŵƵĐŚ
more consideration. Discussions preceding the first application between Foreign Office 
officials had largely dismissed ĨĞĂƌƐŽĨƚŚĞďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ, de 
'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĚŝƐĚĂŝŶĨŽƌ ‘ŶŐůŽ-^ĂǆŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌĂŵŽƌĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƵƌŽƉĞǁĞƌĞnow 
viewed as a serious threat to the unity of the West.827 The idea that Britain could act as a 
bridge between Europe and the United States from outside the EEC was now gone  W 
                                                          
821 ƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
822 ^ĞĞ PƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ? “Dƌ ?WŝƚďůĂĚŽ ?Ɛ'ƌŽƵƉ ? ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
823 David WŝƚďůĂĚŽ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĂŶĚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/177374/M1093/121. 
824 Ibid. 
825 James Marjoribanks to Pierson Dixon, 23 October 1964, TNA/FO371/177374/M1903/121. 
826 David Pitblado to Charles Johnston, 14 October 1964, TNA/FO371/177374/M1903/121A. 




without British membership, there would be no bridge at all. It was warned that the 
ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƚŚĞtĞƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ ‘Ĩŝƌmly opposed to the 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂƐĂƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ?ĐŽƵůĚĞĂƐŝůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
interests vis-à-vis reunification or the role of NATO.828 These issues added further impetus 
to the urgency of British accession and demonstrated the potential dangers of exclusion. In 
the eyes of the Foreign Office, only British membership of the EEC could curb these 
deviations and preserve the integrity of the Atlantic Alliance. The resurgence of fears of the 
ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ?ǁĞŶƚŚĂŶĚŝŶŚand with the divergence of political vision within 
ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ P ‘KŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚŝƐƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ QKŶ
ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŝƐƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐǇŵďŽůŝƐĞĚĂƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚďǇ'ĂƵůůŝƐŵ ? ?829 As argued 
above, the Gaullist conception of the EEC was attractive to many British politicians and 
officials, as it downplayed the supranational components of European integration and 
reaffirmed the primacy of national governments. However, as Parr has demonstrated, the 
Foreign Office knew that the real issue was not whether the French approach was more 
compatible with British interests, but that de Gaulle remained stubbornly opposed to 
British membership.830 In practical terms, that meant making a tactical decision to support 
ƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ?ƐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨa federal Europe even though most ministers and officials were 
opposed to such an arrangement.831 Reconciling these two conflicting objectives would 
cause a rift between Downing Street and the Foreign Office which would frame the debates 
on the decision to apply to the EEC a second time and the state of British foreign policy 
towards Europe. Indeed, shortly after the new government had taken office, they were 
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dŚĞtŝůƐŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐurope was, as argued above, rather 
ĂŵďŝǀĂůĞŶƚ ?ƐWĂƌƌŚĂƐŶŽƚĞĚ ?>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƐŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďǇ
ƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝǀĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? PŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐĨŽƌ
Commonwealth trade, the maintenance of BrŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽ&d ?ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƵƐĞ
central economic planning and nationalisation in government policy, and full control over 
foreign policy.832 These rather inflexible criteria did not give the Foreign Office much room 
for manoeuvre, and by FebruaƌǇ ? ? ? ?ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ‘ďĞŐĂŶƚŽƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞtŝůƐŽŶŵŽƌĞĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƚŽ
ĚĞĐůĂƌĞŚŝƐŚĂŶĚŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?833 Michael 
WĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞ,ĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇWůĂŶŶŝŶŐ^ƚĂĨĨ ?ǁĂƐŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůŝŶ
convincing the new Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart to urge the Prime Minister to pursue 
a more consistent European policy.834 The Planning Staff Department was a new creation 
ĂŶĚŚĂĚƵƐƵƌƉĞĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨĂůĂƌŐĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞtK ?ƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?
and poliĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇŝŶĐĞŶƐĞĚ:ŽŚŶĂƌŶĞƐ ?ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨ ?835 The 
decreasing importance of the WOCD, which only retained control over NATO, WEU and 
ŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ŝƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞK ?ƐĂƐĐĞŶƚĂŶĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚĂƐƚŚĞ
principal department concerned with multilateral European institutions in the 1960s.836 
DŽƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ŝƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ
European Communities and European integration efforts as opposed to the more 
Atlanticist line taken by the WOCD.  
^ƚĞǁĂƌƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƐƚĞĞƌtŝůƐŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŵŽƌĞ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚ ?
foreign policy had mixed results. The Prime Minister was clearly not particularly 
ĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞntion to reapply for membership of 
ƚŚĞ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶŐŽŶ^ƚĞǁĂƌƚ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌ P ‘hŶůĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞ ? ǁĂƐŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇŽƵƚǁĂƌĚůŽŽŬŝŶŐ
and not autarkic it must be inimical to Atlantic and Commonwealth links. The real test is 
agricultural policy, which in its present ĨŽƌŵ QǁŽƵůĚĚĞĂůĂĚĞĂƚŚ-blow to Commonwealth 
ƚƌĂĚĞ ? ?837 KŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĞŚƵƌĐŚŝůůŝĂŶ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞĐŝƌĐůĞƐ ?ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƌĞĂƌĞĚŝƚƐŚĞĂĚĂŶĚĨůĂƵŶƚĞĚ
                                                          
832 Broad, >ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝůĞŵŵĂƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?WĂƌƌ ? “'ŽŶĞEĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? 
833 Parr, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2006), 36. 
834 Ibid.; Michael Stewart to Harold Wilson, 12 February 1965, TNA/PREM13/306/PM/65/26. 
835 Foreign Office, Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book 1965 (London: Harrison 
and Sons, 1965), 6; Michael Palliser, interviewed by John Hutson, 28 April 1999, CCC/BDOHP/37/10. 
836 Foreign Office, Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book 1965 (London: Harrison 
and Sons, 1965), 7. 




its enduring legacy in the attitudes of British politicians. However, Wilson was not entirely 
opposed to greater cooperation with Europe, and publicly stated in February 1965 that he 
ǁŽƵůĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ĂďƌŝĚŐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ&dĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?ŝŶŚŝƐ
bilateral talks with Chancellor Ludwig Erhard.838 WĂƌƌŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚtŝůƐŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚ
by Foreign OfficĞĂŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ
after the imposition of the 15% import surcharge at the end of 1964 which had antagonised 
the other members of EFTA and put Britain in the diplomatic doghouse.839 Whilst the EEOD 
were pleased with this slight progress, there were still concerns over the practicalities of 
tŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐ ?/ŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŽŶtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?EŽƌŵĂŶ
^ƚĂƚŚĂŵƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŵƵƐƚďĞĚŽƵďƚĂƐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇǁŽƵůĚďĞ
intĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐEĞǁƐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƚŽĚŽǁŶƉůĂǇƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
success of such a proposal.840 Marjoribanks also expressed his disappointment, suggesting 
ƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚĂŶŽƵƚŽĨĚĂƚĞŝĚĞĂǁŽƵůĚ ‘ƌĞ-emphasise in the EEC that we are out of touch with 
ƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?841 Keeble argued that an EEC-&dĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ǁĂƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ
as a non-ƐƚĂƌƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽďĂďůǇŶŽƚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞŵƵĐŚŽĨĂŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ?842 However, the Prime 
Minister had decided that the issue was worthy of exploration and instructed the Foreign 
Secretary to circulate a note on possible links between EFTA and the EEC to be considered 
by ministers in late March.843 dŚĞK ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌƌĞĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚŵƵĐŚŽĨǁŚĂƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶƐĂŝĚ
previously, but in slightly more detail. Firstly, it was argued that an association would likely 
disrupt EFTA rather than create a functional link with the EEC.844 dŚĞ ?ƐĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ
economic integration and productivity could potentially sap EFTA of investment and 
industrial output.845 In addition, the EEOD were keen to sƚƌĞƐƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ QǁŽƵůĚ
probably require acceptance of most of the obligations of full membership without a 
ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐ
 ‘ƐĞĐŽŶĚĐůĂƐƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?846 This was quite a daŵŶŝŶŐǀŝĞǁŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚ
she continue to rely on EFTA and an associative relationship, something which had been 
largely debunked by most Foreign Office officials. Wilson was not unsympathetic towards 
                                                          
838  “DĂŬŝŶŐEŝŶƚŚ&dDĞŵďĞƌ ? ?The Times 26 February 1965, 12. 
839 Parr, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞEuropean Community (2006), 41. 
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these views, and did raise the question of EEC membership with the Cabinet on a number 
of occasions.847 Parr has suggested that this was a more calculated ploy in order to appease 
the pro-European wing of the party, led by the First Secretary of State, George Brown.848 
ZĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽns, the government were slowly beginning to investigate 
ways in which Britain could try and forge new links with the EEC. 
It was at a Cabinet meeting on the 27 April that Wilson announced his interest in creating 
closer links between EEC and EFTA.849 It is important to note, however, that Wilson 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĂƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇŶŽƚĂŶŽƉƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝǀĞ
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ?850 From his memoirs, it appears that Wilson was largely 
concerned with currying favour with the other EFTA member states, which would explain 
ŚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶĂ ‘ďƌŝĚŐĞ-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ?ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ?851 The main cut and thrust of his 
approach consisted of accommodating the economic interests of the EFTA members in an 
EEC-EFTA association as opposed to appreciating the political connotations of the EEC.852 
The various schemes which sporadically tumbled onto paper ranged from tariff reductions 
and the creation of a wider free trade area to a single customs union.853 This is an argument 
shared by Parr, who has stated that the bridge-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞǁĂƐĂ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƐŚŽƌƚ-
ƚĞƌŵƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐ QƚŽŚĞůƉƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞƐĞůĨ-made problem of the fragmentation of EFTA and 
ƚŚƵƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?854 Unsurprisingly, the EEOD and UKDEL immediately 
voiced their concerns. In response to ideas for a ministerial contact committee between 
ƚŚĞĂŶĚ&d ?ƚŚĞŶŽǁ,ĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ<ĞĞďůĞ ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƚŽ
^ǁŝƚǌĞƌůĂŶĚ ?EŽƌŵĂŶ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĐŚĞŵĞǁĂƐŵĞƌ  ‘ǁŝŶĚŽǁĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ? ?855 
Furthermore, if the creation of the committee actually did get approved, it would be 
ůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĨŝĞůĚĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨ
ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ? ?856 &dĂŶĚƚŚĞǁĞƌĞ ?^ƚĂƚŚĂŵĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? ‘ƚŽƚĂůůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂŶŝŵĂůƐ ?ĂŶĚ
attempts to tƌǇĂŶĚĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞƚǁŽŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ƉŽůŝĐĞƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŚĂƉŚĂǌĂƌĚĂŶĚ
disjointed affair.857 However, Statham did not fail to point out that the most fundamental 
                                                          
847  “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&dĂŶĚƚŚĞ ? ?10 May 
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barrier to an EEC-EFTA association was the French, something which Michael Palliser later 
reiterated.858 In this sense, the other issues with the bridge-building exercise were largely 
irrelevant, as it was doomed to failure. Patrick Hancock, the new Assistant Under-Secretary 
ĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐDĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ?ĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞĨŽƌƌƵƐƐĞůƐĐŽŵŵĞnted: 
 ‘/ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞWDŝƐƋƵŝƚĞĂǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĐĂŶďĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƚŽƌĞũĞĐƚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂ
ŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŚĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵŝŶĚ ? ?859  
dŚŝƐĞƉŝƚŽŵŝƐĞĚƚŚĞtŝůƐŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞŝŶŝƚƐĨŝƌƐƚǇĞĂƌ PĂǁĂƐŚǁŝƚŚ
ambiguity and more concerned with political posturing than practicalities. To borrow from 
^ƚĞƉŚĞŶtĂůů ?ƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂĚ ‘ĂƚŽĞŝŶƚŚĞǁĂƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƐŚŽǁĞĚŶŽŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ
signs of reaching a definitive position on European integration.860 At a meeting of the EFTA 
heads of government in late May in Vienna, it was agreed that EFTA should investigate 
possible links for collaboration with the EEC.861 Schemes such as tariff reduction or 
commercial harmonisation were regarded as the most promising initiatives in light of 
French opposition to wider political consultations.862 Whitehall were ordered to draft 
ƉĂƉĞƌƐŽŶƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ‘ďƌŝĚŐĞ-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ?ƉůĂŶƐ ?ǁŚŝĐh provoked a number of reactions. The 
word from UKDEL in Brussels was that the Vienna initiative would be completely rebuffed 
by the Six.863 DĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ P ‘KŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ QŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞŚĂǀĞŚĂĚŽĨ
Community reactions, we should have no illusions that there is any likelihood of the Vienna 
ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?864 DĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ?ŶƵŵďĞƌƚǁŽĂƚh<> ?
Arthur Maddocks, stated that the President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, 
was worried that the bridge-building initiative would play into the hands of the French by 
using it to their advantage by inserting proposals which would curb the power of the 
Commission.865 This was dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, the French already dominated 
the EEC. Any measures which would enhance their influence would be to the detriment of 
both Britain and the Five. Secondly, if Britain supported a bridge-building initiative which 
                                                          
858 Ibid. ?DŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌ ? “&d ?ŽŶƚĂĐƚŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? 
TNA/FO371/182345/M10723/33E. 
859 WĂƚƌŝĐŬ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬ ?ŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌ ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
860 Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community Volume II (2013), 80. 
861 Parr, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽmmunity (2006), 47. 
862 Ibid. 
863 James Marjoribanks to Foreign Office, 11 June 1965, TNA/FO371/182346/M10723/68. 
864 Ibid. 
865 Arthur Maddocks to Norman Statham, 2 June 1965, TNA/FO371/182346/M10723/69. 
Interestingly, Maddocks and Statham were the same age and both attended Manchester Grammar 
School at the same time. It is not clear whether or not they were old friends, but they certainly 
shared similar views on Europe. 
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would result in a diluted Commission and open the door to further French domination, the 
 ‘&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇ&ŝǀĞ ?ǁŽƵld be enraged.  
The Vienna initiative hit an obstacle with the inception of what has been dubbed the 
 ‘ŵƉƚǇŚĂŝƌƌŝƐŝƐ ? ?866 ĨƚĞƌĂĐŽƵƉůĞŽĨŐƌƵĞůůŝŶŐǁĞĞŬƐŽĨĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ ?ƐŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨ
Ministers over the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy in June 1965, Maurice 
Couve de Murville announced the withdrawal of the French delegation from the 
negotiations.867 WĂƌƌŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ ‘ŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇƚŽďĞŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ
ďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶ ? ?ďƵƚŝŶĂĐƚƵĂůĨĂĐƚƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶĂ&ƌĞŶĐŚďŽǇĐŽƚƚŽĨĂll EEC institutions until the 
 ‘>ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ?ŽĨ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?868 It is at this juncture that the EEOD and 
UKDEL started drafting significantly fewer papers and minutes on EEC-EFTA association and 
bridge-building. This is largely because the Empty Chair Crisis made the likelihood of an 
associative relationship between the two groupings even slimmer than before given the 
deadlock within the EEC ?'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
was to avoid controversy and prevent the government from embarking on any outlandish 
schemes for European cooperation. In early September, Statham responded to a paper 
from the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) which made a number of suggestions on 
areas for cooperation between the EEC and EFTA.869 He lambasted the paper for 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚůĂĐŬŽĨĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƐĐŽƉĞĨŽƌƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
bridge-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ‘ƐĐĂƌĐĞůǇƐĞĞŵƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽǁĂƌƌĂŶƚĂůůƚŚĞƐŽŶŐ
and dance about bridge-building initiativeƐƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŚĞƋƵĞƌƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŝŶƉƌŝů ? ?870 Statham 
was aware that the EEC was not in a fit state to consider the proposals, and that it would 
simply suggest that Britain was attempting to strengthen EFTA for its own sake, which 
would only serve to irritate the Five.871 This view was confirmed by reports from 
                                                          
866 ^ĞĞ P,ĞůĞŶtĂůůĂĐĞĂŶĚWĂƐĐĂůŝŶĞtŝŶĂŶĚ ? “dŚĞŵƉƚǇŚĂŝƌƌŝƐŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐ
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Empty Chair Crisis was unlikely to resolve itself before the end of the year, which would 
likely result in a complete standstill to the bridge-building initiative.872 The attitude of the 
French remained the decisive factor. Marjoribanks suggested that de Gaulle was playing for 
time until the presidential elections in December 1965, when he would be more confident 
of his position and would be able to force the Five to make a favourable deal.873 On the 
prospect of bridge-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŐĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶǇŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵ ?DĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ?ĂƐƐĞ ƐŵĞŶƚ
was bleak. He argued that Britain wading into the Empty Chair Crisis and seemingly trying 
to play it to its advantage would foster a great deal of resentment, and the French in 
particular would fight tooth and nail to prevent a challenge to their influence within the 
EEC.874 However, he did suggest that there was a possibility that Britain could havĞĂ ‘ŵĂũŽƌ
ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐ P 
 
dŚĞƌĞŝƐ QĂĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŚĂƚĚƵƌŝŶŐ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŬĞǇƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐŵĂǇŽŶĐĞŵŽƌĞůŝĞ
with us. If we then decided that it was in our interest to join the Five in working a 
Community of the kind established by the Rome Treaty, we might in return enjoy a 
ďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ QǁŚĞŶŝƚĐĂŵĞƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ?ŶŽƚĂďůǇƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůWŽůŝĐǇ QŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ QŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ
open to us to wait until the Five, as a result of the difficulties operating of the 




and establish a new relationship with the EEC, but that the Empty Chair Crisis could 
eventually lead to Britain having a stronger bargaining position. Indeed, he warned that 
 ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐƚŽďĞŐĂŝŶĞĚ ?ĂŶĚŵƵĐŚůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞůŽƐƚ ?ďǇŵĂŬŝŶŐĂŵŽǀĞƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉŽƵƌ
relations with the Six before it is clear whether France is going to win the current 
ĚŝƐƉƵƚĞ ? ?876 DĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐĂůƐŽŬĞƉƚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂǁŝĚĞƌĨƌĞĞƚƌĂĚĞĂƌĞĂ
alive, which would be more compatible with British economic interests. The feasibility of 
such a suggestion is less relevant than the confidence which this projected. Marjoribanks 
                                                          












to let the impetus of bridge-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĨůĂŐ ? ?877 Slowing the initiative down or prematurely 
quashing it would leave Britain without any future bargaining chips and would also incense 
the Danes, who had taken up the cause of bridge-building with a great deal of 
enthusiasm.878 As such, Statham outlined three potential options for the government: do 
nothing; establish the parameters of a bridge-building initiative but defer approaching the 
EEC until its internal divisions had healed; or immediately approach the EEC with an 
initiative.879 Statham immediately dismissed the first option out of hand, citing the reasons 
given above. He expressed his personal preference for the third option, but added that it 
would probably be easier to implement the second option.880 K ?EĞŝůůǁĞŝŐŚĞĚŝŶĂŶĚ
suggested that the second option was the best course of action in light of comments made 
by Dutch contacts who expressed reservations over the pursuit of bridge-building in the 
current political climate.881 He was supported in this by Gore-Booth, who as Permanent 
Under-Secretary added that ministers could be prone to changing their minds on the 
matter and that a paper should be produced on the implications of the Empty Chair Crisis 
for the bridge-building initiative.882 In short, the Foreign Office line, approved at the very 
top, was to dig in and play for time. MaƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵƌƵƐƐĞůƐǁĂƐĂůƐŽƌĞůĂǇĞĚƚŽ
the Foreign Secretary, who raised the issues at a Cabinet meeting. Stewart informed his 
ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĚĞĂĚůŽĐŬŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨĂŶǇŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƚŽ
ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĂǁŝĚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂŶĚ as far as Britain was concerned, the stand-off was a double-
edged sword.883 /ƚǁĂƐŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞƐƚĂŶĚĨĂƐƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
&ƌĞŶĐŚĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ?ĂƐĂŶĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇ&ƌĂŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ŝŶǁĂƌĚ-looking and less 
satisfactory as a partner in our politico-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?884 Conversely, however, 
&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĂƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚŝƚƐƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵǁĂƐ
                                                          





881 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
882 Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ?163B. 




ŵŽƌĞŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƌŝƚŝƐŚǀŝĞǁƐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ?Ɛ ?885 Repeating the advice of his officials, 
Stewart urged patience and caution, but it was generally agreed that in the near future the 
ĂďŝŶĞƚ ‘ǁŽƵůĚƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŽƵƌĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚƌĞ-examine, in the light of 
developments in recent years, the conditions which the Labour party had attached to the 
hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?886 Indeed, Michael Palliser had argued earlier that the time had 
ĐŽŵĞƚŽƚƌǇĂŶĚĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝǀĞĐŽŶĚŝƚ ŽŶƐ ?ǁĞƌĞĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŚŝŶĚƌĂŶĐĞƚŽ
ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞĂsymbol of 
>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĂŝƐĞĚƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶƐĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?887 Patrick Hancock 
concurred and even went as far as to say that the Foreign Secretary should go to some 
ůĞŶŐƚŚƐƚŽĚŝƐĂǀŽǁƚŚĞŵŝŶƉƵďůŝĐ ?ĂƐŝƚǁĂƐƐŝŵƉůǇŶŽƚĞŶŽƵŐŚ ‘ƚŽũƵƐƚƐtop talking about 
ƚŚĞĨŝǀĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?888 The pressure which the Foreign Office had applied to Stewart to 
tread lightly on bridge-building and subtly raise the possibility of a future bid for 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĨƌĞĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐŚĂĐŬůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝǀĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƉƉĞĂrs to have worked. 
In November, at the request of the Foreign Secretary, the EEOD began drafting a Cabinet 
ƉĂƉĞƌŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŵƉƚǇŚĂŝƌƌŝƐŝƐĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
 ?^ŝƌŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽŽŬƚŚĞďƵƌĚĞŶŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĚƌĂĨt upon himself, and produced an 
ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞĂŶĚƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝǀĞƉĂƉĞƌ ?K ?EĞŝůůĞĨĨ ĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐ
was a turning point for the whole of Europe, and the outcome would have significant 
consequences for future British interests.889 However ?ƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌĂůƐŽďĞƚƌĂǇĞĚK ?EĞŝůů ?Ɛ
vehemently anti-&ƌĞŶĐŚǀŝĞǁƐ ?K ?EĞŝůůĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĂ&ƌĞŶĐŚǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞ
 ‘ďĂĚĂŶĚĞǀĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐĂǀŝĐƚŽƌǇĨŽƌƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ‘ĐŽƵůĚƚƵƌŶƚŽŽƵƌĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ? ?890 
In response to later comments from Barnes ?K ?EĞŝůůĞǀĞŶǁĞŶƚĂƐĨĂƌĂƐƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝĨ
ƚŚĞƌĞŵƵƐƚďĞĂŶŽĚĚŵĂŶŽƵƚ/ǁŽƵůĚƐŽŽŶĞƌŝƚǁĞƌĞ&ƌĂŶĐĞƚŚĂŶǁĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ&ƌĞŶĐŚ
expulsion from the EEC was a price well worth paying for British membership.891 This cut 
against the prevalent thinking at No. 10 and other Whitehall departments such as the DEA, 
ǁŚĞƌĞŝƚǁĂƐďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĂŶƚŝ-supranationalist tendencies could help 
accommodate a British accession to the EEC on more favourable terms, as mentioned 
above. Indeed, Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Under-Secretary of the DEA, wrote to Gore-Booth 
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887 DŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚ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ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?1 November 1965, 
TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/112G. 
890 Ibid. 
891 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?' ? ) ? 
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arguing that if France forced the Five to submit, the power of the Commission would be 
ǁĞĂŬĞŶĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĨĞĚĞƌĂůŝƐƚ ?ĐŽŶŶŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŚŝĐŚĂůŝĞŶĂƚĞĚŵĂŶǇ
senior British politicians would be removed.892 K ?EĞŝůůĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚƚŚŝƐůŝŶĞŽĨ
ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ&ƌĞŶĐŚĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚ ‘ŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ
ĞǀĞŶŚĂƌĚĞƌĨŽƌƵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚƚŽůŝǀĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĂŶŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƵƉƚŽŶŽǁ ? ?ĐŝƚŝŶŐ
the possibility of an agricultural settlement even more favourable to the French than 
previously and a probable increase in protectionist measures.893 /ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?K ?EĞŝůůůŝƐƚĞĚ
the potential politico-ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐŽǀĞƌƚĂŶƚŝ-Americanism 
and disdain for NATO, which could cripple the Atlantic Alliance.894 Even more worryingly, 
K ?EĞŝůůƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ&ƌĞŶĐŚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐĐŽƵůĚĨŝůƚĞƌƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŽtĞƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?
making the Franco-'ĞƌŵĂŶĂǆŝƐŵŽƌĞƉƌŽŶĞƚŽĂĐƚŝŶŐůŝŬĞĂ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ
unacceptable to Britain and the United States given the potential for the Soviet Union to 
exploit the situation.895 ^ƵĐŚǁĂƐK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐĨĞĂƌĂŶĚƌĞƐĞŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĂďƌĂƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŝŶ
the European arena that he did not shy away from stating that a breakdown of the EEC or a 
French expulsion would be more advantageous than a French victory.896 The Five would in 
all likelihood gravitate towards Britain and EFTA, which would result in Britain becoming 
the principal European power once again.897 This was, to be sure, very radical thinking, and 
K ?EĞŝůůƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚĂƐŵƵĐŚ ?ĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐŵĂǇƌĞŐĂƌĚŵǇƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů
ĂƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ? ?898 His attitude towards European integration was 
clearly couched in terms of searching for a revitalisation of British prestige rather than any 
idealist attachments to continental solidarity.  
K ?EĞŝůů ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐǁĞůĐŽŵĞĚƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?'ŽƌĞ-Booth and 
,ĂŶĐŽĐŬůĂďĞůůĞĚŝƚ ‘ǀĞƌǇƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝĨƚŚĞǇƉŝƚĐŚĞĚŝƚƚŽƚŚĞPrime 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĂƐƚŚĞ ‘tŝůƐŽŶWůĂŶĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚŵĂƐƐĂŐĞŚŝƐĞŐŽĞŶŽƵŐŚĨŽƌŚŝŵƚŽďĞ
persuaded.899 ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵĂůƐŽƉƌĂŝƐĞĚK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐĚƌĂĨƚ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ
 ‘ǀĞƌǇĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐůǇ ? ?900 It was suggested that the second draft of the paper should contain a 
                                                          
892 Eric Roll to Paul Gore-Booth, 20 October 1965, TNA/T312/1015/2F415/06D. 







899 WĂƚƌŝĐŬ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ
1965, TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/112G(A). 





^ŝǆ ?ƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚĂŶĚƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝǀĞ ?WĂůůŝƐĞƌ
ĚƌĂĨƚĞĚĂŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝǀĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?and tried to instigate a reappraisal on 
ƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?WĂůůŝƐĞƌĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŚĂƐŶĞǀĞƌďĞĞŶ ?ƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ ?ǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞ
conditions must remain immutable or that the passage of time and changing events would 
ŶĞǀĞƌĂĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞŵ ? ?901 The entire tone of WĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?ƐĚƌĂĨƚǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ
ƌĞĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ?dŚĞŵŽƚŝǀĞƐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚŝƐǁĞƌĞ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?
partly cynical. Any declaration which could potentially draw the Five closer to Britain and 
away from France in the midst ŽĨƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐǁŽƵůĚƉůĂǇƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?
WĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽ-European credentials are well-documented, and it would be logical to assume 
ƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂŶǆŝŽƵƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐŝŵĂŐĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƐĂǁĨŝƚƚŽ
rehabilitate it.902 The fact that this happened to coincide with the general direction which 
ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĞƌĞƚĂŬŝŶŐƐƵŝƚĞĚWĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?ƐĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚŝƐ ?K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ
WĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞĚŝǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁŚŽ
bĂĐŬĞĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ?K ?EĞŝůů ?ǁŚŽǁĂƐŵƵĐŚůĞƐƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐĂďŽƵƚ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂŶWĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚǁĂƐ ‘ƚŽŽĐůŽƐĞůǇŐĞĂƌĞĚƚŽĂŶ
ĂĐƚƵĂůƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŽĨŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŝŶƚĞŶƚ ?ǁĂƐmuch 
ŵŽƌĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ ‘ďĂůů ?ŝŶƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ?Ɛ ‘ĐŽƵƌƚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ
making British accession to the EEC a more attractive prospect.903 ĨƚĞƌK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚ
Hancock finished work on the second draft, Palliser responded to his collĞĂŐƵĞ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐ
by arguing that presenting the government as ready to negotiate with the Six would 
encourage ministers to see the benefits of a second application, as many were eager to see 
progress with Europe.904 There was an awareness that a new approach to Europe would 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨ ‘ĂďŝŶĞƚƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ ?ƚŽǁŝŶŽǀĞƌƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂůĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ
in the government, and that the Foreign Office would need to advise the Foreign Secretary 
on how to broach the subject.905 Indeed, when Gore-Booth submitted the paper to Stewart 
for his consideration, he mentioned that there were points of procedure with regards to 
                                                          
901 DŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
902 WĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?ƐĂƌĚĞŶƚƉƌŽ-Europeanism has been noted in a number of interviews and obituaries: 
DŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚďǇ:ŽŚŶ,ƵƚƐŽŶ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ? ?K,W ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂǀŝĚ,ĂŶŶĂǇ ? “^ŝƌ
DŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌKďŝƚƵĂƌǇ ? ?The Guardian  ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? “^ŝƌDŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌ ? ?The Telegraph 20 June 
 ? ? ? ? ? “^ŝƌDŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌ P^ĞŶŝŽƌŝƉůŽŵĂƚǁŚŽŚĞůƉĞĚƚĂŬĞƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?The 
Independent 3 July 2012. 
903 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
904 DŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dNA/FO371/182378/M10810/114A. 
905 :ŽŚŶEŝĐŚŽůůƐ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?     ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
158 
 
other Whitehall departments which needed to be discussed.906 dŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?ďĞĐĂŵĞ
ĐůĞĂƌŝŶK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐůĂƚĞƌĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ P^ƚĞǁĂƌƚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĞĚ'eorge Brown and Harold Wilson 
alone first.907 This suggests that Stewart wanted approval from the Prime Minister and the 
First Secretary of State before putting the paper to the Cabinet. Only then would he feel 
confident enough to propose a renewed membership bid. 
tŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŚĞŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶŚŽƉŝŶŐ
ĨŽƌ ?,ŝƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇDĂůĐŽůŵZĞŝĚǁƌŽƚĞƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ƐWƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůWƌŝǀĂƚĞ
Secretary, Murray Maclehose, informing him that Prime Minister found much of the 
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ‘ŚĂƌĚƚŽƐǁĂůůŽǁ ? ?908 Firstly, Wilson did not accept that the French views on the 
ĨƵƚƵƌĞƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞǁĞƌĞ ‘ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇĐŽŝŶĐŝĚĞĚǁŝƚŚŵĂŶǇƌŝƚŝƐŚǀŝĞǁƐ ?
such as opposition to supranationalism and curbing the power of the Commission and 
majority voting.909 Secondly, he still had concerns over the continued independence of 
British foreign and defence policy and the potential cost of the Common Agricultural Policy 
ƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŝŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƐĐŽƌĞŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚ ‘ŶŽĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ŚĂĚ
been given .910 dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐůƵŬĞǁĂƌŵ
ƌĞƉůǇ ?K ?EĞŝůůƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐ ‘ǀĞƌǇĨĂƌŝŶĚĞĞĚĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶŽƵƌƉĂƉĞƌ ? ?911 /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?tŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ attitude towards 
ƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽďĞƐŽƐƚƌŽŶŐƚŚĂƚK ?EĞŝůůĚŽƵďƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂŶǇĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ QƉƵƚ
ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚǁŝůůĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞŚŝŵŽĨŽƵƌĐĂƐĞ ? ?912 Gore-Booth also contributed his own thoughts, 
which juxtaposed the attitudes of the leadership of the Foreign Office and the government. 
The Permanent Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƉůǇǁĂƐŶŽƚĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶƌĂŝƐĞĚ ? ‘ďƵƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽŽĚǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŵƐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌůŝĞ
ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?913 As such, Gore-Booth was effectively suggesting that the Prime Minister 
was being deliberately obstructive and narrow-minded. He suggested that the solution was 
a comprehensive rebuttal of the view that the French approach towards the EEC was 
compatible with British interests.914 In a remarkably progressive tone, Gore-Booth detailed 
                                                          
906 Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚƚŽDŝĐŚĂĞů^ƚĞǁĂƌƚ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/114B. 
907 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ?ŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶWĂƵů'ŽƌĞ-ŽŽƚŚ ?s letter, 7 December 1965, 
TNA/FO371/182378/M10810/114B; Michael Stewart to Harold Wilson, 10 December 1965, 
TNA/FO371/182379/M10810/152/G. 
908 Malcolm Reid to Murray Maclehose, 28 December 1965, TNA/FO371/182379/M10810/164/G. 
909 Ibid. 
910 Ibid. 
911 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?' ? 
912 Ibid. 






between a group of independent states.915 This statement alone represented a significant 
change in attitude in the upper echelons of the Foreign Office. There was a realisation that 
the Six had formed the EEC with very specific ideas on its functions and future trajectory in 
mind, and that attempts to disrupt this  W as de Gaulle was doing  W would breed suspicion 
and ill will in the long term. As far as the Five were concerned, there could be no suggestion 
that the British government viewed the internal divisions within the EEC as an opportunity 
to pursue their own agenda. 
By the end of 1965, British policy towards the EEC remained fraught with ambiguity and 
conflicting views of the right approach towards Europe. Downing Street remained 
ƵŶĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚ&ƌĞŶĐŚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞǁĞƌĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐor contrary to 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŽ
ŵĂŬŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚƵƌĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ‘&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇ&ŝǀĞ ?ŚĂĚůĂƌŐĞůǇďĞĞŶŝŶǀĂŝŶ ?916 The potential 
effects of the Empty Chair Crisis continued to weigh heavily on offŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ŵŝŶĚƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ
after de Gaulle began to intimate that Britain could join the EEC during and after the French 
presidential election campaign of December 1965.917 It was in the early months of 1966 
that events began to move quickly and opinions began to shift. The Empty Chair Crisis was 
resolved at the end of January with the Luxembourg Compromise; Wilson called a snap 
election in March which resulted in a landslide victory for the Labour government; and de 
Gaulle withdrew France from NATO, precipitating yet another international political crisis. 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚďŝĚĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞĚƌĞǁĞǀĞƌĐůŽƐĞƌ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐĂŵĞĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ




                                                          
915 Ibid. 
916 Indeed, tensions between No. 10 and the Foreign Office had got to the point where Gore-Booth 
ŚĂĚƚŽǁƌŝƚĞƚŽtŝůƐŽŶĂŶĚĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐŶŽƚ ‘ĂŶƚŝ-WƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ? PWĂƵů'ŽƌĞ-
ŽŽƚŚƚŽ,ĂƌŽůĚtŝůƐŽŶ ? “&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƐĂŶĚEŽ ? ? ? ? ? &ĞďƌƵary 1966, Gore-Booth Papers, 
BODL/MS.Eng.c.4563. 




 ?,ŽǁƚŽŐĞƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ? PdŚĞ:Ƶly Economic Crisis and the 
Move towards Membership  
 
ƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞĚĞĂĚůŽĐŬǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů
from the European Community institutions was resolved in what has now been dubbed the 
 ‘>ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ? ?918 The settlement reached was rather superficial. Nugent has 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚƐŽŵƵĐŚĂĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞďƵƚŵŽƌĞ ‘ĂƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? ?919 The 
Six effectively acknowledged their differing opinions on the use of qualified majority voting 
with a vague declaration that they would agree to disagree. There was no formal resolution 
or clarity on which areas of policy would be subjected to unanimous decision-making; the 
&ƌĞŶĐŚƐŝŵƉůǇƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁŚĞŶǀĞƌǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂƌĞĂƚƐƚĂŬĞ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŵƵƐƚ
be cŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƵŶƚŝůƵŶĂŶŝŵŽƵƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŝƐƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ ? ?920 The actual substance of the 
compromise was less significant than what it represented in political terms. The cohesion 
of the Six had been reinforced, albeit unconvincingly and temporarily.  
The Luxembourg Compromise provoked a range of reactions from the Foreign Office. 
^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ?ƐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁĂƐůĂĚĞŶǁŝƚŚƉĞƐƐŝŵŝƐŵ ?,ĞƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌĂĐůŽƐĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞh<ŚĂǀĞƌĞĐĞĚĞĚ ?
and argued that the Six would be preoccupied with maintaining the unity of the EEC and 
ƚŚĞĨƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐ ?921 K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐůĞƐƐĚĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞŚĂĚ ‘ƐĐŽƌĞĚĂǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ?ŽŶƉŽŝŶƚƐ ?ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ&ƌ ŶĐŚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞ
preferable than the alternative scenario.922 John Nicholls, Deputy Under-Secretary for 
Information and Cultural Affairs as well as superintendent of the Policy Planning 
Department, was much more optimistic. He argued that the Five would not tolerate any 
further French attempts to create a deadlock after the most recent debacle, and would 
ďĞĐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞƌĞĐĞƉƚŝǀĞƚŽĂŶĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
                                                          
918 For insightful accounts of the Luxembourg Compromise and its consequences, see: Camps, 
European Unification in the Sixties (1967); Fiona Hayes-ZĞŶƐŚĂǁĂŶĚ,ĞůĞŶtĂůůĂĐĞ ? “ŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
Course of European Integration  W KƌEŽƚ ? ?ŝŶVisions, Votes and Vetoes: The Empty Chair Crisis and 
the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On, ed. Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace and Pascaline 
Winand (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2006), 301-320; N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the 
Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge (London: Routledge, 2007); James Ellison, The 
United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-68 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
919 Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 
168. 
920 Camps, European Unification in the Sixties (1967), 112. 
921 EŽƌŵĂŶ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ? “ƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
922 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “ŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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dictatorial tendencies.923 Conversely, Nicholls also suggested that de Gaulle would be more 
willing to allow BritĂŝŶƚŽĂĐĐĞĚĞƚŽ ‘ŬĞĞƉƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉůĂĐĞ ? ?ǁŚŽŚĂĚŐƌŽǁŶ
ǁĞĂƌǇŽĨ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐũŽƐƚůŝŶŐĂŶĚǁŚŽƐĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽǁĞƌǁĂƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĂƚƐƵĐŚĂ
rate that it would soon be a threat to French hegemony within the EEC.924 What had 
 ‘ƌĞĐĞĚĞĚ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĨŽƌĂĐůŽƐĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ďƵƚ
Nicholls believed this could be reversed by an Anglo-French partnership.925 In conclusion, 
he stated that the likelihood of membership had not disappeared and was either still in 
place or had been increased. These lines of thought demonstrate an essential point. Whilst 
most of the Foreign Office favoured British membership of the EEC, there was still some 
ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽǀĞƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŽĂůŝŐŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĐƵƌďŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ?Ɛ
conception of Europe de la Commission or with the Five in order to pressure France into 
accepting British accession and making another veto as politically and diplomatically 
damaging as possible. In addition, it revealed that elements of the Foreign Office perceived 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞƚŽďĞƐŽǀŝƚĂůƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ
willing to achieve it by any means necessary. The issue of membership was not given much 
consideration in the immediate aftermath of the Luxembourg Compromise, but events 
stirred some Foreign Office officials into action.  
In early March, de Gaulle informed President Lyndon B. Johnson that he was withdrawing 
French forces from the Allied Command Structure of NATO and expelled American military 
personnel from France.926 In light of this startling new development, Norman Statham 
drafted a Foreign Office memorandum on the political motivations for British membership 
of the EEC.927 /ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽŽƵƚůŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?ĂŶ
anxiety long-ŚĞůĚŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĞǀĞƌƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ
document addressed an issue which was becoming increasingly apparent, and was 
probably a significant influence on French attitudes and actions. This was the resurgence of 
Germany. 
By the mid-1960s, the West German economy was being galvanised by the 
Wirtschaftswunder Žƌ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŵŝƌĂĐůĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĨŽƌŐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞKƌĚŽůŝďĞƌĂů
                                                          
923 :ŽŚŶEŝĐŚŽůůƐ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
924 Ibid. 
925 Ibid. 
926 Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance 
(New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 164. 
927 EŽƌŵĂŶ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ? “WŽůŝƚŝĐĂůZĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌh<WĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂǁŝĚĞƌŐƌŽƵƉŝŶŐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ?966, TNA/FO371/188332/M10810/115G. 
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social market economy model adopted by Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard.928 
Economic growth and household incomes had soared to some of the most impressive 
levels in the world, and with it, German political influence.929 The ascent of de Gaulle 
ĐŽŝŶĐŝĚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐĞǆƉŽŶĞŶƚŝĂůďŽŽŵŝŶtĞƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐůŽƵƚ ?ĂŶĚ
the General was aware that French dominance of the EEC was starting to be challenged.930 
/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŵƉƚǇŚĂŝƌƌŝƐŝƐŚĂĚŝŶůĂƌŐĞƉĂƌƚďĞĞŶƉƌĞĐŝƉŝƚĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ?
insistence that the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy be overhauled.931 The rise 
of Franco-German rivalry within the EEC had not gone unnoticed in the Foreign Office and 
had significant implications for British foreign policy towards Europe. Statham wrote: 
 ‘/Ĩ QǁĞƐƚĂǇŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?'ĞƌŵĂŶǇƐĞĞŵƐďŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐƌƵŶƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞ
ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞĂ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ?ŝŶǀŽŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƚƌĂƵŵĂŽĨƌĞĐĞŶƚŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?932 Statham also added that 
Italy and the Benelux states continued to voice support for British membership for this very 
reason  W they still feared German resurgence and had nothing but contempt for the 
instability of the Franco-German axis.933 British accession would act as a counterweight to 
these tendencies and would also be crucial in realigning the EEC with the Atlantic Alliance. 
Therefore, a renewed British bid for membership was now, in theory, more attractive to all 
members of the Six. France would benefit from an additional check on German power, 
West Germany would benefit from the same vice versa, and the remaining members of the 
EEC would have a potentially powerful ally who could stand up to the French and the 
Germans. These thoughts were given further credence after a report was forwarded from 
the Permanent Mission in Brussels to London, detailing a conversation with the Secretary-
General of the High Authority of the ECSC, Edmund Wellenstein. Wellenstein was 
convinced that de Gaulle would seek a rapprochement with Britain in order to prevent 
West Germany from further asserting itself and following a more independent foreign 
policy, particularly after the French withdrawal from NATO.934 Further examinations of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨƌŽŵĂĐƌŽƐƐtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůĚƌĞǁƐŝŵŝůĂƌĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ?
especially with regards to the potential dangers of a more independent and assertive West 
                                                          
928 Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany and Embedded Bilateralism 
from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 159. 
929 Ibid. 
930 Ibid. 
931 Ibid; John Keiger, France and the World Since 1870 (London: Arnold, 2001), 150. 
932 EŽƌŵĂŶ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ? “WŽůŝƚŝĐĂůZĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌh<WĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂǁŝĚĞƌŐƌŽƵƉŝŶŐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?' ? 
933 Ibid. 





ƚŚĞǁŽƵůĚƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇ&ƌĂŶĐĞŽƌďǇ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?935 British 
membership of the EEC was now absolutely integral to maintaining the cohesion of the 
tĞƐƚĞƌŶůůŝĂŶĐĞĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƉƌĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ? 
The conflation of the NATO crisis with the issue of British membership of the EEC caused 
tensions in the Foreign Office. John Barnes, the chief of the WOCD, argued quite forcefully 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚǁŽďĞŬĞƉƚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚŚĂĚĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶůŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ
 ‘ĐŽƵůĚŚĂƚĐŚƐŽŵĞŵĂůŽĚŽƌŽƵƐƌĞĚŚĞƌƌŝŶŐƐ ? ?936 Barnes believed that the French were trying 
to distract from the disruption which they had caused in Europe by wooing a British bid for 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?,ĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĂĚǀŝƐĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ‘ŵĂŬŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌEdKŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ
ƐŵŽŽƚŚŽƵƌƉĂƚŚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐting that de Gaulle would not necessarily be 
receptive to such a bargain and that such an arrangement would infuriate the Five.937 In 
some ways, this was Barnes simply trying to protect his department, which, as mentioned 
above, had lost a great deal of influence since the 1950s and did not want its control over 
NATO affairs to be annexed by the increasingly powerful EEOD. In addition, the Atlanticist 
leanings of the WOCD continued to make the department sceptical about the case for 
membership of the EEC. However, he was not incorrect in his conclusions about French 
attitudes. Ludlow has written at length over how the French remained opposed to British 
accession, even after the March 1966 general election.938 During bilateral talks between the 
French and the Germans in April 1966, the Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder felt 
encouraged by British attempts to discuss membership more positively, whereas Couve de 
Murville remained negative and continued to dwell on potential obstacles.939 ĂƌŶĞƐ ?
objections were ultimately overruled by Paul Gore-Booth, who in accordance with George 
ƌŽǁŶĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽƚŚĞ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨũŽŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞůǇ
ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ out views and policies in regard to our policy towards NATO and the EEC 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ǁĂƐƉĂƌĂŵŽƵŶƚ ?940 The old Foreign Office orthodoxy of 
                                                          
935 ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? “&ƵƚƵƌĞZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/188333/M10810/129G. 
936 :ŽŚŶĂƌŶĞƐƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?' ? 
937 Ibid. 
938 Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s (2007), 135. 
939 Ibid. 




separating political and economic issues with regards to European integration had all but 
died, and it was agreed that the DEA would work in partnership with the Foreign Office to 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƉůĂŶĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?941 
Further signs of French ambiguity and possible hostility were reported from Paris and 
Brussels. John Robinson wrote to Statham detailing a conversation Olivier Wormser, the 
ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĨĨĂŝƌƐĂƚƚŚĞYƵĂŝĚ ?KƌƐĂǇŚĂĚŚĂĚǁŝƚŚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂƚƚŚĞ
Dutch embassy in Paris.942 tŽƌŵƐĞƌƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƚŚĞ
increasing weakness of sterling, would make any new initiative extremely difficult.943 
ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂĚ ‘ƌĞĂĐŚĞĚƚŚĞƐƚĂŐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐŚĂĚƌĞĂĐŚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂƐƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŚĞŝƌĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?944 Statham 
also reported on conversations between Couve de Murville and Patrick Reilly on the British 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůWŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚ&ƌĞŶĐŚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇŽƉĞŶ-ŵŝŶĚĞĚ ?ŽŶƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ‘ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ
British attitudĞŝŶƚŚĞEdKĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ?945 This rather enigmatic stance did little to quell 
ministerial and official anxieties about the viability of a new overture towards the Six. 
tŚŝůƐƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŬŶĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚĐŽƵŶƚŽŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇ&ŝǀĞ ? ?ƚŚŝƐ ?ŝŶ
Paƌƌ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ ?ǁĂƐ ‘ĂƚĂĐƚŝĐĨŽƌƚŚĞůŽŶŐ-ƚĞƌŵ ? ?946 Reconciling with de Gaulle was the key to a 
short-term solution. The government decided to try and smooth over relations with the 
French. George Brown, who was becoming increasingly vocal about a renewed bid for 
membership and who would be appointed Foreign Secretary in August partly because of his 
strong pro-European credentials, wrote to the Prime Minister that the upcoming visit from 
the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was an ideal opportunity.947 The EEOD 
immediately began drafting ideas about how best to approach the meeting and probe the 
&ƌĞŶĐŚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽŶƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?dŚĞƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŶŽƚĞƐ ?ǁĂƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐ
and radical. Officials believed that there was a need to ram home the belief that Britain was 
 ‘ĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂůƉĂƌƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ QĂŶǇŐƌŽƵƉŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƉƵƌƉŽƌƚƐƚŽďĞ “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ
ƵƐŝƐŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ? ?948 In addition, it was emphasised that there was now a great deal of 
                                                          
941 Ibid. 
942 John Robinson to Norman Statham, 15 June 1966, TNA/FO371/188339/M10810/277. 
943 Ibid. 
944 Ibid. 
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947 George Brown to Harold Wilson, 23 June 1966, TNA/PREM13/906. 




political and public support within the UK for membership of the EEC.949 This rhetoric would 
have appealed to the French ministers. It was unabashedly Europeanist and demonstrated 
ƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶǁĂƐ ‘ƌĞĂĚǇĂŶĚǁŝůůŝŶŐ ?ƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨ
Anglo-American relations, NATO, or the cohesion of the Western bloc. Indeed, Wilson had 
ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇƉƵďůŝĐůǇĚŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚŚŝŵƐĞůĨĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ďŽŵďŝŶŐŽĨsŝĞƚŶĂŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
ŚĂĚŝŶĐĞŶƐĞĚtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶĂŶĚŵĂƌŬĞĚƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨĂƐůƵŵƉŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?950 ƐǁĞůůĂƐƐŚŽǁŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚment to European integration, the 
Foreign Office also wanted to apply pressure to the French by playing on the German 
question and reminding them that they were largely isolated from the Five. 
dŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐŚĞůĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?ǀŝƐŝƚŚĂĚŵŝǆĞĚresults. The British position 
was to ascertain whether or not France would attempt to block another bid for 
membership and to convince them of the sincerity of their enthusiasm for the European 
project. The French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou went to great lengths to explain the 
difficulties of participating in the Common Market, and the great sacrifices its members had 
had to endure.951 ,ĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĞǆŝƐƚĞĚĂĨĂůƐĞŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ&ƌĂŶĐĞĂůŽŶĞŚĂĚ
ƐƋƵĞĞǌĞĚĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŽƵƚŽĨŚĞƌƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ? but that their concessions to the 
Germans on an industrial free trade area showed that matters were not so simple.952 
Pompidou then took aim at Wilson and asked if Britain was truly ready to enter the EEC and 
ƚĂŬĞŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚďƵƌĚĞŶƐ ?ŽĨŵĞmbership.953 This was a veiled criticism of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉĂƐƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞ ?ĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐƐƚƌŝŶŐĞŶƚĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ĚŝůƵƚĞ ?ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?tŝůƐŽŶ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚďǇĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŚŝůƐƚĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐǁĞƌĞƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚĞĚ ? ?954 However, he did not shy away from highlighting the various 
economic problems which Britain faced, including the balance of payments deficit, the 
weakness of sterling and the likely effects of the Common Agricultural Policy. His most 
adroit statement was on the future of political union  W Wilson emphasised that the 
government was primarily motivated by economic and commercial interests and were not 
considering the advantages of full political integration.955 This was a crucial point. Wilson 
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was subtly opening the door to potential Anglo-French partnership on curbing the 
supranational tendencies of the Commission, which would have appealed to Gaullist visions 
of Europe. He even went so fĂƌĂƐƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůƚĂůŬƐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ŽĨ
political union.956 Whilst the French appeared to have been receptive to such ideas, their 
leaks to the press suggested that the meeting had been a failure. An article appeared in The 
Financial Times ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂ ‘&ƌĞŶĐŚƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?ƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂďůĞƚŽũŽŝŶŝĨ
sterling was in a constant state of turmoil.957 Indeed, Marjoribanks had warned his London 
colleagues that the French were likely to exploit the weakness of sterling to keep Britain at 
bay.958 The leak was an international humiliation for British ministers and officials and even 
resulted in George Ball, the American Under-Secretary of State, getting in touch with 
George Thomson, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, in order to ascertain why the 
Anglo-French talks had been so fruitless and offer potential United States support.959 
Reactions from officials within the EEOD were highly pessimistic. As the French leaks 
ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐ ?tŚŝƚĞŚĂůůƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĐŽŶ ŵŝĐƉŽƐŝtion confirmed the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĨĞĂƌƐ ?K ?EĞŝůůǁƌŽƚĞƚŽ'ŽƌĞ-Booth and did little to disguise his bitter 
disappointment over the implications for EEC membership. He described the reports as 
 ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĚĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚŽƐĞ ‘ǁŚŽŚĂĚŚŽƉĞĚƚŚĂƚŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚively early entry might prove 
ĨĞĂƐŝďůĞ ? ?960 The predictions for the impact of accession on the balance of payments and the 
cost of the Common Agricultural Policy to the Exchequer were even more stark than 
ďĞĨŽƌĞ ?dŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇƚŽƚŚĞŽmmon Market cited losses of hundreds 
of millions of pounds a year.961 K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƌĞĨƵƐĞĚƚŽ
acknowledge the potential long-term advantages and instead concentrated on the short-
term factors.962 ,ĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽmic advisers963 ŽĨĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ĂƐƚƌŽŶŐ
ĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨƉĞƐƐŝŵŝƐŵ ?ŶŽƚƚŽƐĂǇĚĞĨĞĂƚŝƐŵ ? ?964 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?K ?EĞŝůůĂůƐŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ
ƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƚŽĂƌŐƵĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŬŝŶĚŽĨ
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the Cabinet Office and had a strong working relationship with Wilson. He was utterly opposed to 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ P “>ŽƌĚĂůŽŐŚ PĐŽŶŽŵŝĐZŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?The Times 
21 January 1985, 12. 
964 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽWĂƵů'ŽƌĞ-Booth, 13 July 1966, TNA/FO371/188343/M10810/388. 
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presentation which is now taking shape, since we lack expertise and authority in this 
ƐƉŚĞƌĞ ? ?965 Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽK ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐĂůƐŽůĂĚĞŶǁŝƚŚĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞůĂďĞůůĞĚƚŚĞ
ĚŝƐƉĂƚĐŚĂ ‘ĚĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƐƵƌǀĞǇŽĨƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŵŽŽĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶǁĂƐŶŽǁ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇ
less capable of competing wŝƚŚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇƚŚĂŶ QĞůŐŝƵŵĂŶĚ/ƚĂůǇ ? ?966 This was a staggering 
admission from the Permanent Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ǁŚŽĂůƐŽƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐ
defence commitments were an increasing burden, though presumably a necessary one.967 
Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƌĂĚŝĐĂůƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ P ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞĂůŝƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŽũŽŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶ
DĂƌŬĞƚ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽǁŚĞƌĞĞůƐĞƚŽŐŽ ? ?968 This summarises the departmental orthodoxy of 
the day perfectly. Senior Foreign Office officials, particularly those in the EEOD, knew that 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨĂƚĞǁĂƐƚŝĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽŽƚŚĞƌĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚ
ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁĂŶŝŶŐĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽǁĞƌ ?dŚĞůŽŶŐĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶǁĂƐĚĞŶŝĞĚ
membership of the club, the longer and deeper her slump in influence and capacity would 
be.969 However, by mid-July the pressure on the pound had become so great that ministers 
were distracted from the European question entirely. The Foreign Office were even forced 
to ĐĂŶĐĞů'ĞŽƌŐĞƌŽǁŶ ?ƐǀŝƐŝƚƚŽŽŶŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƚŽďĞĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐŽŶƐƵůƚ
with the Germans on British cooperation with the EEC.970 Officials in the EEOD were aware 
that the looming financial crash would suspend any ministerial interest in a renewed 
European initiative and were forced to bide their time.971 
After the sterling debacle, Brown and Stewart swapped roles in August 1966, the former 
taking leadership of the Foreign Office, a job he had long coveted.972 Parr has argued that 
this move revealeĚtŝůƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĂƐŚŝĨƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?973 This was 
certainly the case, but it was also a qualified victory for the Foreign Office. As an ardent 
Europeanist, the department could rely on Brown to continue to push the agenda for 
membership of the EEC in Cabinet, and he was certainly capable of being frank and even 
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abrasive.974 ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ƌŽǁŶǁĂƐĂ ‘ǁŝůĚĐĂƌĚ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚƚŝŵŝĚůǇŬŽǁƚŽǁƚŽƚŚĞ
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ P 
 
 QǁŚĂƚďŽƚŚĞƌĞĚŵĞ ?ŵĂĚĞĂƐ/Ăŵ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂs they [the Foreign 
Office] who were deciding the areas I should be briefed about, and I quickly 
became aware that, unless I was very determined, I would inevitably become the 
purveyor of views already formed in the Office.975 
 
dŚĞƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇƌŽǁŶ ?Ɛ instability would become a serious issue for Gore-Booth as 
he dealt with various grievances, notably an incident when Brown drunkenly insulted the 
wife of Patrick Reilly at a dinner party at the French embassy in London.976 However, his 
arrival presented ofĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝƐĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?K ?EĞŝůůƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĂŶĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ
ƉĂƉĞƌĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘,ŽǁƚŽŐĞƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?dŚĞƉĂƉĞƌǁĂƐŶŽƚĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚĞĚƚŽ
other Whitehall departments and only Foreign Office officials had been consulted. This was 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐǁĞŶƚ ‘ǁĞůůďĞǇŽŶĚĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞ
areas of Whitehall continued to remain sceptical.977 K ?EĞŝůůĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŚŽǁƚŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨ
AgricƵůƚƵƌĞǁĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂŝŶŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ ? ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĚǀŝƐĞƌƐĂƚŽǁŶŝŶŐ
^ƚƌĞĞƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚKĨĨŝĐĞƐĂǁŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉĂƐ ‘ƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ? ?978 dŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?Ɛ
confidence had been shaken by the recent economic turmoil and potential consequences 
of accession.979 With the possible exception of the DEA, the Foreign Office stood alone. 
The paper was both radical and realistic. From the outset, it was acŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ
ŝƐŶŽƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŽĨĞĂƌůǇĞŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?980 This 
was an extremely significant statement. The upper echelons of the Foreign Office were now 
fully aware that British accession to the EEC was simply unachievable in the short-term, but 
it was necessary to maintain a façade of enthusiasm and to continue to press the Six, and 
France in particular on the issue. It was suggested that the government publicly declare its 
                                                          
974 Gore-Booth recalled a discussion he had with Brown where he had to suggest that the Foreign 
Secretary not berate his staff in front of third parties: Paul Gore-Booth, 22 September 1966, Gore-
Booth Papers, BODL/MS.Eng.c.4563. 
975 George Brown, In My Way: The Political Memoirs of George Brown (London: Penguin, 1972), 119. 
976 WĂƚƌŝĐŬZĞŝůůǇ ? “'ĞŽƌŐĞƌŽǁŶ ? ?ZĞŝůůǇWĂƉĞƌƐ ?K> ?D^ ?ŶŐ ?Đ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
977 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽDƵƌƌĂǇDĂĐůĞŚŽƐĞ ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
978 Ibid. 
979 Ibid. 




acceptance of the Treaty of Rome, that it should begin frank bilateral discussions with the 
^ŝǆŽŶŚŽǁƚŽĞŶŚĂŶĐĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĂďŽǀĞĂůů ?ƚŽƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĨŽƌƚŚĞǀĞƌǇ
real possibility that certain EEC policies would be non-negotiable and that Britain would 
ŚĂǀĞƚŽ ‘ŐƌŝŶĂŶĚďĞĂƌ ?ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂŶĚĂĚŽƉƚƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?981 
/ƚǁĂƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůƉŽŝŶƚ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƐƚĂƚĞĚƉƵďůŝĐůǇ ?ŐŝǀĞŶŝƚƐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ
controversial conclusion.982 Once again, officials knew that they were at odds with public 
anĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞƐŽǁĞĂŬƚŚĂƚ
membership of the EEC was essential, if not inevitable. The report also fully acknowledged 
that the French would probably exercise their veto once again and that they were an 
 ‘ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞďĂƌ ?ƚŽŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?983 Even if Britain reached a provisional agreement with the 
Five, there was little guarantee that the diplomatic pressure on France to accept a British 
application would be sufficient to prevent a veto.984 Officials believed that the only way to 
buy French support would be to disassociate from American intervention in Vietnam, the 
ƚůĂŶƚŝĐŝƐƚůĞĂŶŝŶŐƐŽĨEdK ?ĂŶĚƚŽƌĞǀŝƐĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?985 Unsurprisingly, this 
was considered far too high a price to pay. It was concluded that the government would 
ŚĂǀĞƚŽ ‘ƌĞůǇŽŶƚŝŵĞĂŶĚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŐĞŶƚƐŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?986 
ƌŽǁŶĚŝĚŶŽƚĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚŝƐůŝŶĞŽĨĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĨƵƌŝŽƵƐůǇƐĐƌŝďďůŝŶŐ P ‘ǁŚĂƚŶŽŶƐĞŶƐĞ W 
ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞǁŚǇĂƌĞǁĞŚĞƌĞ ? ?987 Similar comments throughout the paper reveal the 
divergence in attitude between the new Foreign Secretary and the top officials. Brown was 
not convinced of the apparent inflexibility of the EEC application process. He stressed that 
United States support for British membershŝƉĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆŶĞĞĚĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
influence to develop the EEC in the long-ƚĞƌŵĐŽƵŶƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨĂǀŽƵƌ ?988 The 
memory of the Brussels breakdown and years of French obstruction gave officials a 
completely different perspective. Views had hardened to the point of Francophobia, 
something which the ambassador to France, Patrick Reilly, confirms in his memoirs.989 
ƌŽǁŶ ?ƐƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚWƌŝǀĂƚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?EŝĐŚŽůĂƐ&ĞŶŶ ?ǁƌŽƚĞƚŽ'ŽƌĞ-Booth to inform him that 
ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ‘disturbingly negative and in particular defeatist 







987 'ĞŽƌŐĞƌŽǁŶ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶ “,ŽǁƚŽŐĞƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/188346/M10810/458. 
988 Ibid. 
989 WĂƚƌŝĐŬZĞŝůůǇ ? “dŚĞWĂƌŝƐŵďĂƐƐǇ P ? ? ? ?- ? ? ?ZĞŝůůǇWĂƉĞƌƐ ?K> ?D^ ?ŶŐ ?Đ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ? ?990 He ordered it to be revised and redrafted. The revisions did 
not change much of the substance in the original paper. However, it seemed to convince 
Brown that a new approach towards the EEC was needed, and he was soon presented with 
an opportunity to make the case. 
/ŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?
Wilson began to plan for a major meeting with the Cabinet at Chequers, where the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƚŽƉƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ?dŚŝƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚƵƌŽƉĞ ?dŚĞĂŶĚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
Office jointly drafted a paper for the Chequers meeting on the issue of EEC membership, to 
be presented by the First Secretary and Foreign Secretary to the Prime Minister.991 There 
ĐĂŶďĞůŝƚƚůĞĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƌŽǁŶĂŶĚ^ƚĞǁĂƌƚ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚĐŽƵƉĨŽƌĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?
ĂŶĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƵƐĞtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĨŽƌ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?DŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?ĂŶĂƌĚĞŶƚ
Europeanist, was instrumental in keeping No. 10 and the Foreign Office in synchronicity.992 
Indeed, Parr has argued that it was at the Chequers meeting that Wilson firmly made up his 
mind to apply for membership of the Common Market.993 Parr also adds that he was 
primarily motivated by strategic concerns as opposed to economic ones.994 The sterling 
ĐƌŝƐŝƐǁĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇĂĨĂĐƚŽƌ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞĐŽƐƚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌŽůĞ ‘ĂƐƚŽĨ^ƵĞǌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŚĂŽƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ
ƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐZŚŽĚĞƐŝĂ ?ƐhŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞǁĞƌĞ
serious long-term strategic problems which required difficult decisions.995 One of these 
decisions was to try once again to get Britain into the EEC, and by doing so hopefully shore 
up international influence and benefit from larger markets and economies of scale. The 
Foreign Office intended to argue this to Wilson, and the EEOD took the lead on the steering 
briefs for the Chequers meeting. Statham recycled the main points from the earlier paper 
 ‘,ŽǁƚŽŐĞƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?996 The draft was broadly acceptable to his 
colleagues and did not neĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶǇŶĞǁƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŽŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ďƵƚK ?EĞŝůů
took the liberty of forcefully addressing the politico-strategic issues at hand, which he knew 
ǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉĞĂůƚŽŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐ ?K ?EĞŝůůĨƵůůǇĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
argumeŶƚ ?ǁĂƐ ‘ĂƌĂƚŚĞƌƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶĞ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞďǇĐŽŶĐĞĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚŝƐĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚ
necessarily based on hard facts and data.997 This is critical. The Europeanist line taken by 
                                                          
990 Nicholas Fenn to Paul Gore-Booth, 23 August 1966, TNA/FO371/188346/M10810/458(A). 
991 WĂƚƌŝĐŬ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?dEA/FO371/188344/M10810/408/G. 
992 Michael Palliser, interviewed by John Hutson, 28 April 1999, CCC/BDOHP/37/15. 
993 Parr, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2006), 78. 
994 Ibid. 
995 Ibid. 
996 EŽƌŵĂŶ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ? “ƌŝĞĨĨŽƌŚĞƋƵĞƌƐDĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/188347/M10810/479/G. 
997 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “ŚĞƋƵĞƌƐDĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?' ? 
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certain officials was explicitly ideological. When reports such as those which foretold of the 
ůŝŬĞůǇƐƚƌĂŝŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŽƵůĚƉƵƚŽŶƐƚĞƌůŝŶŐĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞ
ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂůƚĞƌĞĚŽƌƐŝůĞŶĐĞĚ ?/Ŷ
K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?ŚĞƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞůǇďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƉŽǁĞƌǁas contingent on her 
membership of the EEC: 
 
For the last 20 years this country has been adrift. On the whole, there has been a 
period of decline in our international standing and power. This has helped to 
produce a national mood of frustration and uncertainty. We do not know where we 
are going and have begun to lose confidence in ourselves.998 
 
Brown and Stewart seized upon this rhetoric and argued that accession was the only way to 
prevent Britain from becoming a second-rate power.999 Parr has argued that Wilson was 
ƌĞĐĞƉƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƉŽŝŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐĂŵĞ ‘ǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŽƵůĚďƌŝŶŐ ? ?1000 tŝůƐŽŶƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚ ?ďǇƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞ
ĨĞůƚǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĂĚǇƚŽŵŽǀĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ? ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĂǀĞƚŽĨƌŽŵĚĞ'aulle was 
still likely.1001 The Prime Minister shied away from making an immediate public declaration, 
but a new attitude towards Europe now governed No. 10: getting into the Common Market 
was a top priority. 
The key decision taken at the Chequers ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐǁĂƐƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂ ‘ŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůƉƌŽďĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
ĨŽƌŵŽĨĂƚŽƵƌŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?ƐĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐĂŶĚďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŚĞĂĚƐŽĨ
state and/or government.1002 The tour would be conducted by Wilson and Brown and 
would establish whether there was a  ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞĂŶĚ ‘ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌǇ
ĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?1003 This fell short of the declaration of acceptance 
for the Treaty of Rome which the officials had been hoping for. However, it was 
recommended that the Foreign Secretary support the Prime Minister in his decision.1004 In 
any case, according to Wilson, Brown had already accepted this strategy at the Chequers 
                                                          
998 Ibid. 
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serious doubts among the Six about the seriousness of our intentions, and in particular 
ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŚŝŵƐĞůĨƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůůǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?1006 
It was hoped that the probe could be used as an opportunity to convince the Six of the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇ.1007 tŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚŝŶƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶƐŽŶ ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞ
outlined the probe in public went some way in addressing these concerns.1008 The 
ĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐĂŶĚ>ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŚĂĚ ‘ĂŶ
ĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐǁĞůĐŽŵĞ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚas the most momentous step forward for the 
British since the breakdown of 1963.1009 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĞĐŚ ?ƐůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞǁĂƐƐƚŝůů
coloured with the same constraints as the first application. There was still talk of consulting 
with EFTA and the Commonwealth ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞ
ƚĞƌŵƐ ? ?1010 This could be explained away as simple caution under the spotlight of public 
scrutiny, but the French did not appear to be fully convinced. Roger Reynaud, the French 
member of the High Authority of the ECSC, stated that political opinion in France was still 
divided and that the General was too unpredictable.1011 It was clear that many French 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐǁĞƌĞƐƚŝůůĂŶǆŝŽƵƐŽǀĞƌ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂŶĚǁĞƌĞŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨ
enlarging the EEC which countĞĚŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨĂǀŽƵƌ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐůŝƚƚůĞĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ
reassurance that a new bid for membership would go unchecked.1012 Further reports to 
>ŽŶĚŽŶƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞǁĂƐ ‘ĚŝƐŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ Ž,DĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌ ?ŽŶƚŚĞ
WƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĂŶĚĂŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŝŶƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĞŵďĂƐƐǇŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚǁĂƐ
ĂƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ PŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĂƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŝŶƚĞŶƚ ? ?1013 French ambiguity would 
continue to frustrate British officials and politicians throughout the probe and after the 
launch of the application, and once again, it would result in a bitter rejection. 
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dŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽďĞ ?ŽĨĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ?ǇŝĞůĚĞĚĨĞǁŝŶƐƚĂŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐƌĞƐƵůƚƐǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂƌŝƚŝƐŚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚǁĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇƚĂŬĞŶĨŽƌŐƌĂŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇ
&ŝǀĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞƐƵƉƉŽƌtive and that everything hinged on the visit to Paris. The Foreign 
KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐďƌŝĞĨƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚŽŶŚŽǁďĞƐƚƚŽĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞǁĞƌĞǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚŝŶ
keeping with their previous line: to downplay any potential problems Britain might have 
with the terms of the Treaty of Rome and maintain a positive tone.1014 This was at odds 
ǁŝƚŚtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƐĞĞŬƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐĂŶĚĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞƐ ?ďƵƚĐŽƵůĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĐƌĞĂƚĞĂŶ
atmosphere of goodwill. In addition, the Foreign Office wished to create conditions where 
any French veto would prove extremely politically damaging for the General, and ensure 
that he had as little justification as possible.1015 Parr has argued that the Foreign Office 
were successful in convincing Wilson to present an enthusiastic façade, and that Palliser 
was instrumental in encouraging the Prime Minister to focus on the political issues 
surrounding German resurgence to further pressure the French into accepting British 
membership.1016 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?tŝůƐŽŶŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚŽŶǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ĨƌĞĞ-ǁŚĞĞůŝŶŐ ?ǁŝƚŚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ
 W that is, not sticking to a rigid set of points and improvising on certain issues. John Young 
ŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ‘ĐĂŵĞƚŽŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞǁĂƐƵŶŝŵƉƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇ
tŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂůƌĞĂĚǇĞǆŝsted between 
the two countries outside the framework of the EEC.1017 Whilst de Gaulle conceded that he 
ǁĂƐ ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐƚƌƵĐŬ ?ďǇƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƚŽŶĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚďǇtŝůƐŽŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚǁŝƚŚ
DĂĐŵŝůůĂŶ ?ƐƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŽĨ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ? ?ŚĞƐƚŝůůƉƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDinister on the state 
ŽĨƐƚĞƌůŝŶŐĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?1018 In his memoirs, Brown 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƐŚĂŬŝŶŐĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽŚĂǀŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶ
DĂƌŬĞƚ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŶůǇƌĞĂůŽƵƚĐŽme of the probe was later securing 
Cabinet approval for an application.1019 Nevertheless, the discussions were greeted in the 
press with a great deal of optimism, and Wilson had managed to dispel some scepticism 
about his intentions.1020 
During discussions over the launch of the application, the Cabinet ordered that a White 
Paper on membership be drafted before any official statement to the House of 
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Commonwealth and EFTA consultations to appease the more sceptical ministers, he 
ĨŽƌĐĞĨƵůůǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐůŝŶĞŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
development of Europe.1022 /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ĂƚĂŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?K ?EĞŝůů
ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚƌĞǁĂƐŵƵĐŚĐŽůĚǁĂƚĞƌ ?ĂƐŚĞĐŽƵůĚŽŶƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚŽƚŚĞƌ
departments such as the Commonwealth Relations Office could draft their own white 
papers on the application.1023 dŚĞĨŝŶĂůǀĞƌƐŝŽŶĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚKĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐ ‘ŶĞĂƌůǇ
identical with that produced in the ForeigŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ?ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
European policy in Whitehall.1024 Cabinet approval for an application came on 2 May, and 
Wilson announced it to Parliament.1025 Marjoribanks was given the green light to present 
ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůĞƚƚĞƌŽĨĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐŽŶ ? ?DĂǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŐƌĞĞƚĞĚ
with an overwhelming sense of positivity in the press.1026 However, despite the euphoria, 
the application hit a barrier almost as soon as it was announced. De Gaulle called a press 
conference on 16 May where he issued the  ‘velvet veto ? and  ‘ŵĂĚĞŝƚĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇƉůĂŝŶ QƚŚĂƚ
Britain cannot be allowed into the EEC so ůŽŶŐĂƐƐƚĞƌůŝŶŐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĂƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇ ? ?1027 
The General played on fears over future pressure on the pound and the dangers of 
devaluation, and in doing so effectively halted the application in its tracks. With the French 
refusing to open negotiations, Brown became increasingly anxious about the notion that 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ƐŶƵďďĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐŝƌĂƚĞĂƚƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ?
ordering the Delegation in Brussels to do more to provoke a response from the Council of 
Ministers.1028 Reports from senior officials in both London and Brussels seemed to confirm 
that the negotiations would never take place so long as France refused to participate.1029  
The Foreign Office were not entirely surprised by this development. They were aware that 
de Gaulle did not want Britain to join the EEC and knew that a second veto was a likely 
outcome. Their tactics focused on the long-term, and how they could potentially play 
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Impetus of ouƌƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?1030 The ideas were simple and clear: ministers and 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌĂŶǇĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ĂůůŽǁƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĨůĂŐ ?K ?EĞŝůůĂƌŐƵĞĚ
that the best strategy was to continue to demand an opening meeting with the Six and 
settle for nothing less.1031 By demonstrating their continued commitment, this would keep 
ƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐŝĚĞĂŶĚŝƐŽůĂƚĞ&ƌĂŶĐĞĞǀĞŶĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?dŚŝƐƚĂĐƚŝĐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽǁŽƌŬ ?ƚĂ
meeting of the Council of Ministers in July, Couve de Murville intimated that British 
accession would amount to an intensification of the Cold War, thereby further entrenching 
divisions between East and West Germany.1032 This was clearly designed to play on German 
anxieties over reunification, but it backfired spectacularly. Leading politicians from the Five 
condemned the remarks, as did sections of the French press.1033 ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ
&ƌĞŶĐŚƚĂĐƚŝĐƐŽĨŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ QŵƵƐƚďĞŝƌƌŝƚĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŽĨĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ
ƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂĚ ‘ĂŶŽƚŝŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞŶĞƚŐĂŝŶ ?ĨƌŽŵ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?1034 By the time of de 
'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ in which he reaffirmed the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ǀĞůǀĞƚ
ǀĞƚŽ ?, France had sustained serious damage to her diplomatic credibility.1035 /ŶWĂƌƌ ?Ɛ
ǁŽƌĚƐ ?ŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ǀĞƚŽ ?ƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ǀĞƚŽǁĂƐ ‘ĂƐŝŐŶĂůŽĨĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐǁĞĂŬĞŶŝŶŐ
ƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?1036 dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƵŶĚŚĂĚƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ŐŝǀĞŶŚŝŵƚŚĞƉĞƌĨĞĐƚĂŵŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚƚŽƋƵĂƐŚƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?Ɛ
dictatorial tendencies had irritated far too many parties at home and abroad. It was a 
Pyrrhic victory. He would fall from power 18 months later, and would be dead 18 months 
after that. Wilson, for his part, continued the Foreign Office line of defiance by declaring in 
ƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶƐ P ‘tĞŚĂǀĞƐůĂŵŵĞĚĚŽǁŶŽur application on the table. There it is, and there 
ŝƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ? ?1037 Over the coming years, the Foreign Office and UKDEL continued to demand 
ƚŚĂƚŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞŽƉĞŶĞĚĂŶĚŶĞǀĞƌǇŝĞůĚĞĚƚŽ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐ ?dŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚ ?ŝŶ
some ways, been a qualified success: 
                                                          
1030 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “DĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ/ŵƉĞƚƵƐŽĨŽƵƌƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/93/MEK1/7/1/120. 
1031 Ibid. 
1032 WĂƚƌŝĐŬ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬƚŽDƵƌƌĂǇDĂĐůĞŚŽƐĞ ? “EŽƚĞĨŽƌ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞŝŶCabinet about meeting of 
ŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE &K ? ? ? ? ? ?D< ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1033 Patrick Reilly to Foreign Office, 11 July 1967, TNA/FCO30/94/MEK1/7/1/160; Patrick Hancock to 
DƵƌƌĂǇDĂĐůĞŚŽƐĞ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ?dNA/FCO30/95/MEK1/7/1/200B. 
1034 EŽƌŵĂŶ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ? “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ PŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐDĞĞƚŝŶŐŽŶ ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?
November 1967, TNA/FCO30/95/MEK1/7/1/277. 
1035 ŚĂƌůĞƐ,ĂƌŐƌŽǀĞ ? “Ğ'ĂƵůůĞZƵůĞƐKƵƚĂƌůǇEĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?The Times 28 November 
1967, 1. 
1036 Parr, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2006), 153. 
1037  “Dƌ ?tŝůƐŽŶƌĞƉƵĚŝĂƚĞƐ ‘ŬŶŽĐŬŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĚŽŽƌ ?ŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ P ‘tĞŚĂǀĞƐůĂŵŵĞĚŽƵƌĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶ




The second try assembled, for the first time, a critical mass of support among the 
political class for the proposition that Britain should become a European country. 
The government was committed, the opposition agreed, the moving powers in 
business were desperate, and the people did not dissent.1038 
 
dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚ ?ǀĂŶŐƵĂƌĚ ?ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚďǇĂ ƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŚĂĚŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ
to make membership of the EEC the most important foreign policy issue of the day and a 
political priority. As the  ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽǁĂŶĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƚŚĞ
Commonwealth became increasingly fractured, Europe was seen as the only viable option 
ĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝƚƐǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞ ?DĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁĂƐǁŝƚŚŝŶŚĞƌŐƌĂƐƉ ?&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
opposition was unsustainable and Gaullism was on the retreat. All that was left was to plan 
















                                                          
1038 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 197. 
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4. Planning for Europe: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office 




 QŝŶAugust 1966, the Commonwealth Office absorbed the Colonial Office and the 
amalgamated department was in its turn absorbed by the Foreign Office to form 
the new Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In addition, there were some evident 
impacts of Europe on departmental arrangements. Notable was the development 
of expertise and specialist sections within the relevant key departments to both 
ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĂŶĚůĂƚĞƌƚŽƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĨŽƌĞŶƚƌǇ ?dŚĞ&K ?Ɛ
European Economic Organisations Department, established in 1960, was renamed 




the European Economic Community. It is this that has entirely altered the 
framework in which diplomatic business is done both within the Community and in 
foreign countries with which the Community has a relationship. Probably, as time 
goes on and the EEC develops further, more changes and adaptations in the 
structuƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ QǁŝůůďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?1040 
 
hŶůŝŬĞƚŚĞƌƵƐƐĞůƐďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ ‘ǀĞůǀĞƚǀĞƚŽ ?ŝŶMay 1967 was not as 
ĚĂŵĂŐŝŶŐƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĚŝĚŶŽƚŝŵƉĂĐƚĂƐŵƵĐŚƵƉŽŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
Office attitudes. The GeŶĞƌĂů ?ƐĚŝƐĚĂŝŶĨŽƌ ‘ŶŐůŽ-^ĂǆŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ&ƌĞŶĐŚ
leadership in Europe were well-known and his actions were unsurprising. The Foreign 
KĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
merely treated as a temporary setback. They refused to accept a second rebuff and 
continued to advocate cooperation with Europe. However, the fact remained that Britain 
had no hope of joining the Common Market as long as de Gaulle remained in power. 
Meanwhile, the future of BƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŐůŽďĂůŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁĂƐŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ PƚŚĞĂƐƚŽĨ^ƵĞǌ
withdrawal was announced in January 1968, which effectively marked the end of the 
British Empire, the Commonwealth was still in turmoil over the Rhodesia crisis, and Anglo-
American relations had rĞĂĐŚĞĚĂŶĞǁůŽǁĂĨƚĞƌtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐĚŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
Vietnam campaign. Indeed, the East of Suez withdrawal damaged the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
                                                          
1039 Simon Bulmer and Martin Burch, The Europeanisation of Whitehall: UK Central Government and 
the European Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 71. 
1040 Alan Campbell, Colleagues and Friends (Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1988), 5. 
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ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ĞǀĞŶĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞĞĂŶZƵƐŬƐĂǇŝŶŐ P ‘ŽŶ ?ƚ
pull out, Britain, ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚĚŽƚŚĞũŽďŽĨǁŽƌůĚƉŽůŝĐĞŵĂŶĂůŽŶĞ ? ?1041 The battle for 
EEC membership was all Britain had left. Everything hinged on accession to this 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŝŶŶĞƌǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚƚŚŝƐƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞ
amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was a clear signal that the old 
imperial territories were no longer considered to be of great importance to British 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚŽŶĂŶĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞůĞǀĞů ?^ƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂ ‘hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?
to be created in ŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƌĞǀĞƌƐĞƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĐĂǇŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?ǁĞƌĞƐǁĂƚƚĞĚĂǁĂǇ ?1042 The European Economic 
Organisations Department was renamed the European Integration Department (EID) in 
May 1968 after intense lobbying from John Robinson, another indicator that the Foreign 
KĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐƐƚĂŬŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
rest of Europe.1043 The officials were planning for Europe and waiting for the right moment 
to strike. 
This chapter will explore the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
how officials continued to orientate the department specifically towards European 
integration as the government opened negotiations with the Six. The majority of officials 
were now completely committed to British membership of the EEC, and this was reflected 
in the institution as a whole as well as through their individual attitudes. Over the course of 
the 1960s, British officials and policymakers had managed to acquire greater knowledge of 
ƚŚĞ ?ƐŝŶŶĞƌǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?1044 In doing so, the Heath 
government had far more manoeuvrability in terms of being aware of where compromises 
and deals could be reached with the member states, in particular the French.1045 The 
Foreign Office and, more broadly, Whitehall, had already made numerous adjustments and 
adaptations to facilitate the coordination of European policy prior to the amalgamation, 
but there is scant literature on the effects of the merger on official attitudes towards 
                                                          
1041 Ronald Hyam, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĐůŝŶŝŶŐŵƉŝƌĞ PdŚĞZŽĂĚƚŽĞĐŽůŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?-1968 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 387. 
1042 Richard Baker to Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ? “DĞƌŐĞƌŽĨ&KĂŶĚK ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?^ŝƌWĂƵů'ŽƌĞ-ŽŽƚŚ ?Ɛ
Private Office Papers, TNA/FCO73/104. 
1043 Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan, 
1998), 199. 
1044 'ĞŽƌŐĞtŝůŬĞƐ ? “dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚ&ĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽ^ƚĞĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ PŶ
/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ&ĂŝůƵƌe to Enter the European Community 1961-63: The Enlargement 
Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations, ed. George Wilkes 
 ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P&ƌĂŶŬĂƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?^ŝŵŽŶƵůŵĞƌĂŶĚDĂƌƚŝŶƵƌĐŚ ? “KƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞ PtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?




ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ ?1046 The implication of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office merger for the Heath negotiations is one of the crucial gaps in 
ƚŚĞƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐration and on the history of the 
Foreign Office itself, and warrants further examination. The coinciding of the amalgamation 
with the East of Suez withdrawal, the decline of Anglo-American relations and the radical 
ƌĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞĂĚĚƐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŵƉĞƚƵƐƚŽƚŚŝƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƋƵĞƐƚĨŽƌ
membership of the EEC in the late 1960s and early 1970s has often been framed as a 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ‘ĐŚŽŽƐŝŶŐ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ŽƌĂƐ
a natural progression (or deĐůŝŶĞ )ĨƌŽŵƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů ?ƚůĂŶƚŝĐŝƐƚƌŽůĞƚŽĂƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚ
continental one.1047 KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇǁĂƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ
elites had gone to great efforts to salvage her ties with the United States and the 
Commonwealth over the years, but that domestic economic constraints and external 
factors such as the dissolution of the Malayan Federation, the Indo-Pakistani War and UDI 
ŝŶZŚŽĚĞƐŝĂĐĂƵƐĞĚŝƌƌĞǀĞƌƐŝďůĞĚĂŵĂŐĞƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŚĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ
to finance her overseas commitments.  
/ŶĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌǀĞŝŶ ?ƐŽŵĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŽŶ
ƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇƉƌŽ-European credentials made 
accession an inevitability.1048 There is a strong case in the ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƉƌŝŽƌƚŽ,ĞĂƚŚ ?Ɛ
ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƐWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞĂůŽŶĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂŶ ‘ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞďĂƌ ?ƚŽŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨ
ƚŚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂůĞǀĞŶĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶǁŽƵůĚ
probably succeed in joining.1049 The enthusiasm and commitment for European integration 
ǁŚŝĐŚ,ĞĂƚŚƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚŚŝŵǁŝƚŚ ‘ĂĨƵŶĚŽĨŐŽŽĚǁŝůů ?ŝŶƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ
                                                          
1046 /ƚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďƌŝĞĨůǇŝŶƵůŵĞƌĂŶĚƵƌĐŚ ?ƐThe Europeanisation of Whitehall ĂŶĚ,ĞŶŶĞƐƐǇ ?Ɛ
Whitehall. dŚĞĂŬƐƚŽŶ ?ƐThe Labour Party and Whitehall focuses on the civil service more broadly, 
ǁŝƚŚŽŶůǇƉĂƐƐŝŶŐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?DŽƌŚŽƵƐĞ ?ƐThe Diplomats contains some 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƐŽŶŚŽǁƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁĐŚĂŶŐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĞƌŐĞƌ ? 
1047 Frederick S. Northedge, Descent From Power: British Foreign Policy, 1945-73 (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1974); Saki Dockrill, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐZĞƚƌĞĂƚĨƌŽŵĂƐƚŽĨ^ƵĞǌ PdŚĞŚŽŝĐĞĞƚǁĞĞŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ
World? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Jonathan Colman,  ‘^ƉĞĐŝĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?,ĂƌŽůĚ
Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ƚƚŚĞ^Ƶŵŵŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?-68 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2004); P.L. Pham, ŶĚŝŶŐ ‘ĂƐƚŽĨ^ƵĞǌ ? PdŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽ
Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, 1964-1968 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Andrew 
Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011).  
1048 David Gowland and Arthur Turner, Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-
1998 (London: Pearson, 2000), 169. 
1049 John Campbell Edward Heath: A Biography (London: Pimlico, 1993), 352; Helen Parr, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
WŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ P,ĂƌŽůĚtŝůƐŽŶĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWorld Role, 1964-1967 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 95. 
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EEC which undoubtedly strengthened the British case for membership.1050 However, it must 
be stressed that the success of the negotiations were by no means a foregone conclusion. 
Denman, Hanrieder and Auton have suggested that if Labour had returned to power in 
 ? ? ? ? ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐďŝĚĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶůŽƐƚ ?1051 This heavily implies that 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚǁĂƐďǇ no means guaranteed. The enduring issue 
of Commonwealth trade, the future of sterling as a reserve currency and the implications of 
the Common Agricultural Policy were the three most significant obstacles to accession.1052 
The cost to the British economy and the potential for food prices to soar as a result of the 
Common Agricultural Policy continued to be serious concerns for the government, 
especially in light of the fact that Britain did not stand to benefit from the policy given its 
relatively small agricultural output.1053 Campbell has argued that the French refused to 
compromise on the Common Agricultural Policy as they were its main beneficiaries, which 
 ‘ĂƵŐƵƌĞĚďĂĚůǇ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?1054 dŚŝƐĚĞĂĚůŽĐŬƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĂƌĞĂůǁĂƌŶŝŶŐ ‘ŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ?1055 Indeed, the reconstruction of Anglo-French relations with the 
ascension of Georges Pompidou, which was critical in the success of the negotiations, was 
not necessarily caused by a political backlash against Gaullism or a gesture of goodwill on 
the part of the French. The increasing assertiveness and independence of West Germany 
under the leadership of Willy Brandt and their challenge to French leadership within the 
EEC forced the French to reconsider allowing Britain to join and act as a counterweight to 
German influence.1056 Had a less energetic and independently-minded politician risen to 




ƉƌĞŵŝĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƐǇŵƉƚŽŵĂƚŝĐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƚƵƌŵŽŝůŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚůǇ
                                                          
1050 Gowland and Turner, Reluctant Europeans (2000), 169. 
1051 Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Graeme P. Auton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and 
Britain (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 239; Roy Denman, Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in 
the Twentieth Century (London: Indigo, 1996), 231. 
1052 Campbell, Edward Heath  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?:ŽŚŶt ?zŽƵŶŐ ? “dŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚ  ƚƌǇ
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ŝŶThe Heath Government 1970-1974: A Reappraisal, ed. Stuart Ball 
and Anthony Seldon (London: Longman, 1996), 267. 
1053 zŽƵŶŐ ? “dŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
1054 Campbell, Edward Heath (1993), 355. 
1055 Ibid. 
1056 Christopher Lord, British Entry to the European Community Under the Heath Government 1970-4 




ŵŝƌƌŽƌĞĚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĚĞĐůŝŶĞŽŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚƐƚĂŐĞ ?1057 However, as argued by Hill and Lord, 
ƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁĂƐ ‘ĂƐŵƵĐŚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƐŚŽƌŝŶŐƵƉŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
relations with the Commonwealth and the United States as it was concerned with West 
ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?1058 dŚŝƐŝƐĂĐƌƵĐŝĂůƉŽŝŶƚ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶǁĂƐŶŽƚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ?Ăƚůeast by most 
officials and politicians, to be an admission of defeat or an acceptance of a diminished 
world role. Likewise, members of the British political and administrative elite had not 
suddenly converted to the ideals of European unity in the late 1960s. British entry into the 
Common Market was still seen principally as a means to an end  W ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
international power and influence. As Young has suggested, the Heath government 
ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉĚŝĚŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ‘ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƚŚĞƐƵrrender of historic British 
interests, but would rather allow them to be defended more successfully in a new 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ?1059 KƚŚĞƌƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ,ĞĂƚŚĚŽǁŶƉůĂǇĞĚŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƌŽŵĂŶƚŝĐŝƐĞĚĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚs to the Commonwealth 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞĨŝƌŵůǇďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚƉŽǁĞƌƐƚĂƚƵƐǁŽƵůĚ
come from across the Channel as opposed to from across the Atlantic and beyond.1060 
,ĞĂƚŚǁĂƐŚŽƉĞĨƵůŽĨĂƵƌŽƉĞǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚ ‘ĂĐƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇĂƐŽŶĞ ?ǁŝƚŚŝƚƐŽǁŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚ
defence policy, with Britain leading the way in this new era of global politics.1061 The overall 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨďŽůƐƚĞƌŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚƌĞĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐŚĞƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐĂǁŽƌůĚƉŽǁĞƌǁĂƐĂ
goal which never altered over this period. Of course, there were a number of politicians 
and officials who were devoted to the ideological goals of European integration  W most 
notably Heath  W but they were in a minority. In this chapter, it will become clear that the 
Foreign Office were acutely aǁĂƌĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ďƵƚĚŝĚŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ
accept that it was an irreversible fact. In addition, it will be argued that officials did not take 
ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶĨŽƌŐƌĂŶƚĞĚĂĨƚĞƌĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞƐƚŝůůǀĞƌǇ
real obstacles and challenges during the Foreign and Commonwealth Office merger and 
over the course of the negotiations. 
 
                                                          
1057 Jock Bruce-Gardyne, Whatever Happened to the Quiet Revolution? The Story of a Brave 
Experiment in Government (London: C. Knight, 1974); Martin Holmes, The Failure of the Heath 
Government (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997). 
1058 ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ,ŝůůĂŶĚŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ>ŽƌĚ ? “dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇŽĨƚŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶThe 
Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, ed. Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (London: Longman, 
1996), 285-314. 
1059 zŽƵŶŐ ? “dŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
1060 Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 45; Alex May, Britain and Europe Since 1945 (London: Longman, 1999), 47. 
1061 zŽƵŶŐ ? “dŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
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 ?dŚĞDŝŶŝ-ƌŝƚĂŝŶŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? PdŚĞŵĂůŐĂŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚ
Commonwealth Office 
 
As arrangements were being made for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office merger, it 
became clear to the Personnel Department that the Foreign Office and diplomatic service 
suffered from Ă ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶďůŽĐŬĂŐĞ ? ?1062 dŚĞŵĂŝŶĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐďůŽĐŬĂŐĞǁĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞ
ŚŝŐŚƌĂƚĞŽĨƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚǁĞŶƚǇǇĞĂƌƐĂŐŽ ? ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĂĨƚĞƌĂƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ?
ƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŚĂƐŶŽǁĐĞĂƐĞĚƚŽŐƌŽǁŝŶƐŝǌĞ ? ?1063 dŚĞŐƌĞĂƚ ‘ƉŽƐƚ-ǁĂƌďƵůŐĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŚĂůĨ
of the 1940s had resulted in an increasingly overcrowded diplomatic service.1064 According 
to Colin Crowe, the Foreign Office Chief Clerk and the main overseer of the amalgamation, 
the average age of a newly-appointed Counsellor in the early 1950s was 36; this had risen 
to over 40 by the late 1960s.1065 A shortage of senior posts in grades 4 and above left 
younger officials anxious for their future career prospects. John Ford, a member of the 
post-war intake who was born in 1922 and had served during the War, expressed such 
anxieties to the Personnel Department as Commercial Counsellor in the Rome embassy: 
 ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-ǁĂƌďƵůŐĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞůŝŬĞŵǇƐĞůĨ ) QĂƌĞŽŶǀĞƌǇǁĞĂŬŐƌŽƵŶĚŝŶƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽ
ĂůƚĞƌƌĂĚŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƚŽƐŽůǀĞĂǀĞƌǇƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?1066 Like many 
members of his generation, Ford was an ardent Europeanist and later served as Assistant 
Under-Secretary for European integration affairs in 1970-1.1067 He was one of the chief 
architects of the European Communities Information Unit (ECIU) in the Foreign Office, 
which effectively distributed propaganda to bolster public support for membership of the 
EEC.1068  
                                                          
1062 ŽůŝŶƌŽǁĞ ? “WƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶĂŶĚWĂǇŝŶƚŚĞŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO79/40/DSP22/1/12. 
1063 Ibid. 
1064 John Ford to Gerald Clarke, 14 June 1967, TNA/FCO79/40/DSP22/1/13. 
1065 Indeed, Robinson, who was regarded as one of the ablest officials of his generation, did not 
ŽďƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƌĂŶŬŽĨŽƵŶƐĞůůŽƌƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞĂŐĞŽĨ ? ? PŽůŝŶƌŽǁĞ ? “WƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶĂŶĚWĂǇŝŶƚŚĞŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ
^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1066 John Ford to Gerald Clarke, 14 June 1967, TNA/FCO79/40/DSP22/1/13. 
1067 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1971  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ
Stationery Office, 1971). 
1068 dŚĞ/h ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞŬĞƉƚƐĞĐƌĞƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶĚŝƚƐƐƚĂĨĨǁĞƌĞŽƌĚĞƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ďĞĐŽǀĞƌƚ ? P
:ŽŚŶ&ŽƌĚƚŽĂƌŽůŝŶĞWĞƚƌŝĞ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶhŶŝƚ ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?
dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?WDt ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶĞǆĐĞůůĞŶƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƉƌŽ-European 
domestic propaganda in this period has been condƵĐƚĞĚ PWĂƵů'ůŝĚĚŽŶ ? “dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ
and Domestic Propaganda on the European Community, 1960- ? ? ? ?Contemporary British History 23, 
no. 2 (2009), 155-180. 
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Aside from the effects of their wartime experiences on their attitudes towards European 
unity and solidarity, the opportunities presented by British accession to the EEC were 
extremely appealing to the post-war generation. The promise of defending British interests 
in dynamic and interesting jobs at the heart of one of the most significant and powerful 
organisations in international diplomacy was very attractive and would serve as the perfect 
antidote to the blockages in promotions. If the amalgamation of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was conducted in a way which orientated the service even further 
towards European integration, there would be a greater chance of a renewed bid for 
membership succeeding, and thus of securing both a new arena for shoring up British 
influence and new job opportunities for an overstaffed Foreign Office. As such, the 
amalgamation of the two departments had thrown into question the very nature of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƐŽŵĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŚĂĚĨŽƌ her future.  
Amalgamation had been planned for some time after the recommendations of the 1964 
WůŽǁĚĞŶZĞƉŽƌƚ P ‘dŚĞůŽŐŝĐŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐƉŽŝŶƚƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞĂŵĂůŐĂŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office. The unified control and execution 
ŽĨŽƵƌĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ QǁŽƵůĚďĞĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚŚĞůƉĨƵůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?1069 The report had 
ŵĂĚĞƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĐŽƵůĚŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌŵĂƚĐŚƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ůĞƐƐĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƚhan once they 
ǁĞƌĞƚŽƐĞƌǀĞĂƐĂůĞǀĞƌĨŽƌĞǆĞƌƚŝŶŐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽƌƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŚĂĚƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?1070 Britain 
had endured a second rebuff from the EEC, the pressure on the pound had forced the 
government into devaluation, the balance of payments deficit had grown even further, and 
ƚŚĞĐŽƐƚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞƵŶĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďůĞ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇ
ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐŵƵĐŚŽre precarious than that a 
mere four years earlier. In light of these daunting circumstances, some elements of the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐƐƚĂĨĨǁĂƐŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
lessened responsibility and capacity. These officials tended to be younger and more radical 
in their thinking. During discussions within the Foreign Office Personnel Department on the 
                                                          
1069 Committee on Representational Services Overseas,  “ZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶ
Representational Services Overseas appointed by the Prime Minister under the chairmanship of Lord 




future of the diplomatic service after the amalgamation had been completed, one official 
by the name of Bryan Cartledge1071 stated:  
 
Do we really believe that the mini-Britain of the 1970s will need a larger overseas 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ŝŐdŚƌĞĞ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŽŶǁŚŝĐŚ
our current manpower planning and recruitment programme is based. It is, to say 
the least, unproven; I personally consider it preposterous.1072 
 
It was this orthodoxy which guided much of the Personnel Department, and indeed the 
ĂŵĂůŐĂŵĂƚŝŽŶŵŽƌĞďƌŽĂĚůǇ ?ŶĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨĂŶĚƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁĂŶŝŶŐ
power acted as a catalyst for radical thinking on the future of the Foreign Office, and how 
its new structure would respond to the challenges presented to British foreign policy, 
principally membership of the EEC. In a major paper on the future of the diplomatic service, 
Cartledge nŽƚĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨĚŽƵďƚƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?ĨƌŽŵ ‘ǇŽƵŶŐĞƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞƌŽůĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ĐůŽƐĞƌĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ
between our forward political thinking and our long-ƚĞƌŵĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ? ?1073 It is 
also abƵŶĚĂŶƚůǇĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĂŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞǁĞƌĞŶŽƚ
ŚĞůĚďǇĂŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇŽĨǇŽƵŶŐĞƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ P ‘&ƌŽŵĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚŝƐĚĞƐŬ ?/ĐĂŶĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶŝƐĂĨĂŝƌůǇŐĞŶĞƌĂůŽŶĞ ? ?1074 Responses 
ƚŽĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌĨƌŽŵŚŝƐWĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐĂůƐŽĂĚĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚ
 ‘ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐƐƚƌĂǁƐŝŶƚŚĞǁŝŶĚ ?ƚŚĂƚǇŽƵŶŐĞƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞ ‘ŚĂĚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝons with 
&ŝƌƐƚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĂŐĞŐƌŽƵƉŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ QĂůůŽĨǁŚŽŵŚĂǀĞŵĂĚĞŝŶďƌŽĂĚŽƵƚůŝŶĞƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞƉŽŝŶƚƐ ? ?1075 The main grievance of the younger generations of officials was, as 
ĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞƉƵƚŝƚ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚŵŽƌĞƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƵƉŽŶƉŽůŝƚical events 
ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐ QƐŽŵĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞƚŚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚĚĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨ
the service.1076 By this, there can be little doubt that Cartledge was arguing for a diplomatic 
                                                          
1071 At the time a middle-ranking official at First Secretary, but went on to become an expert in 
Eastern European affairs, ending his career as ambassador to the Soviet Union (1985-88). 
1072 ƌǇĂŶĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶ “^ŽŵĞ ? ? ? ?sŝĞǁƐŽŶWƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ
1967, TNA/FCO79/49/DSP22/6/1.  
1073 ƌǇĂŶĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞ ? “dŚĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞǀĞŶƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?FCO79/49/DSP22/6/4. 
1074 Ibid. 
1075 Mark Russell to Frank Mills and John Duncan, 25 January 1968, TNA/FCO79/49/DSP22/6/4. 
1076 ƌǇĂŶĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞ ? “dŚĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞǀĞŶƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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service more orientated towards Europe, which was the cornerƐƚŽŶĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞ
foreign policy:  
 
The primacy which has been accorded to Europe in our external relations can be 
ĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŽďĞƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ ?ƵƌŽƉĞŝƐŶŽǁƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?Ɛ
economic and defence policies. Given the reduction of our commitments in other 
parts of the world it is, indeed, difficult to see on what other viable foundation this 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĐŽƵůĚƌĞƐƚ ?1077 
 
ĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞĂůƐŽĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŽŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƉƌŽďĂďůĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ
membership of the EEC and the priority to be given to British economic and commercial 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂďƌŽĂĚ ?ŚĂĚĂĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ
diplomatic service.1078 dŚŝƐŝƐƐƚƌŽŶŐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ƐŵĂŝŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ P
that the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was in large part 
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚďǇĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞĂƐĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŶĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŽ
increasingly adapt the diplomatic service as a whole to European integration affairs. 
Furthermore, the notion that the savings to be made from the cuts to overseas staff and 
spending was the main motivation for the merger is misleading.1079 Cartledge argued that 
there would be a need for a substantial increase in economic and commercial officers both 
in London and abroad, ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚ ‘ďĞ
ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĂďƐŽƌďƚŚĞƐĂǀŝŶŐƐ ? ?1080 The Permanent Under-Secretary Paul Gore-Booth himself 
ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ&ƵůƚŽŶŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚŚŽŵĞĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽ
contribute a ůŽƚŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŽŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞĂŶĚ
after accession.1081 Crowe, who oversaw much of the amalgamation, also stated that the 
ŵĞƌŐĞƌǁŽƵůĚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶ ‘ĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƐŵĂůůĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƐƵŵŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽKĨĨŝĐĞƐ
but not veƌǇŵƵĐŚƐŵĂůůĞƌ ? ?1082 Indeed, Cartledge was quick to suggest that the embassies 
ĂŶĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨtĞƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ ‘ďĞĞǆĞŵƉƚĨƌŽŵĂŶǇƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚĂĨĨŽŶ
                                                          
1077 Ibid. 
1078 Ibid. 
1079 Indeed, Moorhouse has argued that cost-ĐƵƚƚŝŶŐ ‘ŚĂĚĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇďĞĞŶŶŽĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŽĨ>ŽƌĚ
WůŽǁĚĞŶ ?ƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ŝĨĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ
increase rather than dwindle, and had allowed for the topping up of existing manpower by 10 per 
ĐĞŶƚ ? ?'Ğoffrey Moorhouse, The Diplomats: The Foreign Office Today (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1977), 25-26. 
1080 ƌǇĂŶĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞ ? “dŚĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞǀĞŶƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1081  “KƌĂůǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨ^ŝƌWĂƵů'ŽƌĞ-ŽŽƚŚ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ?/DSP22/5/8. 




ƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƚƌĂĨĨŝĐ QŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚ ? ?1083 This was a 
ĐůĞĂƌƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƵƌŽƉĞǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵƌƌŽŐĂƚĞĨŽƌĞŵƉŝƌĞ ?for which Dean 
Acheson claimed Britain was searching.1084 The younger generations of officials who were, 
broadly speaking, much more in favour of British membership of the EEC than some of their 
ĞůĚĞƌĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?ǁĞƌĞĂĚĂŵĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶĞǁǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞƐĂƚŝƐĨǇďŽƚŚƚŚĞŝƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
and professional ambitions. 
ĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐǁĞƌĞĞĐŚŽĞĚďǇDĂƌƌĂĐŬ'ŽƵůĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŵŝĚĚůĞ-ranking official in the 
Planning Department.1085 Goulding drafted a paper in which he identified three main 
sources of discontent in the ranks of the diplomatic service: the slowness and inflexibility of 
promotion, the number of increasingly irrelevant and unnecessary jobs, and the lack of 
professionalism and specialist expertise.1086 In 1968, there were over 150 grade 5 officials 
ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĂŐĞŽĨ ? ? ?ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞĨƵůůĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶďůŽĐŬĂŐĞ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇ
Crowe.1087 'ŽƵůĚŝŶŐĂůƐŽĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞǁĂƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐƚŽĚŽ ‘ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞũŽďƐĂƐŝƚ
ĚŝĚǁŚĞŶ/ũŽŝŶĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞŚĂĚ ‘ĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ
ŝŵŵĞĂƐƵƌĂďůǇ ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŶ ?1088 ,ĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚĚĞĞƉĐƵƚƐǁĞƌĞŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽĂƌĞĂƐ ‘ŶŽ
ůŽŶŐĞƌŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?1089 By this, he meant posts in former 
territories of the British Empire and Commonwealth countries which continued to maintain 
unnecessarily large representations.1090 'ŽƵůĚŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞĨƵůůǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ
power meant that it no longer needed officers constantly reporting on developments in 
their respective regions as the government did not have the capacity to act upon such 
information or need to be fully informed about areas of the world in which it held little 
stake.1091 With regards to specialist training, Goulding conceded that he did not believe in a 
 ‘ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐ ? ?ďƵƚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚƌĂĚĞ ?ŝŶĚƵstry, 
science and technology in external relations meant that relevant training and expertise 
                                                          
1083 ƌǇĂŶĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞ ? “dŚĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞǀĞŶƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1084 WĂƌĂƉŚƌĂƐĞĚĨƌŽŵ ‘ƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂƐůŽƐƚĂŶĞŵƉŝƌĞĂŶĚŚĂƐŶŽƚǇĞƚĨŽƵŶĚĂƌŽůĞ ?ŝŶ P,ĞŶŶĞƐƐǇ ?
Whitehall (1990), 253. 
1085 'ŽƵůĚŝŶŐǁĂƐĂŶŽƚŽƌŝŽƵƐůǇƌĂĚŝĐĂůŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ŚĞǁĂƐ ‘ďĂŶŝƐŚĞĚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ
Lisbon embassy after producing a damning report on overseas representation which the 
departmental leadership found difficult to accept. He ended his career as Under-Secretary-General 
of the UN; a post he held for 11 years: Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (London: John Murray, 
2002), 4. 









were necessary.1092 KŶĞŽĨ'ŽƵůĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐŝŶƚŚĞWůĂŶŶŝŶŐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ
Everett, echoed these sentiments but was even more radical in his vision of ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞ P
 ‘ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůŝŶƚŽĂƉƵƌĞůǇƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƌŽůĞǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞƌĞǀĞƌƐĞĚĂŶĚ QŽƵƌŐůŽďĂů
ƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƌŽůĞǁŝůůĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚ ? ?1093 Everett advocated cuts to overseas staff in the 
Third World, with a prioritisation of North American and European embassies and missions 
ĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?1094 >ŝŬĞ'ŽƵůĚŝŶŐ ?ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ĚĞŵĂŶĚĞĚĂƐĞƌǀŝĐĞǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞĂŶĚ
training in commercial affairs.1095 The savings made from tŚĞĐƵƚƐƚŽ ‘ŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĂŶĚ
ƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞŝŶǀĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƉŽƐƚƐĨŽƌƚƌĂĚĞĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ P 
 
What is already clear is that our external policy is, and will increasingly be, 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚďǇĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ QdŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨǇŽƵƌ
amalgamation exercise are crucial to any authority which the Office will enjoy in 
Whitehall  W certainly for the next ten years, and probably for a good deal longer. It 
would be tragic if the exercise were conducted from the point of view of saving the 
odd body here and there.1096 
 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that current and former members of the EID and authorities on 
European economic affairs were heavily consulted on the future structure of the service. 
The fact of the matter was that the EEC and its institutions represented the most dynamic 
arenas of economic and industrial diplomacy, and the fastest growing and most attractive 
market at the time was, of course, the Common Market. Indeed, the potential for the 
Foreign Office to continue to branch out into commercial affairs as a means of modernising 
British diplomacy and strengthening British economic power had been endorsed by the 
Plowden Report, the Permanent Under-Secretary, and other officials in the Personnel 
Department.1097 This could be achieved by sending officials on sabbatical in industry, 
                                                          
1092 Ibid. 




1096 dĞƌĞŶĐĞK ?ƌŝĞŶƚŽ<ĞŝƚŚKĂŬĞƐŚŽƚƚ ? “ZĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐtŽƌŬ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?^ŝƌWĂƵů
Gore-BoŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞKĨĨŝĐĞWĂƉĞƌƐ ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1097  “ZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐKǀĞƌƐĞĂƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞ
Minister under the chairmanship of Lord Plowden, 1962-63 ?(1964), 147; Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ? “DĞĞƚŝŶŐ
between Paul Gore-Booth and ƚŚĞ&ƵůƚŽŶŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
:ŽŚŶ,ŽŶĞǇĨŽƌĚ ? “&ƵůƚŽŶŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?&ƌĂŶŬDŝůůƐƚŽDĂƌŬ
Allen, 25 July 1967, TNA/FCO79/41/DSP22/1/29; Mark Allen to John Honeyford and Frank Mills, 26 
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secondments to the Treasury, and training courses at the Bank of England.1098 From mid-
1968, the Foreign Office took over all commercial training programmes from the Board of 
dƌĂĚĞ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĞŶĐƌŽĂĐŚŵĞŶƚŽŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?1099 
Increasing the number of staff in the EID, the Economic Relations Department, the Oil 
Department and the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, as well as increasing 
the number of commercial posts abroad would allay the overcrowding in the Foreign Office 
and allow the department to further orientate itself towards Europe. The functions of the 
Commonwealth Office needed to be redistributed in the newly merged department, which 
gave rise to an opportunity to downgrade the importance of Commonwealth affairs in 
favour of Europe. Alan Furness, an official in the Economic Relations Department, proposed 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ/ƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐtĞƐƚĞƌŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
Department, with the current posts in the latter department being cut.1100 In addition, the 
Economic Relations Department would benefit from taking on a variety of policy areas, 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚdƌĂĚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?1101 A 
new Export Promotions Department would also be created with the specific purpose of 
promoting British economic interests abroad  W this had been advocated by the Head of the 
Economic Relations Department as a fundamental component of the new Foreign and 
ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?1102  
EŽƌŵĂŶ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ?ƚŚĞŶ,ĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞ/ǁĂƐƋƵŝĐŬƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚďŽƚŚŚŝƐĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
interests and the &ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞ ?>ŝŬĞ&ƵƌŶĞƐƐ ?ŚĞ
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ/ƐŚŽƵůĚƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ĐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŬĞǇ
elements in oƵƌĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ?1103 However, Statham went further and 
advocated the EID taking over all Commonwealth affairs relating to British accession to the 
EEC and the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement.1104 In doing so, the Foreign Office was very 
clearly downgrading Commonwealth affairs as a secondary issue to the more important 
                                                          
1098 dĞƌĞŶĐĞK ?ƌŝĞŶ ? “ZdƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ P/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽƵƌƐĞƐ ? ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?^ŝƌWĂƵů'ŽƌĞ-
ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞKĨĨŝĐĞWĂƉĞƌƐ ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1099 :ŽŚŶ,ŽŶĞǇĨŽƌĚ ? “&ƵůƚŽŶŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1100 AlaŶ&ƵƌŶĞƐƐ ? “ĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨWƌŽƉŽƐĞĚDĞƌŐĞƌŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐŝŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚ
ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?^ŝƌWĂƵů'ŽƌĞ-Ž ƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞKĨĨŝĐĞWĂƉĞƌƐ ?
TNA/FCO73/104. 
1101 Ibid. 
1102 Ibid. ?dĞƌĞŶĐĞK ?ƌŝĞŶ ? “ZdƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ P/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽƵƌƐĞƐ ? ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?^ŝƌWĂƵů
Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞKĨĨŝĐĞWĂƉĞƌƐ ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 





objective of securing membership of the Common Market. With the EID now in charge of 
ĂůůĂƌĞĂƐŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƉŽůŝĐǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐ
being some of the staunchest supporters of membership of the EEC, any bars to accession 
ĨƌŽŵƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚǁŽƵůĚďĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚůĞƐƐĞŶĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŽƌ
being of little consequence. Statham also stated that the EID should continue as the 
princiƉĂůĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ĂƐ ‘ĂŶǇĂďƐŽƌƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
this department by another with less clear responsibilities and less convincing a European 
ƚŝƚůĞĐŽƵůĚŽŶůǇďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐƐŝŐŶŝĨǇŝŶŐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?1105 This was a crucial point. 
Statham was aware that the impetus behind British membership of the EEC needed to be 
maintained and that the Foreign Office needed to continue to show that it gave European 
affairs serious weight and consideration. Statham mentioned that he had cleared his ideas 
with John Robinson, who was to succeed him as Head of the EID.1106 Both men were among 
the most vocal supporters of British membership of the EEC; particularly the latter. Their 
coordinated response to the Personnel Department and the Permanent Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?Ɛ
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌĞǀĞĂůĂĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽƉƌĞƐƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽ-ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐĂƐĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞ
amalgamation. The fact that this coincided with a departmental orthodoxy which had 
accepted that British membership of the EEC was the future of British foreign policy and 
power gave their views greater clout.  
ŶŽƚŚĞƌĨŽƌŵĞƌ,ĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞ/ ?ƐƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌ ?ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
Department), Ken Gallagher, voiced similar points to those made by Statham and Robinson, 
who sent him a copy of the original letter. Gallagher was now Head of the Common Market 
Department in the Commonwealth Office, which was to be abolished in the merger. He 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐǁŽƌŬƚŽďĞ
largely absorbed by the EID, particularly that which had a direct bearing on British policy 
towards the EEC.1107 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŚĞĂůƐŽƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶ
European integration affairs was much more substantial than Statham and Robinson had 
ĂƐƐƵŵĞĚ P ‘ĂůůƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŽŵmonwealth countries are intensely interested in the evolution 
ŽĨŽƵƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?1108 This meant that the future EID would need more personnel in 
order to take on the additional responsibilities, which would have given the department 
even greater influence within the new Foreign and Commonwealth Office as it widened its 
                                                          
1105 Ibid. 
1106 Ibid. 





remit to include British economic relations with the Commonwealth. Statham and 
'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚĞĚĂƚĂŚŝŐŚĞƌůĞǀĞůďǇƌƚŚƵƌ^ŶĞůůŝŶŐ ?
deputy head of the diplomatic service, to Colin Crowe and Roger Jackling.1109 Snelling 
ŚŝŵƐĞůĨǁĂƐ ‘ĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚǁŚŽƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂŶĞǁďƌĞĞĚŽĨƉŽƐƚ-war diplomat  W 
ǁŝƚŚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůƐŬŝůůƐĂŶĚĂůĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚƌĂĚĞĂŶĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?1110 His input on the 
reorganisation of economic work in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was highly 
respected and his suggestions, along with those from Statham and Gallagher, appear to 
have been broadly implemented.1111 These new arrangements were further steps towards 
a diplomatic service better equipped for economic diplomacy and international trade. 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office formally came into being on 17 October 1968.1112 
As argued above, the supposed staff and cost-cutting initiatives did not appear to bear 
much fruit, and the department ƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚŝƐ ?/ŶĂĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛ
staffing after the merger, the Personnel Department suggested comments on staff 
ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ P ‘dŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚĂŶĚĞƉƵƚǇhŶĚĞƌ-
Secretaries has been reduced through the merger by 25% and there has also been a 
significant reduction at [Assistant Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ůĞǀĞů ? ?1113 This was a cunning use of 
statistics. In the year to January 1969, there had only been an overall reduction of five staff 
in grades 1-3; from 32 to 27.1114 One of these positions was the Permanent Under-Secretary 
of the Commonwealth Office, which was due to be cut after the merger anyway, given that 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was to become a single department. With regards 
to financial savings, the DuŶĐĂŶZĞƉŽƌƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ ‘ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĨŽƌĐƵƚƐ
ŝŶĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ?1115 ĂŶĚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĞǀĞŶĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐ
representation cost the Exchequer less than 1% of total government spending  W Ă ‘ƚŝŶǇ
ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶ ? ?1116 As such, the pressure for cuts in expenditure was not significant and is not 
                                                          
1109 Ibid. Snelling had previously been Deputy Under-Secretary for Commonwealth affairs. At this 
point, Jackling was Deputy Under-Secretary for economic affairs. 
1110  “^ŝƌƌƚŚƵƌ^ŶĞůůŝŶŐ ?The Times, 1 July 1996, 25. 
1111 Economic work (including the Commonwealth) was delegated to the EID, the Economists 
Department and the Export Promotions Department: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The 
Diplomatic Service List 1970 (LondoŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚŝŽŶĞƌǇKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
1112  “dŚĞDĞƌŐĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ?  ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?'ŽƌĞ-Booth Papers, 
BODL/MS.Eng.c.4564. 
1113 <ĞŝƚŚKĂŬĞƐŚŽƚƚĂŶĚĚǁĂƌĚ>ĂŵŽƵƌ ? “ŐĞŶĚĂĨŽƌƉŽƐƚ-merger committee meeting on 13 
&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? February 1969, TNA/FCO79/104/XP22/6. 
1114 Ibid. Indeed, this misleading statistic was quoted to the House of Commons Defence and 
External Affairs Sub-Committee. 
1115 Moorhouse, The Diplomats (1977), 25. 




reflected in official figures. According to the Duncan Report, the total cost of all overseas 
services for the year 1968-9, including the operations of the Foreign Office in London, was 
£105.8 million.1117 In the year 1970-1, this had risen to £129.4 million, according to 
evidence submitted to the House of Commons Defence and External Affairs Sub-
Committee.1118 Both of these figures included the British Council, external broadcasting 
services and British Information Services, but even if one examines the figures for the 
Foreign Office and overseas representation alone, they are £63.4 million for 1968-9 and 
£63.8 million for 1970-1.1119 &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƌĞǀŝĞǁ
in 1971 continued to project increases in real terms for spending on overseas services and 
representation to an estimated £131 million by 1974-5.1120 Therefore, there were no 
substantial cuts to spending after the merger or the Duncan Report, whose principal aim 
was to hĞůƉŽďƚĂŝŶ ‘the maximum value for all British government expenditure and the 
consequent desirability of providing British overseas ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƚůĞƐƐĞƌĐŽƐƚ ? ?1121 
Indeed, the budgets for all overseas representation and services saw quite substantial 
increases, with the Foreign Office and diplomatic service benefiting from small increases 
year upon year.  
This debunks the view that the amalgamation of the two departments was driven by 
financial factors. The creation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was chiefly driven 
by a desire to radically overhaul the shape of the service into one which reflected the new 
ƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞĂŶĚŚĞƌĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?
commercial diplomacy, and a decline in the importance of the Commonwealth, something 
which the Duncan Report explicitly acknowledged.1122 In addition, further impetus was 
ŐŝǀĞŶďǇƚŚĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ‘ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶďůŽĐŬĂŐĞ ?ďĞŝŶŐĞǆƉĞƌŝ ŶĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-war generation of 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?dŚĞƐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŚĂƉpened to coincide with their personal 
                                                          
1117 Ibid. 
1118  “&ŝĨƚŚ Report with part of evidence taken before the Defence and External Affairs Sub-
Committee on 27 July 1971, and on 18, 19 and 23 May 1972, and Appendices (1971-2: Diplomatic 
Staff and Overseas ĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ ) ?,K-344 (1972), 1. 
1119 Ibid ? ? “ZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞZĞǀŝĞǁŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶKǀĞƌƐĞĂƐZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?-  ? ? ? ?DE-4107 
(1969), 166. 
1120  “WƵďůŝĐǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ?-70 to 1974- ? ? ?DE-4578 (1971), 18. 
1121  “ZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞZĞǀŝĞǁŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶKǀĞƌƐĞĂƐZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?-  ? ? ? ?DE-4107 (1969), 
5. 
1122 Ibid.  “We were appointed at a moment when there had been a major shift in British foreign 
policy ? the decision announced at the beginning of 1968 to withdraw our military forces from the 
area East ŽĨ^ƵĞǌ Qthe priority given to the renewed British bid for membership of the European 
Common Market and the greatly increased emphasis on the support of our commercial effort 
overseas prompted by the long-drawn-out series of balance of payments crises. ? 
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ambitions of Britain joining the EEC. As such, the future of the diplomatic service was very 
deliberately and consciously adapted and orientated towards European affairs in a bid to 
ƐĂƚŝƐĨǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁĂŶing international influence and the careers of their 
staff. It was an extremely attractive symbiosis. The Foreign Office now turned its attention 
towards fulfilling its main objective. Officials were still faced with several challenges, least 
of all the obstructive and abrasive General in Paris. Very soon, however, an opportunity 























European Policy after the Merger: The Soames Affair and the Fall of De 
Gaulle 
 
ĨƚĞƌĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ƌŝƚŝƐŚƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞ
 ‘ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚĂƉĞƌŝŽĚ QŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŶŽƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐǁĂƐŵĂĚĞ ? ?1123 German proposals for a 
 ‘ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ŝǆŝŶ ? ?ǁĞƌĞƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
Foreign Office, who refused to consider anything less than membership. Indeed, officials 
went to great lengths to crush dissenting voices within the ranks of the British government 
who were tempted by some of these initiatives. The President of the Board of Trade, Tony 
ƌŽƐůĂŶĚ ?ǁƌŽƚĞƚŽDŝĐŚĂĞů^ƚĞǁĂƌƚĂŶĚƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂ
potential trade arrangement was damaging to British relations with EFTA.1124 Lord Chalfont, 
a Foreign Office minister with responsibility for Europe and one of SteǁĂƌƚ ?ƐƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƐ ?
ĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞĚǁŝƚŚƌŽƐůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŵƵĐŚƚŽƚŚĞĂŶŶŽǇĂŶĐĞŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?dŚĞĞƉƵƚǇhŶĚĞƌ-
Secretary for European economic affairs, Patrick Hancock, fiercely rebuked Chalfont and 
offered a robust rebuttal of the case for a trade arrangemĞŶƚ ?ĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ P ‘/ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ
uncomfortable for you to have to defend the policy of HMG if you did not believe it was 
right. Hence this argument, for which please forgive me, is designed to reassure you that it 
is ƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?1125 dŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƚŽŶĞŽĨ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬ ?ƐŵŝŶƵte to the minister was both patronising and 
derogatory  W ĂŶĂůŵŽƐƚĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚŝŶŐůĞǀĞůŽĨŝŶƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?^ƵĐŚǁĂƐƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛ
unyielding commitment to EEC membership. In alliance with the Foreign Secretary, they 
sought to keep the wavering ministers in line and maintain a united front within the 
government. The EID and the Permanent Mission in Brussels were in the vanguard of this 
cause, but the level of inactivity was exceptionally frustrating. The officials hungered for 
progress. 
The most influenƚŝĂů&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚĂƌĞĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ ?ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚ
John Robinson were by far the most prominent and energetic officials in London engaged in 
European integration affairs. As the EID grew in importance and personnel after the 
amalgamation, the input of other officials also became more pronounced.1126 The 
department was staffed by John Killick, the Assistant Under-Secretary for European 
                                                          
1123 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ PZĞƉŽƌƚďǇ^ŝƌŽŶK ?EĞŝůůŽŶƚŚĞ
Negotiations of 1970-1972 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 11. 
1124 Tony Crosland to Michael Stewart, 18 October 1968, TNA/FCO30/406/MWK4/8/2. 
1125 Patrick Hancock to Lord Chalfont, 29 October 1968, TNA/FCO30/406/MWK4/8/8. 
1126 The EID had grown to such an extent that it was divided into two separate departments in 1971: 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1972  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ




under Robinson, James Adams and Henry Brind, all of whom were well-versed in European 
affairs.1127 In Brussels, James Marjoribanks remained in place as Head of the Delegation to 
the EEC, retiring at the end of 1971 as the negotiations were being completed.1128 The 
Mission in Brussels had also grown in size and importance,1129 and Marjoribanks was aided 
by some exceptional individuals from the post-war generation: Kenneth Christofas, the 
Deputy Head of the delegation, James Mellon, First Secretary and Head of the Chancery, 
and David Hannay, First Secretary.1130 All three men were strongly in favour of British 
membership of the EEC, as was their chief.1131 The Paris embassy continued to play a crucial 
role, with Christopher Soames, the son-in-law of Winston Churchill, taking over from 
Patrick Reilly in 1968.1132 ^ŽĂŵĞƐ ?ĚĞƉƵƚǇŝŶWĂƌŝƐǁĂƐŶŽŶĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĂƌĚĞŶƚ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚDŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?ǁŚŽǁĂƐƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŚĞƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐĞŝŶ
1969.1133 Most senior officials, including Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚure lay 
with Europe. Interestingly, Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌĂƐWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚhŶĚĞƌ-Secretary, Denis 
'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůů ?ǁĂƐ ‘ƐŽĂŬĞĚŝŶƚůĂŶƚŝĐŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ĂŵĂŶǁŚŽƐĞũƵŝĐĞƐĚŝĚŶŽƚ
ƌŝƐĞƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?1134 /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůůůĂƚĞƌĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ ‘Ƶltimate federal 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ P ‘,ŝƐƚŽƌǇǁŝůůƌĞĐŽƌĚŚŽǁ ǁĞǁĞƌĞƐƚĞĂĚŝůǇŽƵƚƐŵĂƌƚĞĚ
between 1972- ? ? ? ? ? ?1135 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŵŽƐƚĞŶŝŽƌĨŝŐƵƌĞ
was largely irrelevant by this point. The departmental orthodoxy of the day was one which 
                                                          
1127 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1970  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ
Stationery Office, 1970), 10; Henry Brind, Lying Abroad: Diplomatic Memoirs (London: Radcliffe, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?:ŽŚŶ<ŝůůŝĐŬ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚďǇ:ŽŚŶ,ƵƚƐŽŶ ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?K,W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “^ŝƌ:ŽŚŶ
<ŝůůŝĐŬ ? ?The Telegraph 14 February 2004.  
1128 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1971 (London: Her MajĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ
Stationery Office, 1971), 108. Marjoribanks was replaced by Palliser, who then went on to become 
Permanent Under-Secretary. 
1129 By 1972 the Delegation had 26 staff ranked at Third Secretary and above, compared with 10 in 
1968: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1972  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ
Stationery Office, 1972), 108. 
1130 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1971  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ
Stationery Office, 1971), 108. 
1131 David Hannay, interviewed by Malcolm McBain, 22 July 1999, CCC/BDOHP/38/27; James Mellon, 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚďǇDĂůĐŽůŵDĐĂŝŶ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ? ?K,W ? ? ? ? ? ? ?tŝůůŝĂŵEŝĐŽů ? “ŚƌŝƐƚŽĨĂƐ ?^ŝƌ
Kenneth Cavendish (1917- ? ? ? ? ) ?ŝŶOxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2004, accessed 21 June 
2017 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/50947  
1132 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1969  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ
Stationery Office, 1969). 
1133 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1970  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ
Stationery Office, 1970). 
1134 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 198. 




mostly ignored or neutralised. 
tŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚDĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ?ĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƐ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐũŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ
service after the Second World War, and with the exception of Hannay, all of them had 
served in the armed forces as volunteers or as part of their national service.1136 Robinson, 
ŚƌŝƐƚŽĨĂƐ ?ĂŶĚ<ŝůůŝĐŬŚĂĚũŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǀŝĂƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŵĞƚŚŽĚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
was specifically for young men whose university educations and early careers had been 
disrupted by the War.1137 As such, they were part of the generation of officials who had 
witnessed the destruction of Europe first-hand. Adams, Brind, Hannay and Mellon were all 
born in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and whilst they were too young to have served 
during the War, still had vivid memories of the conflict which hardened their attitudes in 
favour of European unity.1138 As was the case in the previous chapter, the educational 
ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐŐƌŽƵƉǁĞƌĞĚŝǀĞƌƐĞ ?K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐŶƚŽŶŝĂŶ ?ŚƌŝƐƚŽĨĂƐǁĂƐĂŶKůĚ
Merchant Taylor, Hannay was a Wykehamist, and Robinson attended Westminster School, 
but the remaining officials had attended lesser independent schools or grammar schools. 
Crowe attended Stowe School, Marjoribanks attended Merchiston Castle School and 
ĚŝŶďƵƌŐŚĐĂĚĞŵǇ ?<ŝůůŝĐŬĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚ>ĂƚǇŵĞƌhƉƉĞƌ^ĐŚŽŽů ?DĞůůŽŶĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚ^ƚ ?ůŽǇƐŝƵƐ ?
College, a Jesuit school in Glasgow, Adams attended Wolverhampton Grammar School, and 
Brind was educated at the Barry County School in Wales.1139 Their university educations 
ƌĞǀĞĂůĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇĞĐůĞĐƚŝĐƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?ƚKǆĨŽƌĚ ?K ?EĞŝůůƐƚƵĚŝĞĚŶŐůŝƐŚ ?,ĂŶŶĂǇƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ
Modern History, and Robinson took a degree in Greats. Adams also studied at Oxford, but 
there is no record of what subject he took. Christofas studied Economics and Classics and 
Killick studied French and German, both at University College London. Marjoribanks studied 
modern languages at Edinburgh, Brind studied History at Cambridge, and Mellon studied at 
Glasgow.1140 As such, there is no indication that social class or educational background 
determined their career paths or indeed their views on Europe. The Foreign Office in the 
                                                          
1136 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1972  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ
Stationery Office, 1972). 
1137  “^ŝƌ<ĞŶŶĞƚŚŚƌŝƐƚŽĨĂƐ ? ?The Times 16 November 1992; John Killick, interviewed by John Hutson, 
 ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?K,W ? ? ? ? ? ? “^ŝƌ:ŽŚŶ<ŝůůŝĐŬ ? ?The Times 19 February 2004, 36; Roy 
ĞŶŵĂŶ ? “ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? John Armstrong (1925- ? ? ? ? ) ?ŝŶOxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2004, 
accessed 18th May 2016 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/69317 
1138 Brind, Lying Abroad (1999), 85; James Mellon, interviewed by Malcolm McBain, 14 April 2003, 
CCC/BDOHP/73/11; David Hannay, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐYƵĞƐƚĨŽƌĂZŽůĞ PŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐDĞŵŽŝƌĨƌŽŵƵƌŽƉĞƚŽ
the UN (London: IB Tauris, 2013), 35. 
1139 Stowe, Merchiston Castle School, Edinburgh AcademǇ ?>ĂƚǇŵĞƌhƉƉĞƌ^ĐŚŽŽůĂŶĚ^ƚ ?ůŽǇƐŝƵƐ ?
College were independent. Wolverhampton Grammar and Barry County were state schools. 
1140 There is no record of what subject Mellon studied at Glasgow. 
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post-war period recruited from a broader socio-economic and educational base, which 
ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚůǇƉƌŝǌĞĚ ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚnous [more than] a particular and easily defined skill 
ƐĞƚ ? ?1141 /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?<ŝůůŝĐŬƐƚĂƚĞĚŝŶĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐ ‘ĂƉƉĂůůĞĚ QĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞǀŝƌƚƵĂůƚŽƚĂů
ůĂĐŬŽĨĂŶǇƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŽƌŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?1142  
All of these officials were committed to British membership of the EEC, though some were 
ŵŽƌĞĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ƐĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇĚƌŝǀĞŶ
ďǇĂĨŝƌŵďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝsed inside 
the EEC, and not by any ideological attachment to European unity and solidarity.1143 Killick 
ǁĂƐ ‘ĚĞǀŽƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƚůĂŶƚŝĐůůŝĂŶĐĞ ? ?ƐĞƌǀŝŶŐĂƐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ
Atlantic Committee after retirement.1144 His work on the reconstruction of post-war 
Germany in the Allied Control Commission, and as ambassador to Soviet Union and later to 
NATO suggest that his support for accession was primarily motivated by Cold War 
considerations.1145 The younger officials were much more pro-European both from a 
professional and a private point of view. Mellon has stated:  ‘I joined the Foreign Office to 
get to Brussels to ŚĞůƉĚŽƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƵƌŽƉĞ Qto make Europe safe, so to speak ? ?1146 
Similarly, Hannay has argued that  ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐ been an enormous 
force for economic growth and developmenƚ ?ĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? and that she ŚĂĚ ‘ůŽƐƚƚŚĞǁŝůůƚŽ
keep the Empire ?ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ ?1147 ŚƌŝƐƚŽĨĂƐ ?ƉƌŽ-European convictions 
were so great that his biographer has stated: µHe would have wanted to be remembered 
for his role in Britain's participation in the ever closer European union ? and that he 
 ‘confirmed that a great Englishman could also be a great European ?.1148 The latter part of 
his career was spent at the heart of the EE ?ĨŝƌƐƚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐĂŶĚ
then as Director-General of the Secretariat of the European Council of Ministers.1149 Much 
ŽĨĚĂŵƐ ?ĐĂƌĞĞƌǁĂƐĂůƐŽĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ŚĞǁĂƐƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚ,ĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞ/
1969-71 and Head of one of the two EIDs after the department was split in 1971 before 
                                                          
1141 DŝĐŚĂĞů: ?,ƵŐŚĞƐĂŶĚZŽŐĞƌ, ?WůĂƚƚ ? “&ĂƌƉĂƌƚďƵƚůŽƐĞdŽŐĞther: A Quantitative and 
Qualitative Analysis of the Career Structure and Organisational Culture of the Post-War British 
ŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ?Diplomacy and Statecraft 26, no. 2 (2015), 268. 
1142 John Killick, interviewed by John Hutson, 14 February 2002, CCC/BDOHP/69/2. 
1143 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2000), 355. 
1144  “^ŝƌ:ŽŚŶ<ŝůůŝĐŬ ? ?The Times 19 February 2004, 36. 
1145 His language in this interview also suggests an element of Russophobia and strong anti-
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚ P ‘tĞƐƚĞƌŶƉŽůiticians tend to make the mistake of assuming that the Soviet 
ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉǁĞƌĞƌĞĂůůǇƉĞŽƉůĞũƵƐƚůŝŬĞƚŚĞŵ ? P:ŽŚŶ<ŝůůŝĐŬ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚďǇ:ŽŚŶ,ƵƚƐŽŶ ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ
2002, CCC/BDOHP/69/8. 
1146 James Mellon, interviewed by Malcolm McBain, 14 April 2003, CCC/BDOHP/73/15. 
1147 David Hannay, interviewed by Malcolm McBain, 22 July 1999, CCC/BDOHP/38/27. 




being transferred to the British Delegation to the European Communities from 1973-7.1150 
This cohort of officials showed that Europe was now the absolute top foreign policy priority 
and that every ambitious diplomat began to see the continent as containing the most 
coveted posts in the diplomatic service. The Foreign Office were aware that accession 
would present new opportunities in terms of postings and an expansion of representation 
in Europe. As HennesƐǇŚĂƐƐƚĂƚĞĚ ? ‘ŝŶďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐƚĞƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŚŝĞĨďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂƌǇŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
membership of the EEC has been the Foreign Office. The diplomats have found a new place 
in the sun, if that is not too vivid a climatic metaphor for Brussels, Luxembourg and 
StrasbouƌŐ ? ?1151 The amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was a crucial 
step in cementing this sentiment, and the cuts to Commonwealth posts and staff made 
Europe an increasingly attractive destination, both personally and nationally. Planning for 
the future equated to planning for Europe, and these attitudes governed the restructuring 
of the Foreign Office in the 1960s, as well as its firm commitment to membership of the 
EEC. 
After a period of deadlock, British European policy was given a sudden jolt shortly after the 
appointment of Christopher Soames as ambassador to France. In February 1969, Soames 
met with de Gaulle for a series of serious discussions on Anglo-French relations. The 
'ĞŶĞƌĂůƉƌŽĐĞĞĚĞĚƚŽƚĞůů^ŽĂŵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŚĞŚĂĚŶŽƉĂƌƚŝŶƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ of the Common 
DĂƌŬĞƚ ?ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌĚŝĚŚĞŚĂǀĞĂŶǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨĂŝƚŚŝŶŝƚ ? ?1152 This was a frank admission, but 
ŶŽƚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ?Ğ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĨĚĞƌĂůŝƐƚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƐ
well-known. However, the comments which followed would lead to one of the biggest 
diplomatic crises of the 1960s: 
 
He personally foresaw [the EEC] changing, and would like to see it change, into a 
looser form of a free trade area with arrangements by each country to exchange 
agricultural produce. He would be quite prepared to discuss with us what should 
ƚĂŬĞƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ Q,ŝƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂ
large European economic association, but with a small inner council of European 
political association consisting of France and Britain, Germany and Italy.1153 
 
                                                          
1150  “ĚĂŵƐ ?^ŝƌ ?tŝůůŝĂŵ ):ĂŵĞƐ ? ?Who Was Who (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), accessed 
24 July 2017 http://www.ukwhoswho.com/view/article/oupww/whowaswho/U5021  
1151 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Fontana Press, 1990), 404. 





De Gaulle had opened the door to Anglo-French discussions on the effective dissolution of 
ƚŚĞŝŶŝƚƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĨŽƌŵ ?^ŽĂŵĞƐŚŝŵƐĞůĨǁĂƐƵŶƐƵƌĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƐŝŶĐĞƌŝƚǇŽĨĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ
ŝŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶďƵƚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ĂŶŽƉĞŶŵŝŶĚ ? ?1154 The Foreign 
Office was entirely unconvinced and dispatched Patrick Hancock to Paris in order for him to 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌĞĚŝĐĂŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌ ?,ĂŶĐŽĐŬƚŽŽŬĂĨŝƌŵůŝŶĞĂŶĚ
stated that the Prime Minister had no choice but to disĐůŽƐĞƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƐŽĨĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ
conversation to the West German Chancellor, Kurt Kiesinger, whom he was visiting later 
that week.1155 dŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƌŝƚŝƐŚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇ&ŝǀĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚƐƵĨĨĞƌ
significantly if the details of possible Anglo-French collusion ever came to light, which 
ũĞŽƉĂƌĚŝƐĞĚƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?Ɛ
first veto.1156 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚ ?^ŽĂŵĞƐǁĂƐ ‘ǀĞƌǇƵƉƐĞƚ ?ďǇƚŚĞŶĞǁƐĂŶĚ
argued that it would compromise the purpose of his mission in Paris.1157 He went to great 
lengths to try and convince Hancock that his conversations with de Gaulle had been 
ŵŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ‘ƚŽŽĐůĞĂƌ-ĐƵƚĂŶĚƚŽŽĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐ ?ĂƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?1158 Hancock insisted 
that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had already made up their minds. In an 
interview with Hugo Young, John Robinson argued that the decision to inform Kiesinger 
was conceived and suggested by the officials alone, and even alluded that it was 
ƚĂŶƚĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽ ‘ĚŝĐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŽŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?1159 
ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ŶŽǁ,ĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞ/ ?ĚƌĂĨƚĞĚƐŽŵĞŶŽƚĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ƐŶĞǆƚ
ĂďŝŶĞƚŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚ ?dŚĞƌĞ
ǁĂƐĂĐůĞĂƌĂŶǆŝĞƚǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚǁŽƵůĚƵƐĞĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐŝŶǀŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞBritish by 
informing the other members of the EEC, thereby crushing the credibility of the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?1160 /ŶƚŚĞĞǇĞƐŽĨZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂƌĐŚ-
Europeanist, this could not be allowed to happen. Soames was instructed to tell de Gaulle 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĨŽƵŶĚŚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂŶĚĨĂƌ-ƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚŚŝƐ
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐEdKĂŶĚƉůĂŶŶĞĚƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƵƌƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐĂƌĞ
                                                          
1154 Ibid. 
1155 WĂƚƌŝĐŬ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬ ? “WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽDƌ ?^ŽĂŵĞƐ ? ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/414/MWK4/12/18. 
1156 Ibid. dŚŝƐŝƐĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚŝŶŐŽŽĚĚĞƚĂŝůŚĞƌĞ PĂŶŝĞů&ƵƌďǇĂŶĚE ?WŝĞƌƐ>ƵĚůŽǁ ? “ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ^ŽĂŵĞƐ ?
1968- ? ? ?ŝŶThe Paris Embassy: British Ambassadors and Anglo-French Relations 1944-79, ed. 
Rogelia Pastor-Castro and John W. Young (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 138-161. 
1157 WĂƚƌŝĐŬ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬ ? “WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽDƌ ?^ŽĂŵĞƐ ? ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/414/MWK4/12/18. 
1158 Ibid. 
1159 See: Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 205. 
1160 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶƚŽWĂƚƌŝĐŬ,ĂŶĐŽĐŬĂŶĚDŝĐŚĂĞů^ƚĞǁĂƌƚ ? “Ğ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐWƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ to Mr. Soames: 
^ƉĞĂŬŝŶŐEŽƚĞ ? ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Dt< ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? 
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ĨƵůůǇŝŶƚŚĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?1161 Indeed, the Five and the United States had already been informed 
of the discussions, but this would significantly limit the potential damage which France 
could cause. Almost immediately after this, an article appeared in Le Figaro which 
contradicted the British account, presumably leaked by the French authorities.1162 Reports 
from Soames indicated that the French were particularly sensitive about the allegation that 
ƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚĂ ‘ĨŽƵƌ-ƉŽǁĞƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚŚĂĚďĞĞŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůůǇĚĞŶǇŝŶŐŝƚ
at official level.1163 In ruthless fashion, one ForeŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĞǆĐůĂŝŵĞĚ P ‘ǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚƚŚĞ
ďĂƐƚĂƌĚƐĂƚůĂƐƚ ? ?1164 Soames was ordered to show the full account of his conversation with 
ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚďǇƚŚĞYƵĂŝĚ ?KƌƐĂǇ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ?ƐĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƐŝŶ
Paris.1165 The French were trapped. The final nail in the coffin was a full leak of the account 
from the Foreign Office, on the orders of Robinson, which caused an explosion in the 
international press.1166 The furore and embarrassment was all the greater given that 
Richard Nixon was due to arrive for a tour of Europe the following day.1167 Ğ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĨƵƌǇ
ǁĂƐ ‘ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ? ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ>ĂĐŽƵƚƵƌĞ ?1168 Soames was summoned by the 
French Foreign Minister, Michel Debré, and given a fierce rebuke  W he described the 
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐ ‘ĂĨŝĞůĚŽĨƌƵŝŶ ? ?1169 Debré ĂůƐŽĚĞĐƌŝĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ?ŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶǁŚŽ
 ‘ŚĂĚďĞĞŶŚŽƉŝŶŐĨŽƌĂůŽŶŐƚŝŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂůǁŽƵůĚƐŽŽŶŐŽ ?ĂŶĚƌĞŵŝŶĚĞĚƚŚĞ
ĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶĂĨƚĞƌĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞ ? ‘ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉĞŽƉůĞ
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ?1170 This was directly aimed at the likes of Robinson and 
K ?EĞŝůů ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁŚŽŚĂĚƉƵƌƐƵĞĚĂůŝŶĞŽĨƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞĂŶĚ
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1164 There is no certainty over who said this in response to the article in Le Figaro, but Hugo Young 
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1165 Christopher Soames to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 21 February 1969, 
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isolating the French in the hope that the likelihood of British membership of the EEC would 
increase. Gaullism would not die with de Gaulle, and French national interests would 
continue to endure. ^ŽĂŵĞƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚƉƌĞƐƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŚĞĂĨĨĂŝƌĂƐ ‘ĂŶĂůů-
time low in Anglo-&ƌĞŶĐŚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?1171 With the benefit of hindsight, there can be little 
doubt that this assertion was correct.  
The fallout from the Soames affair was monumental and had far-reaching consequences. 
Anglo-French relations, which the government had tried extremely hard to improve, were 
in tatters. The Foreign Office was much more concerned with relations with the Five, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂĨĨĂŝƌƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽ
membership. Reports from James Marjoribanks in Brussels stated that the Italians had full 
faith in the British after Michael Stewart confirmed that the transcript of the meeting had 
ďĞĞŶĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚďǇƚŚĞYƵĂŝĚ ?KƌƐĂǇ ?1172 There was great sympathy for the predicament the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŚĂĚďĞĞŶƉůĂĐĞĚŝŶ ? ‘ĂŶŝŶĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽŶĂŶŽĐĐĂsion such as this 
ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŵĞĂŶƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƵŝĐŝĚĞ ? ?1173 Marjoribanks also noted that the Italians believed 
that de Gaulle had shown his true colours, and that he had always planned to undermine 
and replace the EEC.1174 This was not necessarily the case, but Marjoribanks added that 
ƐƵĐŚƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶƐĚŝĚ ‘ŶŽŚĂƌŵƚŽƵƐ ? ?1175 The Dutch also complimented the British approach, 
ƚĞůůŝŶŐDĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞŚĂĚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐůǇƚŚĂƚǁĞƐƚŽŽĚďǇƚŚĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŵĞƚŚŽĚĂŶĚĚŝƐĐĂƌĚĞĚďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ?1176 Furthermore, the majority of the 
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĚĞƐƉŝƚĞďĞŝŶŐĨĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ ‘ŚĂĚ
ŶŽĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?ďƵƚƚŽĂĐƚĂƐƚŚĞǇĚŝĚ ?1177 The Belgian Director-General of social affairs 
praised Britain for finally compelling the General to explain himself after years of 
divisiveness.1178 Marjoribanks was proud to report that the French were losing ground by 
 ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐƚŽŚĂƌƉŽŶƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂůƉŽŝŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵŽƌĞĂŶĚŵŽƌĞƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞƐĞĞŝŶŐŽƵƌ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?1179 This was an incredibly significant coup for the Foreign 
Office. Their strategy had finally paid off, and they had been proven right. The battle with 
No. 10 over whether or not to pursue an anti-supranationalist partnership with France had 
been decisively won. As for de Gaulle, the GĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐĚĂǇƐǁĞƌĞŶƵŵďĞƌĞĚ ?/ƚǁŽƵůĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
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be an overstatement to say that the affair contributed directly towards his resignation, but 
it certainly exacerbated his already tenuous position. The Foreign Office were well aware 
ƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ďĂĚůǇƐŚĂŬĞŶ ?ďǇƚŚĞƚƵƌďƵůĞŶĐĞŽĨDĂǇ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŽƌƐĞŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ
 ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ŝŶ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?1180 dŚĞYƵĂŝĚ ?KƌƐĂǇŚĂĚŽƌĚĞƌĞĚĂ
radical review of French foreign policy in October 1968 with British intelligence indicating 
that there was a desire for warmer relations with the United States.1181 French anxiety over 
a resurgent Germany and using Britain as a potential counterweight was also a significant 
factor in this reassessment.1182 /ŶƐŚŽƌƚ ?ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĂďƌĂƐŝǀĞƐƚǇůĞŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂŶĚĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ
was out of mode.1183 His decision to tie his future to a referendum on government 
decentralisation and senate reform, which he lost, was ill-fated, but at this point the 
General was fatigued and demoralised.1184 He resigned the presidency on 28 April 1969 full 
in thĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĂƚĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐŽŶǁŽƵůĚ ‘ǁĞĂƌŵĞŽƵƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂŶǇďĞŶĞĨŝƚƚŽ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?1185 
tŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞ^ŽĂŵĞƐĂĨĨĂŝƌĂŶĚĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶŽƉĞŶĞĚ
the floodgates to internal politics and external criticism. As Hugo Young has noted, the 
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽĂŵĞƐĂĨĨĂŝƌǁĂƐĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĞĚďǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐĂŶĚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐǁŚŽ
still opposed British entry.1186 &ŽƌƚŚĞŵ ?ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂĐŚĂŶĐĞĨŽƌ
Britain to build a new organisation for European cooperation, free from the shackles of the 
Common Agricultural Policy and other undesirable elements of the EEC, and the pro-
marketeers in the Foreign Office and government had let the opportunity slip away.1187 The 
new Permanent Under-Secretary, Denis Greenhill, was one of the sceptics who saw the 
events oĨĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ?ĂƐĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌĂŶĞǁŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚ ŽŶ ?ĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
political and economic cooperation, arguing that France was already doing so and that it 
would be more compatible with British interests.1188 Lord Chalfont, the Foreign Office 
miniƐƚĞƌǁŚŽŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇŝƌƌŝƚĂƚĞĚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁŝƚŚŚŝƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů
ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŐƌĞĞĚǁŝƚŚ'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůůĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞůŝŶĞƐƚŚĂƚ
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domestic support for membership of the EEC was flagging.1189 KŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?Ɛ
resignation, Robinson submitted a lengthy paper with a view to quashing these notions 
which had managed to make their way back into the upper echelons of the department. He 
began by keenly reminding his superiors that these ideas directly contradicted government 
ƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚŝĨĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐĞǀĞƌůĞĂŬĞĚ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĚĂŵĂŐŝŶŐ ‘ĨƌŽŵ
ďŽƚŚƚŚĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽŝŶƚƐŽĨǀŝĞǁ ? ?1190 The main conclusions 
of his secret paper were that the political advantages of EEC membership were in line with 
British interests and would allow for greater influence with the United States and West 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ǁŚŽǁĞƌĞŶŽǁ ‘ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŵŽƐƚĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐŽƵƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?1191 Whilst 
Robinson conceded that the economic organisation of the EEC was not ideal, he reaffirmed 
the argument that Britain had missed its chance to influence the creation of the Common 
Market and that the best course of action was to join and influence it from within.1192 The 
only possible instance in which Britain should consider an alternative framework, Robinson 
wrote, was if the Six proposed something as a collective.1193 In this way, there would be no 
suspicion or bad faith in the construction of a new organisation for European cooperation. 
This was the very danger presenteĚďǇĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚ
been overlooked by Greenhill and Chalfont. Moreover, the likelihood of the Six abandoning 
ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇǁĂƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐŵŝŶŝƐĐƵůĞ P ‘/ƚŝƐŶŽƚƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌĞƐĞĞĂďůĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ
to suppose that alternatives will be available to us of a kind which involve the dissolution of 
ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?1194 ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂůŽĨ'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůůĂŶĚŚĂůĨŽŶƚ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐǁĂƐ
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĂŶĚďŽƚŚŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŝƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƉƵƚƚŽŽŶĞƐŝĚĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ
momeŶƚ ? ?1195 Ğ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽǁĞŶƚƐŽŵĞǁĂǇŝŶƋƵĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŶƚŝ-EEC elements 
of the Foreign Office. The Europeanist officials had been vindicated in their handling of the 
^ŽĂŵĞƐĂĨĨĂŝƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞƌĞŵŽǀĞĚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŽďƐƚĂĐůĞ to British 
entry. Slowly but surely, they were edging closer towards their goal. 
/ŶƚŚĞŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĂĨƚĞƌŵĂƚŚŽĨĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĞƌĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ
ĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐ ?'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůůŽƌĚĞƌĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞEĞǁƐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌ ‘ŶŽĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ ?ŽŶƚŚĞ
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matter at the next press conference.1196 They monitored the presidential election campaign 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚĐůŽƐĞůǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƌĞŐƵůĂƌƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞWĂƌŝƐĞŵďĂƐƐǇ ?
Georges Pompidou, the former French Prime Minister, had been positioning himself as de 
'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐŶĂƚƵƌĂůƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌĨŽƌŵŽŶƚŚƐďǇĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐŚŝƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƌƵŶŝŶǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ
and speeches.1197 He had enjoyed great popularity since his handling of the May 1968 crisis 
ĂŶĚǁĂƐƐĞĞŶĂƐƚŚĞĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞ'ĂƵůůŝƐƚƐ ?ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝve elections of June 
1968.1198 Pompidou was the favourite to win, and the divisions amongst the political left in 
France seemed to confirm this.1199 John Galsworthy,1200 Economic Counsellor at the 
embassy, informed Robinson that he had spoken with the Head of the EEC affairs 
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞYƵĂŝĚ ?KƌƐĂǇǁŚŽŚĂĚƐƚĂƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉƚŚĂƚ
 ‘ƐŽŵĞƐŽƌƚŽĨŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶǁĂƐ ‘ĂǀŝƌƚƵĂůĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ Ǉ ? ?1201 The French official 
argued that on the assumption that Pompidou won the election, the French government 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞƵŶĂďůĞƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚ ‘ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ&ŝǀĞ ?ĨŽƌĞŶůĂƌŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?1202 However, the 
French government and civil service were still very much Gaullist strongholds. Indeed, 
'ĂůƐǁŽƌƚŚǇŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůďŽĚǇŽĨŽƉŝŶion in the Quai 
which believes that there is an element of bluff in our public posture and less British 
ĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞƚŚĂŶǁĞƉƌĞƚĞŶĚ ? ?1203 Ɛ<ŶĂƉƉŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?WŽŵƉŝĚŽƵ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ
ƵƌŽƉĞǁĂƐ ‘ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚŵŽƌĞďǇƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůƉŽůŝĐǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƚŚĂŶďǇƚƌĂŶscendent faith in an 
ŝĚĞĂů ? ?1204 The leading candidate may not have had the same personal animosity towards 
Britain as de Gaulle, but he would not welcome them with open arms if it threatened 
French interests. Further reports from Paris seemed to confirm this. Leslie Fielding,1205 a 
&ŝƌƐƚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŝŶƚŚĞĞŵďĂƐƐǇ ?ĐŽŵƉŝůĞĚĂƌĞƉŽƌƚŽŶWŽŵƉŝĚŽƵ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐŽŶ
British membership of the EEC. During the election campaign, Pompidou argued that he 
ĐŽƵůĚƐĞĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ‘ƉƵƌĞůǇĂŶĚƐŝŵƉůǇĞŶƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌket and accepting its 
                                                          
1196 ĞŶŝƐ'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůůƚŽDŝĐŚĂĞů^ƚĞǁĂƌƚ ? “Ğ'ĂƵůůĞ ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/445/MWK4/312/1/47. 
1197 Knapp, Gaullism Since De Gaulle (1994), 18. 
1198 Serge Berstein and Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Cambridge History of Modern France: The Pompidou 
Years, 1969-1974 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5. 
1199 Ibid. 
1200 ĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇDŽŽƌŚŽƵƐĞĂƐŽŶĞŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĞĂƌůǇĐŽŶǀĞƌƚƐƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ?ŝŶDŽŽƌŚŽƵƐĞ ?
The Diplomats (1977), 374. 
1201 John Galsworthy to John Robinson, 4 June 1969, TNA/FCO30/445/MWK4/312/1/76. 
1202 Ibid. 
1203 Ibid. 
1204 Knapp, Gaullism Since De Gaulle (1994), 355. 
1205 Fielding was very much in favour of Britain joining the EEC, but despised the approach taken by 
ƚŚĞůŝŬĞƐŽĨK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ĐĂůůŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ‘ĂůŽŽĨĂŶĚĐŽůĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ‘ĚĞǀŝŽƵƐĂŶĚƉŝŐ-
ŚĞĂĚĞĚ ? P>ĞƐůŝĞ&ŝĞůĚŝŶŐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚďǇdŚŽŵĂƐZĂŝŶĞĂƵ ? 24 April 2012, CCC/BDOHP/139/9. 
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ƌƵůĞƐ ? ?1206 This was a remarkably straightforward statement in comparison to the numerous 
difficulties and complications conjured up by de Gaulle. Pompidou also declared his 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌĞŶůĂƌŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚŝƚ ‘ǁŽƵůĚnot be honest to confine 
ŽŶĞƐĞůĨƚŽĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞǁĂǇŽĨĞŶůĂƌŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?ƉůĂĐŝŶŐ
emphasis on both France and its partners reaching an agreement on the matter.1207 This 
ǁĂƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂĚŝƌĞĐƚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽthe issue of enlargement and 
his dictatorial style within the EEC. The Foreign Secretary was encouraged by these 
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚĚĞ
'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƐƚǇůĞŽĨĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇǁŽƵůĚĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽadded in a letter to the Prime 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĞǆƉĞĐƚ ‘ƌĂƉŝĚŽƌƌĂĚŝĐĂů ?ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽ&ƌĞŶĐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?1208 
However, there was a feeling that Anglo-French relations would be given a fresh start, and 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǀĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďůŽĐŬĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉĂth to the EEC would be lifted.1209 
Pompidou won the second round of the election comfortably and was duly elected 
President of France on 15 June 1969. His first few months were largely preoccupied with 
the formation of a government and internal affairs, but tŚĞŶĞǁWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶ
foreign affairs, particularly Europe, was being meticulously scrutinised by the Foreign 
Office.1210 Michael Palliser, who had moved from his position ĂƐtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ
for foreign affairs to serve as ^ŽĂŵĞƐ ?ĚĞƉƵƚǇŝŶƚŚĞWĂƌŝƐĞŵďĂƐƐy, relayed an account of a 
conversation between the Italian ambassador and the new French Foreign Minister, 
Maurice Schumann. Schumann stated that he and Pompidou were both agreed that a new 
attitude would govern their approach to the question of British eŶƚƌǇ P ‘ƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚŶŽ-one 
ĐŽƵůĚũƵƐƚŝĨŝĂďůǇůĂǇŽŶ&ƌĂŶĐĞƚŚĞďůĂŵĞĨŽƌŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?1211 By this, he 
meant that the Five had not yet been honest about the difficulties and problems which 
British membership of the EEC could bring.1212 However, Schumann was much more 
positive in his attitude towards perceptions of British international relations. He stated that 
ƚĂůŬŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶŐůŽ-^ĂǆŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŚĞƌƐĞůĨĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
^ƚĂƚĞƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ƋƵŝƚĞŽƵƚŽĨĚĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ‘ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚŚĞƌĨƵƚƵƌĞ
ĂƐůŝŶŬĞĚǁŝƚŚƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?1213 WĂůůŝƐĞƌĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŽŚŝƐ>ŽŶĚŽŶĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚ ‘ĚƌĂǁĂ
                                                          
1206 >ĞƐůŝĞ&ŝĞůĚŝŶŐƚŽDĂƌƚŝŶDŽƌůĂŶĚ ? “ƌŝƚŝƐŚĂŶĚŝĚĂƚƵƌĞƚŽƚŚĞ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1207 Ibid. 
1208 Michael Stewart to Harold Wilson, 13 June 1969, TNA/FCO30/446/MWK4/312/1/116. 
1209 Ibid. 
1210 Berstein and Rioux, The Pompidou Years, 1969-1974 (2000), 22. 





ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĨƌŽŵ^ĐŚƵŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƌĞŵĂƌŬƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞƐƚŝůů
some areas of uncertainty and ambiguity.1214 A more concrete brief was sent by the head of 
ƚŚĞĐŚĂŶĐĞƌǇƚŽ>ŽŶĚŽŶŝŶůĂƚĞƵŐƵƐƚ ?ŐŝǀŝŶŐĂĨƵůůĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
position.1215 dŚĞŵĂŝŶĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ĂĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĂŶĚĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ
shift in the French attitude since tŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞŽĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂůĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ? ?1216 In addition, the 
embassy confirmed that France would no longer exercise a veto on opening negotiations 
ǁŝƚŚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƐĂǁ ‘ůŽŶŐĞƌƚĞƌŵƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ƌŽŵŽƵƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?1217 
More broadly, there was a great deal of goodwill towards Britain and the enlarging of the 
EEC in general amongst French journalists, politicians, pressure groups and the public.1218 
dŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĂůƐŽŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌĂĚŝĨĨŝĐƵlt period of 
bargaining with a tough-ŵŝŶĚĞĚ&ƌĞŶĐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?1219 Despite anxieties about German 
hegemony and assertiveness, the French were not prepared to make concessions on the 
Common Agricultural Policy or the EEC budget, and given the recent devaluation of the 
franc and internal economic uncertainty, they would be wary of any potential disruption 
which British accession might cause.1220 /ŶƐŚŽƌƚ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞǁĂƐďǇŶŽŵĞĂŶƐ
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Third Time Lucky? Launching the Application 
 
The latter part of 1969 saw the government and Whitehall manoeuvring for the reopening 
ŽĨŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŝǆ ?KŶ ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
Office as Deputy Under-Secretary for European integration affairs.1221 He had been 
summoned back for one reason: to lead the negotiations which would take Britain into the 
EEC.1222 In addition, George Thomson was appointed the minister in charge of the 
negotiations with the title Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.1223 In this capacity, he was 
given a seat in Cabinet and was attached to the Foreign Office.1224 There were also positive 
signs from the member states of the EEC. After nearly seven years of French obstruction, 
the Six officially agreed to open negotiations with the applicant states at a summit in The 
Hague in December 1969. In return for its cooperation, France demanded that the 
financing of the Common Agricultural Policy be settled.1225 Whilst ending the French veto 
on negotiations was a great victory for the Foreign Office, the new terms of the Common 
ŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůWŽůŝĐǇĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƌĂŝƐĞĚƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?1226 However, 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ<ƌŽƚǌĂŶĚ^ĐŚŝůĚ ?ƚŚĞƐƵŵŵŝƚ ‘ƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞŽĨĐƌƵĐŝĂůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ for the 
ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?1227 John Young has supported this, calling the 
ƐƵŵŵŝƚ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?1228 K ?EĞŝůůŚŝŵƐĞůĨ
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĚŝĚŝŶĨĂĐƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƚĂŬĞĂƚƚŚis summit meeting 
ƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƵƐƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?1229  
dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐƚĞĚŶŽƚŝŵĞŝŶƌĞĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶ
membership. James Adams submitted a draft paper on the political factors motivating the 
British ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶƵƐĞĚ ‘ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞůǇ ?ĨŽƌŚŝƐŽǁŶĚƌĂĨƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŽƌǇ
and concluding sections of a White Paper on the cost of membership which had been 
ordered by the Prime Minister.1230 K ?EĞŝůůŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƐĞŝǌĞĚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ
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the case for accession as favourably as possible. In correspondence with William Nield,1231 
ƚŚĞWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŝŶƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞĚ P ‘ƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞ
Paper should contain a strong  W and fairly lengthy  W passage about the positive 
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞǁĂŶƚƚŽƐĞĞŝŶƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?1232 K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐǁŽƌƌŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŽŽ
much emphasis on the potential financial and economic losses of accession would put 
tŚŝƚĞŚĂůůĂŶĚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ ‘ĂƐƚƌŽŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƐůĂŶƚ ?ŽŶƚŚe 
 ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂďĂůĂŶĐĞĚĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĨŝĞůĚ ?ǁŽƵůĚ
galvanise public and political support.1233 However, Robinson was still required to list some 
ŽĨƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌƐŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶŚŝƐĚƌĂĨƚ ?,ĞƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞCommon 
ŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůWŽůŝĐǇǁŝůůŝŶǀŽůǀĞĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĐŚĂƌŐĞŽŶƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƌĂŶŐŝŶŐ
ĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶƚŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƐƚŽĨ ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ‘ŵƵƐƚďĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƚŽďĞ
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĂŶǁĂƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?1234 The possible rise in the cost of living 
index of 4-5% and in the retail price of food of 18-26% were also detailed, but Robinson 
made clear that these would be temporary and over a short transition period.1235 There is 
ŶŽĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƉŽŝŶƚƐǁĞƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŽŶtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐŽƌĚers; Hugo Young has cynically 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌǁĂƐƚĂŬŝŶŐĐĂƌĞ ‘ŶŽƚƚŽĐƵƚŽĨĨĂůůĞƐĐĂƉĞƌŽƵƚĞƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
 ?ďƵƚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐŵĞŵŽŝƌƐ ?ŚĞǁĂƐŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂŶ
 ‘ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ǀŝĞǁ ‘ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇĨƌĞĞ QĨƌŽŵŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?1236 Indeed, 
the drafts for the White Paper were prepared under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Office 
and included consultations from the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade, the 
Ministry of Technology and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.  
The focus on the possible economic consequences of membership clearly irritated the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ǁŝƚŚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌŚĂĚ ‘ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇĐŚŽƐĞŶ
ƚŚĞŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ ?ƐŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?ĂǀŽŝĚĞĚŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞŬĞǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĚŝĚŶŽƚ ‘ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞ
the cost of not ũŽŝŶŝŶŐ ? ?1237 He railed against the need to provide estimates for the cost of 
                                                          
1231 EŝĞůĚ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞEEC was fundamental. He chaired the Approach to Europe 
official committee which coordinated European policy across Whitehall. Nield reportedly had 
 ‘ƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞǀŝĞǁƐĂďŽƵƚ QƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?ƌƚŚƵƌ'ƌĞĞŶ ?
 “EŝĞůĚ ?^ŝƌtŝůůŝam Alan (1913-1994) in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2004, accessed 10 
October 2017 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/55167  
1232 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽtŝůůŝĂŵEŝĞůĚ ? “tŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌ ? ? ?December 1969, TNA/FCO30/392/MWK2/9/4. 
1233 Ibid. 
1234 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? “tŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌŽŶDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/392/MWK2/9/5. 
1235 Ibid. 
1236 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 209; Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A 
Personal Record (London: Michael Joseph, 1971), 762. 
1237 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? “tŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?
January 1970, TNA/FCO30/782/MWK5/1/46. 
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membership, arguing that they had not been provided in 1967, which would lead to critics 
demanding to know why the government had not disclosed such information before.1238 
Robinson also argued that there were too many variables to accurately predict the cost of 
accession, and that such predictions did not take into account any potential benefits.1239 
The pro-European elements in the Foreign Office were particularly sensitive about how the 
White Paper would be perceived by the public and the press. Robinson even suggested 
ƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŶĞĞĚƚŽ ‘ĐƵƐŚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨŝƚƐƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?1240 Indeed, the Foreign 
Office had created EC/hŝŶEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ‘ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞŚŽŵĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŽƌƚŽŶ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŽ ‘ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂŽĨƚŚĞ “ĂŶƚŝ-ŵĂƌŬĞƚĞĞƌƐ ? ? ?1241 He agreed 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ PŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƐ
opposed to the more ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ‘ƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ PŶƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨŽƐƚ ? ?
which had been proposed as an alternative by officials.1242 The Cabinet did in fact opt for 
the former over the latter.1243 Robinson also feared that the Six could interpret the White 
Paper as an attempt by the government to lay the political groundwork for the 
abandonment of its policy on membership of the EEC by deeming the risks and costs too 
great.1244 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŽŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉƌĞƐƐ ?ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌĂĨƚĞƌŝƚƐ
publication in FebƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ/hƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇǁĂƐ ‘ŽŶƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ
ďĂůĂŶĐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĨĂŝƌƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?1245 French and German newspapers reported on 
the document from a variety of angles; > ?ƵƌŽƌĞargued that the cost of membership would 
be offset by the long term benefits to British finance and commerce, whereas Le Monde 
ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĂǀĞƌǇƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ
his commitment to the political and economic arguments in favour of membership and that 
the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚĞŶƚĞƌŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ĨƌŽŵĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ? ?1246 The German 
Frankfurter Allgemeine argued that Wilson had shown his desire for Britain to play a 
 ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŽůĞ ?ŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƐƚŽĨĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞĚǁĂƌĨĞĚďǇĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐ




1241 C.J.H. Keith tŽ:ŽŚŶWĞĐŬ ? “ŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚWƵďůŝĐŝƚǇŝŶh< ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO26/1212/PBU1/3/2; Trevor Lloyd-,ƵŐŚĞƐƚŽtŝůůŝĂŵEŝĞůĚ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶWŽůŝĐǇ PdŚĞ
/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĨĨŽƌƚĂƚ,ŽŵĞ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ?   W ? ? ? ? ? 
1242 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “ĂďŝŶĞƚŽŶ  ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ PtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌŽŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/783/MWK5/1/85. 
1243  “hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌDĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ PƌĂĨƚtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/CAB129/147/C(70)17. 
1244 Ibid. 





advantages in the industrial and technological sectors.1247 Le Figaro and the Münchner 
Merkur adopted more sceptical positions, stating that the White Paper would provide anti-
EEC groups with ammunition against the case for entry and suggested that it was hard to 
ďĞůŝĞǀĞŝŶtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?1248 Despite these criticisms, the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨǁŝĚĞĨĂĐƚƵĂůĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ?1249  
The paper was debated in the House of Commons on 24-25 February, but no vote was 
held.1250 Reactions from the British press suggest that the government was given a 
balanced reception. The tone of articles in The Times betray an element of suspicion for 
tŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵůĞĂĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚConservative ZĞŐŝŶĂůĚDĂƵĚůŝŶŐ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐŽŶ ? ?
&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌǁĂƐ ‘ƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĐĂƐŚŝŶŽŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŵŽŽĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞŶƚƌǇ
ŝŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?1251 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽƋƵŝĐŬƚŽŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĐŽŶ ŵŝĐĚƵƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶ
the face of the potential shocks to trade and retail prices.1252 The reignition of the European 
debate in British politics and the publication of the White Paper gave the Foreign Office an 
ŝĚĞĂůƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚĨŽƌƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůǁƌŽƚĞƚŽtŝůůŝĂŵ
Armstrong in the Cabinet Office, detailing his initial selections for the negotiating 
delegation.1253 He recommended that the Permanent Mission in Brussels prioritise the 
negotiations in its everyday operations, and that James Marjoribanks and Kenneth 
Christofas  W the head and deputy head of the Mission  W be nominally attached to the 
delegation.1254 K ?EĞŝůůĂůƐŽŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇŶŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶĂƐŚŝƐŶƵŵďĞƌƚǁŽǁŚŽǁŽƵůĚ
commute with him from London to Brussels for the negotiations.1255 The other senior 
members of the delegation were ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇŶĂŵĞĚŝŶƉƌŝů ? ? ? ? PK ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚůĞĂ 
official, with Roy Denman from the Board of Trade, Freddie Kearns from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Patrick Shovelton from the Ministry of Technology, and 
Raymond Bell from the Treasury.1256 In a meeting of the Cabinet Office EURO Committee, 
ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐĂĐƌŽƐƐtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?K ?EĞŝůů




1250 Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970 (1971), 764. 
1251 ,ƵŐŚEŽǇĞƐ ? “dŽƌǇĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶtŝůƐŽŶ ?Ɛ^ŝǆƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ ? ?The Times, 25 February 1970, 1. 
1252 ,ƵŐŚEŽǇĞƐ ? “:ĞŶŬŝŶƐƐĂǇƐƌŝƚĂŝŶĐĂŶĂĨĨŽƌĚĞŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?The Times, 26 February 1970, 1. 




1256 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2000), 44. 
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stated that the negotiations would probably follow a different format to that adopted 
during the first application.1257 As such, the briefs which had been drafted in anticipation of 
negotiations in 1967 would have to be revised, particularly with regards to political 
unification after the settlement reached by the Six on the Common Agricultural Policy in 
December 1969.1258 KŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚK ?EĞŝůůŵĂĚĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ
the new approach to be taken with regards to Commonwealth interests. He stated that 
unlike the 1961- ?ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞůĞƐƐŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨ
the CŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚŽůĚũŽŝŶƚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ
governments on the same scale that it did during the first application.1259 Furthermore, he 
argued that the Commonwealth Liaison Committee not be used as a forum for regular 
consultation, and that the Commonwealth Secretariat be completely excluded from any 
formal negotiating role in Brussels.1260 Even British trade with New Zealand, which was 
considered to be a potential sticking point for the negotiations, was downplayed by the 
Foreign Office ?ƉĂƉĞƌƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐtŽƌŬŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉŽŶƵƌŽƉĞ
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?ƐĚĂŝƌǇĞǆƉŽƌƚƐƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ĂŶĚĂŵŽƌĞ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?ƐƚŽƚĂůĞǆƉŽƌƚƐƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶĨƌŽŵ ? ?A?ŝŶ
1965 to 40% in 1970.1261 In addition, the value of British exports to the EEC exceeded that 
to the Commonwealth for the first time in 1970: 21.8% versus 21%.1262 This is clear 
evidence of Commonwealth interests being downgraded after the amalgamation of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, both due to the decreasing importance of 
Commonwealth trade for British economic interests and the ƌĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚ
role as a primarily European power.1263 /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?K ?EĞŝůůůĂƚĞƌĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ
 ‘we got more for New Zealand than was necessary and had ourselves to pay a heavy price 
                                                          





1261 &ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ? “EĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐŝŵƐŽŶEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/CAB134/3338/WGE(70)6. 
1262 Simon Z. Young, dĞƌŵƐŽĨŶƚƌǇ PƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐEĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ?-1972 
(London: Heinemann, 1973), 152. 
1263 ^ĞĞ P:ŽŚŶ^ŝŶŐůĞƚŽŶ ? “dŚĞƌŽƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐEĞƚǁŽƌŬĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
Growing Interest in Joining the EEC, 1950-70 ? ?Working Papers in Economic and Social History no. 48 
 ?DĂŶĐŚĞƐƚĞƌ PhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨDĂŶĐŚĞƐƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ůĞǆDĂǇ ? “dŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐdƵƌŶƚŽ
Europe, 1945- ? ? ? ?The Round Table 102, no. 1 (2013), 29- ? ? ?&ĞƌĚŝŶĂŶĚ>ĞŝŬĂŵ ? “DĂƚƚĞƌŽĨ
Preference: Commonwealth Africa, Britain and the EEC Association System, 1957- ? ? ?ŝŶThe External 
Relations of the European Union: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Pascaline Winand, 
Andrea Benvenuti and Max Gurdezo (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2014), 293-310. 
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ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚŽƐŽ ? ?1264 Clearly, negotiating on behalf of certain Commonwealth countries 
ǁĂƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĂƚďĞƐƚĂŶŝŶĐŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĂƚǁŽƌƐƚĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŚŝŶĚĞƌĂŶĐĞƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
accession to the EEC. 
Briefs from Robinson to the EURO committee indicated that the Six could agree to open 
negotiations as early as June, but that the French were using the imminent British general 
election as an excuse to delay until the autumn.1265 The Foreign Office line was to press for 
the opening of negotiations before July or as soon as possible thereafter.1266 In the event, 
the government received an official reply from the President of the Council of Ministers on 
9 June, inviting them to begin negotiations in Luxembourg on 30 June.1267 With a general 
ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞĚĨŽƌ ? ?:ƵŶĞ ?ƚŚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ‘ŚĂĚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇůĞĚƚŽƐŽŵĞŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐŽĨŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁĂƐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇŝƐƐƵĞĚ ?1268 
Furthermore, the unexpected Conservative victory in the election was an additional source 
ŽĨĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶ ?WŽůůƐŚĂĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇƉƵƚ>ĂďŽƵƌĂŚĞĂĚ ?ďƵƚ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐƉĂƌƚǇĞŵĞƌŐĞĚǁŝƚŚ ? ? ?
seats and a comfortable working majority.1269  dŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ
the premiership for BriƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶǁĞůů-documented and does 
not need to be repeated in full here. A committed Europhile, Heath had long made British 
membership of the EEC his personal ambition, and his intimate involvement in the first 
application under Macmillan as Lord Privy Seal and chief negotiator gave him impeccable 
ĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐ ?dŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞůŝƚƚůĞĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?ƐƉƌŽ-Europeans welcomed the return 
ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽůĚĂůůǇǁŝƚŚĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵ ?ĞŶŵĂŶ ?ƚŚĞŽĂƌĚŽĨdƌĂĚĞ ?ƐhŶĚĞƌ-Secretary on the 
negotiating delegation said that had Wilson been re-ĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ‘ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
ƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚůǇƌĞďƵĨĨĞĚĂŶĚŬĞƉƚŽƵƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĨŽƌĂůŽŶŐ ?ůŽŶŐƚŝŵĞ ? ?1270 His reasons were that 
 ‘WŽŵƉŝĚŽƵĂŶĚtŝůƐŽŶŐŽƚŽŶǀĞƌǇďĂĚůǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚtŝůƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŚĞĂƌƚǁĂƐ ?ŶŽƚ ?ƌĞĂůůǇŝŶŝƚ ? ? 
ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ,ĞĂƚŚǁĂƐĂ ‘ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ? ?1271 The Foreign Office immediately began 
redrafting the statement to be made by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster at the 
                                                          
1264 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2000), 346. 
1265 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞ PdŚĞEĞǆƚ&ĞǁDŽŶƚŚƐ ?EŽƚĞďǇƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ
KĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Dt< ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1266 Ibid. 
1267 WĞƚĞƌ^ƚƌĂĨĨŽƌĚ ? “dĂůŬƐŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚĞŶƚƌǇƚŽďĞŐŝŶŽŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?The Times,  ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?K ?EĞŝůů ?
BƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2000), 15-16. 
1268 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2000), 15. 
1269 Stephen Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community Volume II: From 
Rejection to Referendum, 1963-1975 (London: Routledge, 2013), 360. 
1270 Roy Denman, interviewed by Ruggero Ranieri, 23 July 1998, Historical Archives of the European 




opening meeting in Luxembourg to take into account the change in government.1272 The 
new statement emphasised the key role Heath and the Conservatives had in earlier 
ŽǀĞƌƚƵƌĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƋƵŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŚĞŶ>ŽƌĚWƌŝǀǇĞ^Ăů P ‘ƵƌŽƉĞŵƵƐƚƵŶŝƚĞŽƌ
ƉĞƌŝƐŚ ? ?1273 dŚĞƐĞƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌƐŽĨ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚ
presumably have struck a chord with the Six. However, the statement purposefully took a 
ƚŽƵŐŚůŝŶĞŽŶ ‘ĨĂŝƌĂŶĚƐŽƵŶĚ ?ƚĞƌŵƐĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
contributions towards the EEC budget.1274 According to The Times, this particular point 
stung tŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ?ǁŚŽ ‘ĚŝƐůŝŬĞĚ ?ĂƌďĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶĂŶŝƐƐƵĞ ŽƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞŝƚĐŽƵůĚŵĂŬĞ
or break the deal.1275 
After the Luxembourg meeting, the Foreign Office immediately began planning for the 
format of the negotiations. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster had expressed an 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐĂĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ
ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ƚŚĞŶŵŽǀŝŶŐŽŶƚŽŽƚŚĞƌĂƌĞĂƐ ?1276 
K ?EĞŝůůǁƌŽƚĞƚŽĂƌďĞƌŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌƐŽĨƐƵĐŚĂŶ approach. Namely, the Six 
ǁŽƵůĚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƐƵƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁĂƐƐŝŵƉůǇůŽǁĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƐƚŽĨ
entry, which would sully the negotiations just as they began, or worse, they would insist 
that a settlement on EEC budget contributions become a precondition for negotiations on 
any other issue.1277 K ?EĞŝůůŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐƐĞǀĞƌĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐĂƚŽŶĐĞƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĂ
sense of momentum and progress.1278 He argued that the priority for the ministerial 
meeting on 21 July should be the establishment of working parties for a range of issues, 
including the EEC budget, dairy products, sugar, the Common External Tariff, the ECSC and 
Euratom.1279 The working parties would be divided up amongst the Under-Secretaries on 
the negotiating delegation based on their areas of expertise.1280 Barber consented, labelling 
K ?EĞŝůů ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐ ‘ĂƐĞŶƐŝďůĞĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?1281 However, the Ministry of Agriculture subsequently 
                                                          
1272 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽ:ŽŚŶ'ƌĂŚĂŵ ? “DĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ PKƉĞŶŝŶŐ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ
ĨŽƌ ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Dt< ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1273 Ibid. 
1274 Ibid. 
1275 At this point, Barber was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, before being promoted to 
Chancellor of the Exchequer on 20 July 1970 following the death of Iain Macleod: Elter Strafford, 
 “ƌŝƚĂŝŶĚĞŵĂŶĚƐĨĂŝƌƚĞƌŵƐĨƌŽŵ^ŝǆĂƐĞŶƚƌǇƚĂůŬƐŽƉĞŶ ? ?The Times, 1 July 1970, 1. 
1276 ,ĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŽK ?EĞŝůů PŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽƌŝƐƉŝŶdŝĐŬĞůů ? “urope: Meeting with the 
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŽŶ ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Dt< ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1277 Ibid. 
1278 Ibid. 
1279 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽƌŝƐƉŝŶdŝĐŬĞůů ? “DĞĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŽŶ ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/754/MWK4/6/16.  
1280 Ibid. 
1281 Anthony Barber, comments on ibid. 
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lobbied against working parties on dairy and sugar, suggesting instead that the department 
retain separate control over New Zealand, Commonwealth sugar and British agriculture.1282 
The Foreign Office strongly opposed these proposals on the grounds that a group on 
domestic agriculture would put pressure on Britain to voice acceptance of the Common 
Agricultural Policy from the outset, which would constitute a serious blunder on an issue so 
sensitive to the government and public.1283 At the ministerial meeting in July, the British 
proposals for the working groups were not immediately consented to by the Six, but there 
was broad agreement on which areas to tackle first with the exception of Euratom.1284 The 
Six agreed to parallel discussions on agriculture, the industrial customs union and the 
transition period, the former of which the delegation specifically broke down to milk 
products, pork, eggs and sugar.1285 In doing so, the British delegation were attempting to 
create the impression that their reservations were limited to a small number of issues as 
ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůWŽůŝĐǇĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƐ ?ĂƌďĞƌ ?ƐŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ‘ŚĂĚďĞĞŶĞǆĐĞůůĞnt and exactly the 
ƌŝŐŚƚŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĨƌŝĞŶĚůŝŶĞƐƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶůĞĨƚ ? ?1286 The July meeting also 
established the format of the negotiations: there were to be two ministerial meetings every 
quarter and a two-day meeting of the deputies every fortnight.1287 The negotiations had 
been launched. 
It is not the aim of this chapter to provide a long and exhaustive account of the 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?1288 
Instead, the remainder of this chapter will focus on Foreign Office attitudes towards the 
negotiations, and what measures the department took to ensure their success. In 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŶŐůŽ-French relations and its 
implications will be explored, which prŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ
ƚŽƚŚĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨtƌŝŐŚƚ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘&ƌŝĞŶĚůǇ&ŝǀĞ ?ŚĂĚůŽŶŐ
                                                          
1282 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚƌŝƐƉŝŶdŝĐŬĞůů ? “ƵƌŽƉĞ PDĞĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŽŶ ? ?
JƵůǇ ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Dt< ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1283 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “tŽƌŬŝŶŐWĂƌƚŝĞƐƚŽďĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŽŶ ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/754/MWK4/6/45. 
1284 WĞƚĞƌ^ƚƌĂĨĨŽƌĚ ? “^ŝǆĂŐƌĞĞŽŶĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĞƉƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚŝƐŚĞŶƚƌǇ ? ?The Times, 22 July 1970, 1. 
1285  “ƌĂĨƚŽĨƚhe conclusions adopted at the first ministerial meeting between the European 
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵŚĞůĚĂƚƌƵƐƐĞůƐŽŶ ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/754/MWK4/6/79. 
1286 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚƌŝƐƉŝŶdŝĐŬĞůů ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?FCO30/754/MWK4/6/80. 
1287 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2000), 66. 




talks between the British and tŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ? ?1289 
In May 1970, the Foreign Office Planning Staff, in partnership and consultation with the 
EID, submitted a major paper to the Permanent Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘ŶŐůŽ-French 
ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?1290 The purpose of the paper was to consider the state of Anglo-French 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞĂƌĞĂƐŽĨĐŽŵŵŽŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĂŶĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
membership of the EEC. As argued above, the paper explicitly acknowledged in the first 
ƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚ P ‘/ƚƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞŝƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚǁŝthout French agreement 
ǁĞƐŚĂůůŶŽƚŐĞƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?1291 The Foreign Office knew, more than any other 
branch of Whitehall or government, that an Anglo-French deal was the key to accession. 
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞŽĨ'ĞŶĞral de Gaulle has led to 
substantial improvement in the climate of Anglo-&ƌĞŶĐŚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁĂƐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ
significant.1292 dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĞƌĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚǁĞƌĞƚĂŬŝŶŐ ‘ĂŵŽƌĞ
ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨ policy areas including 
defence, the Middle East, Africa and East-West relations.1293 This alone boded extremely 
well for British prospects of joining the Common Market. However, as acknowledged by 
officials, there were still very real obstacles and differences between the two countries. 
dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐƐƚŝůůƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
her staunch commitment to NATO, which France viewed as little more than another tool of 
American hegemony in Western Europe.1294 Cultural competition and French fears that 
their national heritage was declining in importance also fuelled tensions; the serious drop 
in the use of French as a language of international diplomacy and business was viewed as a 
 ‘ŵĂũŽƌƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŽďƐƚĂĐůĞ ?ďǇƚŚe Foreign Office.1295 In addition, diverging economic 
interests in the fields of technology, aviation, oil and industry solidified the Anglo-French 
relationship as a fiercely competitive one.1296 In light of these factors, the Foreign Office 
acknowledged that the negotiations were a high-risk diplomatic gamble. Failure to secure 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŽƵůĚůĞĂĚƚŽĂ ‘ƐŚĂƌƉĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŶŐůŽ-&ƌĞŶĐŚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ
                                                          
1289 :ŽĂŶŶĞtƌŝŐŚƚ ? “dŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚŶŐůŽ-French Relations, 1958- ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶ
Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation, ed. Alan Sharp and Glyn 
Stone (London: Routledge, 1999), 331. 









ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞŝŶŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐŶŐůŽ-&ƌĞŶĐŚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚĞŶůĂƌŐĞƚŚĞ ‘ĂƌĞĂƐŽĨ
common interesƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?1297 The likelihood of France accepting British 
accession was also stronger than it ever had been since the inception of the EEC. The 
resurgence of West Germany both economically with the Wirtschaftswunder and the 
strength of the ĞƵƚƐĐŚŵĂƌŬ ?ĂŶĚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇǁŝƚŚƌĂŶĚƚ ?ƐOstpolitik factored into 
&ƌĞŶĐŚƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĞŶůĂƌŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƐĚŝĚWŽŵƉŝĚŽƵ ?ƐŵŽƌĞ
pragmatic attitude towards foreign policy than that of his predecessor.1298 Despite this 
counting in BritĂŝŶ ?ƐĨĂǀŽƵƌ ?ƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ
on French terms would be high, and would involve substantial concessions.1299 Provided 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ
sucĐĞĞĚ ? ?1300 
dŚĞWůĂŶŶŝŶŐ^ƚĂĨĨ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌǁĂƐƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚƌĞƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵ^ŽĂŵĞƐƚŽůĞĐ
Douglas-Home, who took up post as Foreign Secretary after the general election. The 
ĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐƐƚŝůůĂŐƌĞĂƚĚĞĂůŽĨ suspicion 
ĂďŽƵƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĞƐŝŶ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?1301 /Ŷ^ŽĂŵĞƐ ?ǁŽƌĚƐ ?&ƌĞŶĐŚƉƵďůŝĐĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ
ǁĂƐ ‘ƉƵǌǌůĞĚĂŶĚĚŝƐŵĂǇĞĚ ?ďǇƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚůŝƚƚůĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶĚŽŶĞďǇƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽ ‘ĞǀŽŬĞƌĞĂůĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵ QĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?ĂŶĚthat instead there 
was a preoccupation with the cost of entry.1302 As such, Soames described the French view 
ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉĂƐ ‘ƚŚĂƚŽĨĂƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŶĞƌǀŽƵƐƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌŽŶƚŚĞ
ƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵǁŚŽƐĞƐŬŝƌƚŚĂƐƐŽŵĞŚŽǁŐŽƚĐĂƵŐŚƚƵƉŝŶƚŚĞĚŽŽƌ ? ?1303 The cautious and 
ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƚŽŶĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŚĂĚ
previously been no guarantee of negotiations being opened. However, Soames explained 
that now that negotiations had begun and the general election was out of the way, there 
was an expectation that the government would adopt a more optimistic tone and attempt 
to stoke public opinion in favour of the European project.1304 Crucially, Soames reminded 
the Foreign Secretary that a greater enthusiasm for the ideological principles of European 
unity would have a positive effect on French attitudes towards the negotiations.1305 The 
Foreign Office seem to have embraced this advice eagerly. The ECIU was given new 












instructions in August 1970 from John Ford, the Assistant Under-Secretary for European 
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ƚŽŵĂŬĞ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵŝƚƐĨŝƌƐƚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ
ƚĂƌŐĞƚ ? ?1306 The ECIU were ordered to analyse anti-EEC propaganda and advise counter-
measures and publicity material, collaborate with pro-EEC organisations such as the CBI 
and the TUC to coordinate information efforts, and develop contacts in the British press 
ĂŶĚŵĞĚŝĂ ‘ǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŽƵƐĞŽƵƌƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇ
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ? ?ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌďĞŝŶŐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐƐŚŽƌƚŽĨƉůĂŶƚŝŶŐƉƌŽpaganda.1307 Foreign Office minister 
ŶƚŚŽŶǇZŽǇůĞĂůƐŽƵƐĞĚƚŚĞ/hĨŽƌĂƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŽĨ ‘ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ ?
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂŝŵŽĨĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐ ‘ĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞh<ƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚŝƐŚ
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ?ĂŶĚĂůƐŽ ‘ƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚĞŵĂǆimum vote in favour of our policy in 
ƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽĨŽŵŵŽŶƐ ? ?1308 Royle outlined a strategy of garnering votes from both 
Conservative and Labour backbenchers which can only be described as political collusion, 
ŚŝŵƐĞůĨĂĚŵŝƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐ ‘ĂŶǆŝŽƵƐƚŚĂƚ/ƐŚŽƵůd not do this personally as it might 
ĞŵĞƌŐĞƚŚĂƚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĐŽůůƵĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?1309 At a local level, he 
ordered the ECIU to work with the British Council of the European Movement to ensure 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐƐƚƌĞĂŵŽĨƐƉĞĂŬĞƌƐŝƐŝŶũĞĐƚĞd into local organisations throughout the 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ?1310 Royle also 
recommended that the ECIU and the Information Department arrange for a constant flow 
of individual letters to be sent to local and national newspapers as part of the public 
opinion strategy.1311 It was made clear that the Foreign Office could not be seen to be 
trying to influence public or political opinion, and that the operation would have to appear 
to be the work of independent bodies.1312 However, if public opinion was to turn in the 
 ?ƐĨĂǀŽƵƌ ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůǁŽƵůĚƐƚŝůůƌĞĂƉƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨŐŽŽĚǁŝůůĨƌŽŵ
the Six.  
ƐƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŵĂĚĞ ‘ŵŽĚĞƐƚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ?ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞƐƵŵŵĞƌŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ-
'ĞŶĞƌĂůŽĨƚŚĞYƵĂŝĚ ?Kƌsay, Hervé Alphand, met with the Permanent Under-Secretary in 
                                                          
1306 :ŽŚŶ&ŽƌĚƚŽĂƌŽůŝŶĞWĞƚƌŝĞ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶhŶŝƚ ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO26/1212/PMW2/7/1. 
1307 Ibid. 








London to discuss a range of foreign policy matters.1313 dŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨŽŶK ?EĞŝůůĂƚƚŚĞ
meeting indicated that EEC membership would be one of the topics of discussion, which 
the French were no ĚŽƵďƚƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚĨŽƌ ?K ?EĞŝůůƚƌŝĞĚƚŽƉƌŽďĞůƉŚĂŶĚďǇƐƚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
importance of a swift negotiation and successful application for both Britain and the Six.1314 
'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůůĂĚĚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƚŚŝƌĚĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ‘ǁŽƵůĚďĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ?ĂŶĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĞŶĚĂůůƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
BƌŝƚĂŝŶũŽŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?ĂƐĂĨŽƵƌƚŚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ? ?ďŽƚŚ
politically and diplomatically.1315 Rather cryptically, the Secretary-General replied that 
France had three objectives: to see the Community enlarged, to see Germany firmly linked 
to the EEC, and to trade with Russia.1316 In order to try and apply pressure to the French 
position, Greenhill broached the subject of European defence cooperation and the possible 
withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe.1317 This would mean that the 
Western European commitment to defence security would have to be enhanced, and 
Greenhill suggested that NATO could provide a good framework for such cooperation.1318 
These appeals to French anxiety seemingly had little effect. Alphand was confident that the 
hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂďƐŽůƵƚĞĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ
a serious presence in Western Europe, also rejecting any notion that France could 
reintegrate its military with NATO.1319 He stated that the situation in Europe had changed 
dramatically since the end of the Second World War, and that the threat of nuclear 
ƌĞƚĂůŝĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁĂƐŬĞĞƉŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶƐŽŶtĞstern 
Europe in check.1320 ůƉŚĂŶĚ ?ƐĐĂůŵĂŶĚĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƉƌŽďĞƐ
were frustrating for officials. It was noted that there were still differences over defence 
cooperation between the two countries, something which Britain hoped it could play to its 
own advantage by effectively pledging support, particularly in the nuclear field, in return 
for EEC membership.1321 The French seemed to be aware of this potential quid pro quo and 
sought to circumvent it.  
                                                          
1313  “ZĞĐŽƌĚŽĨĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚhŶĚĞƌ-Secretary of State and the Secretary-












By November, there was clear anxiety from Foreign Office officials on the progress of the 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?:ŽŚŶ&ŽƌĚƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŽK ?EĞŝůůƚŚĂƚsĂůéƌǇ'ŝƐĐĂƌĚĚ ?ƐƚĂŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ
finance minister, had expressed serious doubts over breaking the back of the negotiations 
by the summer of 1971.1322 /ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?&ŽƌĚ ?ƐŽǁŶĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚ&ƌĞŶĐŚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŝŶ
London and Paris seemed to confirm this line.1323 Even after agreement was reached on a 
five year transitional period for industry and agriculture in early December, the French 
Permanent Representative to the EEC bluntly told his British counterpart that Britain could 
not afford membership.1324 He argued that the British economy would not be able to 
endure the pressures of membership, and that the weakness of sterling continued to be a 
serious liability.1325 This was compounded by reports from Soames on President 
WŽŵƉŝĚŽƵ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐĂŶĚŽǀĞƌĂůůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĞŶůĂƌŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?tŚŝůƐƚ
Pompidou publicly expressed support for a successful conclusion to the negotiations, he 
argued that Britain ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽ ‘ĐĂƐƚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĂĚƌŝĨƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƚŽ
become a truly European nation in the long run.1326 It was acknowledged that France had 
ĐŽŵĞĂůŽŶŐǁĂǇƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĚĂǇƐŽĨĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐŝŶĨůĞǆŝďŝů ƚǇ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĞƌĞ
ŝƌƌŝƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐůŝŶŬƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽďĞĂŶĞĂƐǇĂŶĚĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞ
target for the French. Soames stated ƚŚĂƚŽŶƚŚŝƐƐĐŽƌĞŚĞǁŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĂƚWŽŵƉŝĚŽƵǁĂƐ ‘Ă
ƐŚĂĚĞůĞƐƐĚŽŐŵĂƚŝĐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĐůŽƐĞĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁĂƐŶŽƚ
 ‘ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇ QĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽƵƐƚŽƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?1327 In the 
EID, Norman Statham submitted a brief for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary on 
how to counter these points diplomatically and use the Anglo-American relationship to 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽƚŚĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞŝƚŚĂĚŶŽƚŐŽŶĞƵŶŶŽƚŝĐĞĚ
ƚŚĂƚWŽŵƉŝĚŽƵ ‘ŚĂĚĂĚĞĞƉƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƌĞŐĂƌĚĨŽƌWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚEŝǆŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŽƐĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌ
ĞŶůĂƌŐĞŵĞŶƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ƐƚĂƵŶĐŚ ?ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚĂŶĚĚŝƐĐƌĞĞƚ ? ?1328 Statham proposed, with 
K ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚ'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůů ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ?ƚŚĂƚ,ĞĂƚŚƌĂŝƐĞƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚ
                                                          
1322 :ŽŚŶ&ŽƌĚƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “EŽƚĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞĐŽƌĚ PEĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/772/MWK4/312/1/185. 
1323 Ibid. 
1324 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “DĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ P&ƌĞŶĐŚWŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ
1970, TNA/FCO30/772/MWK4/312/1/198; Christopher Soames to Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, 9 December 1970, TNA/FCO30/772/MWK4/312/1/193. 
1325 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? “DĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ P&ƌĞŶĐŚWŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ
1970, TNA/FCO30/772/MWK4/312/1/198. 
1326 EŽƌŵĂŶ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ? “WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚWŽŵƉŝĚŽƵ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ W Dƌ ?^ŽĂŵĞƐ ?
ůĞƚƚĞƌŽĨ ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Dt< ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1327 Christopher Soames to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 9 December 1970, 
TNA/FCO30/772/MWK4/312/1/193. 
1328 Norman StaƚŚĂŵ ? “WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚWŽŵƉŝĚŽƵ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ W Dƌ ?^ŽĂŵĞƐ ?
ůĞƚƚĞƌŽĨ ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Dt< ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Nixon on his next trip to Washington, and try to get him to persuade Pompidou that 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?1329 Statham also highlighted the need to 
ŐĂŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞĐůŽƐĞƌĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ
cooperation with the French and coŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĂĨŝƌŵ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŝůůĂƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
alliance.1330 The dangers of this were clear. The British government did not want to be 
accused of weakening its ties to the United States and NATO in order to gain entry to the 
Common Market, and it certainly did not want to be accused of using the Americans to put 
pressure on the French.  
EŝǆŽŶ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĞŶůĂƌŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚůŝŶĞŽĨ
argument. The new administration expected its Western European allies to help shoulder 
the burden of Soviet containment, and Nixon even wrote to Pompidou arguing in favour of 
ĂŵƵůƚŝƉŽůĂƌƐǇƐƚĞŵŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁŽƵůĚĨƵůůǇƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ‘ŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚŚĞĂůƚŚǇƚŽ
ŚĂǀĞũƵƐƚƚǁŽƐƵƉĞƌƉŽǁĞƌƐ ? ?1331 High-level meetings between the State Department and 
ƚŚĞYƵĂŝĚ ?KƌƐĂǇƌĞǀĞĂůƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĚŝĚŝŶĚĞĞĚƚƌǇƚŽƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚďǇ
ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚƉƌƵĚĞŶƚǁĂǇƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞƵƌŽƉĞǁĂƐŽŶƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ŶƚĞŶƚĞŽƌĚŝĂůĞ ? Wa reference to the Anglo-French alliance during the First World War.1332 
In discussions with Heath, the American President had stated that Britain was the only 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ‘ĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨƚĂŬŝŶŐĂǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƐŚĞƐŚŽƵůĚƉůĂǇĂ
leading role in European integration.1333 The impetus for this was greater given that the 
United States was suffering from a widening balance of payments deficit and the 
consequences of the disastrous Tet Offensive in Vietnam.1334 In short, the cost of acting as 
ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐĞŵĂŶǁĂƐďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽŽŐƌĞĂƚ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?EŝǆŽŶŵĞŶtioned to Heath 
that Britain could be a strong liberalising influence on the EEC, which showed signs of 
becoming a protectionist economic bloc at the expense of American business.1335 
Therefore, the national interests of Britain, France and the United States were broadly 
aligned on British membership of the EEC. The French sought to counterbalance German 
power in Europe and improve their relations with the United States; the Americans wanted 
to decrease its military commitments in Western Europe and gain greater access to the 
                                                          
1329 Ibid. 
1330 Ibid. 
1331 Scott, Allies Apart (2011), 43. 
1332 Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II (New York: 
Twayne, 1992), 163. 
1333 Scott, Allies Apart (2011), 44. 
1334 Ibid; Keiger, France and the World Since 1870 (2001), 181. 




Common Market; the British wished to revitalise their international influence and economy 
by joining the EEC. All three countries stood to benefit in some way from British accession. 
The significance of this coincidence cannot be underestimated. As argued previously, 
Pompidou would almost certainly not have entertained the idea of Britain joining the 
European club if it was not directly compatible with French interests. 
However, by the beginning of 1971, the negotiations appeared to be at an impasse. Such 
was the level of consternation in the Foreign Office that Robinson drafted a minute in 
which he outlined the very real possibility of failure and the likely consequences.1336 He 
wrote that it would become clear whether or not the negotiations would succeed within 
ƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƐĞǀĞŶŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝŶĂů
ĐƌƵŶĐŚ ?ƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽďĞĐŽŶĨŝŶĞĚƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞďƵĚŐĞƚĂŶĚ
imports from New Zealand.1337 In theory, this would narrow the field of debate and help 
secure better terms on the most significant issues, but Robinson also warned that the 
French would sense advantage in keeping the debate wider to extract more 
concessions.1338 Finally, he advocated the creation of contingency plans in the event that 
the negotiations failed.1339 This would allow the Foreign Office to fully consider the 
implications of exclusion from the EEC and prepare for the worst case scenario.1340 
ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌǁĂƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŽ'ĞŽĨĨƌĞǇZŝƉƉŽŶ ?ǁŚŽƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚĂƌďer as Chancellor of 
ƚŚĞƵĐŚǇŽĨ>ĂŶĐĂƐƚĞƌŝŶ:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?ZŝƉƉŽŶĂŐƌĞĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚƐ
on the negotiating strategy but was cautious about the inclusion of the contingency plans, 
opting for them to be prepared separately instead.1341 After further consultation with No. 
 ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂďŝŶĞƚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?K ?EĞŝůůƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚĂŶƵƉĚĂƚĞĚƉĂƉĞƌǁŚŝĐŚŐĂǀĞĂŵŽƌĞĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ
timetable of the future phases in the negotiations. He reached the conclusion that a 
breakthrough on EEC finance, New Zealand trade and Commonwealth sugar had to be 
made by May 1971.1342 This would allow sufficient time for any outstanding issues to be 
resolved, but also would ensure that Britain entered the EEC on 1 January 1973; this was 
                                                          






1341 ƌŝƐƉŝŶdŝĐŬĞůůƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚEŽƌŵĂŶ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵ ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/1095/MWK3/13/7. 
1342 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽtŝůůŝĂŵEŝĞůĚ ? “ŶůĂƌŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ PdŚĞƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌ





strategy.1343 Despite these preparations, the single most important factor in the 
negotiations could not be ignored  W the attitude of the French. By March, officials had 
floated the idea of a meeting between Heath and Pompidou which could avoid a deadlock 
in the negotiations.1344 This was considered preferable to a summit conference in Brussels, 
which had the potential to be weighed down by procedures and public scrutiny.1345 Reports 
from Soames in Paris indicated that the FreŶĐŚǁĞƌĞ ‘ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐĨŽƌ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞ
ŵŽǀĞ ? ?1346 By this, he meant that a face-to-face meeting between Pompidou and Heath 
would be the only way to prove that the British government was serious and the only way 
to reach a deal with the French.1347 In order for this to be successful, however, Soames 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐĐƌƵĐŝĂůƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŐĂƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽƵƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ QŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞ
ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞĚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƚǁŽůĞĂĚĞƌƐŵĞĞƚ ? ?1348 K ?EĞŝůůƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŚŝƐůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ
that a crisis in the May ministerial meeting of the negotiations would sour the atmosphere 
of a bilateral meeting, but conceded that the French were likely to pressure the British 
position by being purposefully obstructive anyway.1349 Indeed, Soames identified the Quai 
Ě ?KƌƐĂǇĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶŝŶƐƚŝŐĂƚors of anti-British sentiment and negative attitude towards the 
negotiations within the ranks of the French civil service due to certain die-hard Gaullist 
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĞƐ ?1350 Regardless, the Anglo-French 
meeting was liŬĞůǇƚŽďĞƚŚĞ ‘ĐƌƵŶĐŚ ?ƐĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚƐĞĂůƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨĂƚĞǁŝƚŚŝŶŽƌ
without the Community, and the Foreign Office knew it. 
The significance of the Heath-Pompidou summit has been explored in some detail by the 
literature. Hugo Young claims that it was  ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐƌŝƚŝƐŚĞŶƚƌǇ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĂŶĚ
 ‘ƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?1351 In his memoirs, Douglas Hurd described the 
ƐƵŵŵŝƚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚƐŝŶŐůĞĨĞĂƚŽĨDƌ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐƉƌĞŵŝĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?1352 ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚĞƌ:ŽŚŶ
                                                          
1343 Ibid. 
1344 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽƌŝƐƉŝŶdŝĐŬĞůů ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶWŽůŝĐǇ PWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐDĞĞƚŝŶŐĂƚ ? ?ĂŵŽŶ ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ?
12 March 1971, TNA/FCO30/1095/MWK3/13/28. 
1345 Ibid. 




1349 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽƌŝƐƉŝŶdŝĐŬĞůů ? “EĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ PWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐDĞĞƚŝŶŐŽŶ ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů
1971, TNA/FCO30/1151/MWK11/312/1/17. 
1350 ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ^ŽĂŵĞƐƚŽĞŶŝƐ'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůů ? “h<-EĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/1151/MWK11/312/1/20. 
1351 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 233-234. 
1352 ƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ?,ƵƌĚǁĂƐ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůWƌŝǀĂƚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĂŶĚŚĂĚŶŽƚǇĞƚĞŶƚĞƌĞĚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ P
Douglas Hurd, An End to Promises: Sketch of a Government (London: Collins, 1979), 64. 
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Campbell wrote that the Prime MiŶŝƐƚĞƌ ‘ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚƐƵƉĞƌďůǇ ?ĂŶĚĨŽƌŵĞĚĂŐŽŽĚƌĂƉƉŽƌƚ
with the French President.1353 K ?EĞŝůůŚŝŵƐĞůĨĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ďǇĨĂƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?1354 Therefore, 
there is broad consensus that the meeting was exceptionally important, if not fundamental 
to the successful outcome of the negotiations. Furthermore, this also reinforces the 
argument that a deal with the French was the key to British accession. The talks took place 
over two days on 20-21 May 1971, and were wide-ranging in scope. The Paris embassy and 
the Elysée were chiefly responsible for organising the meeting, which was a calculated 
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?,ĞĂƚŚǁĂƐǁĂƌǇŽĨǁŚĂƚŚĞůĂďĞůůĞĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛ ‘ĂŶƚŝ-French 
ŵƵƚƚĞƌŝŶŐƐ QǁŚŝĐŚƐƚŝůůĚŽŐƐƚŚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞYƵĂŝĚ ?KƌƐĂǇ ?Ɛ'ĂƵůůŝƐƚƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƐǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽ
perceived to be a potential obstacle by Michel Jobert, the Secretary-General of the Elysée 
Palace.1355 The Prime Minister had been briefed thoroughly by the Foreign Office and other 
departments ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŬĞǇŝƐƐƵĞƐǁŚŝĐŚWŽŵƉŝĚŽƵƐŽƵŐŚƚĐůĂƌŝƚǇŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚ ?Ɛ
ǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞĂŶĚŚĞƌĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝĚĞĂů ?1356 On this 
score, Heath seems to have convinced his opposite number extremely effectively by 
expressing his desire for a looser association of states rather than a federal European 
project.1357 The two men also quickly came to an understanding on the role of sterling, with 
Heath agreeing to gradually run down overseas holdings of sterling and Pompidou 
providing assurances over European Monetary Union and the preservation of national 
monetary autonomy.1358 WŽŵƉŝĚŽƵǀŽŝĐĞĚŚŝƐƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
ties to the Commonwealth and agreed that temporary safeguards be put in place for New 
Zealand imports, which had been discussed at the May ministerial meeting.1359 Whilst not 
ĞǀĞƌǇƐŝŶŐůĞŝƐƐƵĞǁĂƐƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƵŵŵŝƚ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞ
EEC budget, the atmosphere of trust and goodwill between the two nations represented a 
monumental shift in British European policy. In a highly symbolic gesture, the press 
conference after the summit was held in the Salon des Fêtes of the Elysée Palace, the very 
                                                          
1353 Campbell, Edward Heath (1993), 359. 
1354 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞuropean Community (2000), 336. 
1355 Ibid.; Hurd, An End to Promises (1979), 62. 
1356 ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ^ŽĂŵĞƐƚŽĞŶŝƐ'ƌĞĞŶŚŝůů ? “WƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐsŝƐŝƚƚŽWĂƌŝƐ ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/1154/MWK11/312/1/95. 
1357 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2000), 406; Charles Hargrove and Patrick 
ƌŽŐĂŶ ? “ ?KƵƌǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂƌĞĐůŽƐĞĞŶŽƵŐŚ ? ?DWŽŵƉŝĚŽƵĚĞĐůĂƌĞƐ ? ?The Times, 21 May 1971, 
1. 
1358 Young, Britain and European Unity (2000), 105. 




same room in which de Gaulle had exercised his first rejection in 1963.1360 Britain had, in 
effect, reversed the veto. 
dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐƵŵŵŝƚǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨĐĞůĞďƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽƉƚŝŵŝƐŵ ?dŚĞƌĞ
was an understanding that several issues still needed ironing out, but they had achieved a 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚďƌĞĂŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?^ŽĂŵĞƐ ?report on the meeting between the two leaders gave a 
ŐůŽǁŝŶŐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?Ɛ
diplomatic victory.1361 ,ĞƋƵŽƚĞĚWŽŵƉŝĚŽƵĂƐƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƵŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞƚŽ




Many people believed that Great Britain was not and did not wish to become 
European and that Britain wanted to enter the Community only so as to destroy it 
or divert it from its objectives. Many people also thought that France was ready to 
ƵƐĞĞǀĞƌǇƉƌĞƚĞǆƚƚŽƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĞŶĚĂĨƌĞƐŚǀĞƚŽŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞŶƚƌǇ ?tĞůů ?ůĂĚŝĞƐ
and gentlemen, you see before you tonight two men who are convinced of the 
contrary.1363 
 
Correspondence between Statham in the EID and Soames in Paris reveals the full extent of 
ƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐũƵďŝůĂƚŝŽŶ ?1364 ^ƚĂƚŚĂŵǁƌŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ‘ƐĞƚƚŚĞƐĞĂůŽĨĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůĂƚ
the highest level ŝŶ&ƌĂŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶƚĞŶƚĞŽƌĚŝĂůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĐĂŶ
have been few summit meetings where the stakes were higher and the preparations more 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? ?1365 Statham personally congratulated Soames and the staff at the embassy for 
their part ŝŶƚŚĞƐƵŵŵŝƚĂŶĚĂůƐŽƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĂŝƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞWĂƌŝƐƐƚĂĨĨŝŶ
ensuring both a smooth meeting and all their preparatory work, which was 
considerable.1366 Outside British circles, reports indicated that congratulations had been 
passed on to Foreign Office officials by a large number of foreign diplomats based in 
>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ǁŚŽ ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůůǇ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞWĂƌŝƐǀŝƐŝƚĂƐĂ ŐƌĞĂƚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ?1367 This was 
supplemented by favourable press coverage from Brussels which revealed that the Belgian 
                                                          
1360 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 237. 
1361 Christopher Soames to Alec Douglas-Home, 9 June 1971, TNA/FCO30/1156/MWK11/312/1/187. 
1362 Ibid. 
1363 Ibid. 
1364 Norman Statham to Christopher Soames, 8 July 1971, TNA/FCO30/1156/MWK11/312/1/202. 
1365 Ibid. 
1366 Ibid. 
1367 Nicholas Barrington to Peter Moon, 27 May 1971, TNA/FCO30/1155/MWK11/312/1/161. 
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government and European Commission gave the results of the Anglo-&ƌĞŶĐŚƚĂůŬƐĂ ‘ǁĂƌŵ
ǁĞůĐŽŵĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚ ‘ůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƵŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?1368 As a result of the atmosphere of goodwill forged by the summit, the next 
ministerial meeting of the negotiations in June saw significant progress made on a number 
ŽĨŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ZŝƉƉŽŶƐƚƌƵĐŬĂĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŝǆďŽƚŚŽŶEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚŝŵƉŽƌƚƐĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
contributions to the EEC budget. Butter exports from New Zealand were guaranteed to stay 
Ăƚ ? ?A?ŽĨĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƋƵĂŶƚŝƚŝĞƐďǇƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŝĨƚŚǇĞĂƌŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞ
achievement given that the French had initially proposed 50%.1369 ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
contributions to the EEC budget in 1973 would amount to 8.92% and rise to 18.92% by 
1977; a significant reduction from the 15% opening bid tabled by the European 
Commission.1370 dŚĞƐĞƚŽƵŐŚĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞĂŐƌĞĂƚĐƌĞĚŝƚƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ
delegation and the sheer determination of the Foreign Office and Whitehall in the pursuit 
of their goal. All that was left was to put the terms to Parliament. 
dŚĞƚĞƌŵƐƐĞĐƵƌĞĚŝŶ:ƵŶĞĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
membership of the EEC, published in July 1971.1371 The paper was designed to present the 
case for accession ahead of the Parliamentary vote in October. In contrast to the Labour 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŝǆĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĐŽƐƚŽĨĞŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌŽĨ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ,ĞĂƚŚ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌůĂŝĚŽƵƚĂďŽůĚǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚ
Western Europe ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŚĞĂǀŝůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇK ?EĞŝůů ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
integration: 
 
The choice for Britain is clear. Either we choose to enter the Community and join in 
building a strong Europe on the foundations which the Six have laid; or we choose 
to stand aside from this great enterprise and seek to maintain our interests from 
the narrow  W and narrowing  W base we have known in recent years. As a full 
member of the Community we would have more opportunity and strength to 
influence events than we could possibly have on our own: Europe with the United 
Kingdom in her councils would be stronger and more influential than Europe 
without us.1372 
 
                                                          
1368 WĞƚĞƌ^ƚƌĂĨĨŽƌĚ ? “^ƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞWŽŵƉŝĚŽƵ-Heath talks seen in Brussels as step towards political 
ƵŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?The Times, 24 May 1971, 4. 
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1370 Ibid. 





exclusion; a point which Robinson had consistently argued when criticising previous papers 
ĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ ?dŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŶŽƚƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘Ă
rejection of an historic opportunity and a reversal of the whole direction of British policy 
under successive governmĞŶƚƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂƐƚĚĞĐĂĚĞ ? ?1373 There was also a certain element 
ŽĨĨĞĂƌŵŽŶŐĞƌŝŶŐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐǁŽƵůĚ ‘ƚŽƵĐŚĂůů
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨŽƵƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůŝĨĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇŽǀĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĨƵƚƵƌĞƌŽůĞ
and plaĐĞŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?1374 dŚŝƐĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƉĞƐƐŝŵŝƐƚŝĐǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
membership of the EEC is one which plagued British politics until the referendum of 2016 
ĂŶĚďĞǇŽŶĚ ?/ŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ‘ƉƌŽũĞĐƚĨĞĂƌ ?ǁĂƐĂůŝǀĞĂŶĚǁĞůů ? 
The White Paper was scheduled to be debated in the House of Commons in late October. 
The Foreign Office immediately began drafting briefs for the Foreign Secretary and the 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with the specific aim of countering anti-EEC 
arguments and shaping public opinion in favour of accession.1375 Their work on this front 
was given greater impetus by the increasingly hostile attitude of the Labour party towards 
EEC membership, which was bitterly divided on the issue. Indeed, the Foreign Office went 
so far as to collaborate with pro-European Labour MPs to try and measure the likelihood of 
a government defeat in Parliament. The archival evidence shows that David Owen spoke 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇƚŽDĂƌƚŝŶDŽƌůĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚ,ĞĂĚŽĨ/ ?ŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ
EEC and the pro-ŵĂƌŬĞƚĞĞƌƐ ?ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ ?1376 Owen warned the Foreign Office that elements of 
the Labour party simply saw a controversial vote on EEC membership as a golden 
opportunity to inflict a humiliating defeat on the government.1377 This was confirmed by a 
resolutŝŽŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďǇ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂůǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ
(NEC) that they would oppose membership of the Common Market on the terms outlined 
by the Conservative government in the White Paper.1378 After the party released its own 
backgrounĚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘EŽŶƚƌǇŽŶdŽƌǇdĞƌŵƐ ? ?tŚŝƚĞŚĂůůǁĂƐŝŶĐĂŶĚĞƐĐĞŶƚ ?
Correspondence between officials in the Cabinet Office and Foreign Office show that the 
ĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚĂ>ĂďŽƵƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ‘ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚŽŶĂƚŽƚĂůƌĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
                                                          
1373 Ibid. 
1374 Ibid. 
1375 John Ford to Michael Niblock, 16 June 1971, TNA/FCO30/1100/MWK3/21/3; Martin Morland to 
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1377 Ibid. 
1378 Roger Broad, >ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝůĞŵŵĂƐ P&ƌŽŵĞǀŝŶƚŽůĂŝƌ(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 81. 
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Common AgrŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůWŽůŝĐǇ ?ĞŶƌĂŐĞĚƚŚĞƚŽƉĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀĂŶƚƐ ?1379 One official, Roy Croft, 
ůĂďĞůůĞĚŝƚ ‘ĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƌĞǁƌŝƚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨĂůŵŽƐƚ^ƚĂůŝŶŝƐƚƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?1380 The Foreign 
Office analysed the document rigorously and prepared briefings for ministers which could 
bĞƵƐĞĚƚŽƌĞƉĞů>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƋƵŽƚĞƐĨƌŽŵtŝůƐŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞ
stated that the Common Agricultural Policy was not negotiable.1381 The reaction of the 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉƌĞƐƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇĞǀĞŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĂŶŐĞƌand 
frustration than in Britain. One German journalist from Die Zeit, Dieter Buhl, personally 
ǁƌŽƚĞƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĚĞƚĂŝůŝŶŐŚŝƐŽƵƚƌĂŐĞĂƚ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐĂŶƚŝ-German and anti-
European sentiments, referencing comments by Jack Jones, the General Secretary of the 
dƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂŶĚ'ĞŶĞƌĂůtŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?hŶŝŽŶĂŶĚŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌE ?ǁŚŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐǁĞƌĞƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐĂ ‘ƐŝůĞŶƚŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ǀŝĂŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?1382 Likewise, 
the French press lambasted the Labour party and singled out Wilson for personal criticism, 
ĚĞƌŝĚŝŶŐŚŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĚƵƉůŝĐŝƚǇĂŶĚ ‘ďĂĚĨĂŝƚŚ ? ?1383 When it came to the October debate in 
Parliament, ministers were well-prepared for anti-EEC attacks. In his speech which was 
revised by the EID, Douglas-Home attacked the opposition by arguing that the terms 
ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĞƌĞ ‘ĨĂŝƌĂŶĚŚŽŶŽƵƌĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĐĂůƚŽ
those negotiated by a Labour government.1384 Reports on the debate in The Times showed 
fierce clashes between Reginald Maudling, the Deputy Conservative leader and Harold 
Wilson, now Leader of the Opposition.1385 Ever the political tactician, Wilson seized upon 
the terms negotiated by the government as unacceptable and claimed that a Labour 
government would renegotiate a settlement more amenable to British interests.1386 
Maudling dismissed his claims, arguing that Labour would not have been able to secure 
ďĞƚƚĞƌƚĞƌŵƐĂŶĚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐŝĞƐŝŶŚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?1387 >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ
deep splits over EEC membership were laid bare when 69 of its members voted with the 
                                                          
1379 ZŽǇƌŽĨƚƚŽWĞƚĞƌdŚŽƌŶƚŽŶ ? “>ĂďŽƵƌWĂƌƚǇŽĐƵŵĞŶƚŽŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/1062/MWK2/35/20. 
1380 Ibid. 
1381  “>ĂďŽƵƌWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚŽŶƵƌŽƉĞ PƐƵŵŵĂƌǇŽĨŵĂŝŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?DtK2/35/20. 
1382 Dieter Buhl to Alec Douglas-,ŽŵĞ ? “ĞĂƚŝŶŐƚŝŵĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO30/1062/MWK2/35/13. 
1383 ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ^ŽĂŵĞƐƚŽ/ ? “&ƌĞŶĐŚƉƌĞƐƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐEĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ
1971, TNA/FCO30/1062/MWK2/35/12. 
1384 James ĚĂŵƐƚŽ: ?DĐŽŶŶĞůů ? “^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƐƉĞĞĐŚŝŶƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Dt< ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1385  “dŚĞŽŵŵŽŶƐƐĂǇ ‘zĞƐ ?ƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ PƚĞƌŵƐĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚďǇ ? ? ?ǀŽƚĞƐƚŽ ? ? ? W ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ?The 





government in favour of the terms, with 20 abstentions.1388 The motion was carried with a 
landslide majority of 112 votes.1389  
With a resounding endorsement in Parliament behind him, Heath signed the treaty of 
accession in Brussels on 22 January 1972. The Foreign Office had fought long and hard to 
take Britain into the EEC and were finally victorious. This period represented the high 
watermark of optimism in the European project. There was a sense of relief, optimism, and 
professional satisfaction ?&ŽƌƚŚĞůŝŬĞƐŽĨK ?EĞŝůůĂŶĚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǇďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚ
ƉůĂǇĞĚĂƉĂƌƚŝŶƌĞƐƚŽƌŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŶǁŽƌůĚĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ
more broadly.1390 For the more ideologically motivated officials such as Palliser and Mellon, 
Britain had finally joined her European partners at the altar of post-war peace, prosperity 
and solidarity.1391 The Britain of the 1970s would enter a brave new world as a European 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚĂŶŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŽƌŐůŽďĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ?dŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞůŝƚƚůĞĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĐcession 
was a turning point for British foreign policy and domestic politics, and it can be qualified as 
ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?dŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨĞŶĞƌŐǇĂŶĚĚǇŶĂŵŝƐŵ
employed by the Foreign Office and Whitehall more broadly in adapting itself to the 
Common Market, undertaking the incredibly arduous and complex negotiations for 
membership and carrying British public opinion simultaneously was phenomenal, and ranks 
ĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĞǀĞƌĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐǀŝĐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ?dŚĞƌĞĐĂn be little doubt that 
the Foreign Office subsequently reaped the rewards of this feat. It benefited from the 
lucrative new positions in Brussels as well as the opportunity to project British interests 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ ?ƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂnd administrative influence, the Foreign 
Office reached its zenith in the 1970s. It was free from the constraints of a powerful 
personality in No. 10 and had managed to tighten its grip on an array of domestic affairs 
under the guise of European policy. As ,ĞŶŶĞƐƐǇŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚƐ ‘ĨŽƵŶĚĂŶĞǁ
ƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƐƵŶ ? ?1392 
 
  
                                                          
1388 Wall, The Official History of Britain and the European Community Volume II (2013), 419. 
1389 Ibid. 
1390 K ?EĞŝůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(2000), 355. 
1391 James Mellon, interviewed by Malcolm McBain, 14 April 2003, CCC/BDOHP/73/15; David 
DĐ<ŝƚƚƌŝĐŬ ? “^ŝƌDŝĐŚĂĞůWĂůůŝƐĞƌ P^ĞŶŝŽƌĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚǁŚŽĞůƉĞĚƚĂŬĞƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ? ?
The Independent 3 July 2012. 






successful conclusion of the negotiations. Once inside the institutions of the EEC, doubt and 
frustration began to set in.1393 It became apparent that Britain could not simply push the 
EEC towards its own agenda or shape it effectively from within. Michael Palliser, who had 
been appointed British ambassador to the EEC, sent an annual review to the Foreign 
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŝŵƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
ƐŝŐŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚǇĂŶĚĨŽƌŵĂůĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽŶ ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?,ĞǁĂƌŶĞĚ P ‘ǁĞŵƵƐƚ QĂĐĐĞƉƚ
that a choice will sometimes have to be made between a specific national objective and a 
ǁŝĚĞƌŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?1394 Palliser described quite frankly the difficulties which 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐWĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŚĂĚĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶĂƌĞĂƐƐƵĐŚ
as agriculture and transport, ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞ^ŝǆƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞǇŚĂĚĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŽŽƉĞŶƚŚĞĚŽŽƌŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƵƐ ? ?1395 The enlargement of the EEC 
also appeared to create new tensions between member states which had not been 
anticipated. No longer were the Six and the four applicant states negotiating as blocs; 
ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐďĞŐĂŶƚŽ ‘ĐƵƚĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐŽĨŽůĚĂŶĚŶĞǁ ? ?1396 Palliser attempted 
ƚŽĚŽǁŶƉůĂǇƚŚĞĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨĞůƚďǇƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞ QŚĂǀĞĨĞůƚ
ourselves genuinely anĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇǁĞůĐŽŵĞŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?ĂŶĚǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŽĨĨ
any serious logjams as the cost of doing business in Europe.1397 The same attitude was 
ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚďǇ:ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ǁŚŽĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? P ‘dŚĞĨĂĐƚŝƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƐŚĂůůŶŽƚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ
a major advance at the end of this year on the basis of present policies. We are not even 
ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐŝƚ ? ?1398 Oliver Wright, the Deputy Under-Secretary for European economic affairs, 
ƚŽŽŬĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌǀŝĞǁ P ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐĐĂŶďĞƐůŽǁƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚŝƚŝƐƐƵƌĞ ?ƵƌŽƉĞŝƐĂůŽŶŐ-term 
business ? ?1399 dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŶĞĚĨŽƌƉĂƚŝĞŶĐĞ ?
and that EEC membership would not yield instant results. This was in stark contrast to the 
rest of Whitehall, where there was an expectation that Britain would be able to 
immediately alter the inner workings of the EEC to its own benefit. Wright argued that this 
                                                          
1393 Michael Palliser to Alec Douglas-,ŽŵĞ ? “hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵDelegation to the European 





1398 :ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶƚŽKůŝǀĞƌtƌŝŐŚƚ ? “WƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ?
June 1973, TNA/FCO30/1650/MWE11/548/5/45. 




ƚŚĞƉĂƐƚƐŝǆŵŽŶƚŚƐ ? ?1400 dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐŝǆƚĞĞn-year exclusion 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂĚ ‘ĨĂůůĞŶĨĂƌďĞŚŝŶĚ QŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽƐƉĞƌŝƚǇƐƚĂŬĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽ
ƚĂŬĞĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǁĂƐĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ
future.1401 
dŚŝƐĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞC  W that there was serious potential for future 
progress and that exclusion or withdrawal would be damaging  W coloured Foreign Office 
attitudes for decades. It was an attitude which invited sharp criticism from the rest of 
Whitehall, politicians, and the pƌĞƐƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŚĂĚ ‘ŐŽŶĞŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŽƌǁĂƐƚŽŽƉƌŽ-
European.1402 The current Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office has stated:  
 
 Qŝt is assumed that the Foreign Office is hopelessly, unquestioningly Europhile, 
ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ/ƚŚŝŶŬǁĞ ?ǀĞďeen Qenthusiastically, energetically trying to defend 
British interests within Europe for the last forty years. People like David Hannay 
and Nigel Sheinwald and John Kerr would take on their European colleagues in 
order to advance the British interest; they ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬ P ‘ŽŚ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐĨŽƌƵƌŽƉĞ ?
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞǁĞ ?ůůŐŽĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ? ?1403 
 
This feeds directly into the first conclusion which this thesis has drawn, and perhaps the 
most significant one. The attitudes of Foreign Office officials towards European integration 
and British membership of the EEC in the years 1957-73 were extremely diverse. Even 
when officials were largely in favour of joining the EEC in the mid-late 1960s, there were a 
number of very different motivations behind these attitudes. The binary, essentialised view 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞǁĂƐŵĂĚĞƵƉŽĨ ‘ƵƌŽƉŚŝůĞƐ ?ǀĞƌƐƵ  ‘ƵƌŽƐĐĞƉƚŝĐƐ ?ŝƐĂŶŝůůŽŐŝĐĂůŽŶĞ
which should be discarded. To be sure, there were a group of passionately pro-European 
officials who were motivated by the grand ideological vision of a united, peaceful and 
prosperous Europe after the horrors of the Second World War. This vision was a powerful 
one, particularly for the men who had served on the frontline. For them, the creation of the 
EEC representeĚĂĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐŵŽŵĞŶƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐƋƵĞƐƚĨŽƌƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ
                                                          
1400 KůŝǀĞƌtƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŶƚŽŶǇĐůĂŶĚ ? “dŚĞWƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ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1401 Ibid. 
1402 Hugo Young and Anne Sloman, No, Minister: An Inquiry into the Civil Service (London: British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 1982), 73-81; Hennessy, Whitehall (1990), 402; David Allen and Tim 
KůŝǀĞƌ ? “dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ŝŶThe Europeanisation of British Politics, ed. Ian 
Bache and Andrew Jordan (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 52-66. 
1403 Simon McDonald, interviewed by author, John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson, 2 August 2016. 
230 
 
Britain was dutybound to play a full part. There were also older officials who shared their 
view. Gladwyn Jebb and James Marjoribanks were both staunch supporters of British 
membership of the EEC and of the European ideal but did not share the same generational 
experience as their younger colleagues. However, they appear to have been exceptions. 
The majority of officials were not motivated by such emotional attachments. The likes of 
ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ?:ŽŚŶZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ?WĂƵů'ŽƌĞ-Booth, Patrick Hancock, Patrick Reilly, Roger Jackling, 
Ken Gallagher and Samuel Hood looked towards Europe as an opportunity for Britain to 
ƌĞĐůĂŝŵŚĞƌƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂŐůŽďĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐďegan to wane with 
ƚŚĞ^ƵĞǌƌŝƐŝƐ ?ĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚǀĞƚŽ ?ƚŚĞĞƌŽƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶŐůŽ-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƚƵƌŵŽŝů ?ƚŚĞĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞ
of the Commonwealth and the East of Suez withdrawal, membership of the EEC became 
increasingly attractive as a means of preserving her influence and prestige.  
Of course, there were officials who remained sceptical for the entirety of their careers and 
in later life. The Permanent Under-Secretary in 1969-73, Denis Greenhill, stated in his 
memoirs:  
 
In retrospect I regret I did not take part in the war in Europe itself. I did not see 
ǁŝƚŚŵǇŽǁŶĞǇĞƐƚŚĞŚĂǀŽĐŝŶƚŚĞƌƵŝŶĞĚĐŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǀĂƐƚŚƵŵĂŶƚƌĂŐĞĚǇ Q/Ŷ
later years in the Foreign Office when dealing with European questions I did not 
fully share the deep feelings of those who had seen these events and who sought 
to prevent their repetition by radical new developments in Europe.1404 
 
This statement proves that Greenhill himself was aware that the wartime experiences of 
many of his younger colleagues meant that they were more positively disposed towards 
European integration, and that his experiences gave him a different perspective. After the 
ƐŝŐŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞDĂĂƐƚƌŝĐŚƚdƌĞĂƚǇ ?ŚĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ƐƚĞĂĚŝůǇŽƵƚƐŵĂƌƚĞĚ ?
ĂŶĚƚƌŝĐŬĞĚŝŶƚŽĐŽŵƉůǇŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĞĚĞƌĂůŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ?ƐĨŽƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐŚŝƐ
enduring Euroscepticism.1405 Christopher Steel, the ambassador to West Germany who 
ŵĂĚĞƚŚĞŵŝƐŐƵŝĚĞĚƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁŽƵůĚ ‘ůĞĂĚĨŝƌƐƚƚŽĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ argument and 
ďĞĨŽƌĞůŽŶŐƚŽƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽůůŝƐŝŽŶ QƚŚĞĨĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞǁŝůůďĞŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞ
ĐŽůůĂƉƐĞ ?ǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂůŝĨĞůŽŶŐŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚ ?1406 Steel once chastised his subordinate, Roy 
                                                          
1404 Denis Greenhill, More By Accident (York: Wilton, 1992), 44. 
1405 Ibid. 




Denman, a member of the post-war generation of officials, for his pro-EEC leanings, 
ůĂďĞůůŝŶŐŚŝŵ ‘ĂďůŽŽĚǇĨŽŽů ?ĂŶĚĚŝƐŵŝƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƐ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůĐŽĐŬĂůŽƌƵŵ ? ?1407 
Roderick Barclay was another official who was never fully convinced by the case for British 
ĞŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŽŶĞŽĨ&d ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƐ ?ŚĞĂůǁĂǇƐďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞǁĂƐǁŝƚŚ
this looser association as opposed to the rigid structure of the EEC.1408 &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ
ĨŝƌƐƚǀĞƚŽ ?ŚĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞďŝƚƚĞƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ ? ?ŵŽŶƚŚƐĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŽĨ
negotiations with the Community have left me with a subũĞĐƚŝǀĞĚŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨŝƚ ? ?1409 Indeed, 
Barclay even turned down the post of British ambassador to the EEC in 1963, stating in his 
ŵĞŵŽŝƌƐƚŚĂƚ ‘/ŚĂĚŚĂĚĞŶŽƵŐŚŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?1410 These attitudes were not in step 
with the departmental orthodoxy by 1973, but they were very much the dominant view 10-
15 years earlier. The crucial point is that while the Foreign Office eventually became 
broadly in favour of British membership of the EEC, different officials altered their attitudes 
for different reasons, whereas a handful never warmed to the idea of European 
integration. 
dŚŝƐůĞĂĚƐƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ
and the factors behind the differences in attitudes towards European integration. This 
study has found absoůƵƚĞůǇŶŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ towards European 
integration were determined by their social backgrounds or educational experiences. In the 
years 1957-73, the Foreign Office was composed of officials from an exceptionally wide 
range of backgrounds. Hughes and Platt have argued that the department recruited from a 
broader socio-economic base in the post-ǁĂƌƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ǁŝƚŚĂŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ
nous  ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ?ĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂŶĚĞĂƐŝůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĚƐŬŝůůƐĞƚ ? ?1411 This is a conclusion which this 
study strongly endorses, and the officials under discussion in this thesis reinforce this line 
of argument. From the old public schools, there were four Etonians, four Wykehamists, one 
Old Harrovian, one Old Merchant Taylor and one Old Westminster. There were also two 
Old Wellingtonians, which, though not classified as a public school by the Clarendon 
Commission, was still a highly prestigious independent school. However, these men only 
represent roughly half the group under study. There were four old grammar schoolboys, 
                                                          
1407 Roy Denman, interviewed by Malcolm McBain 4 May 1999, CCC/BDOHP/61/3. 
1408 Roderick Barclay, Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office 1932-69 (London: Butler & Tanner, 1975), 
26. 
1409 Roderick Barclay to Charles Johnston, 11 August 1964, TNA/FO371/177372/M1093/81. 
1410 Barclay, Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office 1932-69 (1975), 26. 
1411 DŝĐŚĂĞů: ?,ƵŐŚĞƐĂŶĚZŽŐĞƌ, ?WůĂƚƚ ? “&ĂƌƉĂƌƚďƵƚůŽƐĞdŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ PYƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ
Qualitative Analysis of the Career Structure and Organisational Culture of the Post-War British 
ŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ?Diplomacy and Statecraft 26, no. 2 (2015), 268. 
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two from Roman Catholic schools, one from a local county school, and one each from 
ůĞƐƐĞƌŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƐĐŚŽŽůƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŝƐŚŽƉ ?Ɛ^ƚŽƌƚĨŽƌĚŽůůĞŐĞ ?&ĞůƐƚĞĚ ?^ƚŽǁĞ ?>ĂƚǇŵĞƌ
Upper School, and Merchiston Castle School. There appears to have been no group attitude 
based on school affiliations. For example, Samuel Hood, Gladwyn Jebb, Paul Gore-Booth 
and ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůǁĞƌĞƚŽŶŝĂŶƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞŝƌĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞĚ
ŵĂƌŬĞĚůǇ ?ƐĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?,ŽŽĚĂŶĚ:Ğďď ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƵropean integration were 
very much at odds with one another. Hood was broadly cautious and sceptical of the case 
ĨŽƌƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŽ:ĞďďŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŶŽĐůŽƐĞƌhŶŝƚĞĚ
<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƵƌŽƉĞ QǁŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞ^ŝǆŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞŝr somewhat arrogant belief 
ƚŚĂƚƵƌŽƉĞďĞŐŝŶƐ ?ŝĨŶŽƚĞŶĚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?1412 Conversely, Jebb was fully 
immersed in the ideological and political objectives of European unity and passionately 
defended them at the end of his career and in later life.1413 K ?EĞŝůůǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƉƌŽ-marketeers from 1963 onwards, but his attitudes were very much 
ĨƌĂŵĞĚďǇƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƌĞĂƐƐĞƌƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƐĂůĞĂĚŝŶŐŐůŽďĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ?1414 Gore-Booth 
was motivated by similar reasons but seemed to ďĞŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞĂŶǆŝŽƵƐĂďŽƵƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
perceived decline, highlighting the lack of alternatives to the EEC and the necessity of a 
new foreign policy strategy.1415  
TŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇĞĐůĞĐƚŝĐƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?KǆĨŽƌĚĂŶĚ
Cambridge continued to send large numbers of graduates to the Foreign Office, but there 
ǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŽŚŽƌƚŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁŚŽŚĂĚƐƚƵĚŝĞĚĂƚĚŝŶďƵƌŐŚ ?'ůĂƐŐŽǁ ?<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
College London, Queen Mary London, and University College London. In addition, the 
subjects studied by officials varied considerably. These included Greats, History, Classics, 
English, Modern Languages, Law, Public Administration, and Economics. This heterogeneity 
ŝŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĚŝǀĞƌƐĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚs European 
integration, and there is no evidence of a correlation between them, or of a network of 
officials based on university affiliation. This was confirmed by the current Permanent 
Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ǁŚŽƐƚĂƚĞĚ P ‘/ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĂǁĂƌĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚǁĂƐĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞor Oxford people 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǀĞƌǇƋƵŝĐŬůǇǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŵŽƌĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨǇŽƵƌǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚǇŽƵ ?ǀĞůĞĨƚ ? ?1416 Sir Simon McDonald instead argued that joining the 
                                                          
1412 Samuel Hood to Gladwyn Jebb, 4 July 1957, TNA/FO371/130972/WU1072/222. 
1413 Gladwyn Jebb, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1972), 288-9. 
1414 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ PZĞƉŽƌƚďǇ^ŝƌŽŶK ?EĞŝůůŽŶƚŚĞ
Negotiations of 1970-1972 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 355. 
1415 Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1416 Simon McDonald, interviewed by author, John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson, 2 August 2016. 
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Foreign Office itself was the key watershed moment for most officials, and that each year 
group had a strong identity.1417 This is a salient point. Officials seemingly had more in 
common with those in the same age group, or more broadly, generation. This is at the very 
ŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵdes towards European integration was generational experience. More 
specifically, the psychological impact of the Second World War and the traumatic 
memories of a continent devastated by the most destructive conflict in history decisively 
shaped the attitudes of the future officials who had witnessed it on the front line as 
soldiers or on the home front as adolescents. The likes of Michael Palliser, Wynn Hugh-
Jones, James Mellon, Curtis Keeble, and Christopher Audland were the most vehemently 
pro-European officials, and all of them have confirmed that their wartime experience was 
the single most important factor in establishing their convictions.1418 This generational 
attitude was not a narrow one. The majority of post-war Foreign Office recruits had seen 
service in the armed forces, either during the War itself or as part of their national service, 
ĂŶĚŵĂŶǇŚĂĚũŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚǀŝĂƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŵĞƚŚŽĚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ
specifically devised for young men who had had their university educations disrupted by 
the War.1419 The Foreign Office also became much more open to the idea of European 
integration as the post-war generation climbed the career ladder to more senior positions. 
ǇƚŚĞǇĞĂƌŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚĂŚŝŐŚůǇƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂƚƚŝƚƵde 
towards the EEC. The new Permanent Under-Secretary in 1973, Thomas Brimelow, was an 
ardent Europeanist, as was Palliser, his successor.1420 This post-war generation of officials 
formed the Europeanist vanguard within the Foreign Office and were the most influential 
group in driving Britain towards EEC membership. They were chiefly responsible for 
convincing their elder colleagues to adopt a more positive attitude towards European 
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĨŽƌĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌket. 
dŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝƌĚŵĂŝŶĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐǁŚĞŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂŵŽƌĞ
positive attitude towards British membership of the EEC and the causes of this shift. This 
study contends that the Brussels breakdown of January 1963 was the most significant 
                                                          
1417 Ibid. 
1418 ƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ? “DĞŵŽŝƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?K,W ? ? ? ? ? ? ?James Mellon, interviewed by Malcolm 
McBain, 14 April 2003, CCC/BDOHP/73/15; Christopher Audland, Right Place  W Right Time 
(Weardale: The Memoir Club, 2004), 118; Wynn Hugh-Jones, interviewed by Malcolm McBain 15 
August 2005, CCC/BDOHP/103/17; ZŽďĞƌƚƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐ ? “WĂůůŝƐĞƌ ?^ŝƌ ?ƌƚŚƵƌ )DŝĐŚĂĞů ? ? ? ? ?-     ) ?
in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2016, accessed 4 April 2018 https://doi-
org.chain.kent.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/105191;  
1419 Audland, Right Place  W Right Time (2004), 63. 




the first application and over the course of the negotiations in 1961-3, the departmental 
line had been cautious and pessimistic. Senior officials such as Samuel Hood, Christopher 
Steel and Patrick Hancock had advocated an associative relationship with the EEC or 
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ&dŽƌƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ?dŚĞƐĞǀĞŶƚƵƌĞƐĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽ
garner much attention or support from the Six or the United States. When the Foreign 
Office began to consider an application for membership in 1960-1, the overarching attitude 
was largely unchanged. Correspondence between senior officials still argued in favour of a 
 ‘ŚĂůĨǁĂǇŚŽƵƐĞ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁŚŝĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ Britain join Euratom and the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), but not the EEC.1421 Anglo-American relations was still 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĞƚŽƉƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?^ĞŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁĞƌĞ
particularly fixated on the United StĂƚĞƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚŝƐŚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶĞŵďĂƐƐǇǁĂƐŽƌĚĞƌĞĚƚŽŬĞĞƉ>ŽŶĚŽŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚŽĨƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
views.1422 The United States ambassador to the EEC stated they would oppose Britain only 
ũŽŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ĂŶĚƵƌĂƚŽŵ ‘ďǇĞǀery means within their power no matter how much 
ĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚǁĂƐĐĂƵƐĞĚ ? ?1423 Similarly, the Under-Secretary of State in charge of 
European affairs, George Ball, told Heath and senior officials that the Kennedy 
administration refused to accept any dilution of the EEC or a wider association within 
EFTA.1424 Once it became clear that the United States expected Britain to participate as a 
full member of the EEC and that further exclusion would result in them looking towards the 
Six as their principal Cold War partners, senior officials begrudgingly accepted the necessity 
of an application.1425 The first application was therefore exceptionally conservative and not 
launched in a spirit of enthusiasm for European integration. The Foreign Office also took a 
rigid stance during the negotiations, with an insistence on safeguards and special 
arrangements for British agriculture and Commonwealth trade.1426 /ƚǁĂƐ ‘ĂĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚ
tentative venture, creeping in a state of high suspicion towards this moment of historic 
                                                          
1421 'ŝůďĞƌƚ,ŽůůŝĚĂǇ ? “hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƚŽŵŝĐŶĞƌŐǇŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽĂůĂŶĚ^ƚĞĞůŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1422 Paul Gore-Booth to Harold Caccia, 21 January 1960, TNA/FO371/150152/M611/87. 
1423 Arthur Tandy to Foreign Office, 30 May 1960, TNA/FO371/150161/M611/209. 
1424 ,ĂƌŽůĚĂĐĐŝĂƚŽ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ? “DĞĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚDƌ ?Ăůů ? ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/158162/M614/45. 
1425  “ƌŝĞĨĨŽƌ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇŽĨZŽŵĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉ ? ? ? ? April 1961, 
dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “ƌŝĞĨĨŽƌ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞZ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƚŽ^ ? )ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ? ? ?
April 1961, TNA/FO371/158267/M634/71. 
1426 ZŽŐĞƌ:ĂĐŬůŝŶŐ ? “DŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? “ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ
President of the CounciůŽĨDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐŽĨ ? ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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destiny, declining to make a commitment until the Europeans had shown what ground they 
ǁĞƌĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?1427 
ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚǀĞƚŽ ?ƚŚĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂŶĚƚŽŶĞĂĚŽƉƚĞĚďǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ
correspondence changed dramatically.1428 The humiliating failure of the first application 
caused a permanent psychological shift which changed Foreign Office attitudes towards 
European integration irreversibly. There was a realisation that Britain could not shape the 
EEC to fit its own interests, and that long-term exclusion from the club would be 
ĚĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ?ƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
leading pro-ŵĂƌŬĞƚĞĞƌŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ P ‘ƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŽĨ QƐƚĂǇŝŶŐ
outside the Communities are the most powerful argumeŶƚĨŽƌ QĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶ ? ?1429 The new 
orthodoxy accepted by the majority of officials was that Britain simply had no alternative 
means of preserving her status as a world power.1430 dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
European integration policy in 1963-4 all reached the conclusion that Britain should try and 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŵŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞǁŝƚŚƌŝƚŝƐŚ
interests, thereby facilitating an eventual accession to the Community.1431 Some officials 
such as James Marjoribanks and Curtis Keeble argued that full acceptance of the Treaty of 
Rome was the only way to ensure a successful accession, and that British membership was 
now an inevitability.1432 This was a momentous departure from the cautious and 
conditional approach which had been espoused before 1963. Over the course of the 1960s, 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĂŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐŽǀĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁĂŶŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŚĞŝŐŚƚĞŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĞǀĞŶƚƐƐƵĐŚ
ĂƐZŚŽĚĞƐŝĂ ?ƐƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŶŐůŽ-American rift over 
sŝĞƚŶĂŵ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐůƵŐŐŝƐŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉerformance, and the East of Suez withdrawal. These 
anxieties caused the Foreign Office to place an ever-increasing trust and confidence in 
British membership of the EEC. Such was the level of concern that by July 1966 the 
Permanent Under-Secretary Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚƐƚĂƚĞĚ P ‘people should realise that there is no 
                                                          
1427 Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan, 
1998), 137. 
1428 &ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ? “hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝl 1963, 
TNA/FO371/171428/M1091/328. 
1429 ŽŶK ?EĞŝůůƚŽƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1430 ,ĞůĞŶWĂƌƌ ? “'ŽŶĞEĂƚŝǀĞ PdŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚ,ĂƌŽůĚtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ?-
 ? ? ?ŝŶHarold Wilson and European Integration: BritĂŝŶ ?Ɛ^ĞĐŽŶĚƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ:ŽŝŶƚŚĞ, ed. 
Oliver J. Daddow (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 82. 
1431 ĞƌĞŬdŚŽŵĂƐ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ PƌŝĞĨĨŽƌDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŽƵƌƚĞƐǇĂůůŽŶD ?
ZĞǇ ? ? ? ?rd April 1963, TNA/FO371/171423/M1091/321. 
1432 Curtis KeeblĞ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
:ĂŵĞƐDĂƌũŽƌŝďĂŶŬƐ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ? May 1964, TNA/FO371/177371/M1903/43. 
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ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŽũŽŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶDĂƌŬĞƚ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽǁŚĞƌĞĞůƐĞƚŽŐŽ ? ?1433 This statement 
was even more remarkable given Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŝŶĞƌƚŝĂƐŝŶƚŚe early and mid-ĨŝĨƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞ QƚŽŽŐƌĞĂƚĨŽƌƵƐƚŽŚĂǀĞŐŽƚŝŶŽŶƚŚĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŐƌŽƵŶĚĨůŽŽƌ ? ?1434 After the Brussels breakdown, British membership of the EEC 
became the top foreign policy priority of the day, and this was reflected in Foreign Office 
attitudes. ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĞǀĞŶƚƐďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐƵĐŚĂƐĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐƐƚĂůǁĂƌƚ
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ĂƌŽůĚtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇƉƵƌƐƵĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?dŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ
continued to adapt and orientate itself towards Europe, but it was not until the end of 
decade that an opportunity for a successful application presented itself. 
The ways in which the Foreign Office adapted and responded to the question of European 
integratiŽŶĨŽƌŵƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐĨŽƵƌƚŚĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?KǀĞƌƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐ ? ? ? ?-73, the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞďĞĐĂŵĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌǁĞŶƚŵĂũŽƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů
restructuring to meet the demands of British foreign policy towards Europe, most notably 
through the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This was a 
consequence of changes to Foreign Office attitudes as opposed to a cause. It was the 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁŚŽŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĂůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚ
orientated the diplomatic service towards European integration affairs. At the start of the 
period, the Foreign Office had two departments which dealt with multilateral European 
institutions: the Western Organisations Department (WOD) and the Mutual Aid 
Department (MAD).1435 The former was chiefly concerned with NATO, the Council of 
Europe, and the Western European Union.1436 The latter had initially only focused on British 
policy towards the OEEC and the Marshall Plan, but soon took charge of negotiations for 
the creation of EFTA, EEC affairs, and economic affairs relating to NATO and the Council of 
Europe.1437 In 1960, the MAD was rechristened the European Economic Organisations 
ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?K )ƚŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƐůŽǁ ƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
integration.1438 AĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ?ƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŶĂŵĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇ
the need for intergovernmental cooperation in the post-ǁĂƌǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?1439 As argued above, 
                                                          
1433 Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚƚŽŽŶK ?EĞŝůů ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1434 Paul Gore-Booth, With Great Truth and Respect (London: Constable, 1974), 260. 
1435 Foreign Office, Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book 1957 (London: 
Harrison and Sons, 1957). 
1436 Ibid. 
1437 Foreign Office, Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book 1960 (London: 
Harrison and Sons, 1960). 
1438 Ibid. 
1439 ƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ? “DĞŵŽŝƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?K,W ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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the departmental orthodoxy prior to 1963 was characterised by caution and reluctance 
towards the EEC ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨǁŽƌĚƐ ?dŚĞǇŽƵŶŐĞƌ ?
more pro-European officials disliked the name intensely. Keeble stated that the name 
 ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?/ )ǁĂƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇĂǀŽŝĚĞĚĂƚƚŚŝƐƐƚĂŐĞĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞ
fearƐĂŶĚĂŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚŽƐĞ ‘ǁŚŽĨĞĂƌĞĚƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶǁĂƐĂďŽƵƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?1440 Christopher Audland was more scathing, 
ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƐƚŚĂƚŽƵƌƵŶŝƚǁĂƐĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶEconomic 
OƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƉůĂǇĚŽǁŶŝŶƉƵďůŝĐƚŚĞ
essentially political ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞZŽŵĞdƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ ? ?1441 John Robinson, who later 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞĚŝƚƐŶĂŵĞƚŽƚŚĞ/ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚ P ‘/ƚƵƐĞĚƚŽďĞĐĂůůĞĚDutual 
ŝĚ ?ĨŽƌ'ŽĚ ?ƐƐĂŬĞ QdŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĞǁĂǇŝƚǁĂƐůŽŽŬĞĚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĨƚŝĞƐ ?ĂƐƵď-branch of 
economics which the Foreign Office could let the Treasury and Board of Trade get on 
ǁŝƚŚ ? ?1442 It is no surprise, therefore, that the Treasury-dominated Economic Steering 
Committee was responsible for the coordination of policy during the first application with 
the Foreign Office taking a more prominent role later in the period. Indeed, according to Sir 
Jon Cunliffe, the current Deputy Governor of the Bank of England and a long-serving 
dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ? ‘the Treasury still has somewhere a kind of inner belief that Europe is 
intergovernmentalism. ?1443 It was tŚĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƵƉƉĞƌĞĐŚĞůŽŶƐ
which governed the structure of its internal departments, and this in turn shaped the 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?/ŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ
a top priority. 
/ƚǁĂƐĂĨƚĞƌĚĞ'ĂƵůůĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚǀĞƚŽƚŚĂƚŵŽƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŚĂŶŐĞƐǁĞƌĞŵĂĚĞƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌnal structure. These changes reflected a more cohesive approach to European 
integration affairs, as argued in chapter 3. The UK Delegation to the EEC in Brussels was 
strengthened, and in 1964 had ten staff ranked at Third Secretary and above.1444 By 1970, 
this number had risen to fifteen, and then rose exponentially to thirty officials by 1972.1445 
Similarly, the EEOD underwent expansion after the Brussels breakdown. In 1963, the 
                                                          
1440 Ibid. 
1441 Audland, Right Place  W Right Time (2004), 124. 
1442 Young, This Blessed Plot (1998), 199. 
1443 Jon Cunliffe, interviewed by author, John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson, 2 September 2016. 
1444  “hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FO371/171428/M1091/328; Foreign Office, Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular 
Year Book 1964 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1964). 
1445 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1970  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ
Stationery Office, 1970); Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1972 
 ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚŝŽŶĞƌǇKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
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department was given an additional Assistant Head and an increased number of desk 
ofĨŝĐĞƌƐƌĂŶŬĞĚĂƚ&ŝƌƐƚ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĂŶĚďĞůŽǁ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĞƌĞŬdŚŽŵĂƐ ?ZŽďŝŶK ?EĞŝůů ?
Stephen Barrett and John Rich.1446 Having been renamed the EID in 1968 by John Robinson, 
ƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽŐƌŽǁƵŶƚŝůŝƚďĞĐĂŵĞƐŽůĂƌŐĞƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐƐƉůŝƚŝŶƚŽ two 
separate departments, simply labelled EID (1) and EID (2).1447 The presence of two powerful 
departments dealing with EEC affairs within the Foreign Office continued well into the 
1980s, with the current Permanent Under-^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇƌĞĐĂůůŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁe had something 
called ECDE and ECDI, which was European Community Department Internal and European 
Community Department External ? ?1448 This precedent had been set after Foreign Office 
officials accepted the necessity of British membership of the EEC and designated it as the 
most important foreign policy issue of the day, and the most significant component in the 
administrative structure of the Foreign Office.  
However, the most far-ƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĞ
amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1968. As demonstrated in 
chapter 4, the merger was only partly driven by financial considerations and was primarily a 
ƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?
There was a broad consensus among officials that the amalgamation be used as an 
opportunity to prepare the Foreign Office for the future of British foreign policy, which was 
principally geared towards obtaining EEC membership. Bryan Cartledge, a First Secretary in 
the PersonŶĞůĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚ P ‘dŚĞƉƌŝŵĂĐǇǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĞĚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞŝŶŽƵƌ
external relations can be assumed to be permanent. Europe is now the focus of the United 
<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ?1449 At this point in the period under study, 
CartlĞĚŐĞ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐǁĞƌĞǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚŝŶƐƚĞƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂůŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆǇ ?dŚŝƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ
ǁĂƐ ?ďǇƚŚĞĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƐĞŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? ‘ĂĨĂŝƌůǇŐĞŶĞƌĂůŽŶĞ ?ĂƐĨĂƌĂƐƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-war 
generation was concerned.1450 Simultaneously, the Foreign Office was severely overstaffed 
by the mid-ůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŚĂĚƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶĂ ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶďůŽĐŬĂŐĞ ? ?ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶŐ
most officials from reaching grade 4 and above.1451 This blockage could only be allayed by 
either an increase in postings or a large number of redundancies. Unsurprisingly, most of 
                                                          
1446  “hŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵWŽůŝĐǇdŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?
dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵƌƚŝƐ<ĞĞďůĞ ? “DĞŵŽŝƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?K,W ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1447 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1972  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ
Stationery Office, 1972). 
1448 Simon McDonald, interviewed by author, John Keiger and Gaynor Johnson, 2 August 2016. 
1449 ƌǇĂŶĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞ ? “dŚĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞǀĞŶƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1450 Mark Russell to Frank Mills and John Duncan, 25 January 1968, TNA/FCO79/49/DSP22/6/4. 




the middle-ranking officials who were affected opted for the former, arguing that British 
accession to the EEC would create a strong demand for jobs in European integration policy 
and economic affairs.1452 Indeed, this very point had been made by the then Permanent 
Under-Secretary, Paul Gore-Booth.1453 Individuals such as John Ford, Bryan Cartledge, 
Marrack Goulding, Christopher Everett, Norman Statham, John Robinson and Ken Gallagher 
all lobbied intensively for increased staff in Western European embassies and Foreign 
Office departments in London concerned with European economic affairs. These men were 
all members of the post-war generation and were strongly in favour of British membership 
of the EEC. The fact that these deeply-held views coincided perfectly with a solution to the 
overstaffing of the department was extremely appealing to the officials.  
dŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇŚĂƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŝƐƚ ?ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǁĞƌĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?
and that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was restructured with a greater focus on 
European and economic affairs. In 1968, the Foreign Office began running the commercial 
training programmes which had previously been the demesne of the Board of Trade in a 
ďŝĚƚŽďŽůƐƚĞƌƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞǆƉertise.1454 The EID inherited 
responsibility for all Commonwealth affairs relating to British accession to the EEC and the 
Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, which has previously been held by the Western 
Economic Department and Common Market Department in the Commonwealth Office.1455 
The Economic Relations Department was created, and the remaining functions of the 
Commonwealth Office were redistributed which resulted in the Commonwealth being 
permanently downgraded in importance.1456 As a direct result, the Commonwealth became 
a far lesser obstacle to British membership of the EEC in the negotiations. This was 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?ǁŚĞŶŽŶK ?EĞŝůůĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ
                                                          
1452 John Ford to Gerald Clarke, 14 June 1967, TNA/FCO79/40/DSP22/1/13; BryaŶĂƌƚůĞĚŐĞ ? “dŚĞ
^ĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞǀĞŶƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ?DĂƌƌĂĐŬ'ŽƵůĚŝŶŐƚŽ
ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌĂƌĐůĂǇ ? “dŚĞŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌǀĞƌĞƚƚƚŽŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌĂƌĐůĂǇ ? “dŚĞŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/FCO79/49/DSP22/6/4; Norman Statham to Keith Oakeshott, 29 March 1968, Sir Paul Gore-
ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞKĨĨŝĐĞWĂƉĞƌƐ ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ?<ĞŶ'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌƚŽ<ĞŝƚŚKĂŬĞƐŚŽƚƚ ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?^ŝƌ
Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞKĨĨŝĐĞWĂƉĞƌƐ ?dE ?FCO73/104. 
1453  “KƌĂůǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨ^ŝƌWĂƵů'ŽƌĞ-ŽŽƚŚ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1454 :ŽŚŶ,ŽŶĞǇĨŽƌĚ ? “&ƵůƚŽŶŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?dE&K ? ? ? ? ? ?^W ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1455 Norman Statham to Keith Oakeshott, 29 March 1968, Sir Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞKĨĨŝĐĞ 
Papers, TNA/FCO73/104; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Diplomatic Service List 1970 
 ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ P,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚŝŽŶĞƌǇKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
1456 ůĂŶ&ƵƌŶĞƐƐ ? “ĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨWƌŽƉŽƐĞĚDĞƌŐĞƌŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐŝŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĂŶĚ
ŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ? ? ?DĂrch 1968, Sir Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞKĨĨŝĐĞWĂƉĞƌƐ ?
TNA/FCO73/104; Norman Statham to Keith Oakeshott, 29 March 1968, Sir Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞ
Office Papers, TNA/FCO73/104; Ken Gallagher to Keith Oakeshott, 1 April 1968, Sir Paul Gore-
ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚe Office Papers, TNA/FCO73/104. 
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 ‘ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞůĞƐƐŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁith the 
Commonwealth governments would be severely reduced from the number held during the 
first application.1457 In the minds of Foreign Office officials, the Commonwealth had 
outlived its usefulness as a viable political partnership and a source of economic 
regeneration. Europe was now the top priority, and the cuts to Commonwealth posts in 
London and abroad confirmed this. 
However, it must be emphasised that the amalgamation and the reduction in 
Commonwealth affairs staff did not yield financial savings, which has hitherto been the 
overarching assumption. The total cost of British overseas services in 1968-9 was valued at 
£105.8 million by the Duncan Report.1458 By 1971, this had risen to £129.4 million, and the 
,ĞĂƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƌĞǀŝĞǁƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞĚďƵĚget increases to £131 million by 1974-
5.1459 /ƚǁĂƐĂůƐŽŶŽƚŝŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽƌďƵĚŐĞƚŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐ
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?dĞƌĞŶĐĞK ?ƌŝĞŶ ?ƚŚĞ,ĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
results of the amalgamation would be fƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƚŽƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ
within Whitehall, and that cutting the number of sub-departments or staff would be 
 ‘ƚƌĂŐŝĐ ? ?1460 The Chief Clerk during the merger, Colin Crowe, specifically advocated a Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office with roughly the same number of staff as its two predecessors, 
and proposed minimal cuts to the number of Deputy and Assistant Under-Secretaries in the 
combined Office.1461 The amalgamation was also the first time in history when a single 
department had been in chĂƌŐĞŽĨĂůůŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?dŚŝƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ
KĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĐĞŶƚƌĂůƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂƐƐƵŵĞĚĂ
range of functions in trade and economics which had previously been dominated by the 
TreasurǇ ?dŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁĂƐĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?
changing attitudes towards European integration. Once officials became convinced that the 
ĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌŚŝŶŐĞĚŽŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂ
                                                          
1457  “ĂďŝŶĞƚ PKĨĨŝĐŝĂůŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶƚŚĞƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?  &ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
TNA/CAB134/2826/EURO(70)2. 
1458  “ZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞZĞǀŝĞǁŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶKǀĞƌƐĞĂƐZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?-  ? ? ? ?DE-4107 (1969), 
9. 
1459  “&ŝĨƚŚ Report with part of evidence taken before the Defence and External Affairs Sub-
Committee on 27 July 1971, and on 18, 19 and 23 May 1972, and Appendices (1971-2: Diplomatic 
^ƚĂĨĨĂŶĚKǀĞƌƐĞĂƐĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ ) ?,K- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? “WƵďůŝĐǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ?-70 to 1974- ? ? ?
CMND-4578 (1971), 18. 
1460 dĞƌĞŶĐĞK ?ƌŝĞŶƚŽ<ĞŝƚŚKĂŬĞƐŚŽƚƚ ? “ZĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐtŽƌŬ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?^ŝƌWĂƵů
Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞKĨĨŝĐĞWĂƉĞƌƐ ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
1461 Only 4 of 32 Deputy and Assistant Under-Secretaries were cut after the amalgamation: Colin 
Crowe to Patrick Dean, 17 May 1968, Sir Paul Gore-ŽŽƚŚ ?ƐWƌŝǀĂƚĞKĨĨŝĐĞWĂƉĞƌƐ ?dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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concerted effort to adapt the service to the machinations of the Common Market and 
European affairs more generally. 
The years 1957-73 represented some of the most momentous changes to Foreign Office 
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŝŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?dŚĞƐĞchanges were driven by external 
events and the arrival of a new generation of recruits with markedly different views from 
their predecessors. Shaken by the Suez Crisis and increasing marginalisation on the global 
stage, officials began to embrace more radiĐĂůƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĞǆĂĐƚŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
world role, a fact which had been largely unchallenged for the best part of a century. The 
ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐǁŚŝĐŚĞŵĞƌŐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
influence lay with membership of the EEC. However, this consensus had been reached after 
a long period of caution, scepticism, and fierce debate between officials. For the senior 
officials, there was simply no alternative to the EEC. For the younger, more radical officials, 
the EEC was ĂŶĚĂůǁĂǇƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐĂůǀĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐĞŝƚƐŝŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂŶ
element of self-interest. It is no coincidence that the Foreign Office reached its zenith after 
accession in the 1970s, having claimed ownership of all external affairs and an array of 
domestic policies. Brussels became a new centre of power for the officials, and a 
destination for the most ambitious diplomats.  
ĞƐƉŝƚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇƌĞĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚƌŽůĞĂŶĚĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƚŚĞ
relationship which followed was a largely awkward and reluctant one with an institution 
ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇďĞĞŶƐĞĞŶĂƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐĂǀŝŽƵƌĨƌŽŵĚĞĐĂǇĂŶĚĚĞĐůŝŶĞ ?ƐƚŚĞ
widened and deepened over the years, the suspicions harboured by sections of the British 
political class, press, and public would result in a complete rejection of the arguments 
which had been presented and accepted in the 1970s. True to the attitudes and opinions of 
the post-ǁĂƌŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŵĂŶĚĂƌŝŶƐĚŝĚŶŽƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůt 
of the 2016 referendum.1462 Since then, the Foreign Office has seen its influence dwindle 
further with the creation of the Department for Exiting the European Union and the 
Department for International Trade. It has been constantly besieged by critics as a bastion 
of Europhilia and incapable of acting in the national interest.1463 As the government 
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once again found themselves embroiled in a crisis of identity and attitude. The Foreign 
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